

**CULTURAL DIPLOMACY AND CULTURAL RELATIONS**  
COLLABORATION/ DIVERSITY / DIALOGUE

**KULTURNA DIPLOMATIJA I KULTURNI ODNOSI**  
SARADNJA / RAZNOLIKOST / DIJALOG

edited by / urednice  
Milena Dragičević Šešić, Raphaela Henze, Ljiljana Rogač Mijatović





CULTURAL DIPLOMACY AND CULTURAL RELATIONS  
COLLABORATION/ DIVERSITY / DIALOGUE

KULTURNA DIPLOMATIJA I KULTURNI ODNOSI  
SARADNJA / RAZNOLIKOST / DIJALOG

*endorsed by / recenzenti*

Aleksandra Uzelac

Institute for Development and International Relations, Zagreb

Institut za razvoj i međunarodne odnose, Zagreb

Lluís Bonet

Universitat de Barcelona

Univerzitet u Barseloni

Federico Escribal

Universidad Nacional de las Artes, Buenos Aires

Nacionalni univerzitet umetnosti, Buenos Ajres

Mafalda Dâmaso

Erasmus University, Rotterdam

Erasmus univerzitet, Roterдам

This publication has been published with the support of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, the Ministry of Culture and Information of the Republic of Serbia and the Austrian Cultural Forum, Belgrade. The publication is the result of research at the University of Arts and the Faculty of Dramatic Arts within the institutional funding by the Ministry of Science of the Republic of Serbia, as well as research within international projects: *ARTIS Art and Research on Transformations of Individuals and Societies* (Horizon 2020), *Stronger Peripheries: A Southern Coalition* (Creative Europe) and *SHAKIN' Sharing subaltern knowledge through international cultural collaborations* (Erasmus+).

Ova publikacija objavljena je uz podršku Ministarstva prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije, Ministarstva kulture i informisanja Republike Srbije i Austrijskog kulturnog foruma, Beograd. Publikacija je rezultat naučnoistraživačkog rada na Univerzitetu umetnosti i Fakultetu dramskih umetnosti u okviru institucionalnog finansiranja Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, kao i rada na međunarodnim projektima: *ARTIS* (Horizont 2020), *Stronger Peripheries* (Kreativna Evropa) i *SHAKIN'* (Erasmus+).

# **CULTURAL DIPLOMACY AND CULTURAL RELATIONS**

COLLABORATION / DIVERSITY / DIALOGUE

# **KULTURNA DIPLOMATIJA I KULTURNI ODNOSI**

SARADNJA / RAZNOLIKOST / DIJALOG

*edited by / urednice*

Milena Dragičević Šešić, Raphaela Henze,  
Ljiljana Rogač Mijatović

UNIVERZITET UMETNOSTI U BEOGRADU

**CLIO**

2023



# CONTENTS / SADRŽAJ

Notes on Contributors / Beleška o autorima .....	9
Introduction / Uvod .....	13
<i>Milena Dragičević Šešić, Raphaela Henze, Ljiljana Rogač Mijatović</i>	

## I

### **Values and Visions / Vrednosti i vizije**

section editors / urednice poglavlja:

*Milena Dragičević Šešić, Raphaela Henze*

From Vying for Values and Power towards Cultural Diplomacy as a Global “Common Good” / Od borbe za vrednosti i moć ka kulturnoj diplomatiji kao globalnom “opštem dobru” .....	33
<i>Emil Brix</i>	

Exploring Fairness in Cultural Relations through the Lens of Dilemmas / Istraživanje pravičnosti u kulturnim odnosima kroz prizmu dilema .....	46
<i>Matina Magkou, Avril Joffe, Sudebi Thakurata, Katelijn Verstraete</i>	

Questions and Concepts toward a Blurred Future: A new Role for Culture? / Pitanja i koncepti ka nejasnoj budućnosti: Nova uloga kulture? .....	63
<i>Serhan Ada</i>	

Construction of EU Narrative in External Cultural Relations / Izgradnja narativa EU u spoljnim kulturnim odnosima . . . . .	71
<i>Ljiljana Simić</i>	

Kulturna diplomatija iz perspektive audio-vizuelnog servisa Evropske komisije / Cultural Diplomacy from the Perspective of the Audiovisual Service of the European Commission . . . . .	86
<i>Aleksandra Krstić</i>	

## II

### **Countries Distinctiveness / Posebnost zemalja**

section editors / urednice poglavlja:

*Raphaela Henze, Ljiljana Rogač Mijatović, Milena Dragičević Šešić*

China's Rise: Implications for Remapping of Cultural and Heritage Diplomacy / Uspon Kine: Implikacije za re-mapiranje diplomatije u oblasti kulture i nasleđa . . . . .	103
<i>Emilija Marić</i>	

Application of Japanese Digital Diplomacy Toward Vietnam / Primena japanske digitalne diplomatije prema Vijetnamu. . . . .	114
<i>Thai Hoang Hanh Nguyen</i>	

Cultural Diplomacy between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina: Enhancing Culture of Peace, Trust and Dialogue / Kulturna diplomatija između Srbije i Bosne i Hercegovine: unapređenje kulture mira, poverenja i dijaloga . . . . .	127
<i>Sarina Bakić</i>	

Cultural (Para)Diplomacy of Federated Units: International Positioning of Quebec's Distinctiveness / Kulturna (para)diplomacija federalnih jedinica: međunarodno pozicioniranje posebnosti Kvebeka. . . . .	138
<i>Nina Sajić</i>	

Restitution of Cultural Heritage: From a Claim to a New Cultural Strategy in Benin / Restitucija kulturnog nasleđa: od zahteva do nove kulturne strategije u Beninu . . . . .	153
<i>Espera Donouvossi</i>	



Cultural Diplomacy without Artistic Freedom? The case of the People's Republic of Bangladesh / Kulturna diplomatija bez umetničke slobode? Slučaj Narodne Republike Bangladeš . . . . .	167
<i>Zobaida Nasreen, Raphaela Henze</i>	

Cuba and Cultural Relations in Challenging Times: a Practice-Approach / Kuba i kulturni odnosi u izazovnim vremenima: pristup zasnovan na praksi . . . . .	179
<i>Lea Jakob</i>	

Spain's Music Festivals and their Role in Cultural Diplomacy / Muzički festivali u Španiji i njihova uloga u španskoj kulturnoj diplomatiji . . . . .	195
<i>Ana Milosavljević</i>	

### III

#### **Serbia and Yugoslavia / Srbija i Jugoslavija**

section editors / urednice poglavlja:

*Ljiljana Rogač Mijatović, Milena Dragičević Šešić*

O delotvornosti kulturne diplomatije / On the Effectiveness of Cultural Diplomacy . . . . .	215
<i>Darko Tanasković</i>	

Српска научна дипломатија у Француској (1894–1903) / Serbian science diplomacy in France (1894–1903) . . . . .	231
<i>Александра Колаковић</i>	

Културна дипломатија у трима путописима о Балкану / Cultural diplomacy in three travelogues about the Balkans . . . . .	250
<i>Милош Пржић</i>	

Kulturna diplomatija u odnosima Jugoslavije i Albanije nakon Drugog svetskog rata, 1945–1948. / Cultural diplomacy in the relations between Yugoslavia and Albania after the Second World War, 1945–1948. . . . .	260
<i>Igor Vukadinović</i>	

Arcadian and Yugoslav – (Re)shaping Cultural Identity in the State Art Collection in Belgrade / Arkadijski i jugoslovenski – (pre)oblikovanje kulturnog identiteta u Državnoj umetničkoj kolekciji u Beogradu . . . . .	276
<i>Jelena Todorović i Biljana Crvenković</i>	
Kultura kao manifestacija: međunarodno pozicioniranje Srbije kroz kreativne industrije / Culture as a Manifestation: International Positioning of Serbia through Creative Industries . . . . .	288
<i>Marina Simić i Miloš Ničić</i>	
Културна дипломатија на веб-презентацији Министарства спољних послова Републике Србије / Cultural Diplomacy on the Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia . . . . .	302
<i>Ненад А. Васић</i>	

## NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS / BELEŠKA O AUTORIMA

**Serhan Ada**, Professor, Cultural Policy and Management Research Center, Istanbul Bilgi University, Turkey / profesor, Centar za istraživanje kulturne politike i menadžmenta, Istanbul Bilgi Univerzitet, Turska.

**Sarina Bakić**, vanredni profesor Fakulteta političkih nauka Univerziteta u Sarajevu, Bosna i Hercegovina / Associate Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

**Emil Brix (Emil Briks)**, PhD, Ambassador, Diplomatic Academy, Vienna, Austria / ambasador, Diplomatska akademija, Beč, Austrija.

**Biljana Crvenković**, viši kustos, Muzej primenjene umetnosti, Beograd, Srbija / Senior Curator, Museum of Applied Arts, Belgrade, Serbia.

**Espéra Donouvossi**, PhD Candidate, The International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), University of Cape Coast, Ghana / doktorand, Međunarodni centar za proučavanje očuvanja i restauracije kulturnih dobara (ICCROM), Univerzitet Kejp Kousta, Gana.

**Milena Dragičević Šešić**, profesorka emerita, Fakultet dramskih umetnosti Univerziteta umetnosti, Beograd, Srbija / Professor Emerita, Faculty of Dramatic Arts, University of Arts, Belgrade, Serbia.

**Lea Jakob**, PhD candidate, University of Applied Sciences, Heilbronn; Leuphana University Lüneburg, Germany / doktorand, Univerzitet primenjenih nauka, Hajlbron; Univerzitet Leuphana u Lineburgu, Nemačka.

**Raphaela Henze**, Professor, Cultural Management, Heilbronn University, Germany / profesor, menadžment u kulturi, Univerzitet Hajlbronn, Nemačka.

**Thai Hoang Hanh Nguyen (Thai Hoang Hanh Nguien)**, Lecturer, PhD candidate, Faculty of International Relations, Ho Chi Minh City University of Foreign Languages and Information Technology; Vietnam / predavač, doktorant, Fakultet za međunarodne odnose, Univerzitet za strane jezike i informacione tehnologije Ho Ši Min, Vijetnam.

**Avril Joffe**, Professor, Cultural Policy and Management Department, School of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa / profesor, Odeljenje za kulturnu politiku i menadžment, Škola umetnosti, Univerzitet Vitvatersrand, Johanesburg, Južna Afrika.

**Aleksandra Kolaković**, viši naučni saradnik, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, Srbija / Senior Research Associate, Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade, Serbia.

**Aleksandra Krstić**, vanredni profesor Fakulteta političkih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu, Srbija / Associate Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, Serbia.

**Matina Magkou**, Researcher and consultant, SIC.Lab Méditerranée, University Côte d'Azur, Nice, France / istraživač i konsultant, SIC. Lab Mediterranee, Univerzitet Cote d'Azur, Nica, Francuska.

**Emilija Marić**, master, UNESCO Katedra za kulturnu politiku i menadžment; Univerzitet umetnosti, Beograd, Srbija / MA, UNESCO Chair Cultural Policy and Management; University of Arts, Belgrade, Serbia.

**Ana Milosavljević**, master, UNESCO Katedra za kulturnu politiku i menadžment; Univerzitet umetnosti, Beograd, Srbija / MA, UNESCO Chair Cultural Policy and Management; University of Arts, Belgrade, Serbia.

**Zobaida Nasreen**, Professor, Department of Anthropology, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh / profesor, Odsek za antropologiju, Univerzitet u Daki, Bangladeš.

**Miloš Ničić**, istraživač saradnik, Fakultet političkih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu, Srbija / PhD, Research Collaborator, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, Serbia.

- Miloš Pržić**, doktorand, istraživač saradnik, Institut za književnost i umetnost, Beograd, Srbija / PhD Candidate, Research Collaborator, Institute for Literature and Arts, Belgrade, Serbia.
- Ljiljana Rogač Mijatović**, vanredni profesor, Fakultet dramskih umetnosti Univerziteta umetnosti, Beograd, Srbija / Associate Professor, Faculty of Dramatic Arts, University of Arts, Belgrade, Serbia.
- Nina Sajić**, docent, Fakultet političkih nauka Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci, Bosna i Hercegovina / Assistant Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- Ljiljana Simić**, dr, konsultant i predavač, Evropski koledž, Univerzitet u Brižu, Belgija / PhD, consultant & lecturer, College of Europe, University in Bruges, Belgium.
- Marina Simić**, profesor Fakulteta političkih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu, Srbija / Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, Serbia.
- Darko Tanasković**, profesor emeritus, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Srbija / Professor Emeritus, University of Belgrade, Serbia.
- Sudebi Thakurata**, Researcher and consultant, Srishti Manipal Institute of Art, Design and Technology, Karnataka, India / istraživač i konsultant, Srishti Manipal Institut umetnosti, dizajna i tehnologije, Karnataka, Indija.
- Jelena Todorović**, profesor, Fakultet likovnih umetnosti Univerziteta umetnosti, Beograd, Srbija / Professor, Faculty of Fine Arts, University of Arts, Belgrade, Serbia.
- Nenad Vasić**, naučni saradnik, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, Srbija / Research Associate, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, Serbia.
- Katelijan Verstraete**, Independent cultural consultant, ReFlAction Works, Singapore / nezavisni konsultant za kulturu, ReFlAction Vorks, Singapur.
- Igor Vukadinović**, naučni saradnik, Balkanološki institut Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti, Beograd, Srbija / PhD, Research Associate, Institute for Balkan Studies, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade, Serbia.



# INTRODUCTION

MILENA DRAGIĆEVIĆ ŠEŠIĆ, RAPHAELA HENZE,  
LJILJANA ROGAČ MIJATOVIĆ

Over the past decades changes within international relations have led to an interdependent world facing global challenges, with significant consequences on cultural diversity and peaceful relations among peoples. In the world of 'the complex interdependence' (Keohane; Nye, 2011), a fundamental way of perceiving the political reality has become culturally framed, while culture has taken a leading role in theoretical and practical consideration of political subjects and power relations. In many areas across the world, conflicts are developing rapidly, while at the same time, the need for strengthening collaborations is becoming obvious. Nevertheless, searching for cultural awareness at the political level might be somewhat of an ambitious task.

The field of cultural diplomacy as a practice and as an area for research and study continues to expand and shift focus, from the discourse of representative logic in international relations, towards collaborative logic in cultural policy and other cultural disciplines. This is of particular importance because cultural politics make salient issues of identity and expression, inclusion and exclusion, voice and silence, and the power of symbols (Singh, 2010: 2).

Cultural diplomacy is underpinned by cultural policy, using and sharing foreign policy strategies and instruments. In a traditional sense, cultural diplomacy is about representing national cultures abroad. However, the classic model of cultural diplomacy as an activity of a nation-state is rapidly developing and broadening in its scope, with new actors and approaches becoming more and more important in

the international arena. However, more scholars are emphasizing the necessity for cultural diplomacy to go beyond a national perspective, toward more cosmopolitan issues that will become significant in the Anthropocene era, advocating for “cultural relations and exchange (...) as critical contributions towards adapting to climate change” (Durrer & Henze, 2020: 16) and many other interrelated issues of contemporaneity.

What complicates the definition of cultural diplomacy is the fact that unlike in other areas of diplomacy, the state cannot do much without the support of nongovernmental actors such as artists, curators, teachers, lecturers, and students. The moment these actors enter the fray, the desires, the lines of policy, the targets, and the very definition of state interests become blurred and multiply. What is more, these actors frequently assume a responsibility and an agenda of their own, regardless of the program or organization to which they are assigned. While the degree of state involvement remains negotiable, the criteria of “state interest” – defined in the broadest possible terms and to the extent that informal actors likewise represent the state – remains stable’ (Gienow-Hecht, 2013: 5).

The notion of cultural relations transgresses the exclusive position of states and their policies to focus on the interactions between societies and interactions among non-state groups. Thus, trends like fair collaboration, sustainability and decolonization appear foremost in the cultural relations field.

‘The preferred mode of cultural relations is one that induces mutuality through exchange and co-operation. Whatever the relative political significance of any two countries, they will best succeed in their cultural relations if they operate according to this mode. If neither country assumes a position of superiority towards the other, and if they consider long-term understanding between them to be more important than short-term advantage.’ (Mitchell, 2016: 88).

In the context of cultural relations, cultural exchange appears as a common way of interaction among states, societies, groups and individuals. In its ideal form, cultural exchange involves a balance of the reciprocal flow of symbols, artifacts, genres, rituals, or technologies between cultures. This is exemplified in the very definition of cultural diplomacy as “the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects



of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding' which 'can also be more of a one-way street than a two way exchange, as when one nation concentrates its efforts on promoting the national language, explaining its policies and point of view, or "telling its story" to the rest of the world" (Cummings, 2003:15).

However, it is highly relevant to refer to the imperial roots and notions, in which cultural exchanges occur in the context of unequal power relations. Multiplicities of power and constraints on agency complicate determinations of the voluntary nature of cultural exchange, thus the identification of "pure" cases of cultural exchange may be difficult insofar as intercultural communication occurs in contexts in which power imbalances are always relevant (Rogers, 2006: 495).

The book *Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Relations: Collaboration/ Diversity / Dialogue* consists mainly of papers presented at the international scientific conference held at the University of Arts in Belgrade in 2022. This book offers an inter-disciplinary insight into reflections on the part of cultural policy that relates to the establishment of contemporary international cultural relations, from conceptual reflections to case studies that demonstrate the complexity of the concepts of cultural diplomacy and cultural relations, as well as their practices. The book addresses several questions, such as: How is cultural diplomacy understood and constructed in the contemporary context? How is cultural diplomacy perceived beyond the notions of soft power? Why are cultural representations of high significance for contemporary cultural diplomacies and cultural policies as such? Is culture an instrument in the promotion of foreign policy interests or is it a field that enables inter-social and inter-cultural connections at different levels? What are the possible strategies of identity politics in the context of cultural diplomacy representations?

Although the book might still look "Euro or Western-centric", it offers a critical approach to Eurocentrism and tries to shine a light on inequities or patronage in the processes of international collaboration, whether led by the Global North or initiated by the Global South to "please" investors and tourists. It identifies discrepancies between discourses and policy instruments through analysis of cultural diplomacy practices, it indicates contributions of new agencies such as social

networks, media, citizens or artistic collectives and activism that are happening in a cultural counter-public realm (Dragičević Šešić, 2018) or within a sphere of cultural and creative industries. Thus, the book looks at issues that are absent in usual cultural diplomacy narratives and theories. The European worldview, based on a European cultural tradition, used to be instrumental in understanding and describing cultures of other continents, thus distorting and neglecting the values of Asian, African, Latino-American or any other culture. As Paul Ricoeur wrote:

The fact that universal civilization has for a long time originated from the European centre has maintained the illusion that European culture was, in fact and by right, a universal culture. Its superiority over other civilizations seemed to provide the experimental verification of this postulate. (Ricoeur, 1965: 277)

Thus, this book would like to offer a small contribution to the concept of a pluriverse in international relations (Reiter, 2018), in order to contribute to more equity and fairness in international relations. It underlines the importance of the EU, both its narratives and policies, but also some of the individual EU country's practices (Austria, Spain...) and their cultural diplomacy efforts, taking into account that most of them consider foreign relations as their sovereign right. The countries of the Western Balkan and most specifically Serbia, considering the changed context of its global surroundings and specific actors that influence their ideas, values and narratives within foreign policy (Rogač Mijatović, 2011) deserved a specific attention in this book.

But, the scope of the book goes far beyond Europe, covering global topics of cultural diplomacy and fairness in international collaboration, from Quebec and Cuba in the Americas to China, Japan, Vietnam, Bangladesh from the Eastern hemisphere... And one of the pressing African concerns of decolonization is also addressed: the restitution of stolen heritage in the example of Benin.

The keynote lecture at the conference was given by Ambassador Dr. Emil Brix under the title: *From Vying for Values and Power towards Cultural Diplomacy as a Global "Common Good"*. Starting from the rise of conflicts in Europe and the world (focusing on the war in Ukraine),

the decline of democracies and the return of national identity politics on the international scene, he gave a precise framework for studying international relations and, more specifically, cultural diplomacy challenges at this very moment. This argumentation reminds us of those used in the book *Clash of Civilisations* by Samuel P. Huntington. Emil Brix showed how cultural diplomacy was used in a negative way, denying the right to a specific cultural identity to people and nations of the “Russian world”. Showing that cultural diplomacy is a political instrument for telling stories about values and power, Emil Brix stresses its role in this multipolar world order, analyzing problems that are challenging the EU. Underlying this, all EU member states still believe that international relations are a matter of the nation states (competence of national government). Member states leave to the European Union only additional competencies in coordinating and uniting EU countries when they are working together in the field of culture and education with the countries outside the EU. At the same time, understanding cultural values as European but seen as universal, the EU allocates to itself the task of the transmission of “our” (universal/European) values to the rest of the world. It leads to certain clashes in establishing relations with China, Russia, or even the USA (i.e., the case of the death penalty). Thus, the idea of human rights based on cultural values, promoted within cultural diplomacy of the EU, is seen as controversial in numerous programs of international cultural cooperation. In the last part of this paper Emil Brix confirms that the role of states and nations is more and more limited as new agents are coming on the scene: which can be cities, regions, supranational organizations, or even NGOs, religions, and/or powerful individuals. Underlying that national actors still have an important role to play, limited to national narratives, it is clear that it is difficult to write a history book that would go beyond the national narrative among neighboring countries whether in the Balkans or EU. On the other side, he stresses the importance of companies that rule the internet, like Google or Facebook, showing to what extent globalization had not reduced the idea of identity but increased the need for separate identity building. Finally, this text stresses the importance of visibility of the national identity and national branding, especially for small countries. However, there is still a need to support the global common good through cultural diplomacy. Digitalization and climate change issues

might be those global common goods where cultural diplomacy can play a role, as well as a fair approach to cultural relations, preventing a “recolonisation in cultural relations” of the big countries, giving more relevance and visibility to the small ones.

Matina Magkou, Avril Joffe, Sudebi Thakurata, and Katelijn Verstraete, in their text *Exploring Fairness in Cultural Relations through the Lens of Dilemmas*, are debating power imbalances and continued domination of the so-called big countries, former colonial powers, as major challenges for cultural relations. They ask questions: Will fairness as a concept provide a more adequate framework for practicing cultural relations? What are the main dilemmas when putting fairness into practice? This paper is one of the side results of an action research project on fair collaboration in cultural relations that EUNIC (European Union National Institutes for Culture) commissioned in March 2021 from a team of six experts (text authors with Cristina Farinha and Anna Steinkamp) that resulted with the book *Not a toolkit! Fair collaboration in cultural relations: a reflAction* (providing concrete ideas, recommendations, and instruments to collaborate across borders in a fairer way). The whole research was based on a participative methodology and an iterated research process engaging both practitioners and EUNIC stakeholders inside and outside of Europe. The authors identified situations of unfairness and imbalances, asymmetries of power and resources that influence decision-making in different international cultural cooperation projects. They confronted the experiences of cultural relations operators when they practiced fairness in their projects, underlining numerous dilemmas that they faced when collaborating internationally. Each operator had to confront and reflect on their own positionality, bias, influences, purpose, and choices, but also key values that underpin the notion of fairness, such as ethics, human rights, mutuality, solidarity, equity, equality, sustainability, decolonization, inclusivity and care. Demonstrating that the cultural cooperation field became multidimensional, embracing complexity in itself (as three major forms of cultural diplomacy have different agents: state actors, non-state actors, people-to-people exchange; etc.) and focusing on EUNIC strategies and modalities of operation, the authors have shown to what extent the reflection on fairness marked an important step in putting a new form of cultural relations into practice. The authors studied different UNESCO, EU, and

national strategic texts that tried to rethink international collaboration, considering structural inequalities and cultural differences in relation to fairness, values of solidarity, equity, and conditions of fairness, the proposition of instruments towards fairer and unified arts ecosystem (with the concrete suggestion of a solidarity tax) as well as climate justice across the cultural community. The text has shown to what extent the Not a Toolkit tool tries to approach fairness in cultural relations by acknowledging inequalities and injustice not only in the past but in the current way of implementing international cultural projects. They have shown to what extent cultural operators have to acknowledge different positionalities and respect for each other – “having more ‘ubuntu’ in all that we do”.

In his text, *Questions and Concepts toward a Blurred Future: A New Role for Culture?*, Serhan Ada discusses key issues that are facing contemporary men in this society of acceleration according to the German sociologist Hartmut Rosa: “unemployment, poverty, oblivion, and desocialization”. All these pessimistic prognoses have been underlined during the pandemic but Ada discusses the issue of uncertainty, which came during an unprecedented state of confusion. The pandemic re-inversed some pictures of the rich and of the poor, of those who are giving or who are receiving help. Thus, Italy asking for help is the first picture that Ada is “showing” as this call was met with a wall of negative responses (Germany and Netherlands) while the most impoverished neighbor, Albania, was sending its doctors and nurses. For the first time, roles were re-inversed from south to the north. Ada discusses further limits to growth, and how growth was affecting the realm of the cities of culture (the creative city, the creative class), that “have exploited, sucked up, and depleted the resources produced by all the people living in those countries”. Developmental visions should be closer to people, their beliefs, values, and needs, such as Agenda 21 for culture, the 2020 Rome Charter, or the culture summit in Izmir with the concept of circular culture. As the relevant cultural diplomacy tool, Ada quotes the *Declaration from Izmir Culture Summit*, a possible tool for development based on micropolitics, inviting “all cities and local governments to place culture at the center of local development, including the local achievement of the SDGs, the strategies on resilience and the plans on equity and the climate emergency...”. This text is calling to radically rethink

values and to call into question the world system proposing a replacement of Nietzsche's *Will to Power* with the *Will to Thought*.

Ljiljana Simić, in her text *Construction of EU Narrative in External Cultural Relations*, discusses the construction and dissemination of the European Union's cosmopolitan narrative focusing on its development and its applications linked to cultural diplomacy and international cultural relations. Starting with the hypothesis that narratives give meaning to practices and experiences by mediating between the world of thoughts and the world of actions, Ljiljana Simić demonstrates how external cultural relations, values and the ideas embedded in them, are endorsing a desired narrative that could be expressed by the slogan *United in diversity*. It is also a narrative to unite as it appears on all official websites and in official rhetoric. At the same time, EU cultural diplomacy narratives represent values such as freedom of expression, human rights, the rule of law, and peace. Showing that every image has a memory, repeating former actions and expressions, Ljiljana Simić underlines that visual political communication plays a vital role in political rhetoric. She has identified five overarching narratives: EU as a peace-keeper, as a democratiser, as good neighborliness, as a security provider, and as a well-being entity. Discussing all controversies around national and EU identities, including European colonial memories, Ljiljana Simić claims that external EU cultural relations would help improve the decolonial narrative from a macro perspective with a new push to the EU narrative. This way, the new EU narrative might become more inclusive and closer to the *United in diversity* motto.

Aleksandra Krstić, in her text *Cultural Diplomacy from the Perspective of the Audiovisual Service of the European Commission*, presents an overview of the activities of this service. She starts with the hypothesis that the audio-visual service of the EC is one of the main tools of cultural diplomacy that is particularly active towards the Western Balkans countries and Serbia. The text analyzes the content of the video material published online on the EU Commission audio-visual service's website during 2021 (qualitative analysis). EU Commission is seen as the source of information and creator of media content. The accent is on how the Commission creates its own institutional image and a wider representation of the EU, and on how organizational and editorial aspects impact created media content in relation to the topic of cultural diplomacy.

Aleksandra Krstić presents a legal and institutional overview of the communication activities of the European Commission; analyzing the complex diplomatic activities of the EU and its communication strategies through specific EU institutions. Results show that the topic of cultural diplomacy is treated mostly protocolally. Most of the video materials on the EC's website relate to visits of high officials or ratification of agreements in-between the EU and different candidate states. The most important instruments are Brussels press conferences. Among the states that are the focus of attention were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Switzerland, Albania, and Turkey. The selection of countries depended on the visits of their officials. Apart from the purely protocolally representation of the European Commission, more as a political project than as a meeting place of different cultures, there is no original, innovative approach to this topic, nor an approach that, following all the strategies and regulations adopted by EU in the last 20 years would involve the media and citizens in implementation and promotion of activities in the field of cultural diplomacy and branding of the EU and culture; not only an important instrument of EU soft power but also a path of cooperation towards countries whose goal is a full EU membership.

Emilia Marić starts this second section – which looks more closely at the diverse cultural diplomacy initiatives undertaken by different countries or regions – with an examination of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and the Confucius Institutes Network in her text *Chinese Cultural Relations and the Silk Road*. Through these initiatives, China is about to take a lead not only in cultural but also in heritage diplomacy for their own political and geopolitical interests particularly but not exclusively in Africa and South America. Marić makes clear that these cultural diplomacy initiatives, which are often accompanied by infrastructure investments, have the goal of changing existing power structures. That these initiatives are viewed with growing concerns, particularly from European organizations, becomes visible by an initiative of the German IFA e.V. (Institute for International Cultural Relations) that has recently launched a call for research into exactly these Chinese investments in South and Central America; since this is as well an area of (geopolitical) strategic interest. Interestingly the suspicion regarding these investments and initiatives is still relatively recent. When the first Confucius institutes were about to be established many



universities of reputation were eager to host one of the branches as early as possible. The enthusiasm seems to have faded and critical voices that were rarely heard before grow louder.

Thai Hoang Hanh Nguyen leads us into the important field of digital diplomacy whereby he understands digital diplomacy as all initiatives taken by a country to enhance and promote its image via diverse digital tools. In his text *Japan and Vietnam Cultural Exchange and the Application of Digital Diplomacy* he closely examines the digital initiatives taken by Japan with regard to Vietnam. Both countries seem to be united by skepticism towards China's expansion strategy. He provides concrete ideas of how such initiatives could be improved in order to reach out to a specific, in this case Vietnamese, population. That there is no one-size-fits-all solution in cultural diplomacy surely also applies in the digital realm.

Sarina Bakić also focuses on national cultural diplomacy that is driven by state-actors in her text on *Cultural Diplomacy between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina: Enhancing Culture of Peace, Trust and Dialogue*. State-actors unfortunately often neglect or ignore non-state actors and civil society initiatives that might be – for a variety of reasons – better suited to advance reconciliation processes because they have closer ties to the population and understand their various needs better. Sarina Bakić examines the cultural diplomacy policies of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, countries that share a recent troubled past. While cultural diplomacy is mostly seen as part of the national diplomacy toolkit, initiatives of regions and even cities to position themselves internationally are not equally considered in cultural diplomacy research.

Nina Sajić presents the case of Quebec, which is of particular importance given the specificity of language as exemplified in her text *Cultural (Para)Diplomacy of Federated Units: International Positioning of Quebec's Distinctiveness*. Despite this being a North-American example, it might serve well to also understand current debates in Spain or France and hopefully advance the necessary debate on the importance of language not only within cultural diplomacy and policy but also within cultural management. The importance of language as a component of what can be understood as cultural identity is too often marginalized and the potential of multilingualism is not always seen.

Esperá Donouvossi in his text *Restitution of Cultural Heritage: From a Claim to a New Cultural Strategy in Benin* starts by explaining the most



important international conventions and treaties that safeguard artworks from illegal trafficking and that try to help the return of looted artworks; despite being enacted after the colonial period and not being retroactive. Furthermore, he also clarifies the exact origins of these works in the Benin context. What might be unfamiliar to many in the current debate on the so-called Benin bronzes, that can be found in arts organizations, private collections as well as in churches in different parts of the world (mainly Europe as well as the USA) and unfortunately still on the black arts market, is that the kingdom of Benin, which the British looted in 1897, is now part of Nigeria which is therefore in charge of claims for restitution. Particularly Germany has had intensive discussions with Nigerian representatives. At the beginning of 2023, German representatives returned a multiplicity of artworks looted by the British in what can be described as a well-staged ceremony that raised a lot of (media) attention. The British Museum in contrast is still not willing even to discuss the issue of restitution, which is unacceptable. The Kingdom of Danxomè was actually where the French army looted intricate wood and ivory carvings as well as metalwork in 1892 and what is by now the Republic of Benin (until 1975 known as Dahomey and from 1975 to 1990 as the People's Republic of Benin), neighboring Nigeria. Esperá Donouvossi's text deals with the cultural strategy of this state, which by now has around 12 million inhabitants, and has lost around 6.000 artworks according to UNESCO estimates; which have had a devastating effect particularly but not exclusively on cultural identity. The cultural policy strategy can be described as cultural diffusionism as it tends to put in place instruments and mechanisms to enable cultural creation and its diffusion as well as communication in order to build and consolidate the country's national and cultural identity and promote – as we have seen throughout this book as very common – tourism. Despite a variety of obstacles, among them funding, the restitution claims have, according to Donouvossi, helped this process of setting up a concise strategy for art, culture and heritage in the Republic of Benin.

Most countries in development have cultural diplomacy actions aiming to raise their public image in the Global North, trying to enhance the rise of investments but also tourism and specifically cultural tourism. In their text *Cultural Diplomacy without Artistic Freedom? The Case of the People's Republic of Bangladesh*, Zobaida Nasreen and Raphaela

Henze analyze this phenomenon in the example of Bangladesh, one of the Asian countries that has a fast-growing population but had also a traumatic experience in getting its own independence in 1971. This text explains, contextualizes and puts into question different public diplomacy initiatives that the People's Republic of Bangladesh implements inter alia through its embassies around the world and digital tools. The "Beautiful Bangladesh" campaign, realized through posters, videos, festivities, stamps, and websites, underlines cultural diversity as its most respective phenomenon. In an attractive manner, indigenous peoples are shown in their specific landscapes, dressed in national attire, although in reality, they are among the most vulnerable groups within the country (five million people belonging to 50 different groups speaking at least 35 different languages). The central part of the text is devoted to freedom of expression, showing to what extent the government represses any form of dissent, which even leads to a rebellion of the bloggers' community or to migration, especially of different ethnic and religious minorities. The authors further discuss to what extent artistic freedom is limited, how it is accused of insulting Islamic religious sentiments as well as freedom of sexual expression restricting those of non-binary genders. This text points out the dangers of misrepresentation and manipulation through cultural diplomacy tools that lead to a distorted "beautiful" image of the country with a repressive authoritarian system. The rise of tourism and foreign investments will further strengthen authoritarian governments and help to sustain the regime of deprivation of human rights. Zobaida Nasreen and Raphaela Henze therefore underline the importance of international stakeholders in safeguarding artistic freedom and in openly discussing contradictions between the image conveyed to the outside and the contrasting reality within the country.

Lea Jakob in her text *Cuba and Cultural Relations in Challenging Times: A Practice-Approach* reflects on the basics of international relations and how they can and should look like when dealing with a country like Cuba that is not only a country in crisis but also one that for a variety of reasons has a debatable approach towards artistic freedom amongst others. She elaborates on how music has been used as a cultural ambassador for Cuba for many years thus leading to stereotypes that until this very day generate interest as well as income e.g. through

tourism and the willingness of Western organizations to promote what is widely accepted as “original” Cuban music. This leads to the valid question of how international collaborations have to be designed and how audiences need to change in order to allow Cuban artists to move ahead in their artistic endeavors that go far beyond Mambo and Buena Vista Social Club.

Ana Milosavljević also puts music as a universal language in the focus of her research and investigates *Music Festivals in Spain and Their Role in Spanish Cultural Diplomacy*. This text falls in line with the fast-growing field of research into music festivals and adds the important facet of their use as a cultural diplomacy tool. Particularly due to the long history and huge variety of music festivals in Spain and their successful export to other countries – as can be seen by the Sonar Festival – they are supported by the government in order to promote interculturalism, openness, and tolerance to important stakeholders such as tourists. Ana Milosavljević considers Spain as a good practice example for other countries that could also use their music tradition for cultural diplomacy purposes; for example Serbia.

The third part of the book is devoted to different forms of Serbian and Yugoslavian cultural relations in different historical periods.

In his text: *On the Effectiveness of Cultural Diplomacy*, Darko Tanasković introduces his argumentation with a premise that the general perception and image of Serbia in the international community, since the nineties is a negative one. Thus, he points out the importance of cultural contacts, exchanges of arts and culture in between citizens and peoples. He suggests that the right modality could improve the present image, and guarantee stable cultural relationships, in a manner outside of daily politics and ephemeral political interests. However, long-term cultural relations are overshadowed by short-term interests and benefits. Processes of mutual recognition and collaboration demanding investments in the future are neglected and not supported enough. Professor Tanasković emphasizes three case studies of effective cultural diplomacy practices in the last twenty years, of China, Iran and Turkey toward Serbia, that have succeeded in spite of numerous prejudices and negative stereotypes in re-establishing cultural relations using different cultural diplomacy tools and measures. Together with

an analysis of history of the cultural diplomacy of Yugoslavia and Serbia, and finding in these examples possible ideas for present endeavors, Tanasković opens a discussion about possible strategies and tools for future diplomatic actions.

The text of Aleksandra Kolaković: *Serbian Science Diplomacy in France (1894 – 1903)* discusses to what extent science diplomacy became only recently a part of cultural diplomacy in many countries of the world. She studied links and collaborative practices in between researchers of France and Serbia in different domains in the last hundred years. Claiming that research links had always been an important “engine” flywheel for development of humanity in general, Aleksandra Kolaković underlines their importance for mutual relations between states and peoples – focusing on a complex example of Serbian-French relations that had ups and downs, depending on the larger political interest and strategies of both countries. Conscious that changes in international relations are constant, she does not take historical facts as examples to be directly followed, but to show how, in different situations and different geopolitics, research and academic links can be a pillar of stability of bilateral relations, contributing to a wider understanding of mutual interests. As a basis of future scientific diplomacy of Serbia Aleksandra Kolaković identifies international research projects, a large number of academics living in diaspora, specific platforms for the financing of bilateral projects (le Partenariat Pavle Savić et Hubert Curien franco-serbe), and the readiness of domestic researchers to participate in scientific diplomacy actions, etc.

Before tourism, diplomats were privileged travelers around the world, and their writings were first testimonies about diplomatic efforts, but at the same time, about possible cultural encounters, and exchanges that confirmed or dismissed existing prejudices. Miloš Pržić’s text: *Cultural Diplomacy in Three Travelogues about the Balkans* reveals stories written by three different travelers in the Balkans, who started their journeys with different motivations, and ended with similar outcomes. Alberto Fortis explored minerals and fisheries in Dalmatia for the account of Venice republic, while British sponsors tried to identify verses of one “primitive people”. Bruno Barilli, came to Serbia privately but ended up as a war correspondent. Prince Božidar Karađorđević came

once as an exile under a false name, and another time as a member of the Royal Family, for the crowning of his relative King Peter. But all three had kept, in a different manner, the same, patronizing and polarizing approaches to domestic population and its cultural features, that could be described as a post-historical cultural diplomacy.

Understanding cultural relations and modalities of cultural diplomacy between two countries, can be analyzed the best in a concrete, relatively distant historical period. That is the case of the text: *Cultural diplomacy in the relations between Yugoslavia and Albania after the Second World War, 1945–1948*, by Igor Vukadinović. Although it was a period of the most intensive political relations, the author researched why cultural diplomacy was not an effective part of diplomatic relations. The experience of Yugoslav developmental aid to Albania just after WWII had revealed the weaknesses of the authoritarian model, that existed in both countries. The non-democratic character of one-party regimes had limited capacities of cultural workers in joint projects. Cultural and foreign policy had been submitted to ideological aims of communist parties of Yugoslavia and Albania. Contacts among artists were the result of party directives, thus political breakdown meant an immediate breakdown of those relations in 1948. During a collaboration process, two sides saw their roles differently: the Yugoslav side proclaimed international solidarity, while the Albanian side often saw in those projects' elements of political and cultural hegemonism. This text shows to what extent even cultural dialogue among neighboring countries can be burdened by prejudices and stereotypes.

The history of the use of state art collections within cultural diplomacy actions go beyond the compilation of artifacts that were acquired as diplomatic gifts, or deliberate acquisitions and commissions over the course of time. Thus, the text: *Arcadian and Yugoslav – (Re)shaping Cultural Identity in the State Art Collection in Belgrade* by Jelena Todorović and Biljana Crvenković shows to what extent this collection was created to be an idealized presentation of the state and throughout its history represented different political entities – two opposing regimes (Kingdom and Socialist republic) while remaining a notable art collection in its own right. The focus of the text is on the specific role that the State art collection played in the cultural diplomacy of both, and to demonstrate how its universal artistic vocabulary was reshaped through different

regimes. The Yugoslav government art collection lost a great part of its primary function acting as a dual mirror; reflecting the history of diplomatic relations through the exchange of gifts, while acting at the same time as a looking-glass through which the ideal state is envisioning and conceptualizing itself. In a concluding paragraph, Jelena Todorović and Biljana Crvenković express their wish that the state collection does not remain only in a ceremonial space or a complex monument, or a memento of Yugoslav countries that shaped it. “The future role of this important state collection is still to be determined. It is our hope, as scholars, curators and researchers that SAC will become a museum and that its treasures will become accessible to the wider local and European public”, and thus be actively used in processes of cultural diplomacy.

Marina Simić and Miloš Ničić in their text: *Culture as a Manifestation: International Positioning of Serbia through Creative Industries*, departs from the Raymond Williams concept of culture as a manifestation, using it as a theoretical framework for understanding the contemporary positioning of different countries in the domain of international relations. They have shown to what extent it is relevant when it comes to the concept of creative industries (a segment of a culture as a manifestation). Cultural content is widespread, comprising popular culture as well as the arts, including elements of everyday culture; it allows diversification of potential audiences for content spread within cultural diplomacy tools; finally, this inclusive model of cultural diplomacy includes content characterized by flexibility, relevance, intertextual and intercultural capacity, especially when compared with established art forms usually used within cultural diplomacy practices. The authors analyze the case of the platform Serbia Creates, and its diverse activities, that enable the re-positioning of Serbia on the international scene, using first of all creative individuals from Serbia. These activities include traditional arts (folklore), and high scientific-technological achievements on one side, and different forms of music and popular culture on the other. Thus, the re-positioning of Serbia on a world cultural scene contributes to wider repositioning on a political scene. Through creative industries, popular culture of everyday life connects with traditional domains of high art and science and become, together part of state cultural diplomacy actions, that include domains such as gastronomy, fashion, and cultural

tourism. Thus, with creative industries in the focus, Serbia realizes its potential for equal participation in contemporary cultural programs, and receives positive impacts of such endeavors.

The last text in this final part, Nenad Vasić's analysis of *Cultural Diplomacy on the Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia*, presents a critical comparative study of the two web-platforms and their ways of communication. The author concluded that Serbian arts and culture, and its different manifestations should be much more present on the Internet related to foreign affairs and diplomacy, as it allows quick search and information. The old website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013) was of contemporary design, enabling easy search and quality content, compared to the present website (2022), characterized by old fashion design, a non user-friendly search and lack of cultural content. Neither presentations were regularly updated, new content was not added, especially not content related to arts in the newest web presentation. The author further concludes that arts and culture, and specifically news related to cultural heritage have to be regularly updated and presented on the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, showing more complex and more relevant images of Serbian cultural identity and of the relevant public policies of the State of Serbia.

This brief introduction suggests that we need to broaden the cultural diplomacy and cultural relations calls for examining both the instrumental and the transformative logic of these fields. Acknowledging cultural differences is a key issue for cultural relations, on all levels of the cross-cultural discourse, be it conceptual, methodological, policy or/and practical. We need more awareness of propaganda, of the misuse of culture and those that produce it, we need to make aware of the vulnerability of artists and strengthen our international organizations and those working within them to address exactly these issues. We strongly hope that this book can be a small contribution in this direction.

## Bibliography

- Cummings, M.C. (2003) *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey*. Washington D.C.: Center for Arts and Culture.
- Dragičević Šešić, M. (2018) *Umetnost i kultura otpora*, Beograd: CLIO.

- Durrer, V. & Henze, R. (Eds.) (2020) *Managing Culture: Reflecting on Exchange in Global Times*, Palgrave MacMillan.
- Gienow-Hecht, J. C. E. (2007) Introduction: Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy. In: Gienow-Hecht, J. C. E. & Donfried, M.C. (Eds.) *Searching for Cultural Diplomacy*. New York: Berghan.
- Keohane, Robert O. & Nye, Joseph S. (2011) *Power and Interdependence revisited*. Longman Classics in Political Science.
- Mitchell, J. (2016) *International Cultural Relations*. London: Routledge.
- Ricoeur, P. (1965) *History and Truth*. Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1965.
- Reiter, B. (Ed.) (2018) *Constructing the Pluriverse – The Geopolitics of Knowledge*, 63-89. Durham: Duke University Press, 2018.
- Rogač Mijatović, Lj. (2011) Kulturne aktivnosti Srbije u Evropi i svetu: 2000 – 2010., *Kultura*, n. 130, pp. 331-349.
- Rogers, R. A. (2006) From Cultural Exchange to Transculturation: A Review and Reconceptualization of Cultural Appropriation, *Communication Theory* 16, International Communication Association, pp.474–503.
- Samovar, L. A. & Porter, R. E. (2012) *Communication between cultures*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Singh, J.P. (2010) Global Cultural Policies and Power. In: Singh, J.P. (Ed.) *International Cultural Policies and Power*. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London.



# I

## **Values and Visions / Vrednosti i vizije**

*section editors/ urednice poglavlja:*

MILENA DRAGIĆEVIĆ ŠEŠIĆ, RAPHAELA HENZE



# FROM VYING FOR VALUES AND POWER TOWARDS CULTURAL DIPLOMACY AS A GLOBAL “COMMON GOOD”

EMIL BRIX

I see the situation for cultural diplomacy globally in flux at the moment and this has to do with the rise of conflicts, the decline of democracies (we only have about 20 to 25 percent of democracies at the moment globally), and the return of identity politics – national identity politics mainly – on the international scene. This changes how we should look at and analyze cultural diplomacy, and how cultural policy really works in the political field. Here is already my first conclusion – we have to differentiate between the growing number of policy areas, where cultural diplomacy and cultural relations are being used. I am using the word *used*, in the instrumentalized sense mainly: what sort of model of international relations should we use for analysis? Should we use the constructivist model or the model of realists or neo-realists?

I do not think that one can deliver a keynote speech at this very moment in Europe without mentioning the war in Ukraine. Even in the field of cultural diplomacy and cultural relations, this is a moment in European history, which may be called, as the German chancellor Scholz did, a change of time or a paradigm change (“Zeitenwende”), and when we look at cultural diplomacy, we see immediately this conflict, what it can do and what it cannot do. Cultural diplomacy is, when we have a look at the very difficult definitions, a non-coercive power, and at the moment what we see in Ukraine is coercive power. It is simply a war – a territorial, very traditional war, with a lot of missiles being shot, tanks being used, and real-time fighting in the cities of Ukraine. But still, cultural diplomacy is behind this war, because when we look

at the Russian side, what was the motivation that Mr. Putin himself and his people in the Kremlin used to argue for this war – they have used cultural arguments. The main arguments that Mr. Putin brought forward in the summer of 2021 and again when he started the war, were two cultural things – one of them was that there are Nazis, there are national socialists in Ukraine, and we have to de-nazify Ukraine; an obvious cultural argument. The second cultural argument was that Ukraine is an invention, the identity of Ukraine is an invention of the Soviets after the First World War, and in reality, the cultural identity of Ukraine does not exist but it is simply part of the “Russkiy Mir”, of the Russian World. This is a very strong cultural argument that reminds us of the book “A Clash of Civilizations” by Samuel P. Huntington. So this is the Russian perspective, but as we see, normally, you use cultural diplomacy in situations of crisis in a positive way. At least you try to use it in a positive way, you speak about how it can foster mutual understanding, and how it can help to create a dialogue.

In Ukraine, the Russian side has a very difficult job to use cultural diplomacy in a positive way. The only option they have in the state media is to say that they are liberating Ukraine from fascists, and from wrong ideas about identity and then to show pictures where you can see Russian soldiers giving food and other material, maybe even books, about the real culture of Russia to the so-called liberated Ukrainians, in the South or in the East of Ukraine. Otherwise, cultural diplomacy is only seen through Western eyes as a negative element of how Russia wants to destroy the culture of Ukraine. On the Ukrainian side, cultural diplomacy has a better chance in this crisis, because Mr. Zelensky and his team have decided from the very first moment, that if they want to win this war or to save the identity of Ukraine, they have to use culture. They have to use the idea that there is a united Ukrainian nation, irrespective of the mother tongue of the Ukrainians. And it is obvious that you have a lot of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the East, especially around Kharkiv and the Northeast, are strongly pro-Ukrainian, which means being pro Ukrainian cultural identity. The Russians are having a hard time finding enough people in the so-called liberated areas, from the Russian point of view, who can run the politics in these regions they have occupied.

So for the Ukrainian side, using cultural relations, cultural diplomacy is the strongest point they have, when we are not talking about

weapons, which is a different story. As a non-coercive power, as a soft power, cultural diplomacy is being used very successfully by strengthening the Ukrainian national identity and the will to defend this identity on the Ukrainian side. When we look at the images which play an important role in cultural diplomacy, as well as stories and narratives, this is the story the Ukrainians want to tell the rest of the world: that they defend their cultural identity and they are successfully doing so by also using pictures that not only show how civilians have been killed, but also how they have to defend their cultural identity, and their monuments; how the monuments from the Baroque period and other periods have to be secured with sandbags against Russian missile attacks. So these are again very strong images. Saying we want to save our cultural tradition against aggression from abroad – can be easily transformed into pictures, stories, and narratives about defending culture by using these sort of images. Especially on the issue, which always plays a role in the European heritage, of antisemitism and the issue of the Holocaust. The Ukrainians are skillfully and, I think, rightfully using cultural relations and cultural diplomacy to say the Russians have even attacked one of the monuments against the killing of Jews during the Second World War, with their grenades and their missiles. And around the globe you could see pictures of this destroyed monument to the Holocaust, and later on, they even succeeded in showing Mr. Lavrov speaking about Hitler maybe having some Jewish blood, and Mr. Zelensky, despite of being Jewish, being an anti-Semite and so on.

So you see how political cultural relations and cultural diplomacy can become in a situation of conflict. And this is something one has to study, because we are going into an age of identity politics, or maybe we are already in the middle of an age of identity politics, as this conflict is actually proving. So this is not a harmless instrument that we are talking about – cultural diplomacy, cultural relations – it is a very political instrument, which is always about telling stories, and it is about values and power. Even in the European Union, the idea that we discuss now is the role of the European Union in this coming multipolar world order. Most of the analysts are saying it is about European values and the way of a pluralist European culture, how we managed to work together in spite of all our differences on the European continent, by means of overcoming the view of culture as being an element which can only divide

us or which can only create national identities; isolated and defending themselves against other national identities.

In the Balkans, we can see how difficult this match is between seeing culture as a national identity, a building element that should be separated from other national elements, and seeing culture as an element of a pluralistic cultural environment, which helps us to define the common good and helps us to foster mutual understanding. I understand that in Serbia this is one of the big cultural issues that one has to discuss – how much pluralism is allowed in society, how Serbia positions itself in the Balkans, and how strongly national identity, cultural identity, is being used. I myself was just recently in Belgrade and in the other cities of the Balkans with a group of 50 students. As I said, I have to be provocative: I and even my students could immediately see, how different culture is perceived in Serbia, than for instance at the moment in North Macedonia, or even in Albania for that matter. And this plays a very political role. Analyzing cultural diplomacy and cultural relations, one has to take this sincerely into consideration and look into historic developments in all parts of Europe, where culture had to go a long way from being an element of division, of what was called by the 19<sup>th</sup> century's Habsburg monarchy *the emancipation of nations or emancipation of language groups*, into a community. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, in the European context, culture including religion was mainly an element of creating national identity and not of overcoming these differences. When we look at the discussion of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, we see how this dilemma between the two sides has even become part of the two world wars and the following Cold War.

Discussing historical developments of cultural diplomacy and cultural relations should be a central part of any form of educating cultural policy experts, cultural managers or people who work in the international field of culture. I could give you many examples from the time when I was responsible for Austrian foreign cultural policy – I struggled with overcoming this idea that cultural diplomacy is working only in the national interest and not also trying to create a common understanding and a common global code in various aspects. When I started my job as director general for foreign cultural policy, we had a written instruction for Austrian cultural diplomats which said that you are supposed to speak only positively about your nation or if you cannot do that, then

at least you have to speak neutrally about the quality of your nation, in terms of culture. I immediately tore apart this piece of paper and told my people who worked around the globe that they are not there to say that we are the best in the world and we have this idea of superiority of our Austrian culture, but you are there to find those forms of dialogue which allow us to move away from competing values of power towards cultural diplomacy as a global common good.

But I promised to tell you how the European Union has a problem when it deals with cultural diplomacy. The first problem is the Union itself, as Brussels has little competence in cultural diplomacy and cultural relations. Why is this so? This is so because all member states still believe them to be key issues of sovereignty and identity that they do not want to transfer to a supranational level. That is why education and culture remain the main responsibility of national governments and the European Union has some sort of additional competence which is called only when there is an additional value of working together in the field of culture and education – only then the Union is allowed to interfere or to use money to do something in this field. This is a major problem for integration, because it still tells a story that culture is a national thing. It tells the story that we have to use culture to create national identity or at least to strengthen it.

The second point about the European Union is that there is an idea that was already created with the United Nations' system in 1945, that we have universal values which you might call cultural values. When you actually look at it, they were interpreted as European values. That is why until nowadays the European Union is officially saying that one of the tasks that we have not only in cultural diplomacy, but overall in our diplomatic foreign policy work is to transmit our values to the rest of the world with the expectation is that we can call them 'universal values'. We all know that this is a very tricky issue, because many parts of the world do not see them the same way that we in Europe see them. So one of the problems of our European cultural diplomacies, and I include my Austrian one, is that we are trying to export our view of culture, our ideas about culture to the rest of the world; and the rejection of them is actually growing. How should we respond to this, how does cultural diplomacy respond to this? There is this strong idea that if you're not convinced that your values are the best values for a global

situation, then it is difficult for us to speak about them in other countries. This includes all sorts of values like freedom of speech, freedom of information, rule of law, and democracy. But they are all basically cultural values, maybe secondary cultural values, but cultural values nevertheless.

In this given situation, it is obvious that for instance in our relations with China or our relations with Russia or even our relations with the USA, there are clashes of different opinions of what is the substance of these cultural values. I will give you a traditional example: the question of the death penalty. In the USA the death penalty is in most states a very obvious instrument of dealing with criminal acts, whereas in Europe, especially in the member states of the Council of Europe, regulations refer to the death penalty are not part of our cultural convictions, and have been abolished. If you do not abolish it, you cannot apply to become a member of the Council of Europe. But even more than this, it is about the idea of human rights. The idea of human rights (based on cultural values) is certainly different at the moment in countries like Russia, but also in countries like China. So what should cultural diplomacy do, how should it react to that? When I was ambassador in Moscow, one of the tasks that I was given was to speak out against human rights violations, to speak out for instance against all the problems of an institution like "Memorial", that documents the criminal acts of the Stalin regime, but also of the Soviet Union overall. I had to criticize the Russian government saying for example that they worked against such institutions and that human rights activists were put into prison; or that Jehovah's Witnesses were abolished in Russia, that they are not allowed as an organization in Russia; or that liberal critics of the Russian government were put into prison.

So, what is the role of cultural diplomacy in all that? The role that I was given was to criticize the government and ask them stop these actions. And in the European Union we had different ways among the different member countries to deal with this in Moscow. Some countries where human rights are a more essential part of the constitution and of the cultural self-understanding, like the Scandinavian countries, were very outspoken in this criticism and used public and cultural diplomacy to speak out against human rights violations. Some countries, like in the South of Europe, who were less concerned with these issues and maybe



combined them with commercial or economic interests they had in Russia, were less outspoken about this clash of civilizations and about human rights violations. So you see, cultural diplomacy and official cultural relations very much depend on other fields of policy making; and this happens on an everyday basis, you can see this everywhere.

This was actually a basic introduction to how I see this field, but maybe I need also to speak about what is the subject, and how can we define it. I am sure you will deal with the issue of the definition of cultural diplomacy and cultural relations very often, because when you look into the literature on how to study cultural diplomacy and also public diplomacy, you find hundreds of different definitions, and you get the idea that there is no clarity about the topic, the subjects, the instruments, or the methods. Why is this the case? It is very obviously the case, because all the elements, even the element “culture” has no clear definition, so you have to invent your own definitions, you have to not only define what we are talking about, but also the way it should be enacted, for instance in public diplomacy – what does public mean? Does it mean that you are looking for target groups, where your cultural relations should be aimed at, like all our cultural institutes are looking for target groups where they should act and how they want to influence other people? Or is it the public in general? Or does it mean how ambassadors speak in public? So even the very practical things of cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy are not very clear.

And then the main question of what is diplomacy about? Is diplomacy only about communication? Is diplomacy actually about power relations, in a very clear-cut sense? My own view, from my own experience in various parts of the world working in culture is that it is all about power and it is all about how to position identities in the best possible ways. With a few exceptions where there is a real war raging between countries, it is mainly soft power that is being used. By soft power I include economic power, because it is also actually a non-coercive power, but it can become a weapon as we see with the pipelines between Russia and Europe, although it is mainly a non-coercive power.

Cultural differentiation is becoming a major field of confrontation between identities. And here we are in public diplomacy and public relations – identity. This is the moment where we have to discuss which stories are being told. What are the narratives we are talking about? We

have learned in the last 150 years, at least in Europe, that the major narrative is the national narrative. The nation is deciding on the identity of whatever the community is doing outside of its own sovereignty. This is the nation, sometimes it is a nation-state, sometimes it is an ethnic nation, a language group, but the nations all want to tell their own stories. The problem is that there are so many other identities around now and we know from diplomacy how this field has enlarged into all sorts of things, from tourist diplomacy to food diplomacy, to corporate diplomacy, and the same holds true for cultural diplomacy and cultural relations.

First of all, we have to look at who are our actors. Our actors are certainly not only the states and the nations alone, although they want to tell us that they are and ever will be the major actors in the world. But actually, we see that many more identities are looking to define their own culture. It can be cities, it can be regions, it can be supranational organizations like the UN – the UN is also one of the identity-making actors which creates also a cultural idea about how identity can be formed. But these actors can also be individuals, and certainly also religions and NGOs. So, cultural relations and cultural diplomacy have so many actors around that we have to be careful not to ignore what is happening on the ground. We are talking still so much about the national actors, we are talking about how difficult it is to write history books in European countries which go beyond the national narrative. We have problems even having common narratives about history between neighboring countries. People try to make a common Balkans historical narrative, a history book, but without success. People are trying to write a common history book with Polish and Russian participants – a total failure. They published a book, but not one with a common narrative about history, instead, it had one part about the Polish narrative and one part about the Russian narrative. Even Austria and the Czech Republic tried a common history book only recently, which was only partly successful. So there is this problem even between nations.

What we are also observing is that cultural diplomacy is increasingly being used by actors who work mainly in social media. All these companies that rule the internet, like Google Metaverse or Facebook, have become major cultural actors and they understand not only that they have to try to make reputation management or image management, but they also have to act as cultural diplomats or cultural relations

people. And they do that, so they are using all sorts of elements to become major actors in the field of cultural diplomacy. Why can they do this? My major point is that they can do this because the idea that creating identities and maintaining the strength of identities of any community is becoming more and more relevant for the position of a community in a global world. That is because of globalization, which has not reduced the idea of identity but it has actually increased the differentiating role of identity building and the idea of telling your own story.

Coming back to the Ukrainian conflict, Mr. Putin has his narrative about the non-existence of Ukraine. That is his national narrative that he is bringing forward. The European Union has the European Union narrative which contends that human rights are basic universal values, which have the same worth in Belgium as they should have in China, or in Russia, or in Singapore, or other countries. These are simply narratives, stories we want to tell and that is what cultural diplomacy is doing. It is talking about perception, how things are perceived by other groups, how we make sure that the stories that we tell reach the public. The public, as I said, can be many different things, so perception management is at the heart of cultural diplomacy. Image working and branding of identities is important and sometimes when new identities come up the major problem is invisibility. What does invisibility mean? It means that they do not exist as a culture per se, as an identity, so they have to make sure that they have some sort of possibility to make themselves seen in the world. One of the major reasons for small countries, for instance, to invest in cultural diplomacy is to reduce invisibility. What is behind that? I know that Serbia's cultural diplomacy is also looking into this field – When we are invisible, we cannot tell our story. (Which is not always a bad thing.) If you want to tell your story, you have to be visible. You have to be someone who creates an interest, someone who has maybe even a unique selling proposition as the marketing people are telling us.

To show again the Austrian case: when I was responsible for Austrian foreign cultural policy, I always asked my people: look for unique selling propositions, what are our strengths. And secondly: look where these unique selling propositions may help us combine our identities with others. We have the Spanish Riding School, the white horses of Vienna, Lipizzaner. For a long time we used them as a unique selling

proposition, because this is very attractive for tourists in Vienna. At the same time, we knew, but we did not mention, that there is actually a Slovene tradition behind these horses, because they originate from what is nowadays Slovenia, and Lipizzaner are partly an Italian tradition. So it took us quite a long time in cultural diplomacy to say: let's use it together, in this case with the Slovene government and together with Slovenia we made an application to UNESCO to put Lipizzaner on the list of world cultural heritage. I think it is already on the list now, but this was the first time that we tried to do it with Slovenia, and I remember 10 years ago we still had a problem with these horses in cultural diplomacy, because in the monetary system of the European Union, every country has the right to put something onto its coins, national symbols on the various cents and so on. This was decided in one of the finance committees in Brussels, and we learned after one of these committee meetings where the symbols were decided, that the delegate from the Austrian Ministry of Finance missed the decision during this meeting, while the Slovenes put white Lipizzan horses on one of these coins and on another a very famous symbol from Klagenfurt, a stool where the dukes of Carinthia had been enthroned in the Middle Ages. The Slovene use of these symbols was regarded by Austria as a robbery – the white Lipizzaner and the throne were stolen from Austria. It took us quite a long time to ensure that we could all see this as a commonality in our cultural relations, because it combines us also, that we had this Slavic population in what is now Austria and Carinthia. It combines us in the tradition of Lipizzan horses, as a strong central European tradition. We are trying to bring this together and we are now working to make it as something of a common good. And for sure, if we have to accept that identity building is the major trend in global politics on all levels, then our major issue for cultural diplomacy must be to try to find common ground which crosses these identity borders. We have to make sure that not only the national narratives decide on what culture is. I understand how difficult this is, as a cultural diplomat, and as someone who also does research to find ways how to overcome these national narratives. But this has always been an objective of cultural diplomacy, whether you call it cultural diplomacy or cultural relations.

So what can we do? I think, first of all, analyzing the given situation of this sort of cultural identity building, by re-reading Mr. Huntington's

“Clash of Civilizations” is a very helpful start, and then we have to create trends and use the trends that exist. I only give you a few ideas. We can learn, for instance, from political propaganda. Political propaganda in the Cold War period was mainly a top-down thing which was done by security services, by spies, and always driven by governments, by the officials. But nowadays, even propaganda tends to work bottom-up. Why? This is due to social media possibilities and now it is the troll factories and individuals who create their platforms that bring propaganda to the rest of the world. In the West, we are talking a lot about Russian propaganda on social media, but certainly also the Americans have their ways of using means of propaganda bottom-up. But we should also use these methods in cultural diplomacy, to overcome these national narratives, work with bottom-up approaches, work with social media, work with individuals who are not interested in the national narrative alone, and I think there is a huge field in front of us. So the troll factory in St. Petersburg may be a good example that we should use in cultural diplomacy for a better purpose (I hope that is not too provocative).

A second huge trend is migration. Migration and minorities change the contents and structure of cultural diplomacy and cultural relations. Cultural diplomacy now has to work with this plurality within its own identity, which is growing in most of democracies. At least it is growing in Vienna. For instance, more than 50% of our pupils in primary schools that are non-German speakers, which is reminiscent of the situation in the late Habsburg monarchy around 1900. And there are lots of other examples. We have to analyze this and then turn it into policy, we have to integrate how we can work with this migration situation, the minority situation in cultural diplomacy and cultural relations. Just one example of how difficult it is: there will be a struggle between the so-called autochthonous minorities, those minorities that say: “we have been here for hundreds of years”, and the new minorities. It is like in trade union battles, where the trade unions are fighting for those workers’ rights from the trade unions, and not for those workers who come from outside. Traditional minorities are fighting not only against the majorities for the rights they want as a minority group, but also against new minorities coming with migration. This is an uphill battle at the moment, and when you research it, one should also analyze this in the context of European parliament regulations and the UN system,

where you still have mainly the rights for so-called long-time minorities, which are based on a specific territory.

How should cultural diplomacy deal with 100,000 Serbs now living in Vienna? What sort of rights should you give to them? Are they territorially based as a minority in Vienna? Are they one of those who should not be given rights too? You know how difficult this is. And that is not only a political but also a cultural issue. And then the issue of dialogue. We always say that the major objective of culture, in this international context, is that even when there is no other dialogue possible, culture can be an element of creating understanding and trust. My thesis is: in conflicts, this idea of dialogue even reinforces the power of big powers, so the idea of dialogue works better without conflicts, because in conflicts the stronger party can use dialogue much better than those that are at the periphery.

There are many examples in conflict resolution schemes – of how difficult dialogue is because of the uneven power relations in conflicts. This is only a proposition to explore this issue in an analytical way – to look at how this is already being done, and the examples are widespread. Just look into what is happening at the moment in the Western world regarding Russian music or Russian literature. The dialogue with Russian culture is partly abolished, even music, which has nothing to do with Putin and his activities, is sometimes not allowed to be performed for Western audiences. It tells you a lot about narratives and dialogue and how difficult this is. I have two propositions that I am not discussing, just mentioning: In cultural diplomacy, many of our countries have put a lot of effort into using classical music. Not all, but many European countries have used classical music as a major element in cultural diplomacy, and my country is a good example. We regard ourselves as the hub of music, like Salzburg and Vienna and all the composers. We are using Joseph Haydn's words, that music is a language that everybody in the world understands and that does not need to be translated, but as I see it, classical music is a hopeless case. I do not think that it really helps us in cultural diplomacy anymore. You might even call it some sort of colonizing idea of how cultural diplomacy works, as when we try to impose an educational system loaded with classical music around the globe. I am sorry to say this, but I feel that there is some sort of colonizing idea in the back of this case of classical music, and that is why

I think it is a hopeless tool to use when we talk about universal values and the role of cultural diplomacy.

Everything I have said about cultural relations was not very promising for the idea of supporting the global common good. So this is a challenge we have to formulate, in which field cultural diplomacy can really make a proposition for creating more global common goods. I have not mentioned climate change issues where there is a big chance of succeeding in these efforts. I have not mentioned digitalization with the exception of social media and the role of non-state actors. Identify those global common goods where cultural diplomacy can play a role and then try to make use of that. Even someone like Henry Kissinger, who is the epitome of a realist in international relations, in his major works always says that diplomacy has two objectives: it is for national interest and it is for furthering a common global good. So even Henry Kissinger said that there has to be a common global good, and cultural diplomacy is certainly the order of the day to do this, especially in a time where geopolitics seems to have overtaken all other diplomatic and political efforts that we make. I fear that behind the term of geopolitics lies the power of the big countries and the irrelevance and maybe the invisibility of small countries and weak identities. I do not want to live in a world where there is a recolonization in cultural relations.

# EXPLORING FAIRNESS IN CULTURAL RELATIONS THROUGH THE LENS OF DILEMMAS

MATINA MAGKOU, AVRIL JOFFE,  
SUDEBI THAKURATA AND KATELIJN VERSTRAETE

In March 2021, EUNIC, the EU National Institutes of Culture Network published a call looking for a team of experts to conceptualize and design a toolkit on fair collaboration in cultural relations. Underlying the value and the understanding of cultural relations as “reciprocal transnational interactions between two or more cultures, encompassing a range of activities conducted by state and/or non-state actors within the space of culture and civil society” (EUNIC, 2021), the call posed questions that had been central within the EUNIC community: *What does fair collaboration in cultural relations look like for EUNIC members working with local partner organizations worldwide? Can fairness as a concept provide a framework for practicing cultural relations in our contemporary societies?*

A research team of six experts was commissioned to develop a Toolkit that would provide concrete ideas and instruments for working in the field of cultural relations in a fair way. Four of them are the authors of this text, although the work has been a genuine teamwork<sup>1</sup> covering almost nine months of research, consultations, exchanges, writing and designing that took place from May 2021 to January 2022 when the work was published. The mandate, as expressed in the EUNIC terms of references, set a number of concepts relevant within the EUNIC community but also beyond it that needed to be taken into consideration when designing the toolkit. These included the hierarchical dynamics expressed through monetary flows for the realisation of projects, unequal access to funding possibilities, dominant languages, and infrastructural and societal barriers in cultural collaborations across borders. Taking this



context into consideration, one key question was raised: *how do we assure mutually beneficial outcomes such as better understanding and enhanced sustainable dialogue between people and cultures instead of one-sided processes that often harm local structures or practices?*

The research team designed and implemented a participatory, inclusive and iterative research process engaging with practitioners and EUNIC stakeholders from different geographies and realities both inside and outside Europe. The methodology included a literature review, which resulted in a “provocation paper”, roundtables with experts and practitioners, a video-survey and individual interviews, feedback sessions with an international reference team and EUNIC representatives on various occasions and testing different parts of the methods proposed with a number of cultural relations practitioners beyond EUNIC. This action-research project allowed us to map different imbalances and forms that the continued existence of domination take. Most of these have already been pointed out as major challenges for cultural relations by various initiatives and recent policy papers that underline the need of finding new narratives, re-thinking our value systems and proposing a framework for addressing them. The deliverable for EUNIC is not a report or academic-like text. It is rather a playful invitation to reconsider our practices in cultural relations, therefore besides one component which constitutes a provocation paper, the rest of the components propose activities and suggest methods to spark the reflection around fairness for field practitioners. Our purpose here in this text is to provide a more in-depth reflection on the process of developing this work and its main conceptual underpinnings.

Recognizing situations of unfairness and imbalance, and asymmetries of power and resources that influence decision-making in a cooperation, leads us to consider the notion of *dilemma* as an entry point to understanding fairness in cultural relations collaboration. We, therefore, asked *what are the main dilemmas to which cultural relations practitioners are exposed when putting fairness into practice?* While having EUNIC members in mind, our mandate was also to create a toolkit that would resonate beyond them and would be meaningful to other cultural relations practitioners. Introducing the notion of dilemmas was a way to reflect on positionalities, bias, influences, purpose, choices and consequences when collaborating internationally and address

key values underpinning the notion of fairness, such as ethics, human rights, mutuality, solidarity, equity, equality, sustainability, decolonization, inclusivity and care.

Our paper starts with a reflection on the shift from cultural diplomacy to cultural relations in order to contextualize the environment in which the notion of fairness has found fertile ground. We then briefly give an overview of initiatives and conceptual underpinnings that have informed our desk research on fairness in cultural relations and that are captured in a text that we called *A provocation paper* (Farinha et al, 2021). In the next section, we explain how our design-led and user-driven approach to the creation of the toolkit led us to identify the notion of dilemma as an entry point in exploring fairness in cultural relations. We then discuss the main dilemmas mapped in relation to different dimensions that we identified as pivotal in approaching cultural relations nowadays.

## **From cultural diplomacy to cultural relations: embracing complexity**

Traditionally, nation-states – understood as a kind of cultural meta-narrative or ideological framework within which a group of people experiences a sense of unity (Anderson, 2003) – have been the primary players in international cultural cooperation. Most countries – especially from the Global North – have provided an infrastructure for international cultural cooperation through their embassies and consulates abroad, or through their Foreign Ministries and foreign cultural institutes with the aim to extend their cultural influence where foreign cultural products were difficult to access (Paschalidis, 2009). However, as Pehn (1999: 8) noted almost 25 years ago, “the field of cultural co-operation has become multi-dimensional to such an extent that the old structures no longer reflect the needs of the new players”. Today international cultural cooperation has evolved into a complex system of governance, which involves actors on the international, national, regional, and local levels as well as non-governmental civil society actors and independent artists and cultural operators that cooperate at bilateral or multilateral levels.

However, national policies for international cultural cooperation still depend heavily on the promotion of the image of a nation abroad, “a governmental practice that operates in the name of a clearly defined ethos of national or local representation, in a space where nationalism and internationalism merge” defined as cultural diplomacy (Ang et al 2015: 367). Cultural diplomacy has been strongly associated with the concepts of soft power and public diplomacy (Cull, 2009; Cummings, 2003; Mark, 2009; Melissen, 2005; Mitchell, 1986; Nye, 1990). A key strength of arts and culture within the context of diplomacy has been “their ability to tap into emotions, to communicate on more than a relational level, and to precipitate alternative ways of seeing the world” (Schneider 2010: 106).

Berger et al (2008) explain that while public diplomacy is unilateral with an emphasis on explaining one’s policies to the others, cultural diplomacy takes a bi- or multilateral approach with an emphasis on mutual recognition. Understood in this way, “cultural diplomacy is therefore explicitly not meant to be the promotion of a national culture” (Berger et al 2008: 3). A study commissioned by EUNIC (2016) to the University of Siena has revealed that currently there are three basic approaches to cultural diplomacy, which are reflected in Table 1.1.

<b>Approaches to cultural diplomacy</b>	<b>Characteristics</b>
<i>Public diplomacy</i>	Emphasis on state actors; Diplomatic goals through cultural tools
<i>Strategic communications approach</i>	International and strategic communication; Linked to nation branding practices and national image cultivation; States are only one of the players in the field as a consequence of the growing democratization of global communication.
<i>Cultural relations approach</i>	Nation branding is an outdated practice; Culture should come first and diplomacy second; Any actor can practice cultural diplomacy.

**Table 1.1** Approaches to cultural diplomacy. Source: Developed by authors based on University of Siena’s research for EUNIC (2016: 10-13).

These three approaches are not self-denying. But they do confirm what Ang et al (2015) argue when they observe that there is a lack of clarity when using the term ‘cultural diplomacy’, associated mostly with ‘interest-driven governmental practice’ versus ‘cultural relations’, “which tends to be driven by ideals rather than interests and is practiced largely by non-state actors” (Ang et al, 2015: 365).

State actors have during the past years adopted an explicit cultural relations approach in their work. In recent political discourse, especially in the context of the EU, the focus has been gradually shifting from cultural diplomacy to *people-to-people exchange* and *cultural relations*. The individual and the community acquire different roles in this reading of cultural diplomacy. Rivera (2015) highlights that cultural relations differ from cultural diplomacy both in their methodology, their objectives and their outcomes. He underlines that “the absence of government is just as important for cultural relations as its presence is for cultural diplomacy” (idem, 11). This means that when talking about cultural relations, these relations develop organically and without necessarily any governmental support. They are also based on values and mutuality, implying more engagement among collaborators which often leads to more engagement and dilemmas. While cultural diplomacy is more linked with propaganda and nation branding and is more uni-directional, cultural relations place the emphasis on people, on engagement and on mutual exchange.

EUNIC is a recently created network that brings together national institutes of culture and national bodies engaged in cultural and related activities beyond their national borders. By pooling together the resources and expertise of its members and carrying out joint work through clusters in different cities around the world, EUNIC works with different stakeholders in defining and implementing a European policy on culture inside and outside the EU. In EUNIC’s strategic framework 2020-2024 (EUNIC 2020) it is evident that the notion of cultural relations and fairness is embedded in the practice of its members:

Through culture, EUNIC strives to build trust and understanding between the people of Europe and the wider world. We work to make culture count in international relations. EUNIC’s work is based on the principles of cultural relations. We aim to build fair partnerships by

practicing mutual listening and learning and engaging in dialogue, co-creation, and joint capacity building.

EUNIC has developed into a strategic partner for the EU – especially since the adoption of the EU Strategy for international cultural relations (European Commission 2016) produced by the European Commission and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is responsible for the European External Action Service. In this document, the concern on how to mainstream culture in EU external relations is raised. Although, as Figueira (2017: 81) notes, there are various references to ‘international cultural relations’, ‘cultural relations’ and ‘cultural diplomacy’- but none of them are clearly defined. The strategy introduced a new policy agenda and demonstrated a firm EU political commitment toward this direction, which however still today is ‘not effective enough’ (Bacian 2022: 56). Through various activities, and pilot programs, such as the Spaces of Culture project, EUNIC aims to put cultural relations in practice and identify new models of collaboration (Damaso 2021). Engaging in a reflection on fairness among EUNIC members – even if those represent to a large extent the national interests of their own country – marks an important step in putting cultural relations into practice.

## **Cultural relations and fairness: initiatives, conceptual underpinnings and a provocation**

The first step in our work was to draft an initial set of provocations in what we called ‘*Fair Collaboration in Cultural Relations: A Provocation*’ (Farinha et al, idem drawing on key insights, trends and the latest literature and practice available. The Provocation Paper was addressed to key informants and EUNIC members and served as an entry point for the research team to collectively think through concepts and values. It also aimed at understanding how cultural relations are being transformed, in particular how rapid industrialization, globalization and digital transformation had deepened inequalities, affecting culture and biodiversity at the expense of the Global South. It therefore questioned how this

configuration of global challenges, as addressed by the UN's Sustainable Development Goals, might impact international cultural relations with the increased attention on human rights, anti-discrimination, gender equality and climate change movements. The provocation paper was written during the Covid pandemic which exacerbated inequalities and the fault lines of societies asking whether we needed new narratives, new models of collaboration and processes to rethink our values. At this time we still referenced our work as a toolkit although this was soon to change. We asked questions such as *What values should underpin cultural relations or fairness? Is there a difference between cooperation and partnership? What are the benefits and downsides of collaboration?*

It was clear that numerous concepts are drawn from to assert the importance of cultural relations being equitable and fair. Hampel's (2017) work on the notion of fairness in cultural cooperation was our first starting point. Furthermore, a number of texts can be referenced to help unpack these concepts. These included ones related to ethics (Koivunen and Marsio 2007) from the Finish Ministry of Education, the status of culture in development cooperation and human and cultural rights in sustainable development (UNESCO 2005). Ones relating new developments focusing on fairness in the trade of cultural goods and services (UNESCO 2021) and older texts on the rights and status of artists (UNESCO, 1980). Values referenced by EUNIC members such as as mutuality, equality, diversity and inclusion were included alongside guiding principles established by the *EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations* (2016) in particular on cultural diversity, human rights, mutual respect, intercultural dialogue, and complementarity and subsidiarity. Aside from the multiple concepts in play, there was already evidence of a rethinking of international collaboration ranging from (although not exclusively) structural inequalities and cultural differences in relation to fairness (IETM et al, 2018), values of solidarity, equity and conditions of fairness (Flanders Arts Institute, n/a), the proposition of instruments for transition towards an alternative, a fairer and unified arts ecosystem including the concrete suggestion of a solidarity tax (proposed by the Reshape EU Creative Europe project<sup>2</sup>), and climate justice across the cultural community (see for example Julie's Bicycle work).

Moving away from concepts to methodologies, the Provocation Paper highlighted a number of innovations to stimulate our thinking

on fairness in international cultural collaborations such as the Culture Shift Methodology (Creative Carbon Scotland, 2021) which offers practical advice for inclusive participation, the need for an anchorship phase to build shared relations of trust and expectations prior to the establishment of a partnership agreement (Swedish Arts Agency Tillt<sup>3</sup>), and a set of principles governing international cultural relations including innovation, visibility in the local context and new ways of thinking about beneficiaries (see for example the EUNIC's European Spaces of Culture project<sup>4</sup>). Complex, at times difficult, but essential topics for conversation in this frame include that of decolonization and racism, social justice and co-responsibility, digital inclusion and care as a practice. These were highlighted here and further elaborated in the various components of the work commissioned by EUNIC.

### **A methodological roadmap: towards the Not a toolkit**

The design-led user-driven approach of the Not a Toolkit began with problem-framing. As we attempted to define the notion of fair collaboration in the context of its potential users, we wanted to understand the contexts in which they would use the learnings: their unique and differentiated needs, challenges and risks and the changing contexts of use, characterized by a world that is volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. We also wanted to understand how these changing contexts might shape the needs, risks, barriers and enablers and hence the choices that people need to make in order to practice fairer collaborations. An important way to do this was by designing four inter-connected facilitated roundtables as a way of surfacing roundtables, marking the beginning of the empathizing and discovery phase of our design where we tried to re-define and re-frame some of the initial ideas around collaborations, fairness and cultural relations.

The roundtables were iterative, with one leading to the other and the findings from each shaping the design of what the structure of the next one would be like. This process helped us question our own assumptions and validate the theoretical underpinnings of the Provocation

Paper. The roundtables, after being unpacked and synthesized, generated rich insights that formed the basis of the content, form and structure of the toolkit. The participants represented diverse geographies, gender, age, language, socio-economic strata, professional hierarchies etc. within international cultural relations organizations. Their insights revealed that they were not particularly looking for a one-size-fitting-all, top-down, prescriptive, instructive and templated toolkit with the assumptions of solving problems with respect to unfair collaborations in international cultural relations, with none of it eventually being relevant for them. The toolkit approach in the arts and cultural field had been already questioned by Belfiore and Bennet (2010) in their seminal work on toolkits and evaluation. What they were instead looking for, was the ability to ask more pertinent questions that could lead to identifying problematic areas and behaviors. As most problems are complex, systemic, multi-layered, ill-defined and inter-connected, people often need to make difficult choices. And that's when we are faced with dilemmas.

## **Dilemmas as lenses for unpacking fairness in cultural relations**

Our entry point to approach fair collaborations in cultural relations came through the narrative of *dilemma* (Greek: δίλημμα «double proposition»), understanding dilemma as a situation in which a difficult choice has to be made between two different things you could do. We chose dilemmas as opposed to just problems or issues as a design principle in this toolkit, which we also called '*Not a Toolkit! Fair collaboration in cultural relations- a reflAction*'. 'Not a toolkit' was to respect the recommendations by the users in not being prescriptive, didactic and top-down, while 'reflAction' was designed as an interrelated loop of reflection, evaluation, and action leading to further reflections on the action, and evaluation following refined, revised and better actions. To do this, we identified various kinds of dilemmas that people expressed both implicitly and explicitly. We then clustered the most frequently occurring dilemmas under different dimensions using a systems thinking approach to explore the subject matter through its economic, ecological,



cultural and social dimensions, and the mainstreamed technological and geopolitical dimension connected to the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. Later on, we used interview transcripts from many potential users and stakeholders who elaborated on the nature of many dilemmas expressed through the roundtables. These different dilemmas were used in various ways throughout our work; sometimes as scenarios where people had to use different values to act upon; sometimes in terms of tracking how in a project management cycle fairness can be embedded; sometimes in the forms of mulling over how fairness is upheld or violated at various levels within an organization. Sometimes it was about looking at the very foundation of linguistic constructs which shape our ways of being, doing, imagining or inquiring. All these dilemmas were multi-dimensional and complex and often the action towards one dimension of the dilemma could lead to yet another dilemma in another dimension. Therefore, as our intention wasn't to provide a definition of fairness, mapping the main dilemmas that emerged throughout our inquiry helped us better understand the concept and its translation in the arena of cultural collaborations.

### Socio-cultural Dimension

The dilemmas in the sociocultural dimension often brought up questions regarding how we can better embrace diversity in our collaborations. For example, it was underlined that *concepts of time and work practices*, so culturally embedded in our practices, are often ignored or overlooked and yet often make or break collaborations. Another often-cited dilemma was related to *equal access to opportunities*. Developing new networks of people to engage in international cooperation takes time. With funding often guaranteed for short-term project-based collaborations, cultural relations organizations are under pressure to deliver, therefore often take shortcuts in the selection of their collaborators (Henze, 2018; Ouchati, 2022: 12). This creates a culture of selecting 'usual suspects' from existing networks, rather than opening up opportunities for new people. This is perceived as unfair by the sector. If an organization claims to value transparency, it often faces a dilemma regarding time. Yet, given this is an often-recurring issue, a systematic way for solving this is by doing an open call for collaborators

regardless of imminent projects and establishing up-to-date databases for future collaborators. Moreover, in some cases, programs are conceived in a unilateral way, neglecting the potential of working with the skills, knowledge and networks of local people in order to focus on *processes* and longer-term collaborations, rather than on short-term output-driven projects. The dilemma around the use of *language* in cultural collaboration was seen as critical. Organizations involved in cultural relations, although they often proclaim diversity and inclusion as their core values, tend to use English and other dominant languages to reach large audiences in different countries they collaborate with, mainly due to the lack of finance and/or time (Xue & Zuo, 2013). This dilemma reveals a deeper concern: the use of dominant languages creates power imbalances and might favor some people with privilege in certain contexts.

### Economic Dimension

Dilemmas situated in the economic sphere were mostly connected to issues of remuneration, fair distribution of funding and different understandings of value. The issue of *fair remuneration* remained the most frequently mentioned. There were several dilemmas raised, such as if an organization should remunerate consultants or artists according to the actual work done in relation to expertise, skills and knowledge or according to the economic context the collaborators come from and if the remuneration is appropriate to the funders context or that of the local context? With the growing group of mobile cultural operators, this dilemma becomes even more complex. Decisions on *funding allocation* can also lead to dilemmas for organizations that want to adopt universal policies for all their funding procedures. Can a grant-giving cultural relations organization foresee reimbursement for salaries and overhead costs of small NGOs in a country where there are no support systems for culture or do they have to apply their general international rules of only covering artistic work or project costs? The fact that many cultural relations organizations only *value cash contributions* and refuse to account for expertise, time or in-kind inputs, as an equivalent for monetary contributions in projects, is another example of how collaborations are not contextualized. Collaborations cannot be performed

in a fair manner when only the funder sets the rules of what is valued within the collaboration and what is not.

### **Ecological Dimension**

The dilemmas posed vis-à-vis ecological or environmental sustainability related issues had to do mainly with artistic mobility. While international travel for collaboration is considered a condition for effective collaborations, travel costs, time and CO2 footprint have raised various dilemmas among cultural operators. See for example the work undertaken by On-the-move for developing a Charter for Sustainable and Responsible Cultural mobility and efforts of other European cultural networks<sup>5</sup>, or its guide to environmentally sustainable mobility for performing arts published in cooperation with Julie's Bicycle (On-the-move 2011), but also van den Berg, 2015. Many organizations, especially following the Covid-19 pandemic, have reduced their traveling for financial and ecological consciousness reasons, however, they are not necessarily taking into consideration who are the ones that would mostly benefit from face-to-face encounters. Lázaro Gabino Rodríguez (2021), one of the driving forces behind the Mexican artists' collective Lagartijas tiradas al Sol, questioning of Jérôme Bel's call to reconfigure the world of the performing arts in view of the climate crisis explains well that such an approach is not putting the issue into context as it is coming from a privileged perspective. The dilemma posed is about how ecological fairness in collaborations can exist when the ecological crisis unfairly impacts those who have contributed least to its cause and how people from underprivileged contexts without correcting mechanism options can be accountable to adopt greener practices.

### **Technological Dimension**

The dilemmas posed in relation to fairness in cultural relations and their technological dimension became more visible during times of Covid-19, when collaborations quickly moved online. Digital Cultural Relations has even evolved into a new research agenda (British Council, 2022) This dilemma of *face-to-face versus virtual collaboration*

is understandably also related to the ecological dilemma. However, following Covid-19 and due to funding restrictions, online collaborations have become the new normal. Issues at stake are well described in the report on International Cultural Relations of Voices of Culture (Ouchati, 2022: 19) where we read that:

the digital acceleration that occurred during Covid, exacerbated existing inequalities, such as the global digital divide, both for the general public and cultural actors. It could not replace models like touring for performing artists; redirected money that would normally go to artists to digital platforms or production companies; and while some well-equipped organizations could adapt, others could not. Digital opportunities (and risks) need to be explored in more detail for what works in different art forms and in terms of research into digital security; funding; digital privacy and safety, digital carbon footprint, etc.

While on the one hand more online exchanges can open up opportunities for diverse interactions – for those who have access to technology -, on the other hand the decrease of face-to-face interaction might lead to a loss of deeper understanding of the cultural contexts people belong to, given that the interactions are less multi-dimensional and typically results in only the elites in that society being able to participate. Also access to technology cannot be taken for granted, therefore the digital divide poses some dilemmas on organizational aspects of cultural relations. Adding to this, in some countries access to the internet or to specific platforms might also be forbidden which results in further imbalances in regards to access to or even a complete exclusion from information.

### **Geopolitical Dimension**

The dilemmas raised in relation to the larger geo-political contexts focused a lot on issues of access and visa rights or moral questions around de-colonization. Decolonizing international cultural relations was a key value guiding our work but was also underlined by the people we interacted with. Of course, the work of decolonizing ICR is not a one-off event but an activist concept requiring the will and the commitment to seek out alternatives as well as vigilance within the entire process

including funders, core partners and all the beneficiaries and participants of the collaborations. The work of decolonizing is also not simply an organizational concern but a deeply personal or individual one. It asks that we acknowledge the historical, geographical and social situatedness of knowledge and the imbalances in how knowledge is produced and consumed and speak about restorative justice through cultural, psychological and economic freedom (Bonet and Schargorodsky, 2019).

A conscious reflection on the dilemmas, therefore, becomes a prerequisite for thinking, seeing, sensing, and doing things differently in cultural relations, which is exactly what we did while designing various parts of the final outcome of our work. It was also the recognition of both the generic and also very specific nature of the dilemmas of universal and unique contexts, that inspired the completely non-linear way that various parts of the 'Not a toolkit' was designed. This allows for someone to recognize the phase, state the nature of dilemmas they are confronted with at any given point in time and have the ability to have multiple pathways to navigate the various components of the toolkit. Asking pertinent questions about the context of those dilemmas is a starting point for better understanding and developing actions towards solving them. All the components begin and end with questions and throughout those components, questions become a navigational tool.

## Conclusion

Fairness in cultural relations is about acknowledging inequality and injustice not only in relation to the past and our histories, but also in relation to current ways of knowing and doing. It means that in our practice of cultural relations, we include the need for humility, recognition and public acknowledgement of one's positionality and deep respect for each other – having more 'ubuntu' in all that we do. This is also what we tried to do through the *Not a toolkit- Fair collaboration in cultural relations- a reflAction*, as well as to raise the relevant questions when considering fairness in our cultural relations practices.

Dilemmas will always exist. As change management guru Fons Trompenaars states, '*Dilemmas are human. The way we solve the dilemma*

is cultural'. In a way, how we approach those dilemmas, tells a lot about cultural differences and the values that are underpinning the actions of an individual or an organization. Reconciling them needs to happen within a larger framework of systems thinking. Engaging in international cultural relations is a process of profound exchange, where values influence our actions in an explicit or implicit way. These values manifest themselves especially during moments when difficult issues emerge. Thus, considering fairness to specific conditions and circumstances requires us to carefully address underlying questions about values. The fundamental dilemmas that emerge when the notion of fairness is considered have no easy solutions, but they can be addressed by revisiting our own positionality and demonstrating empathy and trust. Stepping into difficult conversations, as well as opening explorations and exciting collaborations give us the experience of what it means to solve problems together. The key in international cultural relations is not to change others, but to be willing to be changed.

## Notes

- 1 The other two authors were Cristina Farinha and Anna Steinkamp.
- 2 More info: <https://reshape.network/>
- 3 More info: <https://www.tillt.se/en-GB/about/what-is-tillt--40909506>
- 4 More info: <https://europeanspacesofculture.eu/>
- 5 More info: <https://on-the-move.org/resources/library/charter-sustainable-and-responsible-cultural-mobility>

## Bibliography

- Bacian, C. (2021) *Implementation of the European agenda for culture and of the EU strategy for international cultural relations*. European Parliamentary Research Service [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2022/734663/EPRS\\_STU\(2022\)734663\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2022/734663/EPRS_STU(2022)734663_EN.pdf) (date accessed 05/10/2022)
- Belfiore, E., Bennett, O. (2010) Beyond the "Toolkit Approach": Arts Impact Evaluation Research and the Realities of Cultural Policy-Making, *Journal for Cultural Research*, 14:2, 121-142
- Berger, M., Van der Plas, E., Huygens, C., Akrimi, N. and Schneider, C. (2008). *Bridge the gap or mind the gap? Culture in Western-Arab relations*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.

- Bonet, L. and Shargorodsky, H. (2019). The Challenges of Cultural Relations between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean, Quaderns Gescènec. Col·lecció Quaderns de Cultura n. 5. EULAC FOCUS Giving focus to the Cultural, Scientific and Social Dimension of EU – CELAC relations
- ICR Research, Natalia Grincheva, & Erik Vlaeminck. (2022). *Digital Cultural Relations: Literature Review (Version 1)*. British Council. Available online at: doi.org/10.57884/80JX-1F62 (date accessed 23/02/2023)
- British Council website. *Equality, Diversity and Inclusion*. URL <https://www.britishcouncil.org/about-us/our-values/equality-diversity-inclusion>.
- Cull, N.J. (2009). *Public diplomacy: lessons from the past. CPR perspectives on public diplomacy*. Los Angeles, CA: Figueroa Press.
- Creative Carbon Scotland (2021). *Culture/SHIFT methodology* <https://www.creativecarbonscotland.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/CultureSHIFT-methodology-2021-final.pdf> (date accessed 05/10/2022)
- Cummings, M. (2003). *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey*. Washington, D.C: Center for Arts and Culture.
- Damaso, M. (2021). Implementing the EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations – Toward a New Paradigm, Los Angeles: USC [https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/default/files/Implementing%20the%20EU%20Strategy\\_12.14.21.pdf](https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/default/files/Implementing%20the%20EU%20Strategy_12.14.21.pdf) (date accessed 05/10/2022)
- EUNIC (2016). *Cultural diplomacy as discipline and practice: concepts, training and skills – final report* conducted by the University of Siena. [https://www.cultureinexternalrelations.eu/downloader/download-file?file=2017/03/eunic\\_cultural\\_diplomacy\\_report\\_.pdf](https://www.cultureinexternalrelations.eu/downloader/download-file?file=2017/03/eunic_cultural_diplomacy_report_.pdf) (date accessed 05/10/2022)
- European Commission, (2016). *Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations* <https://culture.ec.europa.eu/policies/international-cultural-relations> (date accessed (05/10/2022).
- Farinha, C., Joffe, Magkou, M., A., Steinkamp, A., Thakurata, S., Verstraete, K. (2021). 'Fair Collaboration in Cultural Relations: A Provocation' a document commissioned by EUNIC <https://www.eunicglobal.eu/fair-collaboration> (date accessed 05/10/2022)
- Figuiera, C. (2017). A Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: towards an EU strategy for International Cultural Relations, by the European Commission, 2016. *Cultural Trends*, 26 (1), 81-85.
- Flandres Arts Institute (n/a). *Reframing the international*. <https://www.kunsten.be/en/research/internationaal-werken/re-framing-the-international/> (date accessed 05/10/2022)
- Gabino Rodríguez, L. (2021). Open letter to Jérôme Bel <https://e-tcetera.be/open-letter-to-jerome-bel/> (date accessed 05/10/2022).
- IETM, On the Move and Dutch Culture (2018). *Beyond Curiosity and Desire: Towards fairer international collaboration in the arts.*, <https://www.ietm.org/en/node/9051>. (date accessed 05/10/2022)



- Hampel, A. (2017). *Fair cooperation: a new paradigm for cultural diplomacy and arts management*. ENCATC Book Series Peter Lang
- Henze, R. (2018). *Introduction to International Arts management*, Wiesbaden: Springer
- Koivunen, Hannele and Marsio, Leena (2007). *Fair Culture: ethical dimension of cultural policy and cultural rights*. Publications of the Finish Ministry of Education. <https://bibalex.org/baifa/en/resources/document/449447> (date accessed 05/10/2022)
- Mark, S.L. (2009). *A great role for cultural diplomacy*. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael
- Melissen, J. (ed) (2005). *The new public diplomacy: soft power in international relations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mitchell, J.M. (1996). *International Cultural Relations*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Julie's Bicycle (2011). Green mobility- a guide to environmentally sustainable mobility for performing arts, On-the-move available at: [https://on-the-move.org/sites/default/files/library/OTM\\_green-mobility-guide\\_EN.pdf](https://on-the-move.org/sites/default/files/library/OTM_green-mobility-guide_EN.pdf) (date accessed 10/02/2023)
- Trompenaars, F. (n/a). How to use dilemmas to understand cultural differences, podcast available at <https://www.nexum.eu/podcast/how-use-dilemmas-understand-cultural-differences-wfons-trompenaars> (date accessed 05/10/2022)
- Nye, J.S. Hr (1990). *Born to lead. The changing nature of American power*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Ouchati, S. (eds) (2022). *Report of Voices of Culture Structures Structured Dialogue on International Cultural Relations* <https://voicesofculture.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/ICR-070622.pdf> (date accessed 05/10/2023)
- Paschalidis, G. (2009). Exporting national culture: histories of cultural institutes abroad. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 15 (3), 275-289.
- Pehn, G. (1999). *Networking culture: the role of European cultural networks*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
- Schneider, C. (2010). Cultural diplomacy: the humanizing factor. In SINGH, J. (eds) *International Cultural Policies and Power*, pp. 101–112. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Van den Bergh (2015). *Art for the planet's sake- Arts and environment*, IETM & COAL, available at [https://www.ietm.org/system/files/publications/ietm-art-for-the-planets-sake\\_jan2016.pdf](https://www.ietm.org/system/files/publications/ietm-art-for-the-planets-sake_jan2016.pdf) (date accessed 08.02.2023)
- UNESCO (1980). *1980 Recommendation Concerning the Status of the Artist*, Paris: UNESCO <https://en.unesco.org/creativity/governance/status-artist#> (accessed 05/10/2022).
- UNESCO (2005). *The Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions*, Paris: UNESCO
- UNESCO (2021). *Fair Culture – a key to sustainable development*, Prepared by the German Commission for UNESCO. [https://www.unesco.de/sites/default/files/2021-01/FairCulture\\_Discussion\\_Paper\\_Uni\\_Laval\\_DUK.pdf](https://www.unesco.de/sites/default/files/2021-01/FairCulture_Discussion_Paper_Uni_Laval_DUK.pdf) (accessed 05/10/2022)
- Xue, J., & Zuo, W. J. (2013). English Dominance and Its Influence on International Communication. *Theory and Practice in Language Studies*, 3, 2262-226



# QUESTIONS AND CONCEPTS TOWARD A BLURRED FUTURE: A NEW ROLE FOR CULTURE?<sup>1</sup>

SERHAN ADA

The contemporary human being is desperately climbing a slope that is crumbling. We are rushing forward only to stay in the same place, in a present that is constantly fleeing. For if we stop running even for one second, -running after work, after our emails, our appointments, our obligations, our money, after time that flies– we fall. Into unemployment, poverty, oblivion, and desocialization.

(Hartmut Rosa, interview with Frédéric Joignot,  
*le Monde magazine*, 28 August 2010)

It was only about a decade ago that the German philosopher and sociologist Hartmut Rosa, author of the book *Alienation and Acceleration- Towards a Critical Theory of Late-Modern Temporality*<sup>2</sup> said this in an interview. “Unemployment, poverty, oblivion, and desocialization”; these are what await humans of the Late Modern Age (which we also call the Anthropocene) who are trying to run after time –in vain. Rosa’s pessimistic predictions suddenly all came true with the Covid-19 pandemic and the lockdowns that ensued, leaving us all astounded at how it was possible. What had been talked about for some time but was not expected had happened; and all at once too. What was especially surprising was that the rapid pace came to a quick and sudden stop. We were faced with this sudden stop at an utterly unexpected moment, because the acceleration had continued even though we knew more or less that it was not sustainable. The global economy, stock markets,

social interaction all stopped. Humans living on the face of the earth started questioning the future in an unprecedented state of confusion, drawing on news and information from different sources. Yet there was one thing that was certain; and that was absolute uncertainty. Although post-pandemic prophecies came thick and fast, nobody knew how we were to get out of this situation, including scientists. Despite all the talk, the reopenings, the recovery predictions, etc. the only thing that was certain was uncertainty. How long was this period of being locked down at home, yet still connected, going to last? What kind of a new life, a new world, were we going to emerge into?

Actually, at the beginning, our hopes went up with some of the news that came during the first lockdown. Air pollution was decreasing, the seas looked bluer, and the threatening clouds over Delhi that made it difficult to breathe had dissipated. Perhaps, once the virus was gone (would it ever be gone?), we would live in a “cleaner” world after having learnt our lesson from what it had taught us. Nowadays, after more than a year and half has passed since the pandemic was officially recognized and declared as such, we are transitioning from lockdown to a kind of reopening without knowing how protective the vaccine will be against the new variants –a vaccine that has been unfairly distributed among the people living on earth. And the uncertainty and questions persist. While more than 4 million people have died –and primarily health-care workers and the most vulnerable social groups, and of course the elderly–there is an alarming increase in mental health issues such as anxiety, sleep disorders, and depression as a result of quarantine, social distancing and isolation. Not to mention news of an unprecedented heat wave nearing 50°C in the Pacific Northwest, while oceans where pipelines are laid on the seabed have caught fire. And Turkey surrendered to the mucilage that threatened the life of all living beings in and around the Sea of Marmara, which lies between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Inevitably, the question arises: will we just return to a life that is even worse than before without having learned anything from the pandemic?

While on the individual level we lived in isolation, we were actually at an intersection where we needed to reflect on developing practices of solidarity, or, more precisely, conviviality. In an environment where masks and distancing were imposed as prerequisites for survival for

each one of us, we all started perceiving one another –people like ourselves– as a threat, an “other”, especially if they came closer to us than the designated “safe” distance, and even more so if they were not wearing a mask. Meanwhile, the international media had turned its attention to the speed at which the pandemic was spreading, hospital occupancy rates, and the death toll which was mounting at a frightening pace. No one was quite in the mood to concern themselves with the root of the problem, i.e., how health care had been moved from being a social responsibility of the government and entirely handed over to the private sector; a problem which within the last few decades has become a global trend. In the meantime, what was happening in the world’s war and conflict zones was eclipsed by news about the pandemic. And there was not much mention about how the virus was spreading among those living in refugee camps. There is an image from that time that must have remained in our minds... Alarming news was coming from Lombardy in Italy, which was the epicenter of Covid-19 in Europe in March 2020. The memorable image was one of symbolic aid that came as Italy, the first country among members of the European Union to be hit by the waves of immigrants, was desperately calling for help and being met with a wall of negative responses, especially from Germany and the Netherlands (in a way that brings to mind the harsh, unpartnerlike response that Greece received in 2008). Doctors and nurses sent from Albania, the impoverished neighbor that was once even occupied by Italy, were sent on their way with a message from the prime minister Edi Rama saying “today we are all Italian”<sup>3</sup>. This diplomatic collaboration, which we witnessed in the field of healthcare, continued in the domain of culture, especially through initiatives by civil society such as the collective production of masks and supporting the elderly under lockdown. We were experiencing the concept of aid for development at a cross section where it had been taken out of the unidirectional North-South, East-West, or developed-developing paradigm, and a new conjuncture that operated bidirectionally was being imposed. We began to realize through experience that the concept we call equity should be built on solidarity and conviviality –but a conviviality not just among humans but all living beings. Perhaps we would come out of the pandemic having learned a few things. Perhaps the abrupt stopping and slowing down that had emerged with the pandemic would be the beginning of things changing.

Yet there were signs. Only 50 years ago, in 1971, the Club of Rome's "Limits to Growth" report, clearly stated that if population, production, industrialization, pollution, and consumption continued to accelerate at this pace, the earth's resources could no longer renew themselves. But it soon became obvious that this warning would be of no use. "... who is society? there is no such thing. There are individual men and women, and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look to themselves first..."<sup>4</sup> said Mrs. Thatcher, who is one of the founders of neoliberalism and gave her name to a form of government. Seeing that we had become individuals, then we had to fend for ourselves. Was it not taught to us all from the earliest days of Modernism that production, consumption, technology, and acceleration were all one and a whole and that they all meant irreversible progress? And yet, despite the signs of warning, the rulers of the world favored the economy over health and the environment. What mattered was that the wheels of production and retail kept turning at all costs. They even aimed, if possible, to turn the crisis into an opportunity. After all, don't we say economic recession rather than slowdown? Then let's continue to accelerate at this pace despite the pandemic... But at what cost?

Let us take a look at what has happened in the realm of cities. In the last 30-40 years, we have witnessed the rise of and dizzying race –another competition for acceleration– between metropolises, cosmopolitan cities, and megalopolises. Big cities have snatched away the lion's share of the population, the economy, social mobility and the production and consumption of culture, while leaving the majority of populations of entire territories in poverty, inequality, deprivation, as well as desolation. These big cities, or –to put it in terms frequently used by those of us working in the field of culture– the cities (or "capitals") of culture, have exploited, sucked up, and depleted the resources produced by all the people living in those countries. Everywhere in the world, practices applied by initiatives on cultural production and sustainable development have been extensively scrutinized. Nevertheless, it was big cities, in parallel with the accelerated lives within them, that received the heaviest blow during the Covid- 19 pandemic. Now, the time has come to put to a long rest, constructs such as the "creative city" or "creative class", whose authors themselves have recently begun to revise<sup>5</sup>. It is now time to focus on what kinds of action can be taken by cities of

smaller scale, which are not autarkic in the narrow sense, yet are viable and closely interact with healthy citizens who enjoy life. (In this regard, it is important to note that the long-term projects and collaborations with a wide variety of cities developed as part of the Agenda 21 for Culture constitute a major exception. Their websites not only provide information on emergency support offered to artists and those working in the field of culture, but also include many good examples that have developed from the bottom up). “We, the people, are the city. Through our beliefs, values and creative activities –our culture– we shape the city of stones and dreams.”<sup>6</sup> These are the two opening sentences of the 2020 Rome Charter signed by the many cities that are actively involved in the work of the UCLG Culture Committee. A year later, the Culture Summit convened in Izmir, where the concept of “circular culture” was put forward. In its Declaration, it said: “We invite all cities and local governments to place culture at the centre of local development, including the local achievement of the SDGs, the strategies on resilience and the plans on equity and the climate emergency...”<sup>7</sup> These two statements cannot be repeated often enough in terms of reminding us once again that demonstrating the willpower of a “we” to sustain life in cities would not be in vain, and that intangible values and the imagination are not futile things.

So, what did we do, as those being ruled, as the individuals who “must look to themselves”, in other words, as autonomous subjects? If there was no such thing as society, then we would try and hold on to communities. Our micro identities took on importance beyond anything else. But none of this has yielded any tangible results; not even the mass protests we occasionally see in various parts of the world, the resistances we demonstrated to defend spaces that should belong to everyone, to defend that which is public, i.e., the places that are ours. And this is where we are at now. Where can we go from here?

Until now, culture and nature have always been seen as opposite things. In fact, people have even resorted to approximations such as ‘everything outside nature’ when defining culture. So, we have carried out research, produced documents, and issued various publications in order to establish solid foundations for ensuring that culture is accepted as an essential component of sustainable development and included among the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. All of us involved, and

especially the UCLG, have devoted efforts toward this end on a wide variety of platforms. There are a great number of studies that can be cited as evidence to demonstrate the social and economic impact and spillover effects of cultural products and services. We cannot deny any of this. We must continue to work in this direction. In the meantime, people are struggling to make ends meet. We know that in Turkey alone, over a hundred musicians reached the edge of despair and committed suicide. The concept of “precariat” was deemed appropriate to describe the situation of those working in the field of arts and culture and the efforts spent in this field, and most analyses were based on this. But from now on, we will need to concentrate on expounding the concept of “survival” and figuring out how and under what conditions it can actually be possible. When it comes to cultural activities, there are two more criteria that need to be taken into account along with, and perhaps even more than, social and economic impact: and those are ecology and public health. Therefore, when it comes to sustainability, it is now time to rethink acceleration together with and based on nature’s own particular pace (a nature that includes not only underground and aboveground resources, but also bacteria and viruses), and also consider the cycles of life on earth and its ability to regenerate itself. We must continue to emphasize each and every day that culture, and primarily art, whether they are included in international documents or not, are to have a say in the sustainability of beauty and of life itself. As I stated in an article last year<sup>8</sup>, none of us foresaw that the Anthropocene would end so quickly. Yet, here we are, witnessing the sinking of an era: the dusk of the Anthropocene.

Uncertainty, anxiety, restlessness: These are the characteristics of the people of the Anthropocene. But since this era has come to its end, then it means that it is time to replace these characteristics with new ones. “Nothing is beautiful; man alone is beautiful: all aesthetic rests on this piece of ingenuousness, it is the first axiom of this science. And now let us straightway add the second to it: nothing is ugly save the degenerate man...” This is what Nietzsche wrote when he put forward the Will to power as a new concept in *Twilight of the idols* (in the chapter ‘Skirmishes in a war with the age’ -section 20)<sup>9</sup>. When power went beyond all acceleration, everything that humans created and all that surrounds them became unsustainable. Now, we are all experiencing

the outcome together. To pull through this, we need new concepts; we need a brand new language that does not rely on our old conventions. And this will be possible through new concepts i.e., the children of the creative imagination which gives birth to language. But how?

It has been three years since the pandemic struck. Its impact has yet to be fully assessed. Not only are we unable to accurately measure economic costs and human loss, we also do not know what sort of place the world is turning into. The virus, which, with its new variants, is once again hitting hard and spreading in waves from where it first emerged, the inadequacy of the healthcare system to keep up with the pace of the virus, not to mention the unfair war over vaccines that we have witnessed, have all led us to avoid talking about what kind of future awaits the earth and all living beings. Even the shock of all the fictional dystopias conceived to date is rapidly fading. The number of oppressive regimes is increasing by the day; the war in the north of Europe, where there had been no conflict for almost eighty years, is constantly escalated by all sides and has reached a level that threatens the continent and the entire world; and the number of immigrants is rising at a geometric rate. “Fundamental” concepts that had gained international currency following the major devastation caused by the Second World War, such as peace, international security, and “the dignity and worth of the human person, (...) the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small”, are now considered outdated and seen as recurrent stereotypes... “You have stolen my dreams and my childhood with your empty words”.<sup>10</sup> We have no answer that might contain fulfilling words to this sentence spoken by the young climate activist Greta Thunberg at the Climate Action Summit held at the United Nations in late 2019 just before the pandemic broke out. And we will have no answer unless we radically rethink our values and call into question the world system which we almost instinctively believe will persist. But where and how to begin?

First, we must start off with new concepts and questions. That is what I tried to do in this text. Although they have no definitions nor answers for now, I have no doubt that it is the right questions that will pave the way for new concepts. For this, I propose replacing Nietzsche’s Will to power with a different “Will” which will develop brand new concepts that favor beauty and life rather than the borrowed or customary

language that we are in the habit of using; I propose replacing it with the “Will to thought”.

## Notes

- 1 This article is based on a keynote talk given at the UCLG Culture Summit in Izmir on 9th September 2021 titled: “A New Sustainability and the Crucial Role of Culture” ([https://agenda21culture.net/sites/default/files/speech\\_izmircultsum2021\\_serhanada\\_en.pdf](https://agenda21culture.net/sites/default/files/speech_izmircultsum2021_serhanada_en.pdf))
- 2 Hartmut Rosa, *Alienation and Acceleration- Towards a Critical Theory of Late-Modern Temporality*, Aarhus, Aarhus University Press, 2010.
- 3 <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2020/03/28/albania-sends-30-doctors-and-nurses-to-italy-to-help-fight-the-covid-19-pandemic>
- 4 Douglas Keay, “Interview with Margaret Thatcher”, *Woman’s Own*, 17 November 1987.
- 5 Richard Florida, *The New Urban Crisis: How Our Cities Are Increasing Inequality, Deepening Segregation, and Failing the Middle Class-And What We Can Do about It*, New York, Hachette USA, 2018.
- 6 <https://www.agenda21culture.net/news/2020-rome-charter>
- 7 [https://www.uclg-culturesummit2021.org/YuklenenDosyalar/SabitVeriler/Izmir2021\\_statement\\_en.pdf](https://www.uclg-culturesummit2021.org/YuklenenDosyalar/SabitVeriler/Izmir2021_statement_en.pdf)
- 8 [https://agenda21culture.net/sites/default/files/serhan\\_ada\\_-\\_article\\_-\\_culture-covid19\\_-\\_eng.pdf](https://agenda21culture.net/sites/default/files/serhan_ada_-_article_-_culture-covid19_-_eng.pdf)
- 9 <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/52263/52263-h/52263-h.htm>
- 10 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TMrtLsQbaok>



# CONSTRUCTION OF EU NARRATIVE IN EXTERNAL CULTURAL RELATIONS

LJILJANA SIMIĆ

## Introduction

Construction of the European Union (EU) narrative, its development and its application are problematised and partially linked to cultural diplomacy capital. Narratives give meaning to the experience by mediating between an inner world of thoughts, an outer world of observable actions, and the current state of affairs. Creating EU narratives is a process that also depends on its external cultural relations as one of the primary purposes of cultural diplomacy, representing the EU's core strategy. The external cultural relations aim to encourage cultural cooperation based on values such as freedom of expression, human rights, the rule of law and peace between the EU member states and its partner countries.

The EU cultural diplomacy agenda is made of narratives from political – culture in external relations to institutional-inclusive cultural relations as a set of priorities for European foreign cultural policy – its instruments and programs. To balance the soft power projection dimension in EU cultural diplomacy policy and practice, Rogač-Mijatović (2021:17) proposes that:

it would be necessary to persist in advocating for a cultural perspective that would focus on collaborative approaches generated by cultural diplomacy projects. It would essentially incentivise a "new spirit of dialogue" between member states and third countries on the European path.

Since 2016 the EU's MS has been responsible for their cultural diplomacy. Moreover, as a transnational entity, the EU now accompanies external cultural relations. Furthermore, a significant contribution of the actions is the narrative of the EU's image abroad while promoting the EU motto – *United in diversity*. In short, cultural diplomacy is a battle of narratives, and those powers with more seductive narratives in international communication are more influential.

Two theorists have advanced effective ways of articulating the political dimensions of aesthetics. The first theorist Ankersmit (1996), distinguishes between mimetic and aesthetic approaches. He emphasises to the social sciences that there is always a gap between a representation and what it represents. However, on the other hand, aesthetic approaches recognise the difference between represented and representation as the exact location of politics. It consciously or subconsciously repeats former actions and expressions. Visual political communication is central to politics and plays a vital role in the phenomenon of political rhetoric.

The second theorist, Rancière (2004), expands on the significance of these links between aesthetics and politics. He explores how we negotiate the sensible world and what is arbitrarily but self-evidently accepted as thinkable, reasonable, and doable. The content and contours of politics are inevitably linked to how we, as political and cultural collectives, in this case, the EU – speak and visualise feelings about *ourselves and others*. Rancière stresses the aesthetic engagements with the political.

A survey of images and visibility's role in international relations can be found in Bleiker (2018). One of his early texts argues an aesthetic turn in studying international relations. Surveys show that images and visual artefacts are crucial in global politics.

The EU's external cultural relations influence its self-image and, thus, the EU's behaviour as a global actor. A common European identity is both possible and desirable and an inevitable part of the modern European cultural diplomacy practice. They also serve as sources of knowledge about European identity. It is a way of being and acting as the basis of its historical and geographical identity construction.

## Narratives: constructs of reality

In the case of the nation-state, narratives express a historically constructed social and political reality. On the other hand, EU narratives had to be created and distributed throughout the public sphere, before and after EU creation, to legitimise the new European project to replace market-based, economic narratives and justifications of unity. The European narrative is interesting as it has been constructed first to facilitate the process that would stimulate nation-states to give up full sovereignty and then to create conditions for the EU's self-representation in its external relations. As a result, the narratives have focussed on the positive roles of the EU. In this text, we will focus on the second aspect of EU narratives, those created to represent the EU in external relations, although many are also used to strengthen the EU's inner image in member states.

The following discussion explores the construction of narratives, focusing on their intercultural dimension and the links between official discourses and political practice. Breznik (2008) described that the construction of the nations is happening “with important assistance from cultural elites, cultural ideological apparatuses and cultural ideologies” and with “culture that is constantly producing institutions, ideological institutions which culture may offer to nation-state building projects helping the homogenisation of the nation”. Schmidt (2008) brought two discourses within a political community. First, *coordinative discourse* describes practices that occur within political institutions and get support from the actors who possess political knowledge and power. On the other hand, the public is addressed through *communicative discourse*, which seeks to convince individuals regarding the necessity of different policy approaches.

These types of communication play their part in constructing the EU's narratives in external relations, although coordinative ones are considered to have a more central role. A review of the EU narrative debates indicates that, first of all, crises and fears have dominated the EU discussions. As often stated, governments should have a narrative of the EU that better resonates with the citizens' concerns. Peace and financial protection have figured intensely in the French perspectives

(*L'Europe qui protège*). However, this also indicates that it is not pro-internationalisation or liberalisation. However, avoiding discussions about the EU's future also carries dangers that might result in a polarisation of the national narratives. Consequently, their construction has been much more top-down and characterised by a snowballing effect where shared narratives created in the past are continuously accrued with new institutionalised discourses.

## **Mapping EU narratives**

Moreover, political outcomes in external relations are subject to many more external constraints. Therefore, it is legitimate to map out how different EU narratives impact external relations and affect its policy outcomes.

Identifying the linkages between discourses within the five narratives facilitates potential influence on policy outcomes in EU external relations. Based on different studies, research and documents, five overarching narratives are identified: EU as a peacekeeper; EU as a Democratiser; EU good neighbourliness; EU as a security provider; EU as a well-being entity.

All of them are used in coordinative and communicative discourses, as the later analysis will present. The rationale is based on the vast discrepancy between the ambitious goals set out in narratives and the policy practice of the EU in its external cultural relations. Long-term cultural policy and discursive redefinition provide a dynamic context in which goals are renegotiated when political reality deviates from them. A clear pattern of downgrading ambitions when policy outcomes do not match them can be observed in the EU's external relations.

## **The EU as a promoter of peace**

Diez (2005) has argued that constructing “the narrative of Europe as a promoter of global peace is part of the more significant self-image of the EU as a normative power.” The EU uses various tools and

instruments to achieve this, including diplomacy, mediation, economic sanctions, and peacekeeping missions. The EU highly values human rights and democracy. Accordingly, it has developed comprehensive policies and instruments to promote these values within its member states and globally. It includes supporting democratic transitions in countries outside the EU, promoting respect for human rights, and protecting minorities and vulnerable groups. The EU is a significant player in global affairs and works closely with other international organisations to promote peace and stability.

### **The democratisation narrative**

Democracy is seen through communication and multilevel governance. According to the White Paper on a European Communication policy (European Commission: 2006: 6),

democracy cannot be achieved without building a communicative link with citizens. It involves promoting three broad principles: inclusiveness – political language should be accessible to the entire society; communication practices should be diverse and address and consider equally all the views expressed in public debate; citizens should have the opportunity to express their pictures to participate in political trials.

The EU provides significant financial and technical assistance to countries undergoing democratic transitions or seeking to consolidate their democracies. The EU provides funding and support to civil society organisations in countries worldwide. These organisations are critical in promoting democratic values and holding governments accountable. The EU's democratisation narrative is based on the belief that democracy, the rule of law, and human rights are essential for promoting stability, prosperity, and peace. While there is still much work to be done to promote these values both within the EU and globally, the EU's commitment to promoting democracy is a critical element of its foreign policy.

## **Good neighbourliness**

According to Agh (2010),

the EU's success is proving the EU's ability to act in a normative and civilian manner. The narrative that portrays the EU as a good neighbour is based on the belief that the EU should build or is striving to build a partnership with its neighbours, through which it could spread a series of universal norms and values.

The EU's Neighbourhood Policy aims to promote stability, prosperity, and security in the EU's neighbourhood by offering incentives for democratic and economic reforms, supporting civil society, and providing financial and technical assistance. The EU supports cross-border cooperation projects that promote good neighbourliness by bringing together communities on both sides of borders. These projects often focus on improving infrastructure, promoting economic development, and enhancing cultural exchanges. The EU works with its neighbours to address issues such as air and water pollution, biodiversity, and climate change. The official narrative acknowledges the mutual benefits of enhanced cooperation with the EU's neighbours. However, being a neighbour to the EU does not mean being a member of the EU. EU's norms, whether democratic, liberal, or economic, gain over the other's culture and values.

## **The Security narrative**

Regarding the EU's ability to provide security, the main idea is that political development depends on security assurance. The EU security narrative is complex and multifaceted. However, at its core, the EU security narrative is focused on protecting the EU and its citizens from various threats, including terrorism, cyber-attacks, organised crime, and instability in neighbouring regions. In recent years, the EU security narrative has also focused on addressing new and emerging threats, such as cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns. Cultural relations can contribute to addressing security fragility by facilitating an interpretation of the cultural dimensions of conflicts, responding to the

impact of conflicts on cultural heritage (e.g., through restoration, mapping, management, capacity-building), and strengthening prevention and restitution measures towards the illicit trafficking in cultural goods.

### **EU and the well-being of people around the world**

Promoting the well-being of its citizens is a narrative for the EU and has gained prominence in the social policy agenda in the last decade. However, in terms of practical outcomes, the most challenging narrative is on climate change which can include new indicators for economic performance and social progress that can provide a comprehensive picture of people's well-being.

The EU is one of the world's largest development assistance donors, providing funding and technical support to partner countries in health, education, agriculture, and governance. The EU has set ambitious targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, increasing renewable energy use, and promoting energy efficiency. Consequently, the construction of narratives has been much more top-down and characterised by a snowballing effect where shared narratives created in the past are continuously accrued with new institutionalised discourses. From the *communicative discourse* approach, political outcomes in external relations are subject to many more external constraints. Therefore, it is legitimate to map out how different EU narratives impact external relations and affect its policy outcomes. Furthermore, identifying the linkages between discourses within the five narratives facilitates the influence on policy outcomes in EU external relations, therefore, the results of external cultural relations.

Given the (re)emerging national (and regional or local) narratives on the one hand and the compelling case for (re)establishing a vision to maintain global influence on the other, strengthening the EU's symbolic and intercultural dimension could help reinforce cultural diplomacy. From *coordinative discourse*, the EU's basic narrative originates in the earliest days of European integration, and it portrays the EU primarily as a model for structural peace among states. This model is successful because it is based on interdependence and integration rather than on principles of territorial sovereignty and balance of power politics.

Instead of territorial sovereignty, the EU is based on the universal values of democracy, human rights, multilateralism and international solidarity. Such identity as a model for peace is still the primary message of the EU's external communications.

## The narrative of the EU's motto

The motto "United in diversity" (UinD) (Latin: *In varietate concordia*) is meant to represent EU beliefs, values and ideals formally. Mottos are often formulated in Latin and combined with a symbolic image. It is a slogan of the EU's active will and future-oriented intentions. It is a verbal key symbol. It is short and memorable to express the goals of the collective EU. It also represents how the EU understand itself but also its image. It is also a narrative to unite, for example. Furthermore, the EU motto appears on all official websites and official rhetorics. Finally, a motto is a tool for branding.

Analysing this change from "Unity" into "United" could bring a new understanding of the facts that might not have a positive effect taking the historical aspects. The same goes for "difference" to "diversity", indicating more multicultural aspects of the EU. So, concluding further, diversity is making the political choice of the EU. The word 'In' seems to combine aspects of a 'through' and 'by', making diversity sustainable with a feature of future action in accomplishing it. The motto is presented as the European motto more than the EU motto. EU is a geographic, political and economic entity, but the EU motto emphasises one more aspect: the cultural one of being and acting together on a European level.

Delanty and Rumford (2005: 7) distinguish four ways to conceive the relationship between unity and diversity:

(1) *diversity as a derivative of unity* (as in ideas of the historical heritage of Greek-Roman and Christian culture); (2) *unity as a derivative of diversity* (in the cultural policy project of overcoming differences through intercultural understanding and cosmopolitanism); (3) *unity as diversity* (where diversity itself is not to be overcome but rather to be acknowledged in a postmodernist fashion); and (4) *a self-limiting unity* (a



post-national position where a minimal kind of unity is formed out of an active engagement with diversity).

The authors are sceptical that it denies the possibility of a European identity since this will always be in danger of undermining national diversity. The authors see political, class, gender and lifestyle differences within nations as more significant than between countries. They argue for “creating new spaces for communication that do not fix identities but open up for an unfinished project of social justice, cosmopolitan identity (hybrid identity) and dialogue.”

Another critical point in analysing the intercultural aspect of “UinD” is that some nations include a measure of transnational orientation. For example, in Atatürk’s time, Turkey used a more externally oriented axis: ‘Peace at home, peace in the world’ (*‘Yurtta such, cihanda sulh’*). The European motto is turned more internally acknowledging plurality within itself with no relation to the rest of the world.

The EU motto indicates that diversity is the leading resource for unifying European nations and is diversity-friendly with linguistic and cultural differences. Whereas the US motto aims at [a] unity created from a diversity of states, the EU put any further unity under the condition of a maintained diversity amongst the states.

Since 1958, the ‘EU Presidency rotates among MS every six months. Every time MS comes with a particular motto and logo that aim to reflect the important current task. That task is to add the current yearly narrative. 2006, Austria used *‘Partnership for a social future’*, and in 2007, Germany used three different slogans: *‘Europe – succeeding together’*, *‘Living Europe safely’* and *‘Europe – a partner for sustainable global development’*. Portugal in 2007 had *‘A stronger Union for a better world’* or the Czech presidency in 2009 opened up again with *‘A Europe without barriers’*, and Sweden in 2009 connected to by its *‘Openness, effectiveness and dialogue’*. EU is a supra-ideological construct in permanent change, and all slogans reflect the current political moment.

## EU cultural relations as decolonising narrative

The EU's external cultural relations are part of power relationships only if done through intercultural strategies in all international cooperation and involving local actors in equal dialogue. In this regard, the role of the EU Delegation (EU Del) is essential. When involving local partners and adapting the general policy frameworks to their contexts, EU Del decolonises praxis from the institutional and organisational points of view. EU Del, with multidisciplinary agenda mixing historical, sociological, cultural and political approaches, should discuss and manage European colonial memories.

However, the postcolonial agenda needs a solid intercultural dimension (Zamorano 2016: 166-186). External EU cultural relations would help improve those from a macro perspective with strategies and policy narratives and as a new push to the EU narrative. If so, the new EU narrative should become more inclusive and closer to the *United in Diversity* motto.

External cultural relations should have bottom-up initiatives, co-creation and capacity building. It is on that way, creating and establishing the way toward more horizontal relations with partners. "Multilateralism's return to realist politics has switched the discourse toward terms such as "the language of power" or a "geopolitical Commission"<sup>1</sup>. The culture and arts are the tools for challenging EU representations and their meanings. If art and cultural projects are pieces that brought the "colonial gaze" to the European collective imagination, they are also a critical space for decolonial discussion. It is essential for the EU external relations to re-write colonial memories, challenging stereotypical MS representations and re-thinking its symbols. It represents a social innovation and change tool for external EU services. If the EU is willing to engage differently in decolonising culture, it can be done with more intercultural co-creation. European external action services (EEAS) also need to practice what they preach in cultural terms and, therefore, present their solutions to future cultural challenges in a self-critical manner.

Europeans today are critically aware of the legacies of their histories in both their positive and negative aspects, including the colonial past. Mutual understanding will only be improved through a deep knowledge of one's and others' cultures. Europeans need to take

the time to respectfully listen to others as much as they communicate freely with them.

### **The Narrative of European intercultural citizenship**

The link between multicultural societies and citizenship is linked to identity politics. Identity is a result of social and cultural interaction, which has always been contextual. The nature of identity is dialectical as far as taking into account identification and differentiation. It means that individuals can see their differences only through others. Identity is a changeable category because sociological, biological and historical facts are dynamic. In the book *'Soi-même comme un autre'* Ricoeur (1990) analyses personal and narrative of identities – sameness on one side and selfhood on the other. He claims that we need two at the same time to understand ourselves.

The main narratives of the EU, although not formatted as stories, are “the story of a successful common market”, “the cultural story of a shared past”, and “the story of a new social bond of diversity” (Sassatelli, 2008). Based on his opinion, the idea of European cultural space “was never enough to define the socio-cultural reality”. Such a collective identity still searches for boundaries between geography as a space and project as a vision.

### **The narrative through cultural and art management**

At the beginning of the 1990s, the EU administration began to differentiate Europe by Macro regions – Central Europe, Baltic states, Southeast Europe (later on broken down to East and West Balkans), and Eastern Europe (Dragicević Šešić & Dragojević, 2005:7). Since their borders are based on the national borders of the countries that form, from the perspective of cultural policy, the notion of cross-border regions seems more open for intercultural dialogue, a way towards the *New Regionalism* Brenner et al. (2003) Europe and the EU need a new political vision and concept for political integration.

Bringing Cummings (2003:2) definition of cultural diplomacy as “*the exchange of ideas, information, art*” is helping to broaden “*the other*

*aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding*". In principle, some elements of each of these definitions: intervention in the arts, sciences and other cultural expressions, might be the basis of an official categorisation of national identity.

Analysing different dimensions of external perceptions of 'the EU' and 'Europe', the notion of 'Europe' has often been used in EU treaties. It is associated with a set of historical, cultural and geographical values. In such official narratives, 'Europe' is presented as the objective of the EU and its political legislation. Even so, these narratives are not defining 'Europe'.

### **The narrative of the values**

The role of values in the debate about the EU focuses on two related questions. The one is about the nature of European discourse – normative or rational, as the values European institutions identify as principles of transparency and dialogue. The other one is the absence of a European public space which reflects a need for more political community.

The first suggests a definition of European values through debate. The second means offers institutionally predefined European values. The central values of the EU are referred to as global, which also belong to non-Europeans. This approach also shows the limits of the self-proclaimed cosmopolitanism of the EU through the resilient claim for authorship of universal values. European values are described as "shared" and "common".

The document '*Values in the EU Policies and discourse*' (2016:4) recommends "launching a discussion on what European values are and integrating them consistently in future communication activities" <sup>2</sup>.

Isar (2014) focuses on the agenda-setting complexity processes in the evolution of the culture in external relations agenda by the need to reshape the European narrative "*in a pattern rather distinct from how national governments elaborate cultural diplomacy*". It looks like a unique occasion to promote EU cultural diplomacy values.

Borrell, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, focuses on specific changes in EU diplomacy. First, EU diplomacy, in his opinion,

must evolve into full political representation and ‘real diplomacy’. However, with all current deficiencies, the EU is still the most desirable way of organising human societies. It puts humans in the centre and supports progress not only for Europe but also for the future of humanity.

## Conclusion

The challenge of an EU strategy for international cultural relations in a multipolar world would be to achieve a more inclusive image. EU can then tackle inequality, consolidate its economy, reshape its actions, and imprint on the international scene. Given the (re)emerging national (and regional or local) narratives on the one hand and the compelling case for (re)establishing a vision to maintain global influence on the other, strengthening the EU’s symbolic and intercultural cultural dimension could help reinforce cultural diplomacy.

The EU’s basic narrative originates in the earliest days of European integration. It portrays the EU as primarily a model for structural peace among states. This model is successful because it is based on interdependence and integration rather than on principles of territorial sovereignty and balance of power politics. Instead of territorial sovereignty, the EU is based on the universal values of democracy, human rights, multilateralism and international solidarity. This identity as a model for peace is still the primary message of the EU’s external communications. The problem is that the projection of the EU’s identity requires it to present a more unified image abroad. However, at the same time, this increased international visibility will reduce the normative foundation for projecting EU values. The value-based discourse with EU narratives means cultural diplomacy is targeted abroad with its local dimension, as cultural diplomacy is a battle of narratives.

## Notes

- 1 *EU External Cultural Action: decolonising the Praxis? Culture Solutions*. [online] Available at: <https://www.culturesolutions.eu/articles/eu-external-cultural-action-decolonising-the-praxis/> [Accessed 7 Apr. 2023].

- 2 Values in the EU policies and discourse. <https://www.cairn.info/revue-les-cahiers-du-cevipol-2016-3-page-5.htm>, [Accessed 6 Apr. 2023].

## Bibliography

- Agh, A., (2010). *Regionalisation as a Driving Force of EU Widening: Recovering from the EU "Carrot Crisis" in the "East."* *Europe-Asia Studies*, 62 (8), p. 1239-1266.
- Ankersmit, F. (1996). *Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy Beyond Fact and Value*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, p. 33-55.
- Bleiker, R. (2018). The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 30.3 (2001): p. 509-533; *Visual Global Politics*. London: Routledge
- Breznik, M. (2008). Cultural identities from the bottom up-labour relations perspective. *Cultural Identity, Politics in the (Post-) transitional Societies: Cultural Transitions in Southeastern Europe*, p. 127-140.
- Cummings M., Jr., (2003). *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey*, Washington, DC: Center for Arts and Culture, p. 2.
- Delanty G., Rumford C., (2005). *Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization*, New York: Routledge.
- Diez, T., (2005). Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering Normative Power Europe. *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*, 33(3), 613-636.
- Dragičević-Šešić M., Dragojević S., (2006), Imagined or Real Divides? In, Meinhof, Ulrike Hanna and Triandafyllidou, Anna (eds.) *Transcultural Europe: Cultural Policy in a Changing Europe*. Basingstoke, UK. Palgrave Macmillan, p. 2-8.
- Isar R. I. et al. (2014). *Preparatory Action – Culture in EU External Relations*. Engaging the World towards Global Cultural Citizenship. EU 2014
- Rancière, J. (2004). *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible*. Translated by Gabriel Rockhill. London: Continuum, p. 7-15.
- Ricœur P., (1990). *Soi-même comme un autre*, Seuil.
- Rogač Mijatović Lj., (2021). Kultura u spoljnim odnosima Evropske Unije – ka novoj paradigmi kulturne diplomatije? *Kultura* n. 173, 9-20.
- Sassatelli, M. (2008). European cultural space in the European cities of culture: Europeanization and cultural policy. *European Societies*, 10(2), 225-245.
- Schmidt, J. R., (2008). Why Europe Leads on Climate Change. *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 50(4), 83-99.
- Zamorano M. M., (2016). Reframing Cultural Diplomacy: The instrumentalisation of Culture under the Soft Power history, *Culture Unbound*, 8, 166-186.

### Webography:

- Aesthetic Turn in International Relations*. [online] Available at: <https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0236.xml>. [Accessed 24 Mar. 2023].
- Values in the EU policies and discourse. A first assessment. *Les Cahiers du Cevipol*, 3, 5-52. Calligaro, O., Coman, R., Foret, F., Heinderyckx, F., Kudria, T. & Perez-Seoane, A. (2016). <https://www.cairn.info/revue--2016-3-page-5.htm>. [Accessed 12 Mar. 2023].
- Cultural diplomacy and the United States government: a survey*. (n.d.). Available at: <https://www.americansforthearts.org/sites/default/files/MCCpaper.pdf>. [Accessed 29 Mar. 2023].
- EU External Cultural Action: decolonising the Praxis? Culture Solutions*. [online] Available at: <https://www.culturesolutions.eu/articles/eu-external-cultural-action-decolonising-the-praxis/> [Accessed 7 Apr. 2023].
- White Paper on a European Communication policy* (European Commission: 2006: 6), Available at: [https://europa.eu/documents/comm/white\\_papers/pdf/com2006\\_35\\_en.pdf](https://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com2006_35_en.pdf). [Accessed 6 Apr. 2023].

# KULTURNA DIPLOMATIJA IZ PERSPEKTIVE AUDIO-VIZUELNOG SERVISA EVROPSKE KOMISIJE

ALEKSANDRA KRSTIĆ

## Uvod

Jedan od glavnih ciljeva Evropske unije (EU) u poslednjih dvadesetak godina je bio da se poveća interesovanje medija i građana o EU temama i da se aktivnosti EU institucija približe javnosti. Zato su EU institucije posle 2000. temeljnije počele da definišu i sprovode svoje komunikacione aktivnosti usmerene i prema građanima, i prema medijima. Komunikacione aktivnosti Evropske unije i njenih institucija deo su šire institucionalne komunikacije EU koja se, pre svega, odnosi na tri glavne oblasti: na pitanja dostupnosti dokumenata i informacija, odnosno pitanja transparentnosti EU, zatim na profesionalne odnose s javnošću i strateško komuniciranje institucija, i na samu političku retoriku, odnosno komunikaciju na nivou političkog upravljanja EU i pojedinačnim institucijama (Brüggemann, 2005).

Za odnose sa medijima danas u svakoj EU instituciji postoje odeljenja za komunikaciju sa medijima, na primer različiti direktorati, mnogobrojne službe portparola i posebna odeljenja koja imaju zadatak da obaveštavaju novinare o događajima u tim institucijama i pomažu im, između ostalog, u prikupljanju informacija i intervjuisanju sagovornika. Jedan od pokušaja EU institucija da, s jedne strane, obezbede kvalitetnije novinarsko izveštavanje i, s druge, povećaju sopstvenu transparentnost jeste i osnivanje audio-vizuelnih servisa. To su posebna odeljenja pri Evropskoj komisiji, Evropskom savetu, Savetu Evropske unije i Evropskom parlamentu koja proizvode različite medijske sadržaje. Audio, foto



i video materijal, snimljen na važnim događajima, distribuira se satelitskim prenosom ili preko onlajn platformi. Novinari mogu da preuzimaju materijal i da ga preoblikuju u skladu sa uređivačkom politikom kuće u kojoj rade. Na taj način više ne moraju fizički da prisustvuju događajima da bi o njima izveštavali, zato što su glavne institucije EU postale kreatori medijskog sadržaja koji se besplatno distribuira medijima i najširoj publici (Krstić, 2020).

Komunikacione strategije i aktivnosti EU se često istražuju, i to sa aspekta odnosa portparola EU institucija i novinara, iskustava dopisnika iz Brisela i vidljivosti EU u medijima. Dosadašnja istraživanja (De Vreese 2001, 2002; Peter et al. 2003; Machil et al. 2005; Bijsmans and Altides 2007 itd.) pokazuju da se o EU izveštava retko, površno, bez dublje novinarske analize. Među razlozima nezainteresovanosti medija da prate EU teme su i komplikovane procedure EU institucija koje novinari često ne razumeju (Balčytienė and Vinciūnienė 2010), kao i problemi u komunikaciji sa portparolima sa kojima se suočavaju dopisnici u Briselu (Lloyd and Marconi 2014). Prema Laursenu (Laursen 2012), pojedine studije koje se bave komunikacionim aktivnostima institucija EU tretiraju institucije najčešće kao „EU“ ili „EU institucije“, iako je svaka „odgovorna za organizaciju sopstvene komunikacije“.

S druge strane, audio-vizuelni servisi, kao jedan od ključnih elemenata komunikacionih aktivnosti EU institucija, izostaju iz pažnje istraživača. Jedno od retkih istraživanja (Krstić i Milojević 2013) koje ispituje da li, i kako, novinari koriste materijal audio-vizuelnih servisa sprovedeno je na osnovu ankete sa novinarima iz 41 lokalnog medija u 25 opština i gradova u Srbiji. Ovo istraživanje pokazuje da je tek 27% lokalnih novinara čulo za audio-vizuelne servise institucija EU. Sedmoro anketiranih „nije umelo da odgovori šta su tačno ti servisi i čemu oni služe“, dok su ostali ispitanici u audio-vizuelne servise uvrstili i druge evropske medije, na primer Dojče vele, ili nejasno upućivali na druge veb-sajtove. Za razliku od srpskih novinara, izveštači iz zapadnoevropskih medija smatraju da je najveća prednost sadržaja emitovanog preko audio-vizuelnih servisa to što, u poređenju sa alternativnim izvorima dostupnim na internetu, garantuju kredibilitet informacija i izvora (Eurobarometer, 2016).

Ovaj rad razmatra način na koji Evropska komisija (EK), kao „pokretačka snaga“ i izvršno telo EU (Borhart 2013) definiše i sprovodi

komunikacione aktivnosti usmerene prema medijima i novinarima koji izveštavaju o EU temama, posebno o temama poput kulturne diplomatije. U radu se EK posmatra, pre svega, kao izvor informacija i kreator medijskog sadržaja. Rad nastoji da ispita kako Komisija, posredstvom audio-vizuelnog servisa, kreira sopstvenu institucionalnu sliku i širu predstavu o EU, kao i da istraži na koji način organizacioni i uređivački aspekti mogu da utiču na proizvedeni medijski sadržaj u vezi sa temom kulturne diplomatije.

## Komunikacione aktivnosti Evropske komisije

Komunikacione aktivnosti Evropske komisije definisane su u širem regulatornom okviru. Strategija iz 2001, „Ka e-Komisiji: strategija 2001–2005“ (EU Commission 2001), ukazala je na potrebu za većim učešćem zemalja članica u komunikacionim aktivnostima EU, a posebno za modernizacijom unutrašnje administracije i povećanom komunikacijom sa spoljnim partnerima (Constantin 2011). „Bela knjiga o evropskoj vladi“ (EU Commission 2001), usvojena iste godine, uspostavila je nova pravila za pristup građana dokumentima Komisije i naglasila razvoj interaktivnog odnosa javnosti sa institucijama preko veb-sajta [www.europa.eu](http://www.europa.eu). U toku 2005. Komisija je usvojila „Akcioni plan za poboljšanje komuniciranja Evrope“, koji je imao važnu ulogu u kontekstu izborâ za Evropski parlament koji su se održali godinu dana ranije i na kojima učešće građana nije bilo na zavidnom nivou (Constantin 2011: 39). Glavni nedostaci u dotadašnjoj komunikacionoj politici odnosili su se, pre svega, na neusaglašeno i nejedinstveno komuniciranje, politizovane poruke neusaglašene sa potrebama građana i neadekvatno sprovođenje prethodno usvojenih strategija i dokumenata. U tom smislu, Komisija je, bar u regulatornom smislu, počela da se fokusira na građane, kao i na profesionalizaciju osoblja (Krstić 2020). „Bela knjiga o evropskoj komunikacionoj politici“ iz 2006. (EU Commission 2006) trebalo je da unapredi komunikaciju svih nivoa vlasti u EU, a dokument „E-Komisija 2006–2010“ (EU Commission 2006a) da naglasi upotrebu informaciono-komunikacionih tehnologija u komuniciranju EU tema i vrednosti. U drugim dokumentima, kao što su „Komuniciranje Evrope u partnerstvu“

(EU Commission 2007) i „Komuniciranje o Evropi putem interneta – uključivanje građana“ (EU Commission 2007a) ističe se potreba da se građanima omogući da daju svoje mišljenje o određenim odlukama i politikama.

Možda najvažnija strategija sa medijskog aspekta je „Komuniciranje Evrope putem audio-vizuelnih medija (EU Commission, 2008) iz 2008, koja prepoznaje potencijal nacionalnih elektronskih medija u promovisanju evropskih vrednosti. Pored toga, kada je 2010. dopunjena „Direktiva o audio-vizuelnim medijskim uslugama“, Evropska komisija je na taj način obuhvatila i propise koji se odnose na ulogu nacionalnih država u oblasti medijskih politika, a pre svega na usklađivanje propisa kojim se obezbeđuje kulturna raznolikost u oblasti medija (Krstić 2020). I posebnim programom „Evropa za građane“, koji je trajao od 2014. do 2020, Evropska komisija je istakla, bar deklarativno, posvećenost u negovanju kulture sećanja, istorijske aspekte stvaranje Evrope za sve građane i, pre svega, participacije građana u kulturnoj saradnji kao obliku demokratskog angažmana. Pomenute strategije i dokumenta, usvajani u relativno kratkom razmaku, pokazuju težnju Komisije da se na regulatornom, odnosno institucionalnom nivou definiše i uspostavi efikasnija komunikacija sa medijima i građanima, ali i podstakne šira debata o saradnji u oblasti kulture.

Sa druge strane, glavnim EU institucijama se često zamera da se previše fokusiraju na organizacione aspekte rada. Mejer (Meyer 1999, 2009) smatra da je komunikacija Evropske komisije sa medijima na niskom, odnosno prosečnom nivou. Osoblje zaduženo za odnose sa medijima kritikuje se zbog toga što novinare posmatra kao „klijente kojima portparoli prodaju poruke određene institucije“ (Balčytienė et al. 2007: 14). „Logički konflikt“ koji postoji između novinara i pres-sluzbe EK dodatno komplikuje izveštavanje o EU. Na primer, Komisija u saopštenjima za medije insistira na procesima u kojima se naglašava uloga institucije, dok novinari više izveštavaju o nacionalnim aspektima i ne ističu ulogu Komisije u pitanjima koje obrađuju.

Za komunikacione aktivnosti Evropske komisije zadužen je Generalni direktorat za komunikacije (DG Communication). Glavna uloga direktorata je da komunicira sa medijima, društvenim i političkim akterima i građanima o različitim aspektima Evropske unije, njenim politikama i aktivnostima. Direktorat definiše i nadgleda aktivnosti u vezi

sa predstavljanjem Komisije u širem smislu, pomaže javnosti da razume evropske teme i izveštava EK o mogućem ugrožavanju institucionalne reputacije. U okviru Generalnog direktorata radi i Služba portparola, čiji je zadatak da informiše medije o politikama i aktivnostima Komisije, predstavlja pojedinačne zvaničnike EK u medijima, razvija medijsku strategiju institucije i pojedinačnih država članica. Službu portparola čine glavni portparol Komisije, dva zamenika, dva koordinatora, dvanaest portparola i trideset predstavnika za odnose sa medijima.

Međutim, ako se pogleda iznutra, neki autori (na primer, Christiansen 2001) ukazuju na to da nedostaci u pogledu komunikacione politike Evropske komisije potiču upravo iz „tenzija“ unutar te institucije. Te tenzije između različitih tela, portparola i direktorata utiču na fragmentaciju poruka i komunikacionu politiku uopšte. Naime, priroda ove institucije, opterećene hijerarhijom i birokratijom, jeste takva da između generalnih direktorata i drugih tela koje su u njihovoj nadležnosti vlada stalna napetost, a često se na samu Komisiju gleda kao na „multiorganizaciju“ (Christiansen, 2001: 751). Isti autor smatra da se stvari nisu mnogo promenile ni sa padom Santerove, a kasnije i mandatom Prodi-jeve Komisije, jer ni jedan ni drugi, kao šefovi ove važne institucije tokom devedesetih i početkom dvehiljaditih godina nisu uspjeli da utiču na poboljšanje situacije i smirivanje unutrašnjih tenzija između pojedinih sektora i nadležnosti.

U nadležnosti Generalnog direktorata za komunikacije Evropske komisije nalaze se dva audio-vizuelna servisa: jedan je „Europe by Satellite“ (EbS), a drugi onlajn audio-vizuelni servis Komisije (<http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/>). EbS je zvaničan interinstitucionalni servis ili krovni emiter koji preko satelita prenosi događaje iz glavnih EU institucija, ali i Evropske centralne banke, Suda pravde i Revizorskog suda. Drugi, onlajn audio-vizuelni servis, koji je predmet ovog rada, nudi obilje materijala koji novinarima može da pomogne u izveštavanju o EK. Novinarima su na raspolaganju dva televizijska i jedan radijski studio kako bi snimili intervju sa zvaničnicima Komisije. Video-materijal se proizvodi na svim zvaničnim jezicima EU, a emituje se i na onlajn kanalu „EUtube“. Usluge su u početku bile namenjene novinarima iz manjih evropskih država i medijima koji zbog nedostatka novca nisu mogli da priušte dopisništva u Briselu. Danas materijal koriste i tradicionalni i novi mediji, a dostupan je i na društvenim mrežama (Krstić 2020).

Prethodna istraživanja (Krstić 2016; Krstić 2020: 92) pokazuju da medijski sadržaj proizveden i emitovan na kanalu audio-vizuelnog servisa Evropske komisije „naglašava ulogu Evropske komisije u rešavanju aktuelnih pitanja, problema i izazova u Uniji i njen doprinos razvoju saradnje u društveno-ekonomskim aspektima“, i to u oblastima kao što su borba protiv siromaštva, ekonomska i investiciona politika, proširenje EU, zaštita radnika, industrije i kulturnih delatnosti itd. Bez obzira na to koja tema je u pitanju, audio-vizuelni servis EK pristupa sa stanovišta institucionalnog komuniciranja i odnosa s medijima i javnošću, odnosno sa „aspekta uloge Komisije u rešavanju društveno-ekonomskih problema i u tom smislu sa aspekta razvoja saradnje država članica EU i drugih država“ (Krstić 2020: 92).

## **Kulturna diplomatija Evropske unije – terminološka zbrka**

Savremena akademska i stručna literatura ukazuje na to da ne postoji jedinstvena definicija pojma kulturne diplomatije. U kontekstu izučavanja Evropske unije i pre svega njenog komunikacionog aspekta, mnoga pojmovna određenja su se menjala tokom vremena. Suštinski, u pitanju je „razmena ideja, informacija, vrednosti, sistema, tradicija, verovanja i drugih aspekata kulture, sa namerom unapređenja zajedničkog razumevanja“ (Cummings 2003: 1, prema Udovčić i Podgornik 2016). Neki autori smatraju da je pojam kulturne diplomatije dvosmislen, izuzetno nejasan i preširok (Trobbiani 2017).

Kulturna diplomatija se, u kontekstu izučavanja Evropske unije, posmatra ili kao jedan širi koncept koji podrazumeva podršku kulturi kao jednom od glavnih elemenata razvoja, razmene ideja, dijaloga među ljudima i izgradnje kapaciteta institucija, ili kao instrument kojim se EU brendira i gradi svoj imidž prema svetu. U zvaničnim dokumentima EU često se kao glavni cilj kulturne diplomatije navodi povezivanje, osnaživanje i promocija ljudskih prava, stabilnosti i međukulturnog dijaloga unutar granica EU. U komunikacionim strategijama Evropske komisije koje promovišu koncept kulturne diplomatije jasno je naznačeno da se kultura posmatra kao pokretač održivog društvenog i ekonomskog

razvoja, međukulturnog dijaloga i saradnje. Kao instrument izgradnje imidža EU, kulturna diplomatija se posmatra kao dobar način da se komunicira o evropskoj kulturnoj produkciji, imidžu Unije kao mestu u kome se neguje međukulturna i međunacionalna saradnja. U tom pogledu, postoje brojni primeri kulturnih manifestacija koje „brendiraju“ kulturne vrednosti EU, poput filmskih i muzičkih festivala i drugih kulturnih događaja kojim se EU povezuje sa drugim regionima i državama van teritorije EU.

Tokom 2007. donesena je jedna od najvažnijih komunikacionih strategija Evropske komisije o Evropskoj agendi za kulturu u globalizovanom svetu, dokument koji je, kad je reč o kulturnoj diplomatiji EU, vrlo brzo postao neka vrsta krovnog pravilnika. U tom dokumentu je jasno naznačena uloga Komisije kao glavne institucije koja predlaže državama članicama ciljeve koje treba dostići na kulturnoj agendi. Prema Isaru (2015: 501), glavni stožer nove agende bili su promocija kulturnog diverziteta i međukulturnog dijaloga, promocija kulture kao pokretača kreativnosti i, na kraju, kao ključnog elementa u međunarodnim odnosima Evropske unije. Upravo je ovaj treći oslonac kasnije preimenovan terminom „kultura u spoljnim odnosima EU“, koji je u zvaničnom jeziku EU zamenio dotadašnju „kulturnu diplomatiju“.

Godine 2017. Savet ministara EU je, na osnovu preporuke Evropske komisije, usvojio set zaljučaka o „Kulturi u spoljnim odnosima EU“, koja se zasniva na politikama uključivanja različitih aktera u kulturi, promociji kulturnog diverziteta i pre svega na isticanju uloge pojedinačnih država članica u oblikovanju kulturne diplomatije Unije. U preporukama Evropske komisije se posebno ističe uloga kulturne diplomatije u komuniciranju EU ali, što primećuje Trobijani (Trobbiani 2017), izostaje jasna definicija samog koncepta kulturne diplomatije u kontekstu same Evropske unije kao nadnacionalne organizacije, kao i jasniji fokus o različitim aspektima saradnje koja bi trebalo da bude sastavni deo promišljanja i delovanja u okvirima kulturne diplomatije EU. Zanimljivo je da su kritički glasovi, poput Trobijanijevog, retki u literaturi koja se bavi ovom temom. On, u svom izveštaju iz 2017. navodi da EU mora da definiše jasnu i realnu strategiju sopstvenih kulturnih aktivnosti usmerenih prema spolja, a da istovremeno mora da odgovori na pitanje šta je kultura koju promovise, kako je promovise i šta komplementarnost sa državama članicama zapravo znači: „Prvo, kulturna diplomatija EU

treba više da se zasniva na iskustvu u interkulturnom dijalogu i izgradnji kapaciteta nego na promociji evropske kulture kao instrumentu meke moći“ (Trobbiani, 2017: N/A). Od tada do danas zabeleženi su brojni primeri dobre prakse, kao što su Platforma kulturne diplomatije koja okuplja jedan broj institucija kulture EU i aktivnosti drugih aktera u kulturi, kao i EU nacionalnih instituta kulture (EUNIC) i Evropskih kuća kulture koje deluju pod pokroviteljstvom delegacija EU.

Ipak, kao što je u ovom poglavlju već pomenuto, prema zvaničnom jeziku EU ne koristi se termin „kulturna diplomatija“ nego termin „kultura u spoljnim odnosima EU“. Isar (2015: 494–495) ovo naziva nečim višim od običnog „semantičkog izbegavanja“ koncepta kulture kao meke moći i drugih, kako on to naziva, „instrumentalnih ciljeva“ kad je reč o komunikaciji EU: „Ciljevi meke moći su uvek prisutni sa ostalim instrumentalnim ciljevima, posebno u pogledu izvoza kulturnih dobara i usluga. Uprkos tome, kultura u spoljnim odnosima nosi šire konotacije za EU aktere i korespondira sa brojnim idealističkim, pa čak i altruističkim motivima“. Ipak, ovde se nameće i pitanje uloge pojedinačnih država članica u promociji kulture Evropske unije van tog prostora koji se naziva evropskom kulturnom diplomatijom ili kulturom u spoljnim odnosima, bez obzira na to da li se kao akteri pojavljuju političari, evropski zvaničnici, institucije, nevladin sektor i drugi. Drugi autori (Shore, 2000) primećuju da su nezvanični akteri, za razliku od zvaničnih EU institucija, postali glavni pokretači i promoteri „evropske svesti“ i kreatori narativa koji treba da doprinese brendiranju i imidžu EU prema spoljnom svetu.

Poslednjih godina se pojavljuju predlozi za redefinisane EU modela kulturne diplomatije kao potreba da se prevaziđu postojeće terminološke i značenjske tenzije između nedovoljno jasnih koncepata i pojmova o kojima je reč u ovom radu. Neki autori (Triandafyllidou and Szűcs 2017: 2) zagovaraju novi model kulturne diplomatije koji u sebi kombinuje najbolje elemente od dve glavne definicije u jednu koja bi istovremeno bila i pragmatična i altruistička: „Kao instrument meke i pametne moći ona doprinosi povećanju vidljivosti na globalnom nivou i većem uticaju EU, ali pre nego što izvozi takozvanu kulturnu superiornost ili normativnu moć, ona zapravo ističe proširenje EU kao konstruktivan dijalog sa trećim zemljama u ambijentu zajedničke razmene i poštovanja.“

Glavne institucije koje su u okviru Evropske komisije zadužene za „kulturu u spoljnim odnosima“ i koje imaju najveće budžete za te potrebe



su Generalni direktorat za obrazovanje i kulturu, Generalni direktorat za međunarodnu saradnju i razvoj, kao i Generalni direktorat za susedsku politiku i pregovore o proširenju, koji istovremeno sarađuju sa drugim službama i telima zaduženim za spoljnu politiku EU.

## **Metodološki pristup**

Za potrebe istraživanja, sprovedena je kvalitativna analiza sadržaja audio-vizuelnog servisa EK emitovanog u februaru i aprilu 2021. Medijski sadržaj je izabran na osnovu slučajnog uzorka, što znači da je u periodu od jednog meseca birano ukupno četiri dana emitovanja, odnosno po jedno emitovanje video-materijala nedeljno. Jedinicu analize predstavlja video-prilog koji se u datom periodu emitovao u formi: vesti u slici (događaj predstavljen samo slikom, bez izjava sagovornika ili novinarskog komentara), izjave (u kojoj jedan ili više sagovornika daje izjavu o određenoj temi), debate (snimci i izjave više sagovornika koji učestvuju u radu okruglog stola ili konferencije), priloga u vezi sa temom kulturne diplomatije sa novinarskim komentarom ili bez njega. U posmatranom periodu ukupno je obrađeno osam dana emitovanja, odnosno 23 video-priloga. Analiza je sprovedena na osnovu prethodno uspostavljenog kodeksa koji obuhvata sledeće elemente: temu, ličnost koja se pojavljuje kao sagovornik, povod za izveštavanje, EU instituciju kao mesto održavanja događaja, izvor informacija, žanr i formu u kojoj se tema distribuira, poziciju u određenoj rubrici i trajanje priloga.

## **Glavni rezultati**

Kvalitativna analiza sadržaja audio-vizuelnog servisa Evropske komisije pokazuje da se temi kulturne diplomatije pristupa pre svega iz protokolarnog ugla, s obzirom na to da su najbrojniji materijali koji prikazuju protokolarne posete visokih zvaničnika EK. Tu se najčešće vide posete predsednice Evropske komisije, komesara Evropske komisije i drugih visokih zvaničnika ove institucije. Protokolarnom tonu



video-materijala doprinosi i prenošenje događaja kao što je potpisivanje sporazuma sa državama kandidatima i potencijalnim kandidatima za članstvo, a tiču se programa Kreativna Evropa, ili programa univerzitetske saradnje u oblasti kulture. Audio-vizuelni servis često prenosi i zvanične konferencije, forume, samite u vezi sa temom kulturne diplomatije, ali i zvanične najave za događaje poput Balkanskog foruma, Evropske prestonice kulture itd.

Pored pres-konferencija koje zvaničnici EK drže u Briselu, u uzorku se tematski pokrivaju i specijalni događaji koji se tiču kulturne diplomatije u širem smislu, kao što su evropski festivali, različite promocije kulture, kulturne baštine i programa kulture. Posebna tema kojoj audio-vizuelni servis posvećuje pažnju je status umetnika za vreme pandemije, ali u ukupnom uzorku video-priloga ova tema nije dobila značajnije mesto.

U fokusu obrađenog materijala nalaze se države koje nisu članice EU, i to Bosna i Hercegovina, Švajcarska, Albanija i Turska. Tretman i izbor država u uzorku zavisi od rasporeda posete zvaničnika, a ne nužno od najvažnijih tema kojima se Evropska komisija bavi u oba analizirana perioda. Bez obzira na to, pristup audio-vizuelnog servisa EK je rigidan i očekivan u izboru glavnih aktera u analiziranom materijalu. Najčešći sagovornici na temu kulturne diplomatije su visoki predstavnik EU za spoljnu politiku i bezbednost Žozep Borelj, evropski komesar za proširenje Oliver Varhelji, potpredsednica EK Vera Jurova, evropska komesarka za inovacije, kulturu, omladinu i obrazovanje Marija Gabriel, predsednica EK Ursula fon der Lajen i predsednik Evropskog saveta Šarl Mišel. Apsolutna dominacija navedenih zvaničnika u analiziranom materijalu nije narušena ni u retkim prilikama kada se samo u pozadini, u snimcima kojim se prikazuje atmosfera na događajima ili kratkim tonskim insertima, pojavljuju predsednici država ili ministri kulture sa kojima EK potpisuje protokole o saradnji.

Analiza pokazuje da na audio-vizuelnom servisu EK, kad je reč o tretmanu teme kulturne diplomatije, dominira protokolarni, elitistički pristup, na osnovu koga se ne može jasno utvrditi šta ova institucija smatra temom kulturne diplomatije, niti kako je definiše. To je zapravo više kombinacija različitih tema iz oblasti kulture, umetnosti i obrazovanja sa naglaskom na programe saradnje, razmene i diplomatije Evropske unije prema spolja, prema državama koje nisu punopravne

članice. Potpuno je zanemarena kulturna diplomatija iznutra, odnosno nije usmerena na odnose prema članicama koje su deo EU. Istovremeno, u domenu kulturne diplomatije koja je, tako postavljena, usmerena na države van EU, najčešći sagovornici su EU zvaničnici, a najčešći pristup protokolarna otvaranja i događaji u samoj Evropskoj komisiji. U ovakvom pristupu nema građana, kulturnih društava ili institucija koje bi imale direktne koristi od saradnje sa EU, kao što se na primer ističe u brojnim dokumentima i strategijama koje su nabrojane u uvodnom delu rada. Dakle, audio-vizuelni servis kao jedan od instrumenata promocije EK dominantno koristi institucionalnu promociju zvaničnika koji su zaduženi za donošenje odluka, bez „druge strane“, odnosno onih na koje se te odluke odnose.

Navedeni materijal je, kao i ostale teme na sajtu audio-vizuelnog servisa EK, namenjen medijima i novinarima koji pokrivaju EU teme i dostupan je za preuzimanje, doradu i distribuciju. Međutim, u obzir treba uzeti i to da je materijal koji se bavi temom kulturne diplomatije vizuelno neinventivan, rigidan i protokolaran, odslikavajući događaje i susrete na podijumima ispred zgrada institucija, sala za konferencije i sastanke. U tom smislu, materijal je više namenjen za preuzimanje tonskih izjava zvaničnika i može da pomogne onim novinarima koji nemaju fizički pristup navedenim događajima. U vizuelnom smislu, materijal predstavlja samo protokolarno „pokrivanje“ između dve ili više izjava evropskih zvaničnika.

## Zaključak

Ovaj rad je pokazao da je u tretmanu važne teme kulturne diplomatije audio-vizuelni servis Evropske komisije fokusiran na proizvodnju materijala koji predstavlja protokolarne aktivnosti same institucije. Tematski okvir određen je političkom agendom, aktuelnim događajima i učešćem zvaničnika institucije u tim aktivnostima. Dominantan pristup u okviru šire tematske celine kulturne diplomatije za audio-vizuelni servis EK je upravo onaj koji predstavlja ulogu Komisije u iniciranju programa kulturne saradnje, promociji kulturnih vrednosti van granica EU, uključivanju država van teritoriji EU u manifestacije

i aktivnosti koje doprinose rešavanju određenih problema i izazova u EU. Svim ovim temama zajedničko je da se slika o Evropskoj komisiji i brendiranje EU isključivo gradi sa aspekta uloge Komisije u promociji kulturne diplomatije, a posebno iz ugla razvoja saradnje EU i država koje nisu punopravne članice. Ovaj pristup u velikoj meri korespondira sa glavnom EU strategijom u sprovođenju aktivnosti koje se odnose na „kulturu u spoljnim odnosima EU“, a pre svega sa ulogom Evropske komisije kao glavne institucije u ovom domenu, o čemu je bilo reči u teorijskom delu rada. U navedenom uzorku nema nikakvih naznaka o bilo kakvim unutrašnjim tenzijama unutar institucije koje bi mogle da utiču na fragmentaciju poruke o EU ili Evropskoj komisiji.

Čak i priložima, insertima i vizuelnom sadržaju kojim se prikazuju zvanične posete pojedinih državnika ili predstavnika država Komisiji ili posete zvaničnika EK van granica EU, primećuje se isticanje uloge Komisije kao nosioca i promotera čitavog niza kulturnih i drugih vrednosti, koji obuhvata poštovanje ljudskih prava, razvijanje kulturne saradnje, učešće u obrazovnim politikama, do održavanja manifestacija, konferencija, samita itd. Međutim, na osnovu medijskog sadržaja koji proizvodi audio-vizuelni servis Evropske komisije ne može se utvrditi šta se konkretno smatra kulturnom diplomatijom ili, prema zvaničnoj terminologiji EU, „kulturom u spoljnim odnosima EU“. Nije jasno ni kako sama institucija gleda na definisane politike i strategije kojim se podstiče kulturna saradnja sa drugim državama, jer ti glasovi nisu zastupljeni u ponuđenom vizuelnom sadržaju. Osim čisto protokolarne reprezentacije Evropske komisije, više kao političkog projekta nego kao mesta za susret različitih kultura, zapravo nema originalnog, zanimljivog pristupa ovoj temi, niti pristupa koji bi, u skladu sa svim strategijama i propisima usvojenim u poslednjih dvadeset godina, uključio medije i građane u realizaciju i promociju aktivnosti iz oblasti kulturne diplomatije i brendiranja EU i kulture kao važnog instrumenta meke moći EU i istovremenog puta saradnje prema državama kojima je cilj punopravno članstvo u EU.

## Bibliografija

- Balčytienė, A. and Vinciūnienė, A. (2010). Assessing Conditions for the Homogenisation of the European Public Sphere: How Journalists Report, and Could Report, on Europe, in: Cristiano Bee and Emanuela Bozzini (eds.), *Mapping the European Public Sphere. Institutions, Media and Civil Society*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., str. 141–158.
- Balčytienė, A., Raeymaeckers, K., Bens, E., et al. (2007). Understanding the Complexity of EU Communication: The Spokespersons' Perspective, in: AIM Research Consortium (ed.), *Understanding the Logic of EU Reporting from Brussels. Analysis of interviews with EU correspondents and spokespersons*. Adequate Information Management in Europe (AIM) – Working Papers, 2007/3. Bochum/Freiburg: Projekt Verlag.
- Bijsmans, P. and Altides, C. (2007). Bridging the Gap between EU Politics and Citizens? The European Commission, National Media and EU Affairs in the Public Sphere, *European Integration* 29(3): 323–340.
- Borhart, K. D. (2013). *Abeceda prava Evropske unije*. Beograd: Delegacija Evropske unije u Republici Srbiji.
- Brüggemann, M. (2005). How the Eu Constructs the European public Sphere Seven Strategies of Information Policy, *Javnost – The Public* 12(2): 57–73.
- Christiansen, T. (2001) Intra-institutional politics and inter-institutional relations in the EU: towards coherent governance?, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 8(5): 747–769.
- Constantin, E.C. (2011). Communicating in multi-cultural Europe. *Professional communication and translation studies*, 4(1-2): 31–40.
- Cummings, M. C. (2003). *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey*, Washington: Center for Arts and Culture.
- De Vreese, C. H. (2001). Europe in the News – A Cross-National Comparative Study of the News Coverage of Key EU Events, *European Union Politics* 2(3): 283–307.
- De Vreese, C. H. (2002). *Communicating Europe*. „The Next Generation Democracy: Legitimacy in Network Europe” project. Brussels: The Foreign Policy Centre and the British Council.
- Eurobarometer (2016). *Special Eurobarometer: Media pluralism and democracy*. Eurobarometer, No. 452.
- Isar, Y. R. (2015) 'Culture in EU external relations': an idea whose time has come?, *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 21(4): 494–508.
- Krstić, A. (2016). Izveštavanje o Evropskoj uniji u informativnim programima nacionalnih radio stanica u Srbiji. *Časopis za komunikaciju i medije*, CM 10(34): 5–28.
- Krstić, A. (2020). *Mediji, novinarstvo i Evropska unija*. Univerzitet u Beogradu: Fakultet političkih nauka.
- Krstić, A. i Milojević, A. (2013). Evropske teme iz perspektive novinara lokalnih medija u Srbiji. *Godišnjak*, Fakultet političkih nauka 7(10): 67–82.

- Laursen, B. (2012). Transparency in the Council of the European Union: Why journalists don't get the full picture. *Journalism* 14(6): 771–789.
- Laursen, B. (2012). Transparency in the Council of the European Union: Why journalists don't get the full picture. *Journalism*, 14(6): 771–789.
- Lloyd, J. and Marconi, C. (2014). *Reporting the EU: News, Media and the European Institutions*, London & New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, in association with Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford.
- Machill, M., Beiler, M. and Fischer, C. (2005). Europe-topics in Europe's media: The debate about the European public sphere: a meta-analysis of media content analyses, *European Journal of Communication* 21(1): 57–88.
- Meyer, C. (1999). Political Legitimacy and the Invisibility of Politics: Exploring the European Union's Communication Deficit. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 37(4): 617–639.
- Meyer, C. (2009). Does European Union Politics Become Mediatized? The Case of the European Commission. *Journal of European Public Policy* 16(7): 1047–1064.
- Peter J., Semetko, H., and de Vreese, C.H. (2003). EU Politics on Television News – A Cross-National Comparative Study. *European Union Politics*, 4(3): 305–327.
- Shore, C. (2000). *Building Europe. The cultural politics of European integration*. London: Routledge.
- Triandafyllidou, A. and Szűcs, T. (2017). *EU Cultural Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities*. Global Governance Programme Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Issue 2017/13.
- Trobbiani, R. (2017). EU Cultural Diplomacy: time to define strategies, means and complementarity with Member States. *Policy brief*, Issue 2017/3.
- Udovčič, B. and Podgornik, A. (2016). Cultural Diplomacy of Slavic European Union Member States: A Cross-country Analysis. *Baltic Journal of European Studies*, 6 (2): 117–136.

### Internet izvori

- EU Commission (2006). *White Paper on a European Communication Policy*. Brussels. [https://europa.eu/documents/comm/white\\_papers/pdf/com2006\\_35\\_en.pdf](https://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com2006_35_en.pdf) (pristupljeno: 15. 1. 2023).
- EU Commission (2006a) *E-Commission 2006-2010: enabling efficiency and transparency*. Brussels. [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/informatics/ecom/doc/ecom-2006-2010\\_cs\\_en\\_v414\\_postcis.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/informatics/ecom/doc/ecom-2006-2010_cs_en_v414_postcis.pdf) (pristupljeno: 15. 1. 2023).
- EU Commission (2007) *Communicating Europe in Partnership*. Brussels. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3A110117> (pristupljeno: 15. 1. 2023).
- EU Commission (2007a) *Communicating about Europe via the Internet – Engaging the citizens*, SEC 1742, Brussels. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/144/communication-policy> (pristupljeno: 15. 1. 2023).
- EU Commission (2008). *Communicating Europe through audiovisual media*, SEC(2008)506/2, Brussels.



## II

# **Countries' Distinctiveness / Posebnost zemalja**

*section editors/ urednice poglavlja:*

RAPHAELA HENZE, LJILJANA ROGAČ MIJATOVIĆ,

MILENA DRAGIĆEVIĆ ŠEŠIĆ





# CHINA'S RISE: IMPLICATIONS FOR REMAPPING OF CULTURAL AND HERITAGE DIPLOMACY

EMILIJA MARIĆ

## Introduction

Amid the shifting world order, the People's Republic of China (hereinafter China) launched a development initiative aiming to revive the historic Silk and Road network. Even though at its core the Belt and Road initiative is an economic development strategic plan, it nevertheless encompasses cultural and educational components, constructing it into a far-reaching cultural and heritage diplomacy tool. The Belt and Road Initiative, therefore, has already caused a change in the balance of power not only in Asia but also in parts of Europe and Africa. Europe and Asia, in this context, are of particular importance for China's rise, as Eurasia has already been regarded as the center of global power. Not only China plays a major role in all Eurasian development efforts, but the notions of the global shift are developing in parallel with the rising importance of the Belt and Road Initiative, putting China at the center of global affairs. With American hegemony in decline, values promoted not only by the United States government but also by other Western governments are being questioned. We should not explore whether a new world order is emerging, but rather what the new world order will look like, and what will be its core values. One should aim to conceptualize in what ways will international cultural cooperation be re-portrayed with global actors whose philosophy is greatly differentiating from the Western school of thought. To that end, this paper explores the implications for the remapping of cultural and heritage diplomacy by focusing

on the current dynamics caused by both China's rise in the international arena and the revitalization of the historic Silk Road networks through its projection in the Belt and Road Initiative.

## **China's rise in cultural and heritage diplomacy**

China's foreign cultural policy and its efforts to reclaim its great power status in cultural and heritage diplomacy can primarily be examined through the examples of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Confucius Institute Network. Through these two efforts, we ought to conceptualize the rationale behind their characterization as tools of foreign cultural policy, and through examining them, we will be able to better comprehend China's recent success in the field.

The Belt and Road Initiative (hereinafter BRI), is perceived as relevant to both cultural diplomacy and heritage diplomacy due to its wide scope. If we define cultural diplomacy as "a domain of diplomacy concerned with establishing, developing, and sustaining relations with foreign states by way of culture, art and education" (cited in Tevdovski. 2009: 22), then BRI educational and cultural efforts should be considered as cultural diplomacy efforts. Heritage diplomacy, on the other side, differs from traditional diplomatic actions and does not encompass only actions of the state, but rather includes a cooperation among non-state actors and state actors, as well. In addition, international organizations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (hereinafter UNESCO) play a major role in heritage diplomacy through different projects and initiatives. Even though at the conceptual and empirical levels, a certain overlap between cultural and heritage diplomacy can be acknowledged, Winter argues that heritage diplomacy "needs to be read as empirically and conceptually distinct from cultural diplomacy (2015: 1006). He defines heritage diplomacy "as a set of processes whereby cultural and natural pasts shared between and across nations become subject to exchanges, collaborations, and forms of cooperative governance" (Winter, 2015: 1006). Shared cultural and natural pasts are exactly main attributes of the BRI, through which the Chinese government attracts primarily countries of Eurasia. BRI and

other efforts channelled by the Chinese government should therefore be examined through both lenses of cultural diplomacy and heritage diplomacy.

BRI, formerly known as One Belt One Road is a global infrastructure development strategy that was adopted by the Chinese government in 2013. The plan directly involves over sixty countries and incorporates almost two-thirds of the global population. There are five clear priorities of BRI cooperation, namely *policy coordination, facilitation of connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds*. For the purposes of this paper, priorities other than *people-to-people bonds* will be disregarded. This specific cooperation priority aims to advance cultural and academic exchange, and dialogue. In practical terms, this priority is achieved through financing specific projects, working closely with UNESCO, and advancing its Confucius Institute Network. It can be argued that through these mechanisms, alongside the mythical narrative of the Silk Roads, China advances its *soft power*, as well. Tim Winter, author of the book *Geocultural Power: China's Quest to Revive the Silk Roads for the Twenty-First Century*, argues that the role of culture and history play a major role in China's quest to secure influence internationally (2019: 16). In addition, he outlines that the history has been "articulated as national heritage over recent decades, it has also been deployed internationally as a force of persuasion and attraction, the hallmarks of soft power" (2019: 16). According to his interpretation, attraction of the Chinese cultural past, through concepts of *rejuvenation* and *renewal*, has only contributed the cause (Winter, 2019). In addition, it can be concluded that both the role of culture and history are being used as mechanisms for achieving broader diplomatic goals. Tim Winter believes that the "Silk Road serves as a platform for China to exercise its geocultural advantage" (2019: 16).

To portray the actions and their influence, specific examples will be provided. In 2016, the Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China adopted the *Education Action Plan for the Belt and Road Initiative*. Even though it is an educational plan, this plan can be comprehended in a broader, more cultural sense. *Education Action Plan for the Belt and Road Initiative* should, therefore, be perceived as a cultural policy instrument aiming to foster intercultural dialogue, promote diversity, and advance the position of the Chinese language in

the global arena. According to the action plan, the countries along the routes should work together with an aim to deepen mutual understanding, expand openness, strengthen cooperation, and learn from each other. The plan outlines the need to promote closer people-to-people ties, cultivate supporting talent, and achieve common development. It clearly indicates that channels for educational cooperation should be advanced, and that language barriers should be overcome. Implementation of this policy can be comprehended through different partnerships and projects.

One example is a partnership project between China and Italy that was launched in July 2021. More precisely, China's Northwest University partnered with Italy's University of Salento to open a new school of cultural heritage and arts. Another far-reaching example is the Silk Road Scholarship, set up by the Chinese government in 2017. This program provides scholarships to bachelor, master, and PhD students from BRI countries. There are no limitations when it comes to the subject one might want to study under the scholarship framework however, it is expected from students to enroll in Chinese language classes at the respective university. The scholarship does not solely cover the tuition, but also the accommodation costs, medical insurance, and provides a monthly living allowance, making China an increasingly attractive destination for students. By offering incentives to study in China, the country is becoming one of the leading states for international students to pursue their studies in. The Chinese government has set a goal to make China the largest study-abroad destination in Asia by 2020, and the goal was achieved in the academic year 2017/18. In the same year, over three thousand students came from BRI countries to study in China, according to the China Global Television Network (cited in Qi, 2021). This is of enormous importance since international students offer another perspective to the host country, as well as make bonds and linkages with people from different cultural backgrounds. To that end, Madalina Akli argues that in today's world, study-abroad students act as unofficial cultural diplomats and that they should be in the center of cultural diplomacy (2012). She believes that study-abroad students "engage in soft action to establish intercultural dialogue" (Akli, 2012). Once students claim their cultural diplomacy role, through daily interactions they "cause a shift from formal soft power, traditionally

concentrated in embassies and the diplomatic corps, to informal soft action in daily life abroad” (Akli, 2012). The interactions between the study-abroad and local students function as two-way interactions, where both sides influence the other. It can be concluded that cross-cultural encounters that occur among students in this specific context are extremely valuable.

China's rising influence in international cultural relations can also be examined through the Confucius Institute (hereinafter CI) network. The establishment of the CIs worldwide allows individuals to start studying not only the Chinese language, but also to learn more about Chinese culture, traditions, customs, and history. For instance, studying Chinese is a popular practice nowadays in Ethiopia, where in the past nine years, more than ten thousand people have enrolled in Chinese language courses at the CIs across the country. This trend is a direct consequence of the construction of the Maritime Silk Road, as there is a need for translators that would serve as a link between the Chinese and Ethiopians. One might argue that that is the only reason behind it however, a general interest in the Chinese culture in Ethiopia is noted. This trend is not only evident in this country in East Africa, but rather in many other countries worldwide, with over 500 CIs registered by 2018. Furthermore, there is a version of the CI model applied to primary and secondary schools called Confucius Classrooms. All these institutions are established through Hanban, a non-profit public organization directly connected to the Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China, which serves as the CI Headquarters. Similarly, to the Goethe Institute and the British Council, Hanban oversees the promotion of the Chinese language and culture. Some academics acknowledge the limitations of the CI project which is the most ambitious of China's external cultural policy mechanisms. For example, Joseph Nye (2014), stresses that the Chinese government cannot be extremely successful in *soft power* because its strategy emphasizes culture but neglects civil society and problems caused by nationalistic policies. The Chinese government was also heavily criticized for its aspirations and incidents connected to the CI project. It is extremely challenging to evaluate *soft power* strategies because firstly the success cannot be measured easily and secondly as it is a long-term process with no immediate results. Jeffrey Gil points out that although the Confucius

Institute Project does not have an enormous immediate impact, “it may well turn out to be a significant factor in China’s international relations in the future” (2009). Policymakers and government structures worldwide might not be attracted to China greatly because of the CIs, but the fact is that more and more people show interest in learning Mandarin (Gil, 2009). This should be comprehended as a direct consequence of the BRI, through which China also accomplishes its external cultural policy goals. After all, BRI is not just a trade agreement, but rather a strategic long-term policy that has far-reaching cultural and heritage diplomacy aspects.

Apart from the major policies and projects mentioned earlier, China also cooperates greatly with UNESCO. The organization’s efforts towards the Silk Road heritage management started much before the BRI announcement, and it can be argued that the whole narrative of the majestic ancient Silk Road was promoted by the organization. UNESCO, therefore, can be mapped as one of the most important stakeholders involved in the contemporary Silk Road re-establishment. In addition, China has been for years one of the largest funding contributors to UNESCO, and as of the third quarter of the fiscal year 2022-2023, the biggest one.

## **Towards a new paradigm of cultural and heritage diplomacy**

In the recent past, the rise of East Asia as a cultural exporter is acknowledged. East Asian countries that were once considered a periphery of the West, have established their cultural industries and started exporting their cultural products, not only locally and in the region, but also Europe and North America (Jin and Otmazgin, 2014). Japan, South Korea, and China are the main East Asian cultural exporters and their governments have realized that commercialization of the cultural industries not only benefits the economy but also provides the country with *soft power* influence (Jin and Otmazgin, 2014). Even though the Japanese and South Korean popular culture is much more in demand today compared to the Chinese, the notion of a gradual change is present.

Tim Winter argues that the success of PSY and his Gangnam Style, as well as similar cultural exports of the East Asian countries “represent a valuable starting point for understanding some significant parallel shifts now occurring in the field of heritage conservation” (2014). As Winter explains concepts revolving around cultural diplomacy and heritage diplomacy have been considered as processes involving the spread of Western and European ideas to the non-Western regions, which was bound to change due to the growing presence of various non-Western actors (2014).

The geopolitical context has been changing rapidly however, it can be argued that from the 1980s onwards post-colonial discourse started to emerge inside UNESCO (Wiktor-March, 2019). Non-Western countries were unsatisfied with Western concepts and argued that “Europe and North America had prevailed in the heritage discourse area for too long, and that the time had come to change the rules” (Wiktor-March, 2019). Of course, the change did not occur in a vacuum but rather resulted due to the already changing balance of power in the geopolitical context. From the 1980s onwards, greater space was provided for non-Western countries to engage in heritage debates. This shift developed in parallel with the steady rise of the East Asian economies, in particular the growth of the Chinese economy, providing means for the Chinese government to engage in more meaningful cultural diplomacy efforts. In addition, it can be argued that these shifts and the first Silk Road projects promoted by international organizations were a direct result of the rising geopolitical and economic importance of China. Due to the mentioned changes in the global paradigm, Tim Winter argues “we are now entering a new and historically important phase in how the material past and its conservation are framed, conceptualized, and practiced” (2014). From 2014 till today it can be argued that we have entered this phase. Not only that China has supported UNESCO’s efforts in refocusing on other non-Western discourses related to heritage, but also some argue that “we may be witnessing the beginning of an *Asian age* in the heritage regime” (Wiktor-March, 2019).

When mentioning UNESCO, one should go back to China’s in-depth cooperation with the organization, and perhaps look at the funding contributors list. UNESCO is the most relevant organization regarding cultural heritage and cultural diversity, and therefore cooperation with

it is of utmost importance for leading powers. China not only pays in time its assessed contribution but also contributes voluntarily to the organization. This example of UNESCO is an interesting one, especially considering that the United States of America no longer belongs to the organization. This portrays the difference in approach, in which China finds organizations such as UNESCO relevant, whereas some Western powers have neglected it.

Non-acceptance of Western ideals and perspectives, not only by the Chinese government but also by other countries resulted in the re-portraying of international cultural cooperation. Countries that were culturally and politically marginalized now have a say in processes that are directly linked to their affairs. Namely, the countries of what is now commonly referred to as Eurasia. According to Bruno Maçães *Eurasia* is much more than a geographical entity, it is a descriptive term for a way of perceiving the present notions in international affairs (2018: 12). In addition, he labels the new world order as Eurasian (Maçães, 2018, p. 12). Eurasia should be, therefore, perceived as an ideological standpoint that rejects present hegemonic notions and knits its own. China is one of the major players in the Eurasian context and its BRI has impacted the development of the supercontinent as such. In Eurasia notions of cooperation are of extreme importance, as Maçães notes because of the big powers, namely Putin who “does not think along the national lines” (Maçães, 2018: 39). On the contrary “he thinks in terms of larger blocs and, ultimately, in terms of the world order” (Maçães, 2018: 39). Chinese stance towards comprehending cooperation as well is contrasting Western standards.

Chinese political philosophy and concepts of international relations greatly differ from the Western stands. This is exactly why new modalities for international cultural cooperation are ought to arise. One of the most relevant differences that makes the Chinese stand towards international relations so unique, is the way in which their influence should be spread. Forceful imposing of values, traditions, and other cultural patterns is not something that can be explained using the lenses of the Chinese philosophy. On contrary they believe that just acting by example the others will realize the benefits and the advantages of the Chinese philosophy, and culture, and they will accept this voluntary. On one side, there are the Western powers imposing values and cultural



practices to the others with an assumption that they are superior, and on the other side there are Chinese who also perceive themselves as superior but do not see a need to further intervene. The Chinese approach is well grounded in their history and philosophy and dates to at least the fourteenth century. Henry Kissinger, in his book *On China*, in a great manner elaborates the roots of this approach. He notes that in “*the Chinese version of exceptionalism, China did not export its ideas but let others come to seek them. Neighbouring peoples, the Chinese believed, benefited from contact with China and civilization so long as they acknowledged the suzerainty of the Chinese government. Those who did not were barbarian.*” (Kissinger, 2011: 17). Even though the context and times have changed, this approach remains at the core of the Chinese international relations efforts, including international cultural relations. Another important segment in understanding Chinese ambitions is the ideal of *peaceful coexistence*, which along the *win-win cooperation* is constantly being re-emphasized in relation to the BRI. Peaceful coexistence as a concept dates back to Sino-Indian Agreement in 1954, when Zhou Enlai referred to them as principles that govern China’s relations with foreign countries. *Peaceful coexistence* remained a crucial concept guiding the Chinese government in their actions. President Xi Jinping has many times emphasized the importance of the concept not only for China, but for other Asian countries and he noted that five principles of peaceful coexistence “demonstrate the new expectations the Asian countries have for international relations” (2014). Another ideal guiding all the BRI efforts is *win-win cooperation*. Even though this is not a realistic measurement, it can be argued that *win-win cooperation is indicator* that countries taking part in BRI should expect results that are higher than their current expectations.

A scrutiny of the Chinese outlook was provided to portray better the differences in international relations in general, because these are the key indicators guiding all Chinese international efforts, including those aiming at international cultural relations. This is of great importance taking into account that the Silk Road is already a geocultural imaginary of the modern era (Winter, 2019: 37). According to Winter, “in simplest terms, the Silk Road is a form of historiography that foregrounds connectivity and transmission, and as such has formed part of the project to write world history” (2020). More precisely, “a biography

of the Silk Road as connectivity indicates how China is now using this geocultural form for its own ends through Belt and Road framework” (Winter, 2019: 182). It can be argued, therefore, that BRI encompasses carefully chosen parts of history to produce a grand narrative of trans-continental connectivity, both past, as well as present, and future. This does not undermine the importance of the historic Silk Road, however, it has to be taken into account that only extremely positive segments of history are promoted through BRI.

We currently live in the rare moments when the political, economic, and cultural axis is shifting. In the past couple of centuries that have mostly shaped our everyday realities, this axis shifted towards the West, and now it is shifting towards the East. The changes that this shift will bring do remain unclear however in the context of the paper, some conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the rise of the East will undoubtedly bring radical changes in the sphere of international cultural cooperation. Some of the changes are already evident, as the non-Western countries have engaged in changing both cultural diplomacy and heritage diplomacy discourses. With their rising power, the efforts will become more and more relevant. Secondly, China’s BRI will change the balance of power and offer implications for re-mapping not only Eurasian cooperation but worldwide cooperation. Even though the BRI is primarily an economic development plan, this paper proved that its domain is much more far-reaching and that it encompasses various segments including a strong cultural trait. The cultural cooperation efforts promoted through the BRI and CIs are extremely significant and complex, and that should be considered. Without a doubt, each country, and in this context China, has its own political and geopolitical interests that motivate further action however, with the Chinese principles and stance towards the external players, remapping of cultural cooperation, in particular, cultural diplomacy and heritage diplomacy may occur.

To conclude, China’s efforts to reclaim its cultural great power status through various culture-related initiatives and projects offer ways to re-think the present and to re-imagine the future of the cultural cooperation.

## Bibliography

- Akli, M., (2012). The Role of Study-Abroad Students in Cultural Diplomacy: Toward an International Education as Soft Action. *International Research and Review: Journal of Phi Beta Delta*, [online] 2(1), pp. 32-46. <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1150064.pdf> [Accessed 31 August 2021].
- “Carry Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence To Build a Better World Through Win-Win Cooperation” (2014) *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China* [Preprint]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjdt\\_665385/zyjh\\_665391/201407/t20140701\\_678184.html](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/201407/t20140701_678184.html) (Accessed: February 1, 2023).
- Gil, J., (2009). Confucius Institute Project: Language and Soft Power in World Politics, *The Global Studies Journal*, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 59-72.
- Jin, D. and Otmazgin, N., 2014. Introduction: East Asian Cultural Industries: Policies, Strategies and Trajectories. *Pacific Affairs*, [online] 87(1), pp.43-51. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263482674> [Accessed 24 September 2021].
- Kissinger, H., (2011). *On China*. Penguin Books.
- Maçães, B., (2018). *The dawn of eurasia: On the trail of the new world order*. London: Penguin Books.
- Nye, J., (2014). The Information Revolution and Power, *Current History*, vol. 113, no. 759, pp. 19-22 [Online]. <https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/11738398/NyeInformationRevolution.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.
- Qi, J., (2021). How China has been transforming international education to become a leading host of students. *The Conversation*, [online] Available at: <<https://theconversation.com/how-china-has-been-transforming-international-education-to-become-a-leading-host-of-students-157241>> [Accessed 31 August 2021].
- Tevdovski, L., (2009). *Cultural diplomacy*. Skopje: Macedonian Information Centre, pp. 13-29.
- Winter, T., (2014). Heritage conservation futures in an age of shifting global power. *Journal of Social Archaeology*, [online] 14(3), pp.319-339. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1469605314532749> [Accessed 24 September 2021].
- Winter, T., (2015). Heritage diplomacy. *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 21(10), pp. 997-1015.
- Winter, T., (2019). *Geocultural Power: China's Quest to Revive the Silk Roads for the Twenty-First Century*. 1st ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago.
- Wiktor-Mach, D., (2019). Cultural heritage and development: UNESCO's new paradigm in a changing geopolitical context. *Third World Quarterly*, [online] 40(9), pp.1593-1612. <https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctwq20> [Accessed 24 September 2021].

# APPLICATION OF JAPANESE DIGITAL DIPLOMACY TOWARD VIETNAM

THAI HOANG HANH NGUYEN

## Introduction

Japan and Vietnam have proved their strong ties during the last 50 years in diplomacy. When Prime Minister Abe was in office for the first time (2006-2007), he elevated bilateral relations with Vietnam to a formal strategic partnership with Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung. After that, Japan was Vietnam's second strategic partner after the Russian Federation (Thayer, 2014). As well as a mutual understanding on the capacity for maritime security and defense cooperation, Vietnam and Japan have cooperated in the fields of culture and education. Moreover, diplomacy has shown variations in using the platform for public diplomacy. During this 4.0 industry, information technology, media, and the Internet have been applied to expand information and worldwide communication in diplomacy. Implementing social media for diplomatic purposes has changed how diplomats engage in information management, strategy planning, international negotiations, crisis management, etc. Therefore, each country must consider embracing digital diplomacy, and Japan and Vietnam are not exceptional. This paper aims to provide an overview of the current engagement in terms of culture between Japan and Vietnam, especially on digital platforms that Japan conducts to promote its foreign policy toward Vietnam. Finally, the recommendations that help Japan to advance the operation of digital diplomacy are also mentioned.

## Digital Diplomacy

On December the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2008, when James K. Glassman – Under United States Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs – gave a speech at an event hosted by Steve Clemons and the New American Foundation, he mentioned a new approach, namely public diplomacy 2.0. As the web became a domain for user-generated content, various sectors invented a variety of Web 2.0 formulations for their use, including Library 2.0, Medicine 2.0, Government 2.0, and Public Diplomacy 2.0 – a sub-set of Government 2.0 (Cull, 2011). This new approach achieves its goals in public diplomacy through a new approach to communicating, which is made far more accessible because of the emergence of Web 2.0, or social networking, technologies (Glassman, 2008). Public diplomacy 2.0 indicates using social media technologies to deliver a conduit for feedback, as a platform for citizen-to-citizen dialogue, and as a mechanism for listening to and integrating viable opinions and critical information both through expressed opinions and through end-user behaviors (Seib, 2009). Digital diplomacy is seen as the use of the Internet to promote American values, ideas, and beliefs (Hallams, 2010). The Internet seems to profoundly affect the two cornerstones of diplomacy: information and communication. In addition, social media and its networking have announced a new phase in the communication revolution, and the digitalization of data has increased access to massive amounts of information and knowledge (Hallams, 2010).

Digital diplomacy is also known as e-diplomacy, digitalized public diplomacy, public diplomacy 2.0, Twittdiplomacy, etc. The different names depend on the platform to exercise this kind of diplomacy. The term “digital diplomacy,” which is often used as an alternative to “digitalized public diplomacy,” also advocates the use of digital utensils in its subdivision of diplomacy (Manor, 2019, p. 14). The diplomats and each foreign affairs department have their strategy to drive digital diplomacy by applying different platforms. For instance, Twitter is always used to announce one nation’s foreign policy, while Facebook enhances relationships with the worldwide public. In the book “Digital Diplomacy: Theory and Practice,” digital diplomacy is “defined as a strategy of managing change through digital tools and virtual collaboration” (Bjola & Holmes, 2015, p. 35). In this book, digital diplomacy is also defined as

public diplomacy that created significant attention and criticism. “People worldwide obtain more information than ever through horizontal peer-to-peer networks rather than through the old vertical process by which information flowed down from the traditional sources of media authority” (Bjola & Holmes, 2015, p. 40).

According to Marcus Holmes, digital diplomacy embodies a set of activities that include gathering and analyzing data from foreign publics (Bjola & Holmes, 2015). Digital diplomacy may also prove a helpful tool in nation-branding activities. In 2016, the British High Commissioner to Ghana, Jon Benjamin, said that digital diplomacy is how governments and their diplomats use the Internet, innovative telephony, and social media to manage international relations, again in their national interest (Benjamin, 2016).

“Digital diplomacy,” “e-diplomacy,” and “cyber-diplomacy” are all terms that describe the same reality: the advent of new diplomacy adapted to the digital world. The advantage of this new form of diplomacy is contacting the citizens directly. Therefore, the potential audience of one message is multiplied (Rigalt, 2017).

As mentioned above, many names label new information technology used to achieve diplomatic objectives. However, this paper uses digital diplomacy as the primary term for information technology applied in public diplomacy. Moreover, in the scope of this paper, digital diplomacy mainly focuses on the cultural exchange sector.

### **Monologue and dialogue layers**

In economic, political, and cultural interdependency, monologue and dialogue are essential tools for effective public diplomacy, both online and offline. As a new trend in contemporary public diplomacy, this study uses Cowan and Arsenault’s theoretical framework of layers of public diplomacy – monologue, and dialogue – to analyze digital diplomacy worldwide. The monologue is defined as one-way informational communication. Dialogue is a two- or multi-directional communication (Cowan & Arsenault, 2008).

The monologue layer is one-way communication used to advocate foreign policy strategies. Monologues include speeches, editorials,

proclamations, press releases, and cultural work. The monologue's function mainly focuses on knowledge transfer, so it needs to convey an idea or a vision fluently and clearly. Monologue communication is essential for the state because it is one of the ways of establishing a reputation in the country. One-way communication is used to explain the day-to-day affairs of one's state policy. In digital diplomacy, one government's foreign affairs website is seen as an official channel of one state to transmit information to the public. However, one-way communication is "read-only" and does not offer an opportunity for audiences to send feedback or critical responses. Therefore, it is necessary to have another form of communication, namely, dialogue.

Dialogue is a two- or multi-directional communication. Dialogue communication indicates an actual conversation in which participants can engage keenly and openly in relationship-building exchanges. As a result, feelings of control and dominance are diminished. With the dialogue layer, the key is to find a way to listen, make people feel they are being heard, and have their voice. Listening to the audience can help governments find a better way of expressing their policies. In many ways, social media platforms, where users are encouraged to share information and opinions about themselves and their world, can serve as a form of dialogue.

## **Vietnam – Japan strategic cooperation in terms of culture and current application of digital diplomacy**

### **Overview of cooperation in cultural exchange between Japan and Vietnam**

1973 witnessed the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and North Vietnam. In 1975, when Vietnam reunited between the North and the South, Japan, and Vietnam agreed to exchange ambassadors, and Japan decided to provide an economic grant to Vietnam. In 2004, The Foreign Ministers of both sides issued the Joint Statement

“Toward a Higher Sphere of Enduring Partnership.” In 2006, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe officially visited Viet Nam. On this occasion, Vietnam and Japan issued the Joint Statement “Toward a Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia.” In 2009, Party General Secretary Nong Duc Manh officially visited Japan. During his visit, Party General Secretary Nong Duc Manh and Prime Minister Taro Aso signed the Vietnam – Japan Joint Statement on the Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia, which upgraded Vietnam-Japan relations to a Strategic Partnership. Japan was the first country in the Group of Seven (G7) to establish a Strategic Partnership with Vietnam. In 2015, during an official visit to Japan, H.E. Nguyen Phu Trong, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe adopted the Joint Vision Statement on Japan – Vietnam Relations. This statement aimed to comprehensively promote and further deepen the Japan – Vietnam Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia. Furthermore, this statement showed that the two sides strengthened their cooperation in cultural exchange. In 2017, Majesties Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko paid their first State visit to Vietnam. This trip marked a historical milestone in bilateral relations since it was the first visit by a Japanese monarch to the country. Over the past 49 years, relations between Japan and Vietnam have strengthened via many channels regarding their foreign policy. Japan and Vietnam have established and tied their concerns through different cultural exchange programs on many platforms. This paper mainly highlights the most recent cultural activities conducted in both countries.

Recent years have witnessed Japan and Vietnam’s cooperation successfully organizing their highlight musical program, the “Vietnam – Japan Music Festival.” For example, 2008 marked the 35<sup>th</sup> year of establishing Japan – Viet Nam diplomatic relations. Large-scale cultural commemorative events were organized including the “Hanoi Ho Chi Minh City Music Festival.” Mr. Ryotaro Sugi – a well-known Japanese singer and actor – was the Special Ambassador (Anon., 2018). In addition, Mr. Ryotaro Sugi was awarded the Friendship Medal by the President of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for his active contribution to cultural exchange between Japan and Vietnam. Vice President Nguyễn Thị Bình signed the decision on November 19, 1992 (Anon., 2018). Lately,



the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, and Vietnam Television, in conjunction with the Embassy of Japan in Hanoi, agreed to hold the music festival Vietnam – Japan 2018. This program was on air live on VTV1 – the national television broadcaster of Vietnam and broadcast the following days on the two countries' television. Well-known artists performed this program in Vietnam and Japan (Quan, 2018).

The Joint Vision Statement on Japan – Vietnam Relations mentioned two projects: the Japan-East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths (JENESYS) and the “W.A. Project.” Prime Minister Abe's initiative witnessed two nations' cooperation in JENESYS (Anon., 2015, p. 7). JENESYS is a program between Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, and Vietnam is one of the participants. This program aims to promote mutual trust and understanding among the peoples of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, build a basis for future friendship and cooperation, and encourage a sense of Japan's society, history, cultures, politics, and diplomatic relations. Moreover, the “W.A. Project” to promote two-way arts and cultural exchange and Japanese language learning assistance is highly appreciated by Vietnam (Anon., 2015, p. 7). Besides the key projects mentioned in the Joint Vision Statement on Japan – Vietnam Relations in 2015, there have been many cultural programs conducted by both sides.

Additionally, Japan promotes its culture and supports heritage conservation in Vietnam. Court music (Nha Nhac) is one of the typical case studies in which Japan has impacted Vietnamese national policies toward enhancing Vietnamese cultural identity. Nha Nhac is the tradition of court music reaching its peak in Hue during the Nguyen Dynasty. Nha Nhac was proclaimed a UNESCO Masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity in 2003 and then recognized in the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in 2008. The projects to safeguard Nha Nhac were funded by the Japanese government and involved the participation of Japanese experts. The funding from Japan Funds-in-Trust was \$154,900 (Akagawa, 2015).

From February the 28<sup>th</sup> to March the 5<sup>th</sup>, 2017, there was a visit to Vietnam by Japanese Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko. Notably, the visit occurred six weeks after Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's trip to Hanoi in January 2017. While Mr. Abe's stayed focused on boosting bilateral economic, political and strategic ties, Emperor Akihito's

visit helped promote Japan's "soft power" in Vietnam. In addition, it contributed to strengthening social and cultural connections between the two peoples (Hiep, 2017). During this trip, Vietnam also arranged events to welcome the Japanese Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko and promote Vietnamese culture. When the couple visited Hue, they arrived at the Duet Thi Duong Opera House and enjoyed three royal court music performances. This visit reconfirmed that both nations appreciate the value of culture.

In summary, the cultural exchange between Vietnam and Japan has multiple channels and agendas. It includes the interaction between the government and the public, the monarch and the public, the young people and their peers, and the exchange of pop culture and heritage conversation.

### **The application of digital diplomacy in Vietnam and Japan**

The above information has been featured recently in terms of culture between Japan and Vietnam. During Industry 4.0, interacting with the public is very important. In this research paper, the current use of monologue and dialogue layers of digital diplomacy to promote the cultural image of Japan is mainly mentioned to analyze diplomats' daily directed digital diplomacy.

#### *What are the platforms that Japan uses when conducting digital diplomacy?*

The official website of the Embassy of Japan in Vietnam is <https://www.vn.emb-japan.go.jp>, and the official website of the Consulate General of Japan in Vietnam is [https://www.hcmcj.vn.emb-japan.go.jp/it-prtop\\_vi/index.html](https://www.hcmcj.vn.emb-japan.go.jp/it-prtop_vi/index.html). The official Facebook page of the Embassy of Japan in Vietnam is <https://vi-vn.facebook.com/embassyofjapaninvietnam/> and the Consulate General of Japan in Vietnam, <https://www.facebook.com/consulategeneralofjapaninhochiminh/>. There are quick links to those Facebook pages on the website of the Embassy of Japan in Vietnam and the Consulate General of Japan in Vietnam, respectively.

Other websites and Facebook pages mainly focus on sharing information about cultural exchange, namely The Japan Foundation Center for Cultural Exchange in Vietnam at <https://jpf.org.vn/> and <https://www.facebook.com/japanfoundation.vietnam/>.

Besides the official websites or Facebook pages used to interact frequently with audiences, there are other channels that Japan also uses to promote relations with Vietnam including the website “Japan and Vietnam: Archival Records on Our History” [http://www.archives.go.jp/event/jp\\_vn45/english/index.html](http://www.archives.go.jp/event/jp_vn45/english/index.html). This website jointly projects between the National Archives of Japan and the State Records Management and Archives Department of Vietnam, which presents the exchanges of both countries via their holdings. The contents of this website were supervised by Dr. Masaya Shiraishi, Emeritus Professor of Waseda University. Therefore, this project is a collaboration between two nations and the people of two countries.

There is the annual “Japan Festival in Vietnam” and a website and a Facebook page keeping track of this event every year <https://japan-vietnam-festival.jp/> and <https://www.facebook.com/JVFVN/>. This event is seen as a signature event of Japan in Vietnam.

To communicate with the public in Vietnam, Japan has created many regular and yearly platforms as they are concerned about the cultural exchange between the two nations, especially the one-way communication between Japan towards Vietnam.

According to the above data, the strength of Japan’s strategy is that they have used technology to spread their information by creating different platforms, as mentioned above. In order to utilize the strengths of monologue–one–way communication, the two websites of the Embassy and Consulate General run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are updated frequently, including with news from Japan and Vietnam, especially since they highlight cultural events to engage the two peoples. This is vital during Technology 4.0 since audiences always expect updated information for their needs, such as cultural events, joining events guidance, scholarship announcements, etc.

In addition, the websites create advantages for Vietnamese audiences by having two languages, Vietnamese and Japanese. This helps Japan to deliver messages directly to the Vietnamese more quickly than other Embassies and Consulate Generals in Vietnam, which only use English on their websites.

Name of website	Address
Embassy of Japan in Vietnam	<a href="https://www.vn.emb-japan.go.jp/itprtop_vi/index.html">https://www.vn.emb-japan.go.jp/itprtop_vi/index.html</a>
Consulate General of Japan in Vietnam	<a href="https://www.hcmcgj.vn.emb-japan.go.jp/itprtop_vi/index.html">https://www.hcmcgj.vn.emb-japan.go.jp/itprtop_vi/index.html</a>
The Japan Foundation Center for Cultural Exchange in Vietnam	<a href="https://jpf.org.vn/">https://jpf.org.vn/</a>
Japan and Vietnam: Archival Records on Our History	<a href="http://www.archives.go.jp/event/jp_vn45/english/index.html">http://www.archives.go.jp/event/jp_vn45/english/index.html</a>
Japan Festival in Vietnam	<a href="https://japan-vietnam-festival.jp/trang-chu">https://japan-vietnam-festival.jp/trang-chu</a>

**Table 1:** Websites where Japan conducts digital diplomacy in Vietnam – Monologue layer (data as of September 2022)

Name of Facebook page	Address	Note	Created in
Embassy of Japan in Vietnam	<a href="https://vi-vn.facebook.com/embassyofjapaninvietnam/">https://vi-vn.facebook.com/embassyofjapaninvietnam/</a>	107,226 people like this 117,972 people follow this 4,846 people checked in here	Created in 2017
Consulate General of Japan in Vietnam	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/consulategeneralofjapaninhochiminh/">https://www.facebook.com/consulategeneralofjapaninhochiminh/</a>	13,196 people like this 16,023 people follow this 332 people checked in here	Created in 2020
The Japan Foundation Center for Cultural Exchange in Vietnam	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/japanfoundation.vietnam/">https://www.facebook.com/japanfoundation.vietnam/</a>	83,005 people like this 85,736 people follow this 5,590 people checked in here	Created in 2010
Japan Festival in Vietnam	<a href="https://www.facebook.com/JVF.VN/">https://www.facebook.com/JVF.VN/</a>	27,189 people like this 27,853 people follow this	Created in 2014

**Table 2:** Facebook pages that Japan conducts digital diplomacy in Vietnam – Dialogue layer (data as of September 2022)

The Japan Foundation Center for Cultural Exchange in Vietnam is also designed in Vietnamese and Japanese. This center announces information about cultural exchange activities for young Vietnamese people and valuable studying resources. There is an online library where readers can enjoy books about Japanese culture, history, literature, etc. Moreover, this website is searchable for documents relating to Japan by giving complimentary e-books or e-magazines. The Japan Foundation Center in Vietnam is also dedicated to the mission of the Japan Foundation around the world by carrying out comprehensive global cultural exchange programs. With a friendly interface, the Japan Foundation Center for Cultural Exchange in Vietnam website is a strong point of contact for conducting Japan's digital diplomacy.

Furthermore, "Japan and Vietnam: Archival Records on Our History" is an online exhibition with around 50 records preserved in archival institutions and museums in Vietnam and Japan. This exhibition reflects historical phases of development in the Vietnam – Japan bilateral relationship by collecting documents of cultural events, diplomatic events, etc. The demonstration comprises four main sections: Early relations, Exchanges in the early modern era, Exchanges in the Modern period, and Vietnam – Japan: Old partners, new partnership (Anon., 2018).

The strength of the dialogue is that the Japanese government has created and maintained social media accounts for its mission from 2010 to the present day. The posts are written in Vietnamese and Japanese. The updates on those social media platforms are also frequent, and the number of followers of the Embassy of Japan in Vietnam is over 107,000, the highest among the social media of Japan in Vietnam.

For weaknesses in Japan's digital diplomacy, the details relating to the contents and interactions should be considered, which can mainly be evaluated through social media platforms. For example, although the Japan Festival in Vietnam annually attracts a huge audience to join this event, its website does not have any records, photos, or videos to promote Japanese images. Moreover, though the Facebook pages are official channels to conduct their policy, none of the pages are verified, which means there is no blue verification badge to let people know that this page is authentic. This is a weakness when administrating social media accounts since these Facebook pages cannot prove they are trusted accounts. Hence, when audiences search for information, their page is not

the first result for audiences' references. Naturally, it might lead to less interaction between the pages and the audiences.

Information is updated frequently, but the interaction is not practical. Some posts only have several interactions (like, share, or comment). Though the Facebook page is assumed as two-way communication, the page mainly focuses on making announcements, updating news, and sharing the link from Foreign Affairs website rather than responding to the audiences on this platform.

## **Recommendations to apply digital diplomacy to promote Japan's cultural images and conclusion**

Japan has founded its roots in its cultural exchange with Vietnam when conducting diplomacy. Applying digital diplomacy aims to achieve and increase the mutual understanding between two peoples. Japan's policy has many strengths to enhance, and its weaknesses need to improve.

Japan has established and made popular websites and Facebook pages of its foreign affairs divisions. This is the very first step to creating good opportunities for digital diplomacy.

Although there are currently a number of layers to conducting digital diplomacy, Japan still needs to advance the operation of digital diplomacy. For the authority, the Japanese government should apply and ask for the blue tick verification on their Facebook page to increase audience interaction.

In addition, each platform needs to meet the requirements of its function. For example, dialogue layers should be the channels to communicate and interact with audiences rather than share information only. Furthermore, digital diplomacy innovation needs top leadership support, the trend of top leaders, KOLs, or influencers. Therefore, the campaign should call leaders to spread information about Japanese culture. In addition, young diplomats should join the movement since they are familiar with hi-technology and easily follow social media trends rather than only share the links to cultural exchange events on their Facebook pages.

The diplomats should be the ones to be the storytellers, posting the status or updates their stories, videos, photos, or links; sharing to effectively spreads the news. In addition, knowing how to make an exciting hashtag for their posts is also helpful for reaching many audiences in Vietnam. However, the aforementioned leaders can update their social media platforms but cannot interact with two-way communication appropriately. This means they cannot answer the comments, react to many icons, etc. Thus, there should be task-forces to do the administration tasks. The diplomats should be trained to use social media effectively and follow the code of conduct to gain effectiveness. Hence, the P.R. stories spread by diplomats should be considered to make the contents more diverse.

## Bibliography

- Akagawa, N., 2015. *Heritage conservation and Japan's cultural diplomacy: heritage, national identity and national interest*. s.l.:Routledge.
- Anon., 2015. *Joint Vision Statement on Japan – Vietnam Relations*, s.l.: s.n.
- Anon., 2018. *Decision to Recommission Mr. Ryotaro Sugi as Special Ambassador for Japan-Viet Nam Relationships*. [Online] Available at: [https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2008/4/1178858\\_1000.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2008/4/1178858_1000.html) [Accessed 2022].
- Anon., 2018. *Exchange in the Modern and Contemporary Periods*. [Online] Available at: [http://www.archives.go.jp/event/jp\\_vn45/english/ch03.html](http://www.archives.go.jp/event/jp_vn45/english/ch03.html) [Accessed 2022].
- Benjamin, J., 2016. *Speech: Diplomacy in the Digital Age*. [Online] Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/diplomacy-in-the-digital-age> [Accessed 14 January 2022].
- Bjola, C. & Holmes, M., 2015. *Digital Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. s.l.:Routledge.
- Chachavalpongpun, P., 2011. Digital Diplomacy in Southeast Asia. In: L. P. E. & C. Duerkop, ed. *Rethinking Diplomacy: New Approaches and Domestic Challenges In East Asia and The European Union*. Seoul: Konrad-Adenauer-Stifung, Korea & Japan Office 2011, p. 116.
- Cowan, G. & Arsenault, A., 2008. Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy. *SAGE Journal*, Volume 616, p. 27.
- Cull, N. J., 2011. *Wikileaks, Public Diplomacy 2.0 and the State of Digital Public Diplomacy*. Los Angeles: USC Annenberg School for Communication & Journalism.
- Cull, N. J., 2011. *Wikileaks, Public Diplomacy 2.0 and the State of Digital Public Diplomacy*. Los Angeles: USC Annenberg School for Communication & Journalism.
- Dinnie, K., 2008. *Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice*. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.

- Ganja, A. P. a. S., 2016. *ASEAN Leaders Log on to New Social Media*. [Online] Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/aec/Asean-leaders-log-on-to-new-social-media-30280511.html> [Accessed 2022].
- Glassman, J. K., 2008. *Public Diplomacy 2.0: A New Approach to Global Engagement*. [Online] Available at: <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/us/2008/112605.htm>.
- Hallams, E., 2010. Digital Diplomacy: The Internet, the Battle for Ideas & US Foreign Policy. *CEU Political Science Journal*, p. 549.
- Hiep, L. H., 2017. The Strategic Significance of Vietnam-Japan Ties. *ISEAS Perspective*.
- Holmes, C. B. a. M., 2015. *Digital Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. New York: Routledge.
- Lynch, J. & Chernatory, L. D., 2004. The Power of Emotion: Brand Communication in Business-to-Business Markets. *Brand Management*, p. 403.
- Manor, I., 2019. *The Digitalization of Public Diplomacy*. s.l.:Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy.
- Nikos, C., 2005. *The Internet and Diplomacy*. [Online] Available at: [http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2005/0103/chri/christo\\_net.html](http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2005/0103/chri/christo_net.html) [Accessed 2022].
- Quan, H., 2018. *Japan-Vietnam Music Festival 2018 promises to explode with hot stars*. [Online] Available at: <https://english.vtv.vn/news/japan-vietnam-music-festival-2018-promises-to-explode-with-hot-stars-20180813185518096.htm> [Accessed 2022].
- Sandre, A., n.d. *Diplomacy 3.0 Starts in Stockholm*. [Online] Available at: [https://www.huffingtonpost.com/andreas-sandre/digital-diplomacy-stockholm\\_b\\_4592691.html](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/andreas-sandre/digital-diplomacy-stockholm_b_4592691.html) [Accessed 2022].
- Seib, P., 2009. *Toward a New Public Diplomacy Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Thayer, C., 2014. *The Diplomat*. [Online] Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2014/10/vietnams-extensive-strategic-partnership-with-japan/> [Accessed 2 March 2022].



# **CULTURAL DIPLOMACY BETWEEN SERBIA AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: ENHANCING THE CULTURE OF PEACE, TRUST AND DIALOGUE**

SARINA BAKIĆ

## **Introduction**

Overall relations between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina could now be considered as normalized, after many years of unresolved tensions. Bosnia and Herzegovina shares approximately one-third of its land border with Serbia (almost the entire eastern border of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or 312 kilometres). Additional ties between the two countries result from the fact that Serbs are one of the three constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina and form a majority in one of the two Bosnia and Herzegovina's entities (Republika Srpska)<sup>1</sup> and in Serbia (in the Sandžak region), there is a large, compact and autochthonous Bosniac minority. Finally, another important political link between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia is that, along with Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia is a signatory to the Dayton Agreement<sup>2</sup>.

In recent years, bilateral relations between the Republic of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have been tumultuous. This is in large part a consequence of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the war ended a long time ago, relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia are not only haunted by the legacy of their past but also by ongoing regional and global crises. Both countries in their public political discourse have completely different perceptions of the war which reflect different views within the states of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as well.

The former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia established diplomatic relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2000, almost five years after the end of the war and the signing of the Dayton Agreement. However, relations between the two countries are still affected by numerous outstanding issues among which prevail not only quite opposing views on the past but also on the future political and territorial structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On the other side, cultural diplomacy as a research field has not yet been taken seriously in Bosnia and Herzegovina regardless of the fact that it presents an important mechanism to connect cultures and promote cultural diversity especially among countries with difficult past and present relations. This has been proven by cultural actions between artists from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina who were the first ones to come together to overcome the wounds and sores of the terrifying war. After various individual cultural actions, 2004 was a turning point in relation to cultural cooperation between Belgrade and Sarajevo initiated by both cities' authorities. The theatre season in Sarajevo was opened with guests from Jugoslovensko dramsko pozorište and Atelje 212 and theatres from Sarajevo, Narodno pozorište and Kamerni Teatar 55 opened Belgrade's theatre season with their theatre performances. This kind of collaboration is ongoing and represents what cultural diplomacy in this specific context truly is – a collaboration among cultural institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia that in most cases separate the work of governments from the contribution of non-state actors in the field.

Furthermore, this kind of cooperation illustrates the value of cultural exchange – in which ideas and concepts can be shared in an open and free manner. By networking, cultural and artistic spaces can become important spaces for dialogue, diversity, education and progressive social changes for both countries and their societies in general. These types of activities between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, should not be unappreciated and unacknowledged when speaking about a culture of peace as an important component of cultural diplomacy. However, all the above mentioned is exposed to historical, geopolitical and economic changes which both Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are undergoing, related to their own contexts and positions within the international political landscape.

## **Theoretical underpinnings of cultural diplomacy**

Cultural diplomacy is a tangible activity that embraces foreign and internal politics with culture and cultural relations. Culture has always played an important part in international relations and diplomatic engagement.

Diplomacy represents a social activity as well as a political process in which political participants, in most cases states, join in mutual activities within the international field (Vukadinović, 2004:83). Therefore, cultural diplomacy is a specific form of diplomatic endeavour related to cultural activities and general issues of culture. It is implemented by cultural exchange directed towards the public of other states; building and strengthening mutual understanding according to its own foreign policy's goals, mainly promoting its own culture and cultural values and specific features. Today, states are the main carriers of cultural diplomacy activities (Melissen, 2005).

Initially, Joseph Nye created the concept of soft power – a concept still under debate in various discussions related to international relations and diplomacy. Nye underlines culture as one of three main nations' elements among political principles and standards and foreign policy. These three elements of soft power are considered to be utterly in line with internationally consented credibility and moral authority (Nye, 2004:36). These elements can be viewed in the various forms of popular culture including cuisine, fashion, tourism and entertainment. However, it is most recognizable in art, cultural heritage and education. Conversely, the fast-moving development and constant change of globalization processes have triggered an upswing of cultural diplomacy in the context of international relations. The globalization process was never solely related only to economics but also with issues of culture. Culture, religion and ethnicity play a substantial role in creating the image and identity of every state. In other words, culture is utilized for political and diplomatic objectives. According to Simon Mark, cultural diplomacy is managed both by diplomats working for the state's foreign ministry and by those working for stand-alone entities with varying degrees of governance and funding links to foreign ministers. Activities undertaken within cultural diplomacy's scope manifest an aspect

of the culture of the state which the government represents and include a wide range of participants such as artists, academics and students (Mark, 2009). Additionally, Patricia Goff considers cultural diplomacy as first and foremost about bridging differences and facilitating mutual understanding. It is able to tell another story about a country that may differ from what official policy would imply (2013:3).

Additionally, cultural diplomacy contributes soft power. In the multilateral context, cultural diplomacy uniquely influences international cooperation and the building of trust and partnership among different countries. It is most visible in mutual projects that create long-lasting interactions and relations among states. In this way, culture becomes a bridge for (re)connecting and collaboration.

The expression of culture is associated with numerous connotations and meanings, but in general, culture represents a system of learned and shared beliefs, language, norms, values, and symbols that groups use to identify themselves and provide a framework within which to live and work. Moreover, culture can be defined as all the ways of life including arts, beliefs and institutions of a population that are passed down from generation to generation. Culture has been known as 'the way of life for an entire society'. As such, it encompasses art, language, religion, rituals, cultural and historical heritage, rules of manners and behaviours, clothing and gastronomy. In the context of cultural diplomacy, culture is considered the set of distinctive cultural features of society or a social group that includes, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs (UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, 2001). In a theoretical context, states make an attempt to present their culture, viewed as the "overall way of living" of the nation (Katunarić, 2007:174) which is likewise presented to others using various cultural activities that are viewed throughout Enlightenment's paradigm of culture as high intellectual and artistic accomplishments (Katunarić, 2007). In the context of cultural diplomacy, the intercultural approach is imperative for creating new content and platforms based on already existing cultural diversity.

## Cultural Diplomacy on the Ambassadors' Spot

For the purpose of this article, it was necessary to conduct interviews with diplomatic representatives of both countries that are responsible for cultural diplomacy at the highest government levels. This component of the empirical research illustrates the public diplomacy approach of cultural diplomacy, according to which governments of the countries, ministries of foreign affairs in particular with their ambassadors, influence the practice and objectives of cultural diplomacy in order to achieve foreign policy aims. Interviews with ambassadors of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo and Belgrade were conducted *via* electronic mail and strictly for the purpose of this article. Both interviews were conducted in October 2022 with the same questions related to the importance of cultural diplomacy between these countries and their diplomatic cultural actions.

In the interview with H.E. Ambassador Aleksandar Đorđević, Ambassador of Republic of Serbia to Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo, it is stressed that bilateral relations are burdened by events from the 1990s, and as such cultural diplomacy represents one of the most efficient mechanisms for upgrading various forms of mutual cooperation between Republic of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cultural diplomacy between these two states has been developed in different segments, highlighting cultural areas contained by projects that the Embassy of Republic of Serbia in Sarajevo implements in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Out of numerous projects, he specified the International Literary Festival "Pero Živodraga Živkovića"<sup>3</sup>, organized by the Association of Citizens for Cultural Reanimation Armagedon from Zenica supported by Embassy of Republic of Serbia and Embassy of Republic of Italy. Besides keeping memory of Živodrag Živković, the aim of this Festival is also to work on developing the cultural literary scene in the region, especially among young and unpublished writers and poets. This project has been ongoing for the past eight years. Furthermore, the Embassy of the Republic of Serbia gave its support to a notable festival in Bosnia and Herzegovina called the Actor Festival of Bosnia and Herzegovina, organized by the cultural institution People's University in Konjic. The embassy's support consists of participation and organization

of theatres and actors from Serbia. Among other events, H.E. Ambassador Aleksandar Đorđević underlined the cultural event dedicated to Serbian writer Miloš Crnjanski that was held on June 15<sup>th</sup>, 2021, in the Museum of Literature and Theatre Art of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo.

In the second interview, H.E. Ambassador Aida Smajić, Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia stressed that cultural cooperation presents one of the priorities of foreign policy with impeccable value in the promotion of state *via* culture, and today it is an inseparable part of international politics and diplomacy. According to the principles of Bosnia and Herzegovina's foreign policy, affirmed by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are five priorities of the foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina<sup>4</sup>. In the bilateral context among priorities, there are good neighbourly relations with the states in the region, strengthening relations with other states and organizations, promoting Bosnia and Herzegovina's entrepreneurship and strengthening technological and cultural cooperation with other countries. Bearing in mind that Bosnia and Herzegovina has no developed cultural policy or cultural strategy, unfortunately, the basis for investment in this specific field of diplomacy is very small-scale. Education, science, culture and sport are within the responsibility of the Ministry for Civil Affairs because there is no Ministry for Culture at the state level. As H.E. Ambassador Smajić stated the individual successes of Bosnia and Herzegovina's established artists, athletes, theatre and infilm professionals are surely a bright spot in the country's promotion at the cultural level but unfortunately, they are rarely supported by the state. She is more than certain that there are numerous ways for changing this kind of condition and improve current circumstances.

The embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Belgrade is devoted to presenting Bosnia and Herzegovina in a better light, in spite of long-term obstacles and glitches in the relation of these states. There are important agreements that both states signed as the legal basis for scientific, technological, educational, cultural and sports cooperation<sup>5</sup>. Furthermore, the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Belgrade has participated in the public diplomacy campaign named "12 days of peace". This is a public diplomacy campaign implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the United Nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and

in diplomacy missions throughout the world with the aim to build, sustain and strengthen peace and peaceful culture. The first campaign in Republic of Serbia was organized and realized in the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Belgrade in 2021 named “Meeting of Friends” and was participated in by humanitarians, entrepreneurship representatives, university professors and medical doctors from the Republic of Serbia together with former diplomats from Bosnia and Herzegovina who lived or are still living in the Republic of Serbia. The same Campaign in 2022 started on International Peace Day and ended on International Nonviolent Day when representatives of the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina visited many kindergartens in Belgrade and delivered gifts to children. Additionally, besides these types of activities, the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Belgrade supported a Conference on Education and Art together with the Ministry of Culture and Information of the Republic of Serbia, participated at different festivals with presentations of traditional Bosnian culture (music, cuisine, photography, etc.). On the less positive side, due to the complicated political context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, H.E. Ambassador Aida Smajić considers that there is a huge disparity regarding coordinated activities among various actors in cultural diplomacy, meaning no adequate communication and cooperation without a relevant strategy.

### **Museums as cultural diplomacy contributors in promoting dialogue and peace**

What about non-governmental actors within cultural policy between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina? One of the most encouraging and inspiring narratives is the activities of the War Childhood Museum in Sarajevo<sup>6</sup> and their cooperation with institutions in Serbia. In the interview with Mašić Selma conducted in October 2022, one of the museum’s guides and youth activist, underlined that activities of this Museum in Serbia started in 2018 in cooperation with Caritas organizations from Italy and the town of Valjevo in Serbia; documenting experiences of children in refugees’ camps. Since 2021, this Museum has worked on documenting the experiences of children who were in

Serbia during the time of the NATO bombing. In the context of these activities, the research team of the War Childhood Museum in Sarajevo used methods of oral history, video testimonies and the collecting of children's items that are related to their personal experiences. Besides this ongoing project, the Museum realized two exhibitions in cooperation with Youth Initiative for Human Rights from Serbia. The first one is called "Let's Talk" related to war-time sexual violence as the part of regional project Strengthening of Women's Awareness on War and Gender-Based Violence". The second exhibition was actually part of main exhibition of the museum related to children's war experiences in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Syria, Kosovo, Ukraine, and Afghanistan. Selma Mašić expressed a great satisfaction because many people from Belgrade came and visited this exhibition and that this kind of cultural diplomacy is actually great ground for better communication, dialogue, understanding and finally, reconciliation. Furthermore, the War Childhood Museum in Sarajevo regularly notes many visits by citizens of Serbia, people of all generations from Belgrade, Novi Sad, Valjevo and other towns in the Republic of Serbia.

This is crucial, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the critical approach and reconciliation dialogue within society are almost nearly non-existent, mostly due to the lack of will from political elites and the lack of consensus regarding the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina's organization in a political context (Bakić, 2021). This greatly influences the cultural diplomacy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a much broader view. Additionally, according to Serhan Ada (Ada, 2017:55)<sup>7</sup>, the issue of which artists and which artistic practices are promoted is explicitly one of international cultural policies. It is about multiculturalism, intercultural dialogue and cultural diversity. In other words, we can clearly assert that both, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovinian societies are multicultural ones, in which given societies deal with cultural diversity. Multiculturalism expresses the view that society is enriched by preserving, respecting, and even encouraging cultural diversity. In the field of political sociology, multiculturalism refers to the ways in which societies decide to create and implement official policies dealing with the reasonable treatment of various cultures in the most general terms. These references are deeply connected on how cultural diplomacy functions.



## Conclusion

Cultural diplomacy performs a significant role in the achievement of foreign policy objectives of the state in many fields such as economics and various industries, but also it is a valuable tool for the implementation of state interests and benefits in the wider context of what is recognized in all interviews conducted for this article.

Some of these examples can prove that there is a willingness to search for a formula for generating an alternative dialogue that will safeguard BiH's interests and at the same time direct cultural institutions towards intellectual and affirmative humanistic values. This sort of approach is well suited to face the lingering residues of nationalist animosity. The politics of animosity are largely produced by political elites in this region, with their persistent aim to constantly reproduce and nourish a culture of fear and mistrust among people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. That is why political elites do not prefer and therefore do not support those concepts and institutions that are fostering serious reconciliation processes. Culture in their mind is still an ethnically based culture with the solitary role of strengthening national identities and national histories. Sadly, there is still not an adequate space for cultural diplomacy at the political institutions' level. We can agree with Ljilana Rogač Mijatović that the major task could be to reinforce the civil sector as bearer of cultural policy (2017:207)<sup>8</sup> together with redefining the relationship to various social traditions, cultural matrices and identity layers (Ibid). This could be related not only in the context of Serbia's, but also for Bosnia and Herzegovina's cultural diplomacy. When constructing original models of cultural diplomacy, both states should be ready to accept certain values from each other. In this context it should be remembered that values of culture and art implicate inseparable elements of humanity and refinement, it affects people's attitudes towards other people, binding people together after war and overcoming serious political turbulence between these two countries. This is proven by scattered attempts to continue cultural diplomacy especially in the sectors of education and tourism. Through cultural diplomacy, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia present their unique cultural and social values, better mutual understanding, eliminating various prejudices, respecting authenticity and equality of cultures, strengthening cultural

bonds and forms of solidarity and should work openheartedly, with the aim of what is the most important; efforts for peace keeping.

## Notes

- 1 The peace agreement negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, U.S., in November 1995 established Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state composed of two highly autonomous entities, the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- 2 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), Dayton Accords, Paris Protocol or Dayton-Paris Agreement, is the peace agreement reached at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, United States, in November 1995, and formally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. These accords put an end to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- 3 Živodrag Živković (1937-2002) was Serbian poet, essayist and writer, lived in Zenica, in Bosnia and Herzegovina until the war in 1991 then lived in Kragujevac, Serbia until his death. He was “living his poetry” but not adequately appreciated in public throughout entire region of former Yugoslavia.
- 4 Those priorities are based upon General Principles and Priorities for Implementation of Foreign Policy by Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- 5 Agreement on scientific and technological cooperation between Council of Ministries Bosnia and Herzegovina and Council of Ministries of Serbia and Monte Negro signed in Sarajevo 2003, effective since 2005 and ratified in 2014. Agreement on cooperation in the field of education, culture and sport, signed in 2010 between Council of Ministries of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Government of Republic of Serbia, effective since 2011. Protocol on cooperation between Archive of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Archive of Republic of Serbia signed in 2012. Memorandum on cooperation in the field of sport and youth policy between Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ministry of Youth and Sport of Republic of Serbia signed in 2015 and Protocol on cooperation between Council of Ministries of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Government of Republic of Serbia on preservation of the Bridge of Mehmed Paša Sokolović in Višegrad, signed in 2015.
- 6 The War Childhood Museum has been awarded one of the most prestigious museum awards – the Council of Europe Museum Prize 2018. Tackling children, the most vulnerable social group, in war, this museum opens an important discourse about children’s human rights, position and the memories of children in war, and at the same time it promotes tolerance, empathy, sincerity, mutual respect, cultural diversity and, what is most important, the importance of finding the ability to treasure common ground against wide-ranging wars (Bakić, 2021:352).
- 7 See more in: Dragičević Šešić, M., Rogač Mijatović, M., Mihaljinac, N., 2017. *Cultural Diplomacy: Arts, Festivals and Geopolitics*. Belgrade. Creative Europe Desk

Serbia, Ministry of Culture and Media of Republic of Serbia, Faculty of Dramatic Arts in Belgrade, Institute for Theatre Film Radio and Television

- 8 See more in: Šešić, D., M., Mijatović, R.M., Mihaljinac, N., 2017. *Cultural Diplomacy: Arts, Festivals and Geopolitics*. Belgrade. Creative Europe Desk Serbia, Ministry of Culture and Media of Republic of Serbia, Faculty of Dramatic Arts in Belgrade, Institute for Theatre Film Radio and Television.

## Bibliography

- Bakić, S. 2021. *Different Voices and Luminocities: Encouraging Reconciliation through Museum Practices*, Southeastern Europe 45 (2021), 341-360, BRILL, Ferdinand Schoningh
- Goff, Patricia M. 2013. *Cultural diplomacy. Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*. Routledge
- Katunarić, V. 2007. *Lica kulture*. Zagreb. Antibarbarus
- Mark, S. 2009. A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy, *Discussion Paper – Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’*, (October), pp. 1–51. Available at: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242084249\\_A\\_Greater\\_Role\\_for\\_Cultural\\_Diplomacy](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242084249_A_Greater_Role_for_Cultural_Diplomacy)
- Melissen, J. 2005. *The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice*. In: *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, ed. Melissen, J. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. *Public Affairs (Current affairs/Political science)*. Available at: <https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=sFNfYvNtw5AC>
- Dragičević Šešić, M., Rogač Mijatović, M., Mihaljinac, N., 2017. *Cultural Diplomacy: Arts, Festivals and Geopolitics*. Belgrade. Creative Europe Desk Serbia, Ministry of Culture and Media of Republic of Serbia, Faculty of Dramatic Arts in Belgrade, Institute for Theatre Film Radio and Television
- UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. 2001. Adopted in Paris, 2 November 2001.
- Vukadinović, R. 2004. *Politika i diplomacija*. Zagreb: Politička kultura.

# **CULTURAL (PARA)DIPLOMACY OF FEDERATED UNITS: INTERNATIONAL POSITIONING OF QUEBEC'S DISTINCTIVENESS**

NINA SAJIĆ

## **Introduction**

(Para)diplomacy is a term often employed in literature to denote international activities of sub-state actors, however other terms such as constituent diplomacy, global micro-diplomacy, catalytic/ multi-layered diplomacy, sub-state diplomacy, post-diplomacy, beyond diplomacy, or proto-diplomacy may appear as well. Motives and incentives for their international engagement may vary and can be grouped into three broad categories: economic, cultural and political (Sajic, 2019: 73-74). When (para)diplomacy is motivated by culture, sub-state units “try to defend or expand the recognition of their institutional peculiarities in order to secure their cultural identity” (Blatter et al., 2008: 467). Although it is difficult to determine which motive is more important overall, the international activities of sub-state units may be greater if they involve questions of culture, especially issues of identity and language (Vengroff and Rich, 2006: 112). Indeed, some of the most internationally active sub-state units (Quebec, Flanders, Catalonia, Scotland, the Basque Country etc.) devote a significant part of their international activities to promoting their identity, language and/or culture, often perceived as distinctive. The international scene may provide for such sub-state units an “opportunity to build and consolidate their national identity” (Lecours, 2002: 96). Some of them were pioneers in internationalisation; for example, the international activities of Quebec and the Basque Country date back to the late 19<sup>th</sup> and beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This paper

analyses the cultural (para)diplomacy of Quebec; it looks at how Quebec uses culture to position itself internationally and project its unique cultural and linguistic distinctiveness. A brief analysis of Canadian federal structure is followed by a discussion on Quebec's position in the Canadian federation with a focus on its distinctive culture and language. In analyzing international activities at bilateral and multilateral levels, this paper highlights the role of cultural (para)diplomacy in Quebec's quest for the promotion of its distinctiveness and the kind of recognition that it has never officially received at home. A concluding section summarizes how culture can be used by sub-state units, as an important instrument for promotion of distinctive identity internationally.

## **Canadian federal design**

Canada is one of the oldest and largest modern federations in the world. Federal institutional design was created to accommodate diversity and prevent conflict mainly between Francophones and Anglophones. Federal architecture was especially advocated by Quebec, which sought to acquire political autonomy in order to preserve its distinct culture, language and social structure. However, Anglophones favored the British tradition of unitary government and opposed a decentralized federation (Parker 2015: para 229). In the end, after much of debate and compromise Canada was created as a federation in 1867, with two levels of government, federal and provincial. Originally, it was comprised of four provinces: Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Other Canadian provinces (ten in total) and three territories joined the Federation later, with Nunavut being the last to officially join Canada in 1999. Unlike the USA, Australia and some other federations, residual powers are not vested in federated units (provinces), but in the center, which could be explained as demonstrating a tendency to create a strong center from the onset. Hence, in the beginning, Canada was a fairly centralized federation with provincial powers mainly limited to education, health care, religious matters, municipalities and other local matters. The British North American Act 1867, which served as Canada's constitution until 1982, when it was amended, recognized

the use of both French and English in Parliament and before courts, but the term “official languages” was introduced only in 1969<sup>1</sup>. While in Quebec, Francophones had constitutional instruments to protect their language and culture, Francophones outside of Quebec did not have such provincial protection or mechanisms to stop, for example, the abolishment of French schools in Ontario in 1913 (Erk, 2008: 46). Although the founding fathers of the Canadian Confederation created a new country, Canada was not a real fully-fledged nation-state for quite some time; for example, Canadian citizenship was instituted only in 1947; the Canadian Supreme Court did not rule in final appeal before 1949; the Canadian flag was not adopted until 1965, while Quebec has had an official flag since 1948 (Balthazar 1999:154). Balthazar goes on to say that the “British umbilical cord” was not cut until the 1960s (Balthazar, *ibid*). Canada was originally created to have a strong center, however, pressures to recognize duality and regionalism, have led to a more decentralized state both legislatively and administratively (Watts, 1999:24). Nonetheless, Canada has still failed to accommodate Quebec’s demand to officially recognize the people of Quebec as a distinct nation that is on equal footing with the Anglophones. Despite Quebec’s opposition to substantial constitutional amendments, the Constitutional Act was proclaimed in 1982. The proclamation of the constitution was preceded by a failed referendum on the sovereignty-association project in Quebec in 1980. The years that followed saw increased tensions between Ottawa and Quebec resulting in another failed referendum on the future of Quebec in 1995 (50,58 % were against and 49,42 in favor). The period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s is often called in literature: the era of “mega-constitutional” politics in Canada (Russell, 1993), with debates on issues such as distribution of wealth, education, health, but also the issues of identity and culture. Although, as Simeon (1995: 256) rightly points out, throughout its history and especially after mid-1960s, Canada has been under continual constitutional crises, however the federation has managed to survive.

## **Quest for recognition of Quebec's distinctiveness within Canada**

Quebec is the largest province in Canada by territory and the second most populated with over 8 million people or 23% of the overall population of Canada. French is the mother tongue of almost 80% of Quebec residents with English for only 7%; almost 95% of inhabitants speak French.

Since the creation of the federation in 1867, Quebec has been insisting on a strict federalism as a mechanism to protect its cultural and cultural dualism in Canada and it has constantly opposed “centralizing conceptions and homogenizing tendencies” (Brady, 1959: 260). Quebecers insist on the fact that they are one of the two founding nations of the Canadian federation and as such they want its specificities to be officially recognized in Canada. This demand for recognition and more autonomy started to be more articulated in the 1960s with what has been known as the Quiet Revolution. The Quiet Revolution brought about changes that transformed Quebec from a traditional state, where the Church had a central role in education, healthcare and other aspects of daily life, into a modern and secular social welfare state. According to Zubrzycki (2016: para 32-33) the Quiet Revolution “has a quasi-sacred status in Quebec”, not only because it led to the creation of a modern and secular society, but also because of the shift in self-image. French Canadians no longer saw themselves as “little people born for a small piece of bread” (Zubrzycki, *ibid*), but as a distinct nation that from then on started to use the name Québécois or Quebecers (in English). During the 1960s, the first education minister in modern Quebec Gérin-Lajoie formulated what would become known as the Gérin-Lajoie doctrine. The doctrine is considered to be the official foundation of Quebec’s internationalization and the expression of full autonomous responsibility of Quebec in matters that fall under its jurisdiction (Balthazar, 1999: 158-159). Gérin-Lajoie advocated that Quebec should have a special status that would enable the protection of its language and distinct culture. His doctrine could be best explained in his speech:

Quebec is not sovereign in all matters: it is a member of a federation. But it constitutes, in a political sense, a state. It possesses all elements: territory, population, autonomous government. It is also the political expression of a people that is distinct in many ways from the English-speaking communities inhabiting North America. Gérin-Lajoie 1965 (quoted in Balthazar, 1999:158).

However, Quebec has not been given a special status nor has it been put on an equal footing with the Anglophones. The root of the tensions between Ottawa and Quebec lies in the fact that the Canadian constitution has never officially recognized the existence of Quebec as a nation and distinct society. All of Quebec's initiatives to include specificities and the distinct nature of Quebec in the Canadian Constitution have been rejected; one of them was a failure to ratify the Meech Lake Accord<sup>2</sup> in 1990. In 2006 the House of Commons of Canada adopted a resolution that reads as follows: "That this House recognize that the Québécois form a nation within a united Canada" (Government of Quebec, 2015a). Although this motion represents a step forward, it has no legal consequence and only remains a symbolic political gesture (Government of Quebec, 2015a). In 2017, on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the Canadian Federation, the Government of Quebec presented its Policy on Québec Affirmation and Canadian Relations (Government of Quebec, 2017a). The policy document clearly defines and names Québec's plural and inclusive national identity and includes the vision for Québec within Canada.

## **Internationalization of Quebec**

Michaud and Ramet (2008, 308) distinguish two main phases of development of Quebec's international involvement. The first stage "international affirmation" begun in the 1960s and was important for internal regional building (Michaud and Ramet 2008, 309). This stage begun with the Quiet Revolution that not only transformed Quebec into a modern society, but also led to a shift in self-image of Quebecers. The second stage, which started in the 1980s, was more concentrated on policy development and institutionalisation of Quebec's international



engagement. While Michaud and Ramet (2008, 309-310) argue that the internationalisation of Quebec during the second stage followed the logic of “politics of small steps” in order to avoid conflicts with Ottawa, Feldman and Feldman (1984, 37) argue that the conflict with Ottawa accounts for much of Quebec’s international activities.

### **Bilateral level**

Quebec was one of the pioneers in internationalization, whose international activities date back to the late 19<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Quebec appointed a representative in Paris in 1882 (long before Canada did it), it created a mission in London in 1908, in Brussels in 1915, in 1943 an office was opened in New York mainly for economic purposes and for the promotion of trade and tourism (Balthazar 1999: 157). Although these activities were rather sporadic, they laid grounds for a new wave of Quebec’s internationalization that started during the Quiet Revolution in the 1960s. One of the first initiatives during this period was to create a Ministry of Cultural Affairs, which was established in 1961 with the aim to promote Quebec’s distinct culture and identity through funding various cultural programs and projects both at home and abroad. Quebec signed the first international agreement in 1965 with France in the matters of education. Since then, Quebec has signed over 600 agreements, memorandums and treaties with over 80 countries and almost half of them are still active today. Currently, Quebec has a network of 34 offices in 19 countries. It also has a Ministry of International Relations and La Francophonie, with over 700 employees and even has an Institute of Diplomacy under this Ministry. The Arts and Literature Council of Quebec (Conseil des arts et lettres CALQ) was established in 1994 with the mission to support the creation and production in arts and literature and to promote Quebec’s culture abroad; it provides financial support to 1500 artists and 800 non-profit arts organizations annually (Government of Quebec, Conseil des arts et lettres). Quebec’s cultural (para)diplomacy is an important instrument of the internationalization of Quebec and its distinctiveness.

As Bélanger (2002: 195) rightly points out, Quebec could not truly internationalize if there were no foreign partners that were willing to

undertake relations with its representatives. France has been one of the most important strategic international partners of Quebec. French official support and encouragement have been so substantial, both at bilateral but also at multilateral levels, that one could even argue that without it, Quebec could not have developed its international agency. France gave full diplomatic status to the General Delegation of Quebec<sup>3</sup> in Paris, which was opened in 1961. This means that the Delegation and its official representatives enjoy full diplomatic privileges and immunities normally reserved for foreign Embassies and Consulates. The DeGaulle government was especially keen to encourage Quebec's internationalization, particularly in the field of culture and language. DeGaulle himself went as far as "showing sympathy for the secessionist movement" (Balthazar 1999: 160) when addressing the crowd from the Montreal City Hall balcony on the 24<sup>th</sup> of July 1967 with the words 'Vive le Quebec libre' (*Long Live Free Quebec*). Relations between France and Quebec have changed since then, although they have remained special in many ways. At the request of the Party Quebecois, France revised its position to what has been known since 1977 as "ni ingérence ni indifférence" (*neither interference nor indifference*). Although France took a non-interference stance, bilateral relations have been expended to many issues to include economy, science, culture, industry, mining, renewable energy, education, employment, art, heritage, health, tourism, language etc. These "direct and special relations" between France and Quebec are based on historic, cultural and economic ties, since the 1960s (Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, 2018). They are institutionalized through various agreements, forums, groups, organizations and also by meetings that take place every two years between their respective Prime Ministers. France has concluded more agreements with Quebec than any other sovereign state (Molinario 2002: 244). In 1965 the Permanent Commission on Cooperation between Quebec and France was established to foster and coordinate their bilateral relations and cooperation with a special focus on culture, heritage and the French language. It is worth noting that France is the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest foreign investor in Quebec (Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, 2018). Although their bilateral relations have evolved with multidimensionality, culture and language remaining at their heart. Quebec's cultural (para)diplomacy with France aims at creating various artistic

partnerships between local artists, cultural operators and creative industries. As a result, a very dynamic and frequent artistic exchange has been taking place and France has been the highest “consumer” of Quebec’s culture outside of Quebec. France has been the “epicenter of Quebec’s international relations” and their objective has predominantly been cultural and political (Painchaud, 1988: 243). Celine Dion, Garu, and Lara Fabian to name just a few Quebec’s artists, have gained fame, not only in France but also internationally. Quebec has also oriented its cultural (para)diplomatic activities towards other countries such as the UK, Ireland, the Nordic Countries, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Japan, Mexico and some African countries. Quebec’s literature is very present in German-speaking countries with over 100 of Quebec’s books being translated into German in less than two years (Délégation générale du Québec à Munich, 2022). It is noteworthy that cultural (para)diplomacy also has an economic component. Culture is an important economic engine in Quebec and cultural industries account for 4.3% of its economy and nearly 176,000 jobs (Government of Quebec, 2017b, p. 63). As Quebec’s domestic cultural market is relatively small, Quebec’s cultural (para)diplomacy also has that export-oriented aspect and is in constant search for new cultural markets, such as the ones in Asia and the Americas. (Government of Quebec, 2017b, p. 63).

### **Multilateral level**

Quebec’s cultural (para)diplomacy has also been aimed at the multilateral level, especially at two International governmental organizations: International Organization of la Francophonie (OIF) and UNESCO. Membership in most of the international governmental organizations is almost exclusively reserved for nation states, however some IGOs may allow membership of other actors such as federated units and regions, but under special conditions and under certain limitations (Sajic, 2019: 80). For federated units and regions with national aspirations including identity building and promotion “representation in international institutions is usually an important priority” (Kincaid, 2010: 18).

Quebec’s internationalization at the multilateral level, especially within OIF, has been by and large sponsored and encouraged by France.

This support started with De Gaulle when France persuaded Gabon to invite Quebec to participate in a conference on education for French-speaking countries in 1969, which Canada took as a stark provocation and temporarily broke diplomatic relations with Gabon (Balthazar 1999: 160). The first attempt to be represented in an international organization was with the *Agence de Co-operation Culturelle et Technique* (ACCT), an international governmental agency for cultural and technical co-operation in the French-speaking countries that was a predecessor of OIF. Quebec demanded membership of ACCT on the grounds that it was the sole representative of Francophone population in Canada, and while Ottawa strongly opposed it, Quebec was given membership status in the framework of the Canadian delegation (Balthazar *ibid*).

Today, Quebec is one of the three sub-state units (New Brunswick and Federation Wallonie-Brussels being the other two) that are full-fledged members of OIF. Their membership status is the same as the status of the other 51 state members, but they are presented in the organization as “participating governments” under the names “Canada-Quebec” and “Canada-Nouveau-Brunswick” respectively, while Federation Wallonie-Brussels participates under that name. The French language is obviously one of the most important characteristics of Quebec’s identity and distinctiveness. Quebec has considered itself to be the main homeland of French culture in the Americas and has taken on a special responsibility to develop, promote and safeguard French culture in the Americas and worldwide (Government of Quebec, 2017 b, p. 67). In 2006, the Quebec Government established the Francophonie Centre of the Americas with the aim to promote the French language in the context of cultural diversity in the Americas (Government of Quebec, 2015b). In 2014 the Centre created the Library of the Americas, which provides free access to over 15.000 digital francophones books. Quebec actively participates in all OIF commissions, bodies, working groups and the Standing Council. It contributes to all OIF operating agencies such as the Francophone University Agency (AUF), the Senghor University in Alexandria, the International Association of Francophone Mayors (AIMF), and the TV5 Monde television network. The TV5 network enables Quebec to broadcast its productions, but also news, to over 370 million households in over 200 countries and territories (OIF). As Mark points out the OIF has not only been an instrument to help Quebec in safeguarding the

French language, but it has also been “a source of support for Québec’s aspirations to be recognized as a distinct culture, with a unique position on the American continent” (Mark, 2010, p. 71). The OIF has provided Quebec a unique platform to promote its distinctiveness within the organization, but also among the other 80 states and territories, that have the status of members, associated members or observers.

Quebec’s presence in the UNESCO is more of recent times but as equally important as the OIF. In 2006, the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada signed the agreement at UNESCO, which represents “an unprecedented step forward, placing it among the most decisive initiatives in Québec’s international relations history” (Representative of the Government of Quebec in the Permanent Delegation of Canada to UNESCO 2022). Based on this agreement a post of the Quebec Government Representative, with a diplomatic status of a counselor, was created within the Permanent Delegation of Canada to UNESCO. The Governments of Canada and Quebec (in the fields of its competence) agree on votes, resolutions, negotiations, policies and positions in UNESCO, and Quebec’s representatives participate in meetings and conferences with the rest of the Canadian delegation (Government of Canada, 2022). The representatives of Quebec promote and protect Quebec’s interest in education, culture, scientific development and information society; establish relations with other UNESCO delegations and actively participate in the work of UNESCO representative groups such as la Francophonie and the Commonwealth. (Representative of the Government of Quebec in the Permanent Delegation of Canada to UNESCO 2022).

In the fall of 2019, the Government of Quebec released Quebec’s International Vision as an extension to its International policy adopted in 2017. The first principle of Quebec’s international engagement is based on language and culture as the affirmation of Quebec’s identity (UNESCO, 2020). A whole chapter is devoted to the promotion of Quebec culture and artists internationally; support for presentation and export of Quebec cultural production as well as for cultural showcases is envisioned in this document (UNESCO, 2020). The Government of Quebec intends to promote diversity of cultural expressions, particularly in collaboration with the developing countries of OIF and to strengthen its role in the field of culture within UNESCO.

## Concluding remarks

Quebec has been present on the international scene for over 60 years now, although it was engaged in some sporadic international activities even before that. A systematic, culture and identity-oriented internationalization started in the 1960s with the Quiet Revolution. Quebec's cultural (para)diplomacy has been an integral part of a larger project of Quebec's internationalization and in this paper, it was analyzed in that context. Quebec's identity is based on its unique history, culture, language and set of values that distinguish it from the rest of the Canadian Federation. According to one survey conducted in 2012, 82 % of Quebecers agreed with the statement that "Quebec, because of its language and heritage, is different from the rest of the country" (Government of Quebec, 2017a, 72). However, that distinctiveness and uniqueness have never been officially recognized by the Canadian constitution. In the absence of meaningful and concrete recognition of Quebec's identity in Canada, Quebec's aspirations to be perceived as a distinct culture with a unique position in Canada and the Americas were oriented internationally. Quebec's cultural (para)diplomacy has been aimed at international partners, who are likely to acknowledge its uniqueness, but also those that may provide political support for its agenda. For various cultural, linguistic and historic reasons, France has been the most important strategic partner of Quebec and has not only recognized its distinctive culture and unique position in the Americas but also has sponsored many of its initiatives at the multilateral level; like its membership of the OIF.

Quebec's international action is based on its culture and specificities and cultural (para)diplomacy has been concerned with the promotion and safeguarding of its cultural sovereignty. Quebec is still in search of equal status in the Canadian federation, although there have been some positive changes in that direction such as the representations of Quebec in UNESCO. Quebec will continue to be engaged in various international activities that will provide some sort of international recognition. Quebec's Policy on its Affirmation and Canadian Relations (Government of Quebec, 2017a, 72) is based on the vision that "We must make our voice heard, in order to be better understood" and cultural (para)diplomacy provides instruments to ensure that the Quebec voice reaches the international audience.

Cultural (para)diplomacy represents a significant part of the international activities of regions and federated units with distinctive identities. The research described in this Article represents only a first instance of a broader study of the cultural (para)diplomacy that could be extended to a comparative analysis of other federated units and regions with a distinctive identities. This study raises a number of opportunities for further theory development and hypothesis validation. Firstly, the findings of this Article could be strengthened by expanding the analysis to other federated units and regions having a distinctive identity, such as Flanders, the Basque Country, Scotland, Catalonia, and less studied regions of Tatarstan, Kurdistan, the Republic of Srpska etc. For example for Flanders, the cultural dimension in its international relations is of great importance as it “enhances the international visibility and reputation of Flanders through the arts and heritage sector” (Flanders Chancellery and Foreign Office). Flanders has had its own autonomous cultural policy for over 40 years and since the 2000s the cultural and creative sectors have been seen as an important part of the Flemish innovative economy (OECD, 2022: 91-92). One could examine the evolution of the Flemish cultural (para)diplomacy and how and to what extent Flemish the distinctiveness that has been recognized in Belgium has shaped internationalization of its culture and evolution of its external relations in general.

Scotland's culture is one of the seven priorities of its international activities. The development of the international agency of Scotland has been constrained by the limited powers it enjoys within the UK. Implications of Brexit for Scottish external relations including cultural (para)diplomacy could be included in the future research agenda. For example, one could ask whether Brexit could be regarded as a critical juncture for further development of Scottish international agency and its cultural (para)diplomacy. How has Scotland established its relations with the EU and its members states? How has its institutions such as the External Affairs Directorate or the Scottish Government EU Office in Brussels responded to these new opportunities? How and to what extent has its cultural strategy and (para)diplomacy changed since Brexit? are just some of the questions for future research that could lead to more insight.

Catalan cultural diplomacy was one of the three pillars on which its external relations were based until the independence referendum held



in 2017, the other two being political (para)diplomacy and public diplomacy. As a part of its cultural strategy, the Government of Catalonia, the Government of the Balearic Islands and Barcelona City Council created in 2002 the Institut Ramon Llull as a public institution responsible for promoting Catalan language and culture internationally. The intervention of the Spanish Government after the 2017 referendum in Catalonia led to dismantlement of Catalonia's institutions and dismissal of hundreds of officials and civil servants. These measures and court cases included the activities and operations related to external relations and cultural (para)diplomacy such as for example closure of Catalan delegations abroad. The intervention of the Spanish Government could be regarded as a critical juncture and one could examine how it created constraints on Catalonia's cultural (para)diplomacy.

Further research could therefore be done in the form of comparative studies using for example the theory of historical institutionalism, especially the concept of critical junctures. One could use this theory to analyze the rationales of the international engagements of federated units and regions and how critical junctures produced opportunities as well as constraints for development of their cultural (para)diplomacy. By applying the theory of historical institutionalism to future analysis, one could demonstrate its broader relevance for the study of cultural (para)diplomacy.

## Notes

- 1 For the brief evolution of the official language consult <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/campaigns/canadians-official-languages-act/history-official-languages-act.html>
- 2 The Meech Lake Accord was a package of constitutional changes negotiated in 1987. The Accord, among other things, recognized Quebec as a constituting distinct society within Canada. For more see Centre for Constitutional Studies, Meech Lake Accord, <https://www.constitutionalstudies.ca/2019/07/meech-lake-accord/> (accessed August, 1<sup>st</sup>, 2022)
- 3 Quebec has total of 9 General delegations abroad. General delegations are the most important office of Québec that deal with economy, education, culture, immigration and public affairs (Quebec Government, Quebec government offices abroad, <https://www.international.gouv.qc.ca/en/general/representation-etrananger> accessed August, 15, 2022)



## Bibliography

- Balthazar, L. (1999) "The Quebec experience: Success or failure?", In Aldecoa, F. and Keating, M. (eds.) *Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign Relation of Sub national Governments*. London: Frank Cass, pp. 153-169.
- Bélanger, L. (2002) "The domestic politics of Quebec's quest for external distinctiveness", *The American Review of Canadian Studies*, 32(2), pp. 195-214.
- Blatter, J. et al. (2008) "The foreign relations of European regions: competencies and strategies", *West European Politics* 31(3), pp. 464-490.
- Brady, A. (1959) "Quebec and Canadian Federalism", *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue canadienne d'Economique et de Science politique*, 25 (3), pp. 259-270.
- Délégation générale du Québec à Munich (2022), <https://www.quebec.ca/gouvernement/ministere/rerelations-internationales/representations-etranger/delegation-generale-quebec-munich>
- Erk, J. (2008) *Explaining Federalism: State, society and congruence in Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany and Switzerland*, London and New York, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Feldman, E. J., and Feldman, L. G. (1984) "The impact of federalism on the organization of Canadian foreign policy", *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 14, pp. 33- 59.
- Flanders Chancellery and Foreign Office, Culture, <https://www.fdfa.be/en/culture-science/culture>
- Government of Canada (2022), [https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international\\_relations-rerelations\\_internationales/unesco/index.aspx?lang=eng](https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-rerelations_internationales/unesco/index.aspx?lang=eng)
- Government of Quebec, Conseil des arts et lettres, <https://www.calq.gouv.qc.ca/en/about/who-are-we/mission-and-values>
- , (2015a), Secrétariat du Québec aux relations canadiennes, *Recognition of the Québec Nation*, <https://www.sqrc.gouv.qc.ca/rerelations-canadiennes/institutions-constitution/statut-qc/reconnaissance-nation-en.asp#brun>
- , (2015b), Secrétariat du Québec aux relations canadiennes, *Le Centre de la francophonie des Amériques : mettre en mouvement la francophonie des Amériques*, <https://www.sqrc.gouv.qc.ca/francophonie-canadienne/pour-en-savoir-plus/centre-franco-ameriques-en.asp>
- , (2017a), *Quebecers : Our Way of Being Canadian* <https://www.sqrc.gouv.qc.ca/documents/rerelations-canadiennes/politique-affirmation-en.pdf>
- , (2017 b), *Quebec's International Policy* <https://cdn-contenu.quebec.ca/cdn-contenu/adm/min/rerelations-internationales/publications-adm/politiques/PO-politique-internationale-2017-EN-MRIF.pdf?1602012506>
- The Institut Ramon Llull <https://www.llull.cat/english/quisom/quisom.cfm>
- Kincaid, J. (1990) "Constituent diplomacy in federal polities and the nation- state: conflict and cooperation", In H. J. Michelmann & P. Soldatos (eds.) *Federalism and International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 54-75.

- Lecours, A. (2002) "Paradiplomacy: reflections on the foreign policy and international relations of regions", *International Negotiation*, 7, pp.91-114.
- Mark, S. (2010) "Rethinking cultural diplomacy: the cultural diplomacy of New Zealand, the Canadian Federation and Quebec", *Political Science*, 62(1), pp. 62-83.
- Michaud, N. and Ramet, I. (2004) "Québec et politique étrangère: contradiction ou réalité?", *International Journal*, 59 (1), pp. 303-324.
- Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, (2018), *France and Quebec*, <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/canada/france-and-quebec/>
- Molinaro, I. (2002), "Quebec in Europe: constraints and opportunities", *The American Review of Canadian Studies*, 32 (2), pp. 239-258.
- OECD (2022), "Flanders, Belgium", in *The Culture Fix: Creative People, Places and Industries*, OECD Publishing, Paris.
- OIF, TV5 Monde, <https://www.francophonie.org/tv5monde-96>
- Painchaud, P. (1988) "The epicenter of Quebec's international relations", in Duchacek, I.D, Latouche, D. and Stevenson, G. (eds.) *Perforated Sovereignties and International Relations, Trans-Sovereign Contacts of Subnational Governments*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1988, pp. 91-97.
- Parker, J. (2015) *Comparative Federalism and Intergovernmental Agreements Analyzing Australia, Canada, Germany, South Africa, Switzerland and the United States*. Oxon: Routledge. (kindle edition)
- Representative of the Government of Quebec in the Permanent Delegation of Canada to UNESCO (2022), <https://www.quebec.ca/en/gouvernement/ministere/relations-internationales/representations-etranger/representation-quebec-unesco/mission-mandats>
- Russell, P.H. (1993) *Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People?*, 2nd ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Sajic, N. (2019) "Understanding external relations of federal units and regions", *Politeia*, 9 (18), pp. 67-87.
- Simon, R. (1995) "Canada and the United States: lessons from the North American experience", in Knop, K., Ostry, S., Simeon, R., and Swinton, K. (eds.) *Rethinking Federalism: Citizens, Markets, and Governments in a Changing World*. Vancouver: UBC Press, pp. 250-272.
- Vengroff, R. and Rich, J. (2006) "Foreign policy by other means: paradiplomacy and the Canadian provinces", in James, P., Michaud, N. and O'Reilly, M.J. (eds.) *Handbook of Canadian Foreign Policy*. Oxford: Lexington Books, pp. 105 -132.
- Watts, R. L. (1999) *Comparing Federal Systems*. London, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Zubrzycki, G. (2016) *Beheading the Saint: Nationalism, Religion, and Secularism in Quebec*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (kindle edition).
- UNESCO (2020), *Quebec's international vision*, <https://en.unesco.org/creativity/policy-monitoring-platform/quebecs-international-vision>

# **RESTITUTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE: FROM THE CLAIM TO THE NEW CULTURAL STRATEGY IN BENIN**

ESPÉRA DONOUVOSSI

## **Restitution of cultural property and related international legal frameworks**

Restitution of cultural property usually refers to the return of war pillage and stolen property. When a restitution claim comes from a state government, like in the case of Benin, restitution is also called repatriation because a property is being returned to a nation. Since the 1980s, the concept has been extended to the immaterial aspects of a loss, and now includes all attempts to rectify historical injustices (Bulhan 1980, 1993; Mbembe 2015; Kaye, 1998-1999). Aside from the return of specific belongings that were confiscated, seized, or stolen (such as land, art, ancestral remains, and so on), restitution now includes also reparations (some form of material recompense for that which cannot be returned, such as human life, a flourishing culture and economy, and identity) and apology (an admission of wrongdoing, a recognition of its effects and, in some cases, an acceptance of responsibility for those effects and an obligation to its victims). Therefore, restitution is equally a legal and a cultural concept, and many African intellectuals claim that restitution cannot go without reparation and apology (Byrne-Sutton 1998; Carducci 1997; Cornu & Renold 2009).

These key terms – restitution, return, reparation – have been semantically analysed and differentiated (Greenfield; Ulph and Smith 2012; UNESCO IGC Guidelines). The appropriate word to be used

depends of the ways of acquisition and the nature of an object. Regarding the Benin's cultural heritage in France, the word restitution is more appropriate but due to some political and diplomatic sensitivities, the words return and restitution will be simultaneously used while the word reparation will not be used at all due to the nature of the Benin's advocacy (cultural diplomacy) strategy.

The means for resolving restitution claims are various legal, diplomatic, and alternative means. The Hague Convention 1899/1907 was the first to protect cultural property during conflict (seizure, destruction, wilful damage done to historic monuments, works of art and science, institutions of religion, charity, education, arts and sciences on occupied territory). After the Second World War which saw massive destruction of cultural property and systematic pillage of occupied territories, a new Hague Convention came into force in 1954. It specifically prevented occupying powers from exporting cultural objects from occupied territories in time of war, and made provisions for return in case such looting happens. This Convention was equipped with the Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (the First Protocol), and in 1999 (following the Turkish invasion in 1974, wars in Croatia and Bosnia, and the First Gulf war between Iraq and Kuwait) it was updated with the Second Protocol. For the resolution of claims to restitution and return of cultural property new instruments were needed – UNESCO Convention 1970 on the means of prohibition and preventing the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property (public law instrument – for diplomatic disputes), and the 1995 UNIDROIT<sup>1</sup> Convention on stolen or illegally exported cultural objects (private law instrument). Both conventions deal only with international (cross-border) transactions of illicit trading in cultural property. They have no strict penal provisions but do provide a member state with the ability to order return of an illegally exported object (Article 5(3) 1970 UNESCO). Finally, these two conventions are not retroactive, meaning that the provisions cannot be applied to the events that occurred before the conventions were signed by countries between the illegal export took place. The 1972 UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage was and is important in that sense because it gives countries with listed world heritage sites (e.g., Cambodia with Angkor Complex, and the Temple of

Preah Vihear; Benin with Royal Palaces of Abomey) an ample amount of power to reclaim stolen antiquities from these areas. For the same reason, in 1978 UNESCO created the Intergovernmental committee for promoting the return of cultural property to its countries of origin, or its restitution in case of illicit appropriation. The Committee is primarily a negotiating forum aimed at facilitating bilateral negotiations and agreements for the return or restitution of cultural property, particularly property acquired through colonization and military occupation, when all legal means have failed or where bilateral negotiations were unsuccessful.

Besides desk research of legal and political documents, I have held 21 semi-structured interviews (including heritage professionals, cultural workers, youth organizations, traditional leaders, politicians, researchers, media professionals and journalists, tourism agents, etc. as their voices were missing in the ongoing debates), and used 5 published relevant interviews with experts and politicians.

## **Restitution of Benin Cultural Heritage – Reconstruction of History and Identity**

The Kingdom of Benin in Nigeria and the Kingdom of Dahomey<sup>2</sup>, former French colony and now Republic of Benin, are two different entities. The current Benin city in Nigeria was the former Kingdom of Benin where the valuable bronzes were looted during the British punitive expedition in 1897. So, Benin bronzes is a Nigerian case. The current Republic of Benin was known as the Kingdom of Danxomè where the French army in 1892 looted intricate wood and ivory carvings, metalwork and appliqué.

Benin cultural properties were looted by colonisation, and still are by illicit traffic market. As former colonies, most African countries lost 95% of their cultural property.<sup>3</sup> The illicit traffic in cultural heritage is actually part of the dark side between Africa and Europe. UNESCO estimated the illicit trafficking of cultural property to amount at least US\$ 2 billion per year.<sup>4</sup> In 2015, there were 43 seizures, involving a total of 44,235 objects in more than 25 different categories. The top

five seized artefacts were coins, antiquities, lithographs, ceramics, and archaeological items.

The Republic of Benin's mechanisms to protect its cultural heritage have many flaws. That opened the door to a massive looting and pillage of local cultural heritage and caused serious damages to tangible heritage illegally sold on art market. Some heritage professionals, traditional leaders, and young people in Benin serve the black market by plundering cultural objects that bear unique artistic quality and significant amount of information on cultural identities and humankind. As Françoise Rivière from the Research Department at Agence Française de Développement said: "Theft, destruction, looting and smuggling of cultural property continue to distort our collective memory and peoples' identities despite the constant efforts of the international community" (Prott 2010: xii).

While there is no confirmed and complete inventory of Benin looted cultural objects, UNESCO estimates that more than 6,000 works of art were illegally taken from Benin and mostly found nowadays in French museums and private collections. Although they were looted and exported only for their artistic quality, to serve the European greed for arts and antiquities, these artworks bear distinctive Benin people identities and enable their cultural continuity.

Leaning on the UNESCO conventions and their emphasising of links between identity and cultural heritage, many researchers have confirmed those links and concluded that heritage as the past which make sense (Popadić, 2014: 17-21) generates modern value system (Kisić, 2014: 5). In recent literature, different tables and figures present different values of cultural heritage (Feilden 1982; Hui, 2006; Sable & Kling 2001; Throsby 2001: 84–85). They all agree about the core values – emotional (wonder, identity, continuity, respect, veneration, symbolic, spiritual), cultural, social – and differ only in terms of cultural heritage's practical values, e.g., economic, educational, political, which depends on the context in which the values are presented.

Afolasade A. Adewumi, Nigerian expert in heritage law, listed many negative effects of the looting of cultural property that apply to the case of Benin cultural heritage pillage by France:

- displacement primarily blocks and destroys the source of creative inspiration – it deprives a group of the central core of its own art,

and leads to losses in artistic understanding, science and education; dispersing the elements and materials of a science is a perfect means of destroying and killing that science;

- it prevents the younger generation from ever having the chance to see, at close quarters, a work of art or a well-made item of handi-craft fashioned by their ancestors;<sup>5</sup> it prevents the assimilation and circulation of knowledge about ancient peoples and civilisations;
- violence against cultural property leads to the irretrievable loss of valuable information on mankind; displacement of cultural property involves organised crime that deprives invaluable archaeological artefacts of their cultural, historical and symbolic essence by turning them into simple merchandises and curiosities; when parts of a whole are placed outside their native lands, displacement strips cultural property of that harmony that enhances the parts (and has meaning while it is adorned and admired)<sup>6</sup>; division of monuments or sculptures through displacement leads to a situation where one country or museum would lose what the other would not gain;<sup>7</sup>
- it prevents the perfecting of the means of attaining happiness and pleasure, for the advancement and progress of education and reason.

Since cultural heritage is above all an identity, resituating looted cultural objects to source-countries is central to the identity reconstruction process as it recognizes the past wrongs (and that way restores identity). With such an emotional potential that it carries, resituated cultural property can help to implement successful identity reconstruction projects.

## **Strategic orientation of Benin cultural heritage policy**

This section analyses the domestic legislations, instruments and guidance in terms of protection, promotion, safeguarding and valorisation of cultural heritage in Benin which are essential for related advocacy and management strategies.

The first Benin law on cultural heritage was the 1956 French Statute No. 56-1106 which dealt with the protection of monuments and sites of historic, scientific, artistic or scenic character, classified historic, scientific, and ethnographic objects, and imposed control of excavations. Benin shared this decree with all other French colonies.<sup>8</sup> After the current Republic of Benin became independent in 1960, the new law was brought in 1968. The *Decree No. 35/PR/MENJS concerning the protection of cultural property* made Benin's heritage a national property, and followed the pattern the former French Statute (classification on monuments, sites, and movables; governmental control of all excavation, whether on public or private land, where the license could be revoked because the government considered it should itself proceed with the excavations because of their importance). The Decree forbids exporting cultural property except when the minister in charge allows it after the condition that the objects in question have an equivalent (either in a general form or in a collective form) is fulfilled.

In the country's new Constitution (1990), the article 10 recognizes that: "Every person has a right to culture. The State has the duty to safeguard and promote the national values of civilizations, as much material as spiritual, as well as the cultural traditions". This article gave birth to the Benin first cultural charter (1991) in order to establish obligations for different stakeholders in developing and promoting arts and culture. It was organized along the strategic orientations where the third deals specifically with the "inventory, conservation and valorisation of cultural heritage". This orientation includes safeguarding and restoration of heritage in danger, efficient management and development of museums, national archiving, and the state support to national and international organizations protecting and valorising cultural heritage. It particularly recommends: inventory of national heritage sites and cultural objects; protection of fragile ancient and traditional architectures; collection, processing, conservation and dissemination of tangible and intangible heritage objects and signs; regular and permanent upgrade of institutions serving for the diffusion of cultural heritage; allow and encourage private museums initiatives; creation of local and communal museums in order to serve as stance for the safeguard of cultural heritage in all parts of the country, etc.



In order to make the above happen, some legal frameworks and mechanism were put in place. The Law 97-029 (1999) that organizes Benin territory into municipalities was important because municipalities were allowed to find the best way to protect and promote local heritage and cultural activities. The Law 200-20 (2007) for specifically for the protection of cultural heritage and natural heritage with a cultural character. This Law makes provisions and obligations for the inventory and classification of elements of Benin tangible and intangible heritage and ensuring their protection and promotion. It also deals with the protection of cultural heritage during an armed conflict. The safeguarding and valorisation of ancient and traditional architecture and search and discovery also have an important place. Finally, it provided penalties related to offenses to any disposition of the present legal framework.

At the continental level, Benin is a state party to the Charter for African Cultural Renaissance (2006). Guided by the UNESCO 1970 and 1972 Conventions, it made imperative for African states to carry out a systematic inventory with a view to preserving and promoting tangible and intangible cultural heritage. At the global level, Benin is a State Party to the 1954 Hague Convention, and the five UNESCO conventions.<sup>9</sup> It also signed the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (1995) as the complementary instrument to the 1970 Convention.

Directly plugged to the presidency of the republic, in 2016 the National Agency for Heritage and Tourism was created to valorise and promote Benin cultural heritage and develop sustainable tourism. Under the Ministry of culture, General Directorate of Cultural Heritage was created in 2007 as a technical management office in charge of implementation of the state policies for cultural heritage. It collects, processes and to disseminates heritage objects, and manages all cultural heritage sites. As a financial instrument, Benin government created the Fund for Development of Heritage in 2010.<sup>10</sup> Another, broader fund for arts and culture was created in 1992 as a financial instrument for the Cultural charter (1991).

It could be said that Benin's cultural policy has the characteristics of *cultural diffusionism* (Dragićević Šešić and Dragojević, 2005) as it tends to put in place instruments and mechanisms to enable cultural creation and its diffusion and communication in order to build and

consolidate the country's national and cultural identity and promote tourism. As the cultural policy's strength, there is a demonstrated willingness to promote the cultural dimension of sustainable development – some national and international legal frameworks were supported by adoption and ratification, and the financial and institutional instruments for effective implementation of cultural policies were established. However, there are some important weaknesses such as the lack of heritage inventory, the lack on the national museum's management strategy, the lack of innovation and attractiveness in the promotion and valorisation of Benin cultural heritage; and the lack of coherence between strategy and instruments. The existing funding mechanisms are insufficient to ensure effective promotion of cultural heritage. The educational system has no programme which would prepare people to professionally manage cultural heritage, while museums lack autonomy. In that given framework, and taking into account the necessary requirements to successfully handle and obtain restitution, it is necessary to analyse deeper the Benin advocacy strategy and make some recommendations for its improvement.

## **Case of Benin Restitution Claim**

As the Republic of Benin demonstrates a particular interest in the cultural dimension of its development, the restitution of its cultural heritage from France is a matter of urgency (Kiwara-Wilson, 2013). Relevant policies and instruments have been put in place and the new cultural projects initiated. Any restitution claim needs to follow some steps and requirements, and the government of Benin has done that while taking the negotiation steps.

As it was explained, the artefacts which are requested from France are about the uniqueness and coherence of the cultural identity of Benin people, so there is no dispute over the ownership of the works of arts, even in the absence of a comprehensive inventory of Benin's cultural heritage. According to UNESCO and ICOM, any restitution claim should clearly guarantee: the protection and security of returned objects; adequate institutions and architectures to receive and host the cultural

objects; public dissemination of the objects; strategies and cultural programs that would help to make the objects accessible to a large part of population in the source country and even possible to the world (the objects should also serve individual use such as in education and scientific research); transmission through legal protection. However, ICOM clarified that while the above are necessary, it should not serve for a refusal, and made an appeal to cultural diplomacy and cooperation by saying that – if a state as the legal owner of claimed works doesn't have these conditions in place, it is highly recommended that states should support each other through international community to put in place necessary infrastructures, instruments and programs needed to make the restitution claim effective.

Regarding the list of guarantees, Benin has projects for cultural objects made in accordance with the international standards. According to Ousmane Alédji, a former technical adviser to the President of Republic and chief of the Unit for Monitoring of Cultural and Tourism programmes, Benin has mobilized 1,000 billion Francs CFA (\$2 billion) for five years to develop its cultural sector, which is unique in Sub-Saharan Africa. The major project is the construction of the five museums projected by the architects from Africa and Europe. The mentioned Agency for the promotion of heritage and development of tourism (2016) is handling these major projects (as well as some ongoing cultural programs based on Benin history).

### **Shaming as advocacy strategy to obtain Restitution**

Among many legal instruments for conflict resolution, the government of Benin decided to negotiate by using diplomatic and political methods. The advocacy strategy within cultural diplomacy includes negotiation, cooperation, and diplomacy of shaming. The process of shaming is based in the human rights discourse – the negative action of the targeted institution/state is emphasized in public to persuade them to change behaviour or to apologize and to repair the damage. In the context of Benin cultural heritage restitution claim, it is efficient first because of the reputation created over France and its museums, because of the colonialism universally condemned, and because the works of art

from Benin found their way in France. Colonialism is now a wrongful and sad period in the life of people, so it is a matter of urgency not to carry on so long with the past wrongs. Ousmane Alédji (2018) said that holding Benin heritage in French museums “doesn’t honour France. The Great France should be able to go beyond that and to restore its own image, to upgrade its own history and to prevent heavy debate from surfacing”. That tone was used in the different actions (letters and discussions held between Benin and France politicians).

In this strategy of shaming, there are two approaches used by Benin to support the restitution arguments. The restitution will serve cultural identity reconstruction in a post-colonial, modern and independent country. Another focus is on the economic impact of the restitution. Benin has designated a significant amount of money for the construction of new museums in order to develop tourism and generate income for the country – just like the Western museums generate revenue and reputation for Europe, using also the advantage of exhibiting the looted objects.

For Felwine Sarr (2018), one of the experts recruited by France to help the restitution of African heritage, it is only about identity and meaning, and not economics. The priority is to solve an issue of identity but also to engage contemporary cultural development strategies. The two go along to fully make use of all the values, meanings and functions of cultural heritage. In order to achieve this, the only approach is diplomatic. It may take different forms of shaming or negotiation but it remains the sole way to effective restitution. All 21 of my interviewees recommend the government to keep the diplomatic approach. As for the weaknesses in the advocacy strategy, the involvement of the communities and the socio-professional associations is lacking.

### *Setting up a restitution process*

The Benin’s restitution claim is seen as one of the most remarkable international political and diplomatic acts in Africa. An act of courage that demonstrates a new relationship between a former colonized and a colonizer, it was also equipped with adequate strategies to make it effective. In November 2021, Benin received 26 objects (out of about 6,000) from France. The number seems very small but it means that the restitution is possible.

However, Benin has missed to put in place a more effective restitution strategy. The restitution should happen through a process of three different steps. Considering the amount of works and requirements for protecting and promoting them, the negotiations should happen as follows: (1) firstly, discuss short-term and long-term loan possibilities; (2) secondly, develop a co-ownership agreement and cultural collaboration based on the identified objects; and (3) lastly, agree on the timeline to make the restitution effective through an act of donation.

When Benin received the 26 objects in 2021, huge public awareness was raised and emotional celebrations were obvious. That proves that there is a direct link between cultural heritage and people identity and pride. After some months of temporary exhibitions in a temporary place, these objects were stored as collections with no public access. The Agence Française de Développement and the French government granted financial contributions to Benin government to build new museum and tourism attraction infrastructures for the returned objects. Better restitution process should allow for enough money and time to realize new museum infrastructures on time.

### **Pan African league for restitution**

Since the start of the discussions about the restitution of Benin cultural heritage, and the decision of French to set up the plan for effective restitution of African cultural heritage, many countries got together and formed the pan African committee to address the issue under the African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). So, in 2018, the ECOWAS heads of states and governments made a political declaration and stressed that “the cultural property of West African countries, wherever it is kept, is the foundation of the regional heritage, a cultural legacy. The conservation and cultural heritage must, for posterity, be done by West Africa and in West Africa”. Being in line with the ECOWAS cultural policy (2019) – where the first priority is the protection and conservation of cultural heritage and diversity, including the restitution of cultural property – this declaration gave birth to the ECOWAS Action Plan on the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin (2019-2023). (In March 2023, ECOWAS held a

meeting to better inform and raise awareness on the Action Plan.)

Already in 2021, the African Union's commission organized the experts' workshop on the restitution of cultural property and heritage. The meeting helped to develop the position paper on the African restitution cases learning from Benin experience. In addition, the meeting produced the framework for actions regarding the negotiations about the return of illicitly trafficked cultural property. Despite of all these initiatives and mechanisms in place, one can still find inappropriate and inoperative measures mainly because of the discrepancy between the strategic measures and the financial means.

## Conclusion

The restitution claim by Benin government has contributed to the setting of a clear strategy for art, culture and heritage in Benin focused on new cultural diplomacy strategies and both heritage and contemporary artistic production. This has provoked different actions related to the restitution in west Africa and at the pan African level. However, while the Benin's restitution claims and the French willingness to collaborate have been widely commended, the restitution process should be differently led – in a more consistent way, done in different phases, and within a reasonable established timeframe. The restitution should not be conducted through a rushed process but rather as a plan in different phases and in collaboration with international communities and, more importantly, with the local communities using more dialogues then blaming as a strategy of pressure within cultural diplomacy.

## Notes

- 1 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
- 2 The Kingdom of Dahomey was an African kingdom that existed from about 1600 until 1894, when the last king, Béhanzin, was defeated by the French.
- 3 Intensifying the fight against illicit trafficking of cultural property in West Africa, [http://www.unesco.org/new/en/dakar/about-this-office/single-view/news/intensifying\\_the\\_fight\\_against\\_illicit\\_trafficking\\_of\\_cultur/](http://www.unesco.org/new/en/dakar/about-this-office/single-view/news/intensifying_the_fight_against_illicit_trafficking_of_cultur/) [Accessed 20 September 2018]

- 4 Ibid.
- 5 M'Bow 1979 in Prott L.V: 32
- 6 Quatremère de Quincy A-C. 1796. Extracts from Letters to General Miranda (Letter No. 4): 53 in Prott L.V, Witnesses to History...op.cit: 19
- 7 The museum of origin would lose the figures that form the crowning glory of its collections, that precious addition of lessons in parallels that produces the practical theory of beauty. The museum that would be formed elsewhere from these dismembered pieces would not acquire the whole that can give the requisite value to the fragments thereby leading to a deprivation of the world of the full admiration of the artwork.
- 8 Burkina Faso, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo
- 9 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transport of Ownership of Cultural Property; 1972 UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage; 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage; 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage; and 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.
- 10 Finance projects and programs valorising and promoting religious and non-religious, archaeological, prehistorical, literature, artistic, anthropological, anthropological and scientific goods, objects and values. Finance activities related to promotion of intangible goods at national and international levels. Finance dissemination tools in order to showcase and to promote cultural heritage in the public domain. Finance audio-visual projects related to cultural heritage.

## Bibliography

- Aledji, O. (2018) Le Benin demande restitution des biens, interview : <https://www.ousmanealedji.com/index.php/actualites/52-le-benin-demande-la-restitution-des-biens-culturels-pilles-par-la-france>, accessed 25 September 2018.
- Bulhan, H. A. (1980) Psychological research in Africa: Genesis and function, *Présence Africaine*, 116, 20-42.
- Bulhan, H. A. (1993) Imperialism in studies of the psyche: A critique of African psychological research, in: Nichols, L. J. (ed) *Psychology and oppression: Critiques and proposals*, Johannesburg: Skottaville, 1-34.
- Byrne-Sutton, Q. (1998) Resolution Methods for Art-Related Disputes, *International Journal of Cultural Property*, 249.
- Carducci G. (1997) *La restitution internationale des biens culturels et des objets d'art volés ou illicitement exportés : droit commun, directive CEE, convention de l'UNESCO et d'UNIDROIT*, L.G.D.J.

- Cornu M., Renold, M. A. (2009) Le renouveau des restitutions de biens culturels: les modes alternatifs de règlement des litiges, *Journal de droit international*, No. 2, 493.
- Charter for African Cultural Renaissance (2006) adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity meeting in its Thirteenth Ordinary Session, in Port Louis, Mauritius.
- Dragićević Šešić, M. & Dragojević S. (2005) *Arts management in turbulent times. Adaptable Quality Management*, Amsterdam: Boekman Foundation & ECF.
- Feilden B. (1982) Management Guideliness for UNESCO World Heritage Sites [https://www.iccom.org/sites/default/files/2018-02/1998\\_feilden\\_management\\_guidelines\\_eng\\_70071\\_light\\_0.pdf](https://www.iccom.org/sites/default/files/2018-02/1998_feilden_management_guidelines_eng_70071_light_0.pdf)
- Greenfield J. (2008) *The Return of Cultural Treasures* (3rd Edition) by Jeanette Greenfield. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY
- Kaye, L.M. (1998-1999) Art Wars: The Repatriation Battle, *New York University International Journal of Law and Politics*, 79.
- Kisić, V. (2014) *Governing Heritage Dissonance*, Amsterdam: ECF.
- Kiwara-Wilson, S. (2013) Restituting Cultural Plunder: The case for the Benin Bronzes and Ivoiries, 23 *DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law*, 375
- Mbembe, A. (2015) Decolonizing knowledge and the question of the archive. Wiser lecture: 9 June 2015, <http://wiser.wits.ac.za/system/files/Achille%20Mbembe%20-%20Decolonizing%20Knowledge%20and%20the%20Question%20of%20the%20Archiv e.pdf>
- M'Bow, A. 1979. *A plea for the return of an irreplaceable cultural heritage to those who created it*, *Return and Restitution of Cultural Property*, Museum Vol. XXXI, No. 1: 58.
- Popadić, M. (2014) Vreme prošlo u vremenu sadašnjem, Beograd : Centar za muzeologiju i heritologiju Filozofskog fakulteta
- Prott, L. v. (ed) (2010) *Witnesses to History: A Compendium of Documents and Writings on the Return of Cultural Objects*, United Nations Educational.
- Sable K. & Kling R. (2001) The Double Public Good: A Conceptual Framework for "Shared Experience" Values Associated with Heritage Conservation, *Journal of Cultural Economics* 25, 77–89 (2001). <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007675701979>
- Sarr Felwine (2018), Interview in *Le monde* 22 March 2018 [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/03/22/restitution-du-patrimoine-africain-nous-sommes-face-a-un-defi-historique\\_5274971\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/03/22/restitution-du-patrimoine-africain-nous-sommes-face-a-un-defi-historique_5274971_3212.html), Accessed on 25 September 2018.
- Throsby D. (2001) *Economics and Culture*, Cambridge University Press
- Ulph, J. and Smith, I. (2012) *The Illicit Trade in Art and Antiquities. International Recovery and Criminal and Civil Liability*, Hart Publishing.
- UNESCO 1986/1996 *Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in Case of Illicit Appropriation*.



# **CULTURAL DIPLOMACY WITHOUT ARTISTIC FREEDOM? THE CASE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH**

ZOBAIDA NASREEN & RAPHAELA HENZE

This text aims to explain some of the public diplomacy initiatives that the People's Republic of Bangladesh undertakes utilizing culture, particularly for enhancing tourism and thus economic growth. The image that the fast-growing nation in South Asia, that came to independence in 1971, tries to convey via nation branding tools is not necessarily supported by the reality within the country including the experiences of several minority groups. Furthermore, state-centred cultural diplomacy even undermines freedom of expression and leads amongst other factors to the forced migration of critical voices. The text is *inter alia* based on a qualitative research study conducted in February 2023. Five Bangladeshi embassy members in Europe<sup>1</sup> have responded via Zoom and telephone to questions on public and cultural diplomacy.

## **Indigenous Peoples' Rights: reality and its representation**

All interview partners underlined that the primary goal of their public diplomacy initiatives is to convey a concise and attractive image of Bangladesh to potential partners and primarily to tourists. This is very much in line with diverse campaigns to promote the attractiveness of the country as "Beautiful Bangladesh" (among these being poster campaigns, videos, festivities, the website <https://beautifulbangladesh.gov.bd/>, and

even stamps) issued either by the National Tourism Organization or by the External Publicity Wing of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and used amongst others to greet visitors within the Bangladesh embassies. In order to promote tourism the government of Bangladesh circulated the stamps in 2010 using images of the indigenous community.

Bangladesh has – in contrast to other countries that focus on representing majority cultures – decided to use its minorities in their nation branding activities, while in reality minorities belong to the subaltern population deprived of its rights.

Many of the images used within these public campaigns present indigenous people and the landscapes they inhabit among them the Chittagong Hill Tracts<sup>2</sup> for instance. Particularly, images of indigenous women in traditional attire have played and are still playing a central role in these nation branding efforts despite them being one of the most vulnerable groups within the country. Officially Bangladesh has an overall population of 169,4 million people and is home to around 1.6 million indigenous people<sup>3</sup>. The indigenous population itself claims to be much larger comprising around 5 million people (Barkat, 2015) belonging to more than 50 different groups, living in different areas like Sylhet, Mymensingh, and North Bengal, and speaking at least 35 different languages.

On the official Beautiful Bangladesh website references to indigenous lifestyles are made several times as in the following making connection with the Buddhist minority “...Buddhism and the colorful indigenous lifestyle and culture have made this region wonderful for the tourists. So, your visit to this region during Buddha Purnima which is the biggest festival for the Buddhist community will soak you up with the mesmerizing beauty and provide opportunities to experience the indigenous lifestyle.”<sup>4</sup>

In stark contrast to the messages Bangladesh wants to send to the outside world stands the fact that indigenous populations have been denied any recognition and rights; they are disadvantaged in every socio-economic and political way.<sup>5</sup>

While many countries in the world celebrate the International Day of the World's Indigenous Peoples every August the 9<sup>th</sup> in accordance with the UNESCO resolution 49/214 (never signed by Bangladesh), the Bengal Press Information Department (PID) regularly issues a press

release urging the media, experts, university scholars, and civil society members to avoid the word “adibasi” (meaning original inhabitants in Bengal) in articles, discussions, and talk-shows. This is because according to the circular, there exists no ‘adibasis’ in the country as per the 15th amendment of the constitution<sup>6</sup>. The circular adds that in the 15th amendment minority ethnic communities in Bangladesh are referred to as ‘tribes’ or ‘ethnic minorities. When indigenous peoples protested, because this ignores their economic and political rights and not least their land rights, the government did not respond.

Foucault’s concept of normalisation (Foucault, 1972) might help to understand the process of differentiation and exclusion used by the Bangladeshi government in terms of dealing and controlling indigenous people and their movement for the recognition of their identities as ‘adibasi’ or indigenous. It explores the ways in which the state legitimises its intervention. What are the symbolic constructions, through which the politics of rhetoric and managerial practices are justified? How are they manifested in government press releases and nation branding campaigns?

A few more examples of how certain terms are either restricted or used in government documents to control indigenous communities, particularly in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), will be presented.

In a confidential circular issued on February the 28<sup>th</sup>, 2009, the State Ministry of Bangladesh stated:

Recently a demand from various sectors has been made to refer to tribal people as ‘indigenous’ and to change the name of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs’ ministry to ‘Indigenous Affairs Ministry’. Moreover, many intellectuals in various seminars and symposiums and journalists in their writings are calling tribal people indigenous. Claiming to be indigenous is a game of Christian countries who were trying to influence or create unrest in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

The reference to Christian countries (the majority of the population in Bangladesh is Muslim) and their recognition of indigenous peoples and how this is supposed to create unrest in the region is surely interesting from a diplomacy perspective but should not be the focus of our text that tries inter alia to underline the paradox when dealing with indigeneity in Bangladesh. This circular and various other press releases issued

by the government are examples of the state's hegemonic approach to the indigenous communities living in the CHT and other regions.

## **Discrepancy of images**

In addition to diverse campaigns, the government also uses various events as a way to reach out to potential partners including the diaspora, to promote the country as attractive particularly because of its rich tradition and diversity. Among the most prominent festivities are Independence Day, Victory Day, Language Martyrs' Day, Pahela Baishakh (Bengali New Year), and National Mourning Day. A closer look at the International Mother Language Day that is celebrated around the world on February the 21<sup>st</sup> will reveal another contradiction between inside – and outside communication in Bangladesh.

All of the interview partners stated that language plays an important role in cultural diplomacy. While UNESCO strives to promote linguistic and cultural diversity and multilingualism the analogy for this is Language Martyr's Day by which the Bengalese people remember the martyrdom of those who sacrificed their lives for the sake of their Mother Language<sup>8</sup>.

Bangladesh embassies in various countries organise programmes to celebrate this day by inviting pro-government Bengali diaspora intellectuals and occasionally Bengalese musicians, dancers and artists. However, this is not the place for anti-government voices or dissent. These festivities are again part of a nation branding campaign praising the government's achievements. Interview partners confirmed that artists have little freedom in choosing what to present. Thus, Bangladesh does not accept freedom of thought and expression in introducing Bangladesh and presenting the culture of Bangladesh to the world. It might not come as a surprise that even outside the public diplomacy realm the government represses any form of dissent (Habiba et al., 2017), which often leads to violent incidents and forced migration particularly among religious minorities, critical bloggers and nonbinary people.

The way the Bangladeshi government restricts all forms that freedom of expression can take, is not in accordance with the countries more

recent history nor its constitution. Bangladesh gained independence in 1971 by fighting against the economic, political, and social exploitation of the Pakistani government. One of the conditions of that freedom was freedom of expression. This freedom is de jure reflected in the constitution in articles 39(1) and 39(2)(a) that guarantee the freedom of thought, speech and expression of every citizen. Article 39(2)(b) safeguards the freedom of press.

However, article 39(2) also states ‘Subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence’. It appears that the Bangladesh government is using exactly this caveat to oppress freedom of expression in all its forms.

First restrictions on freedom of expression occurred in 2006 through Section 57 of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Act, which punishes citizens for posting fake, obscene, or allegedly defaming information on an electronic platform that can disrupt law and/or hurt religious sentiments. Convictions under this act are punishable with imprisonment for up to 14 years and fines up to 10 million Bangladeshi Taka.

A network of bloggers and online activists initially organised the so-called Shahbagh movement in 2013 and demanded the prosecution of war criminals of Bangladesh’s liberation war in 1971, which has been a long-standing demand of the people of Bangladesh<sup>9</sup>. At first, the young bloggers came out on the street on February the 5<sup>th</sup>, 2013, demanding the execution of Quader Mollah, who was a war criminal and an influential leader of Jamaat-i-Islam<sup>10</sup> of Bangladesh. Along with prosecuting war criminals, the movement began to oppose religious-based political parties and their alliances (Riaz, 2013).

However, in order to counter the Shahbag movement, an organisation was formed by an Islamic fundamentalist group called Hefazat-e-Islam<sup>11</sup>, which in retaliation demanded the death penalty for 84 critical bloggers and writers (the name of one of the authors was to be found on that list) on the grounds that they were atheists. On February the 15<sup>th</sup>, 2013 blogger Ahmed Rajib Haider was indeed murdered. Instead of taking immediate action, the government supported the demands of Hefazat-e-Islam and arrested four bloggers on charges of hurting

religious sentiments. Then Avijit Roy, a Bangladeshi-American online activist and writer on science, beliefs and homosexuality, who coordinated international protests against government censorship and imprisonment of bloggers and was well known for his Mukto-Mona blog, was killed in Dhaka by Islamic militant groups. At least twelve bloggers that raised concerns and criticized the government were killed during 2013–2020 and several experienced assassination attempts or were threatened (Bhatt, 2020). Until today, about a hundred bloggers advocating for freedom of expression have been forced to leave the country to save their lives and take shelter in Europe.

As a part of its authoritarianism, the government of Bangladesh passed a so-called Digital Security Act (DSA) in 2018, which has been exercised to imprison opposition politicians, journalists as well as ordinary citizens raising their concerns; thus undermining freedom of expression even further (Kundu and Hoque, 2019). The Bangladesh government has since been using police and other security forces to bring all digital social platforms under surveillance. Social media is strongly regulated by the DSA. This threatening and intimidating process obviously creates self-censorship among social media users.

The government is furthermore planning to establish a new legislation, which would permit the Bangladesh Telecommunications Regulatory Commission to demand social media and other digital service providers to remove or block content. There will be a provision that the providers will have to comply within 72 hours or face fines and imprisonment. The government states the law is necessary to govern online content, stop fraud and threats to public calmness, and to discourage piracy and offensiveness. Posts and Telecommunication Minister Mustafa Jabbar explained that the law has been developed for “better governance”.<sup>12</sup>

By enacting various laws to suppress freedom of expression, a culture of fear is fostered and perpetuated by the state. Margold (1999) critically examines the widespread usage of such constructs as ‘culture of terror’ and ‘culture of fear’ to characterise settings in which state power affects civilians. Interestingly friendly relations with other nations are amongst others used as a “pretext” for this kind of oppression.

However, this is far from being a new observation and Bangladesh is not the only state that tries to improve its image globally while internally disrespecting fundamental human rights as could have been

observed recently by Qatar hosting the soccer world cup whilst using the event as a huge image campaign without even trying to hide the human rights violations taking place in the country (Ellwood, 2023).

### **Forced to exile instead of being the new face of the country: contemporary artists and activists under pressure**

Given the fact that artists are often used or misused as cultural ambassadors it should briefly be described how artists have been treated in Bangladesh for many years. In 1994, well-known feminist writer Taslima Nasreen was sued by the Bangladesh government for insulting Islamic religious sentiments. Islamist groups threatened to kill her and the government was obviously not interested in interfering. Taslima Nasreen was forced to leave the country and take shelter in Europe to save her life. Prior to that, in the mid-seventies, Daud Haider, a Bangladeshi poet was forced into exile after writing a poem that insulted religion soon after Bangladesh was liberated (United States Institute of Peace, special report 2022). Renowned women sculptor Novera Ahmed left the country in the 1970s and Shamim Shikder (who was a lecturer at Dhaka University) also migrated as a result of receiving various threats from Islamist groups. The Bangladesh embassies in different countries have never invited any of these artists who were threatened and forced to emigrate nor have they done anything to ensure that they can return safely.

In December 2020, Dhaka Metropolitan Police Cyber Crime Unit filed a case against film director Anonno Mamun and actor Shaheen Mridha. Both have been arrested under the Pornography Control Act 2012 complaining that “very offensive gestures and obscene language” had been used in a film, which may generate “negative perceptions about policing among the public”.<sup>13</sup> In the same year Rita Dewan, a female folk singer and her two daughters were arrested under the Digital Security Act with the accusation of “hurting religious sentiments”. Under the same act, Kishore, an international award-winning cartoonist and writer Mushtaq Ahmed, were arrested for a critical post on Facebook

and other social media against the ruling party of Bangladesh<sup>14</sup>. Mush-taq Ahmed died in the prison.

Not only is freedom of thought under attack, but freedom of sexual expression (especially those of non-binary genders) has also been denied. Bangladeshi law does not recognise same-sex relationships, civil unions, nor any kind of domestic partnership for couples of the same sex. Bangladeshi LGBTQIA+ activists Xulhaz Mannan and Tonoy Mahbub were found stabbed to death in Dhaka in 2016. Though the Bangladesh government accepted Hijra<sup>15</sup> as third gender, sexual and gender minorities remain under constant pressure and threat in Bangladesh because the government takes no action against violence carried out by Islamic fundamentalist groups. Bangladesh remains one of 69 countries where homosexuality is still illegal. In accordance with section 377 of the Bangladesh Penal Code, sexual activity between men, whether consensual or not, is illegal and punishable by a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. After the killings of Xulhaz, an official of the embassy of the United States in Dhaka, the founder and editor of Bangladesh's first and only LGBTQIA-themed magazine, Roopbaan, and his partner, the artist Tonoy, as well as many other LGBTQIA+ activists left the country fearing their safety.

## Conclusion

It is particularly up to us, researchers in the emerging field of cultural diplomacy to be very much aware of the disparities between the strategies that countries use to brand their respective nations (including the use of many beautiful landscapes which are under threat because of tourism) and the realities on the ground. As much as nation branding is a tool that has been in the public diplomacy kit for a long time and as much as it might make sense for many countries – particularly but not exclusively smaller or relatively young ones like Bangladesh – it needs to be distinguished from the propaganda (Henze, 2020) that authoritarian regimes are prone to use in such sophisticated ways that make it difficult to recognise it as such. As communication is nowadays instant and global and can – despite massive efforts in several countries (China and



Russia for instance) – only be controlled to a certain extent, the contradictions between what is presented to the outside in order to increase the influx of tourism, promote exports and gain as much foreign investment as possible, and the situation inside the country will, however, become obvious (Sacker, 2014: 87; Kiriakopoulos, 2011). Many of the potential partners that Bangladeshi authorities envision with their respective nation branding campaigns (which relatively outdated given the fact that we find ourselves in the age of digitized public diplomacy (Manor, 2019)) will have difficulties reconciling silencing dissent and the oppression of freedom of expression with the slogan “Beautiful Bangladesh”.<sup>16</sup>

We should ask ourselves whether researchers in cultural diplomacy, but also actors in citizen’s diplomacy should not be among those who point out exactly these contractions. Advocating for artistic freedom as a fundamental right and basis for a progressive development of the cultural and creative sectors is on a global scale not possible without taking a position. It is particularly important for academics and activists in the so-called West, as they can take up such a position relatively easy and raise their voices and concerns without fearing for their lives. Colleagues, academics, journalists, artists, and activists in countries like Bangladesh – as has been explained in detail in this text – need much more courage for this, they also need resources and support that is non-existent, not even systematically offered by international organisations (from UNESCO to Helsinki citizens’ committees, Pen International etc.).

## Notes

- 1 We were requested not to reveal the countries or names of the officials.
- 2 There is no definite number concerning the indigenous groups in this area (Adnan, 2004:10; Gerharz, 2001:23). Some think that it is eleven or twelve (Branus and Loffler, 1990:37; Roy 2003:11), others state even more (Mohsin, 2003 (a):12; Shelly, 1992:44; Pradipto Khessa, 1996:13)).
- 3 <https://www.iwgia.org/en/bangladesh/3446-iw2019-bangladesh.html> (last visited April 6, 2023).
- 4 <https://beautifulbangladesh.gov.bd/cat/events/166> (last visited April 4, 2023)
- 5 <https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/mandated-areas1/human-rights.html> (last visited April 15, 2023).
- 6 The Fifteenth Amendment was passed in the Parliament of Bangladesh on June the 25<sup>th</sup>, 2011 and made some significant changes to the constitution.

- 7 Despite the fact that indigenous people live in different parts of Bangladesh, the CHT received most attention due to the long conflict between the Bangladesh army and the Shanti Bahini (SB), the armed wing of Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS), a political party of indigenous people living there. When Bangladesh became independent on the basis of Bengali nationalism, indigenous people in CHT demanded autonomy on the grounds of their indigenous identity. The Bangali elite considered this demand as a movement for separation and defined it as a threat to national security. Bangali nationalism took precedence over the concept of a plural society. The entire CHT administration was thus placed under control of the Bengali army in 1972 and the will of the indigenous peoples was ignored for a second time within a few decades since they had originally opted for becoming part of India and not Pakistan back in 1947 and now they were incorporated into the newly established state of Bangladesh. The new state of Bangladesh continued the policies of its predecessor. The Bangladesh constitution did not make any provision for the CHT nor did its first national budget of 1973 foresee any development allocations for the CHT region. The indigenous people, left without any hope for safeguards from the new government, set up their own political party the PCJSS and a year later its armed wing, the SB. For more than 25 years, a fierce conflict existed between the Bangladeshi state and the indigenous communities in the CHT which led to the CHT accord (popularly known as Peace Accord) signed in 1997. As a part of this accord, the Ministry of CHT Affairs has been set up.
- 8 At this place, it is important to notice that while English is widely spoken among the elites in Bangladesh it never was an official language. The Bengali language has played an important role in the fight for independence and is considered a key element of cultural identity. Two hundred years of British rule in India had come to an end in 1947 with the emergence of two independent states, India and Pakistan. The division was made on the basis of religion. Because of close religious, cultural, linguistic and ethnic affiliations with the adjacent population of India, the CHT representatives had demanded that the CHT become part of India. Indeed, on the day of independence, the Indian flag was hoisted in Rangamati and the Burmese flag in Bandarban, where people wanted to merge with Burma. Despite strong protests, the CHT was nonetheless placed in the newly formed state of Pakistan by the Boundary Commission Chairman Sir Cyril Radcliffe providing no explanation whatsoever (Dewan, 1990).
- 9 While those, who had committed war crimes during the Independence War of Bangladesh in 1971, were prosecuted immediately after independence, this ended when General Ziaur Rahman came to power after the killing of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975. He released all remaining prisoners and repealed several acts and regulations that have been passed in order to prosecute those responsible for the atrocities. The lasting feeling of never coming to terms and not having any chance for justice can have devastating effects on post-conflict societies threatening the often fragile social harmony and the prospects of long-term recovery (Devitt, 2012; Mani, 2005).

- 10 It was known as Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh and it was the largest Islamist political party in Bangladesh. The party supported the Pakistani military in the liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971 and its head Ghulam Azam coordinated and organized groups called Razakar, Al-Shams, and Al-Badr in collaboration with the Pakistan Army. These groups were associated with the Pakistani military in killing Bengali intellectuals and many others in the liberation war of Bangladesh.
- 11 It is an advocacy group of madrassah teachers and students (an Islamic school). In 2013 it took a stand against the Shahbag movement and labeled some bloggers, writers, and university teachers as 'atheist' and demanded the death penalty for them.
- 12 <https://www.voanews.com/a/planned-bangladesh-law-raises-freedom-of-expression-fears-6590133.html> Dated May 26, 2022 (last visited March 20, 2023).
- 13 <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/26/bangladesh-director-charged-after-film-depiction-of-police-angers> (last visited April 4, 2023).
- 14 <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa13/3537/2021/en/> (last visited March 18, 2023).
- 15 The new legal category actually identifies Hijra as "people who have problems with sexuality and sex as such". The government's approach reflects the popular understandings of Hijra as impotent, asexual, and born with ambiguous genitalia.
- 16 However, particularly tourists still seem relatively reluctant when it comes to reflecting on where they spend their precious time as can be shown by the massive influx of tourists to the Maldives or Turkey for instance.

## Bibliography

- Adnan, S. (2004). *Migration, Land Alienation, and Ethnic Conflict: Causes of Poverty in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh*. Dhaka: Research and Advisory Services.
- Barkat, A. (2015). *Political economy of unpeopling of indigenous peoples: the case of Bangladesh*. Paper presented at the 19th biennial conference, Bangladesh Economic Association, 8-10 January 2015, Dhaka.
- Devan, A. K. (1990). *Class and Ethnicity in the Hills of Bangladesh*. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada <https://escholarship.mcgill.ca/concern/theses/fn106z825>.
- Devitt, R. (2012). *Justice and Peace. The role of international tribunals in transitional justice*, in <https://www.e-ir.info/2012/01/24/justice-and-peace-the-role-of-international-tribunals-in-transitional-justice/> (last visited April 16, 2023).
- Ellwood, D. (2023). Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Qatar After the World Cup, <https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/soft-power-and-public-diplomacy-qatar-after-world-cup> (last visited April 6, 2023).
- Foucault, M. (1972). *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*. Pantheon Books, New York.

- Gerharz, E. (1999). *The Construction of Identities: The Case of Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh*. Research Paper, Bielefeld University, Germany.
- Habiba, U. et al. (2021). *Freedom of expression in Bangladesh in the context of bloggers' killings*, University of Gothenburg. Gothenburg: Nordicom. <https://policycommons.net/artifacts/3162795/freedom-of-expression-in-bangladesh-in-the-context-of-bloggers-killings/3960939/> on 02 Apr 2023. CID: 20.500.12592/xms9cp (last visited April 2, 2023).
- Henze, R. (2020). Empowerment and Digitization in Arts Management Education: A critical self-reflection of a "Western Educator", *Journal of Arts & International Affairs*, <https://theartsjournal.net/2020/06/24/henze/> (last visited April 11, 2023).
- Mani, R. (2005). Balancing Peace and Justice in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict, in *International Development*, Vol.48, No.3, 2005, pp 25-34.
- Manor, I. (2019). *The Digitization of Public Diplomacy*, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Khessa, P. (1996). *Parbatya Chattagramer Samosya*, Dhaka, Sahitya Prakash.
- Kiriakopoulos, K. (2011). Authoritarian states and internet social media: instruments of democratization or instruments of control? *Human Affairs* 21: 18–26.
- Margold, J. A. (1999). From 'cultures of fear and terror' to the normalization of violence. In *Critique of Anthropology*, 19(1), 63–88.
- Riaz, A. (2013). Shahbag Movement and Moral Power. <http://opinion.bdnews24.com/bangla/archives/8191> (last visited April 7, 2023).
- Sacker, U. (2014). Exporting Culture in a Global World? Necessity, Waste of Money, or even Danger? In Henze, R. & G. Wolfram (Eds.), *Exporting Culture. Which Role for Europe in a Global World?*, Springer VS, pp. 85–97.

# CUBA AND CULTURAL RELATIONS IN CHALLENGING TIMES: A PRACTICE-APPROACH

LEA JAKOB

## Thoughts on a Concert Night in Havana

Synopsis of the field memos from a Saturday night, March 2023: In the historical City Centre of Havana, the *Havana Lyceum Orchestra* plays a concert with a Portuguese conductor and an Italian pianist. The hall is nearly fully seated, with both Cuban visitors and foreigners. Some musicians had played with a popular Cuban salsa band at the international cigar trade fair the night before. Some others soon go to Washington for a US-Cuban concert with their string quartet. On the next day, a part of the orchestra will play a private gig for tourists from Canada. And just a week from now, the documentary *Mozart y Mambo – Cuban Dances* will be premiered with a live performance by the orchestra and Berlin Philharmonics' member Sarah Willis, hosted by the German embassy.

These are a few of many further examples that show that the orchestra's schedule is brimful, with an interest of a wide range of international actors from the field of music – individual artists, arts managers, as well as orchestras and institutions – on the rise again after the slope that the pandemic has caused. As a result, numerous activities are implemented on a day-to-day basis, even if the frame for action by international institutions is officially limited (von Soest, Haffner, and Sell, 2016).

The concert visitors, however, don't see who's missing on stage that very night: Cuba is facing a crisis, leading to massive migration over the

past year. As a result, many musicians of all genres have already left the country, and those remaining face daily challenges and uncertainties about how to keep up the musical activity. Not only the musicians themselves but also international and diplomatic institutions are elaborating on how to react to these challenging circumstances.

One aim of this paper is to better understand how the government has extensively used culture as a soft power and to promote the country as a “music powerhouse” (Perna, 2014, p. 45), with its cultural power outweighing its actual economic importance on the international stage. The article will also elaborate on the current situation in the cultural sector with a particular focus on (classical) music and what it implies for international cooperation. Two central aspects will be depicted: First, the necessity of a practice approach, and second, the importance of a “third vector” in cultural relations that adds to the activities of official diplomatic institutions and the exchange of individuals.

## **Change from Above or Transitions from Below?**

Cuba is often perceived as a country in transition – socially, culturally, economically, and politically. However, it is not a country in transition in the classical sense on the way to democratization<sup>1</sup>; Cuban politics is instead characterized by continuity (Hansing and Hoffmann, 2019). Moreover, until recently, there were also considerable barriers to internet use<sup>2</sup>, so Cuba was not only politically and economically isolated by the embargo but also socially isolated to a certain extent.

The all-dominant state sector of the economy had already gone into crisis after the demise of the Soviet Union (Hoffmann, 2021), resulting in the so-called *Período Especial* at the beginning of the 1990s. The *actualización* (update) of the economic and social system has been on the agenda for over a decade (Alonso & Vidal, 2021). Under Raúl Castro, initial economic reforms were initiated (a detailed analysis is given by Mesa-Lago (2019) or Pellón Azopardo (2017)). Still, Hoffmann refers to these as an “opening with the handbrake on” (2018: 4). Meanwhile, the social reality has changed significantly, leading to discrepancies between the official system and everyday life practices. Alonso and Vidal

conclude that “institutional rigidity is a poor reflection of the accelerated change in the people’s ways of life, values, and expectations, which is translated into a robust and fluid, informal institutional framework.” (2021, p. 156)

When researching in Cuba on a topic related to current social reality, it is necessary to understand better how the post-socialist economy works in practice. This requires an approach that goes beyond dichotomies, such as legal/illegal or state/private, and makes it necessary to take on a “multiple economies” perspective, as analyzed by Thiemann and Mare (2021). In my interviews, for instance, musicians explained in detail their portfolio of music-related activities to gain a living. There was no single case where additional private activities (private lessons or concerts for foreigners, gigs in bars, etc.) did not supplement the state salary (e.g., as an orchestra musician). Thiemann and Mare highlight the commonness of illegal (trans-) actions undertaken to subsist. They refer to these as *la lucha* (the struggle) and state that these informal mechanisms and structures have not only comprised an economy that is larger than the official one but also “constitute an area of collective agency that transforms the country from the bottom up” (2021, p. 91).

## **Tourism, Migration, and Crisis**

Until 2020, tourism was the “economic locomotive” (Perna, 2014, p. 48), with roundabout 4,3 million visitors in 2019, but with strong socially divisive effects: Cuban society is undergoing a process of heterogenization and re-stratification under the facade of stability (Hansing and Hoffmann, 2019). The impact of mass tourism on the music sector and the local musicians were manifold and significant, as will be shown in a later section. Tourism nearly came to a complete hold in 2020/2021, with only 356.470 international travelers visiting the island<sup>3</sup>.

The pandemic and the massive reduction of tourism proved to be a pivotal point that accelerated the existing dysfunctional mechanisms explained above and led to a deep crisis that reached all aspects of professional and daily life. This crisis is present in many conversations and often linked to thoughts on the current migration flux.

Cuba had already become a country of net migration in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, especially during the *Período Especial*, but also after 2013, when most barriers to travel were lifted. However, migration flows were not always unidirectional, and circulatory migration was a significant component (Krull & Stubbs, 2018, p. 330). The current emigration, in contrast, seems to exceed earlier waves by far and includes a disproportionate number of young, well-trained citizens. With young artists and musicians being a significant group in this migration wave, the repercussions on the cultural sector are enormous and reflected on every level of music life, e.g., in decreasing numbers of music students and teachers at the conservatories. Some ensembles I accompanied also changed their artistic profile, and concert format, e.g., the *Ensemble Interactivo de la Habana* started experimenting with electronic components when only four of eight members were left at the beginning of the year. With the central role of culture and especially music in Cuba's self-perception and the international image it projects, the long-term consequences cannot yet be assessed. The following section will be dedicated to the foundations of these interconnections.

## Selling Cuba by its Sound

It is often claimed that the development of Cuban music<sup>4</sup> cannot be separated from the nation's development. In the first place, for example, one could refer to the works of Fernando Ortiz, a Cuban anthropologist, who coined the term *transculturación* already in the 1940s to describe the formation of Cuban society and linked the creolization of musical forms to the formation of a Cuban identity (Ortiz, 1940). Ortiz used the metaphor of *ajiacó* (stew) to describe the process in which Cuba's culture, the *Cubanidad*<sup>5</sup> (Cubanness), is formed due to the constant confluence and interaction of different cultural sources.

In Cuba, the boundaries between art, folk, and popular music are more fluid on various levels than in the European classical music scene: On the one hand, Cuban composers began to integrate rhythms, instruments, and themes from Cuban folk music into art music as early as the 19<sup>th</sup> century, which became an essential factor in the formation of



national identity (Eli Rodríguez, 2004). On the other hand – and again on a practice level – their contemporaries were used to playing both classical and folk music. Cuban musicologist Gabriela Rojas Sierra once told me what is known about the professional life of Organ players in earlier centuries: After church service, they played “popular” music in the streets. This might still have been similar to the 19<sup>th</sup>-century practices in Europe, but the greater permeability between musical genres has been maintained or even cherished in Cuba.

Orchestras like the renowned all-female *Camerata Romeu* have made it their mission to promote Cuban music of all genres to audiences. Many contemporary Cuban composers refer to the traditional heritage in their compositions and base them on typical Cuban dance rhythms. Ernesto Oliva, for example, a composer born in Guantánamo, often integrates the classic *Changüi* dance rhythm into his works and arranges them for classical chamber music formats but doesn’t hesitate to also perform them in a more popular setting featuring percussion and including improvisations.

## The International View: Cuban Music and Tourism

Music has long worked as an international ambassador for Cuba, dating back to the *Habanera* in the 1870s (Perna, 2014). Later, Cuban music played a vital role in developing the tourism sector (Ana, 2021), shaping tourists’ expectations, mediating their experiences, and building an avenue for their contacts with locals (Perna, 2014). Attention should be drawn to two streams of international music promotion in the 1990s that underline how Cuban music shaped the island’s image and how the international reaction, in turn influenced artistic life in Cuba.

During the pivotal *Período Especial*, Cuban economic planners and tourist managers turned to mass tourism as a strategic economic resource. They chose *música bailable* (popular dance music such as the *Timba*) to mobilize Cuban music for tourist purposes by capitalizing on the pre-revolutionary representations of Cuba as a pleasure island. Music and dance became market differentiators, and a whole informal functional relationship arose between state-run clubs, musicians, local

youth, and foreigners. It generated considerable wealth for a small community of famous artists that traveled a lot and contributed heavily to musical promotion – in contrast to those whose music was not marketable to foreigners and who didn't benefit from the tourism flux. Shifts in music consumption were a necessary consequence: *Música bailable* became less accessible to the local population as popular bands were either touring or mainly playing in tourist clubs (Perna, 2014, pp. 48-53).

At the end of the 1990s, with the Cuban economy slowly recovering, the international image of Cuba was redefined when the *Buena Vista Social Club* album and the film by Wim Wenders became a global sensation. The album – produced rather par hazard and by foreign producers (!) – drew on styles and artists from the pre-revolutionary times. At the time, it was seen by many in Cuba as a “stereotypical throwback creation for overseas consumption” (Krull and Stubbs, 2018, p. 338). This eminently foreign success and the expectations it raised among foreigners gave rise to the so-called *músicos de sopa*, who would then cater to the tourists' needs and play the well-known tunes in the Old Streets of Havana. In a way, these “unstaged contexts of musical performance” naturalized the music and fixed it as the “sonic sign” of Cuba (Perna, 2014, p. 59).

The example of *Buena Vista Social Club* highlights the complex and powerful connection with tourism. It had a hugely symbolic and ideological impact and matched the new touristic vision of Cuba as a cultural heritage destination promoted by the Cuban authorities. And even today, images of “authentic” music (and dance)<sup>6</sup> have proved to shape the touristic modes of visualization and experience while also revealing processes of commodification and standardization behind these images (Ana, 2021).

Furthermore, a whole new specialized segment of music tourism has grown in the last decade. Organizations such as *Havana Music Tours* offer a more in-depth experience of Cuban music, usually related to more prominent festivals and including concert visits, musicological input, and private or group lessons by Cuban musicians – thus generating another essential source of income, especially for classically trained musicians.

## Cultural Heritage as Soft Power

Soft-power diplomacy has traditionally been crucial for Cuba (Hoffmann, 2018), be it the early campaign for literacy and the promotion of cultural institutions such as *Casa de las Américas* and the *Havana Film Festival* (Hoffmann and Whitehead, 2022)<sup>7</sup> and Cuba has made use of its unique cultural legacy as a political and economic strength (Ferguson, 2003). State investments in culture were disproportionately high (it is discussed controversially among the actors in the cultural field, whether they still are), and the image projected to the world was a political program in which artistic production and cultural consumption formed an intrinsic part (Padura, 2019). After the revolution, various cultural centers, e.g. the *Casas de Cultura* in each municipality and other state cultural institutions were established. In addition, a free centralized artistic education system ranging up to the *Instituto Superior de Arte* (ISA) was implemented, and a new appreciation of artists was demonstrated (Ferguson, 2003; Storhoff, 2014). The state became the “curator state” and “gatekeeper state” (Grenier, 2017) and even today exercises a comprehensive claim to power<sup>8</sup> over the cultural sector (von Soest, Haffner, and Sell, 2016). The Ministry of Culture MINCULT is a key actor to which numerous institutions are subordinate, including the *Instituto Cubano de la Música* (ICM). The ICM itself includes a range of divisions that build the official framework of musical life in Cuba, such as the *empresas* (agencies) for different music genres that all musicians, bands, and ensembles (should) be inscribed to. The *empresas* (should) take care of regular concert opportunities for the members and guarantee a steady pay of a fixed salary. They are also a necessary vehicle for payments to be realized after many concerts or gigs. Here again, an institution-practice divide can be observed as many interview partners reported that – whenever possible – clients such as bar owners also paid in cash without involving the intermediary institution.

## New models of organizing in the music sector

A large part of the roundabout 16.000 professional musicians registered in Cuba is in a state working relationship which guarantees a minimum of visibility, opportunities to perform, and a basic salary but little opportunity for independent, non-state independent, non-state creative work (Fernández Maceira, 2016). However, informal cultural production and commercialization have consolidated as a reaction of cultural workers to the inadequate legal and economic infrastructure (Monasterio Barsó, 2018). Despite all state and legal obstacles, cultural workers have found new organizational models outside state institutions and built independent cultural spaces or new circuits, ensembles, or other entities. These are often characterized by individual or collective self-management (thus with minimum intervention of the state institutions in the decision-making process) and by a diversification of funding sources (Fernández Maceira, 2016). It will be interesting to see in how far the cultural workers involved in these new entities are going to be key actors contributing to meaningful systemic social change, as has been shown in the southeast European region (Dragičević Šešić, 2013).

A patchwork career with different jobs and projects in the official and informal spheres simultaneously has become the norm for musicians in Cuba. The *Havana Lyceum Orchestra* is, again, an interesting example. It was founded by the Cuban conductor José Antonio Mendez Padrón with the help of the Mozarteum Foundation in Salzburg and surged from a student orchestra affiliated with the ISA. For many years, it acted as an independent ensemble without financial resources but then received a substantial three-year grant from a German patron, which enabled the orchestra to pay the musicians a salary, hire a manager, and launch a regular concert series. After that pilot period, the orchestra became one of the leading ensembles in the country. It then obtained a limited number of fixed positions by the *Oficina del Historiador* – a separate entity not under the auspice of the MINCULT – but still has to raise funds to sustain itself, e.g., by tours, CD recordings, and special concerts that are paid separately. These projects that go beyond the regular concert season also serve as an additional source of income for the members of the orchestra.

## Cultural Relations between Cuba and Europe

An overview of Cuba's international relations would go beyond this text's scope.<sup>9</sup> Instead, I would like to draw on selected aspects of how cultural relations between Cuba and Europe<sup>10</sup> are implemented in practice.

First, one could consider the official institutions: At the national level, cultural programming varies significantly according to the guidelines on foreign cultural policy – via the embassies and the national cultural institutes.

In the specific case of Germany, for example, there is no cultural agreement, as negotiations failed in 2016. This means that officially there can be no independent *Goethe Institute* in Cuba so that the embassy would be the central authority for cultural programming. However, as is so often the case, there is a discrepancy between the official status and daily practice: the liaison office of the *Goethe Institute* under the umbrella of the German embassy is indeed very active. It sets up cultural program work as it does in other countries. There are also numerous official Cuban-German university cooperations at the academic level, but none with the music faculty of the ISA. The latter, however, has signed various *Convenios* (agreements) with other (also civil society) actors, e.g., the *Balthasar Neumann Orchestra* based in Germany. These *Convenios* are the lynchpin for formalizing cooperation with Cuban official institutions. In some cases, it took years to sign, even if the daily practice of collaboration was detached from it.

On the EU level, in 2016, the *Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement* (PDCA) ended 20 years of disagreement over the *Posición Común* (Ayuso and Gratius, 2017) and gave a new impetus to the bilateral relations with implications for cultural cooperation. Furthermore, the PDCA highlights new opportunities for different actors, such as Cuban civil society organizations, ascribing them the potential to play a proactive role in interacting with European counterparts (Pellón Azopardo, 2017).

In terms of cultural exchange or cooperation, or support for cultural actors in Cuba, the EU operates directly and indirectly through different formats and with various partners:

Firstly, with the *European Union Delegation to Cuba*, it's diplomatic representation. Several projects in the cultural sector are implemented as part of the 2021 – 2027 program. It also hosts international cultural events during the “European month” in Cuba.

Second, via funding allocated to, e.g., the UNESCO *Transcultura* program (2020 – 2024), which seeks to deepen integration between Cuba, the Caribbean, and the EU. Several arts managers I interviewed are participating in one of the *Transcultura* online trainings on grant applications. The program also aims to foster cultural collaboration and exchange good practices between individuals, artists' associations, and initiatives from the Caribbean and Europe.

Third, as a partner of the EUNIC (*European Union National Institutes for Culture*) network. A EUNIC cluster in Cuba was created in 2018, aiming to find synergies and increase the impact of the EU members' cultural cooperation activities. *CLIC – Culture to Connect* (2019 – 2022) was the first joint project, driven by the idea of promoting young Cuban talent and connecting Cuban artists with European counterparts.

Regarding smaller-scale support of local actors, attention should be drawn to one recent initiative, the *Fondo de Arte Jóven*, launched by the *Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation*, that aims at the professional development of young visual artists and musicians. It has just started its pilot phase (2022 – 2024) and will mainly operate via grants to address the specific needs of individual young artists and musicians, such as scholarships to support the creation and provision of media, professional accompaniment, and opportunities for academic advancement.

Many of these activities by the official (diplomatic) institutions show a clear shift towards capacity building in Cuba and the support of cooperation with civil society actors. However, many interview partners were unaware of these programs and funding schemes, did not consider their projects suitable, or could not dedicate sufficient time to their project development. Integrating a more comprehensive range of actors, such as individual musicians and ensembles, will be a key challenge for the future implementation. Another challenge arises from the project periods mentioned above: The readers of this publication will be well aware of the discrepancy between the aim for sustainable partnerships and project-based funding, with programs often limited to two to four years.

In the Cuban case, it is therefore interesting to also have a look at the international cultural projects that are implemented outside the realm of the official diplomatic institutions: In fact, several initiatives have been very active in keeping up the exchange between musicians from Cuba and Europe for many years and developing joint projects over a more extended period, thus building trust and forming durable partnerships.

The *Havana Lyceum Orchestra* again is a good case here as it has built these ties with several European counterparts, among others<sup>11</sup>:

The Balthasar Neumann Ensembles and their *Cuban-European Youth Academy* (CuE) with regular exchange and formation programs taking place in Cuba and Europe, founded in 2015.

The Mozarteum Foundation in Salzburg, active in Cuba since 2009 and promoting the annual Mozart festival, among others.

Sarah Willis & the *Mozart y Mambo* project, initiated in 2017, with three recorded CDs and two concert tours realized in 2021/2022.

This form of long-term professional cooperation and exchange between musicians, ensembles, and institutions outside the official programs can be described as an essential additional third vector in the implementation of cultural relations, with the other two vectors being the official relations shaped by the diplomatic institutions and the second vector being the individual “private” forms of exchange. This holds especially true for a complex context such as Cuba, where the official realm for cooperation might often be restricted and where foreign cultural institutions and institutions co-financed from abroad are viewed with suspicion (von Soest, Haffner, and Sell, 2016, p. 29).

When considering the multitude of actors involved in cultural relations on different levels and the wide range of projects implemented in practice, more orchestrated action could be called for. This might not be easy in the official diplomatic sector if, e.g., EU member states have different approaches to implementing cultural relations with Cuba. It may, however, increase the impact of the third vector initiatives if joint action is taken and synergies are created. We often discussed this in the case of the *Havana Lyceum Orchestra*, where the long-term partnerships all have a different focus but might complement each other

on a practical level, e.g., when organizing a project with the orchestra's musicians in Europe.

### **Closing remarks:**

#### **What future of cultural relations with Cuba?**

In the current situation of crisis, cultural cooperation with Cuba is becoming increasingly difficult. Or, to put it differently: Cuba attracts much interest from institutions from abroad due to its enormous musical talent and the nimbus, but on the practical level, many factors are challenging cooperation. Those include, for example, monetary aspects with high inflation leading to higher production costs (transport, accommodation, etc.). The lack of financial resources of the Cuban cooperation partner requires the counterpart to bring in even more funds, thus increasing the power imbalances and the danger of reaching a situation in which the source of funds defines who has authority over the project (Jhunjhunwala and Walker, 2020, p. 160). Furthermore, the current migration situation raises barriers to cooperation projects on two levels: First, by creating uncertainty about whether the musicians needed to implement the project will still be in Cuba and have enough time to dedicate to the activity. Second, Visa issuance is significantly more restrictive than before the pandemic, and visas for cultural projects have been negated in several cases. Every case of a Cuban musician staying in Europe after a concert tour or exchange project could add to this problem.

What does this imply for the future of cultural relations with Cuba and precisely the “third vector” initiatives having promoted joint projects on both sides of the Atlantic for many years? If, for example, the two-way exchange is abandoned because of visa difficulties and projects are only carried out in Cuba, it might occur what Carty writes: “Are we really facilitating ‘inter’ cultural dialogue (between cultures)? Or are we satisfying ourselves with extra-cultural dialogue – dialogue that is, and will always be, external to our own? (...) Is this not, then, a form of sophisticated cultural observation? Twenty-first century ethnographic studies of the intellectual kind?” (Carty, 2020, p. 266). These thoughts can be seen as specifically remarkable for the Cuban case.



In the specific Cuban case, additional challenges are caused by the repercussions of Cuba's international projection as the Island of Music and should not be underestimated. It was analyzed how in the 1990s, *Música Bailable* and "traditional" music shaped foreigners' image of Cuba. Even today, this leads to a specific set of expectations when hosting Cuban musicians in Europe, e.g. in the classical music scene which is often perceived as still quite conservative and eurocentric. Of course, many of the long-term cooperation projects described above have already reached a deeper understanding. This results in a broader picture of Cuban music displayed in these projects, e.g., by presenting classical Cuban compositions from different centuries or by commissioning works from young Cuban composers referencing the island's music heritage. However, on the systemic level, change is still needed to decolonize classical music and give more space to musicians and musical works from different scenes without "othering" or reducing them to the stereotyped image described above. Promoting music events from non-Western cultures could, as described by Henze, Teissl & Oswald, even enable international arts education for the European audience, thus making postcolonial conditions of production and reception visible (2020, p. 19–20). This would require a change of mindsets and strategies on behalf of promoters, agencies, collaborating European artists, and every audience member.

## Notes

- 1 Hoffmann (2016) describes a transition from a model of charismatic socialism to one of bureaucratic socialism.
- 2 Mobile Data has only been introduced in 2019. Zoom, Microsoft Teams and other standard communication tools or websites are only accessible with a VPN client.
- 3 The Cuban statistic office publishes regular reports: <http://www.onei.gob.cu> (Accessed March 24, 2023).
- 4 It will not be possible to give an overview of Cuban Music history here or to explain the Cuban dances that influenced music practice (e.g., bolero, son, danzón, or rumba). For a detailed account of Cuban music from a Cuban perspective, see, for example, the manifold works by Cuban musicologist María Teresa Linares or Olavo Alen Rodríguez. The links of Cuban Music to politics and society are analyzed in more detail by Moore (2006) and Ferguson (2003).
- 5 He also introduces the term *Cubania* in order to describe the consciousness and attachment to Cuba's unique culture.

- 6 An insightful ethnographic research on the effects of tourism on the dance sector was published by Ana (2021).
- 7 Hoffmann and Whitehead name the example of the Rolling Stones concert as an event that seemed to mark a new era in the phase of rapprochement with the US. Havana became the “place to be” for many celebrities, also from the field of Arts, and the artistic projection was a key factor for goodwill and sympathetic perceptions of Cuba (2022, p. 164). Ferguson also concludes that the global interest in Cuban music forms part of an affective and emotional network of interest in Cuban culture, but does not translate into direct support for the government (2003).
- 8 The current constitution, ratified in 2019, guarantees the existence of freedom of artistic production but also demands that this creation respects the values of Cuban socialist society. Only a few months earlier, the highly controversial Decree 349 had been passed, requiring artists to obtain advance permission for public and private exhibitions and performances and giving the government the right to shut down cultural events that showed prohibited content. However, musicians also benefited from travel privileges: The migration policy applied in the cultural sector before 2013 sought to avoid the emigration of its skilled workforce and encouraged artists to travel temporarily while maintaining a link with their entity of origin (Bustamante Salazar and Sorolla Fernández, 2015).
- 9 . An insightful overview of Cuba’s international relations with various partners after the uprisings in 2021 is given by Hoffmann and Whitehead (2022).
- 10 Analyzing the Cultural Relations between Cuba and the US would require a separate chapter. An Ethnomusicological Study of the Policies and Aspirations for U.S.-Cuban Musical Interaction was conducted by Storhoff (2014).
- 11 The orchestra is also involved in numerous other international collaborations, e.g., with international guest conductors or in special co-productions.

## Bibliography

- Alonso, J. & Vidal, P. (2021). The difficulties of Institutional Change in Cuba. In: Hoffmann, B. (Ed.), *Social Policies and Institutional Reform in Post-COVID Cuba*, Opladen, Berlin & Toronto: Verlag Barbara Budrich GmbH, pp. 137–158.
- Ana, R. (2021). Bailarín, Bailador, Callejero, Inflador: Being/Becoming Professional on Cuba’s Dance Scene (An ethnographic Approach). In: Hoffmann, B. (Ed.), *Social Policies and Institutional Reform in Post-COVID Cuba*, Opladen, Berlin & Toronto: Verlag Barbara Budrich GmbH, pp. 207–225.
- Ayuso, A. & Gratiús, S. (2017). Nadar a contracorriente? El futuro del acuerdo de la unión europea con Cuba. In: Gratiús, S. & Ayuso, A. (Eds.), *Nueva etapa entre Cuba y la UE: escenarios de futuro*, Barcelona: CIDOB edicions, pp. 89–104.
- Bustamante Salazar, M. & Sorolla Fernández, I. (2015). La política migratoria cubana. Aplicación en el sector cultural en el periodo 1995-2012, *Mundi Migratios*, 3(1), pp. 73–103.

- Carty, H. (2020). Intercultural Exchange: A Personal Perspective from the Outsider Insider. In: Durrer, V. & Henze, R. (Eds.), *Managing Culture. Reflecting on Exchange in Global Times*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, pp. 259–268.
- Dragičević Šešić, M. (2013). The role of culture in democratic transition: Southeast European experience of civic cultural organisations, *Zbornik radova Fakulteta dramskih umetnosti*, 23, pp. 157–167.
- Eli Rodríguez, V. (2004). Sinfonía a la Cubana. Kubanische Kunstmusik. In: Eßer, T. & Frölicher, P. (Eds.), „*Alles in meinem Dasein ist Musik...*“: *Kubanische Musik von Rumba bis Techno*, Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert, pp. 379–404.
- Ferguson, J. (2003). The transnational politics of Cuban music and Cuban culture, *Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for Cultural and Economic Studies*, 6(1), article 3.
- Fernández Maceira, D. (2016). Nuevos modelos de gestión cultural en Cuba, *AM:PM Magazine*, no. 85–86, pp. 30–34.
- Grenier, Y. (2017). *Culture and the Cuban State: Participation, Recognition, and Dissonance under Communism*, London: Lexington Books.
- Hansing, K. & Hoffmann, B. (2019). *Cuba's New Social Structure: Assessing the Re-Stratification of Cuban Society 60 Years after Revolution*, Hamburg: GIGA Working Papers.
- Henze, R., Teissl, V. & Oswald, K. (2020). Underneath our thoughts. An introduction into Postcolonial Concepts and the Cultural Sector. In: Henze, R., Teissl, V. & Oswald, K. (Eds.), *Postcolonial Cultural Management*, Arts Management Quarterly, 135, pp. 14–25.
- Hoffmann, B. (2016). *Wandel und Annäherung. Perspektiven deutsch-kubanischer Beziehungen in Kultur und Bildung*, Stuttgart: ifa-Edition Kultur und Außenpolitik.
- Hoffmann, B. (2018). *Kuba nach Raúl: Der Reformdruck bleibt hoch*, Hamburg: GIGA Focus 04/2018.
- Hoffmann, B. (2021). Social Policies and Institutional Reform in Post-COVID Cuba: A Necessary Agenda. In: Hoffmann, B. (Ed.), *Social Policies and Institutional Reform in Post-COVID Cuba*, Opladen, Berlin & Toronto: Verlag Barbara Budrich GmbH, pp. 207–225.
- Hoffmann, B. & Whitehead, L. (2022). After the Protests and the Pandemic: Reassessing the International Profile of Post-Castro Cuba. In: Gratius, S. & Pellón Azopardo, R. (Eds.), *Cuba and the European Union*, Barcelona: CIDOB, No. 83, pp. 155–172.
- Jhunjunwala, R. & Walker, A. (2020). Challenging Assumptions in Intercultural Collaborations: Perspectives from India and the UK. In: Durrer, V. & Henze, R. (Eds.), *Managing Culture. Reflecting On Exchange in Global Times*, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 155 – 170.
- Krull, C. & Stubbs, J. (2018). Through a Diasporic or Transnational Lens? Post-’89 Cuban Mobility and Migration in Canada and Western Europe. In: Bandau, A., Brüske, A. & Ueckmann, N. (Eds.), *Reshaping Glocal Dynamics of the Caribbean*, Heidelberg: Heidelberg University Publishing, pp. 329–350.

- Mesa-Lago, C. (2019). La economía cubana en el 60 aniversario de la revolución. In: Fábregues, F. & Farrés, O. (Eds.): *Anuario Internacional CIDOB 2019. Nueva época. Perfil de país: Cuba*, Barcelona: CIDOB edicions, pp. 256–265.
- Monasterio Barsó, F. (2018). *Music Production and Cultural Entrepreneurship in today's Havana: Elephants in the room*, Queen's University Kingston, <http://hdl.handle.net/1974/24851> (Accessed March 24, 2023).
- Moore, R. (2006). *Music and Revolution: Cultural Change in Socialist Cuba*, Berkely: University of California Press.
- Ortiz, F. (1940). *Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar. Advertencia des sus-contrastes agrarios, económicos, históricos y sociales, su etnografía y su transculturación*, Havana: Jesús Montero.
- Padura, L. (2019). Dentro / fuera, a favor / en contra, permisible / inadmisible: Dicotomías de un universo cultural Cubano. In: Fábregues, F. & Farrés, O. (Eds.): *Anuario Internacional CIDOB 2019. Nueva época. Perfil de país: Cuba*, Barcelona: CIDOB edicions, pp. 267–272.
- Pellón Azopardo, R. (2017). Retos y oportunidades en la implementación del nuevo acuerdo de diálogo y cooperación: una mirada desde Cuba. In: Gratiús, S. & Ayuso, A. (Eds.), *Nueva etapa entre Cuba y la UE: escenarios de futuro*, Barcelona: CIDOB edicions, pp. 81–88.
- Perna, V. (2014). Selling Cuba by its sound. Music and Tourism in Cuba in the 1990s. In: Rommen, T. & Neely, D. (Eds.): *Sun, sea, and sound: music and tourism in the circum-Caribbean*, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 44–69.
- Storhoff, T. (2014). *Beyond the Blockade. An Ethnomusicological Study of the Policies and Aspirations for U.S.-Cuban Interaction*, Florida State University, <https://diginole.lib.fsu.edu/islandora/object/fsu:185325> (Accessed March 24, 2023).
- Thiemann, L. & Mare, C. (2021). Multiple Economies and Everyday Resistance in Cuba: A Bottom-up Transition. In: Hoffmann, B. (Ed.), *Social Policies and Institutional Reform in Post-COVID Cuba*, Opladen, Berlin & Toronto: Verlag Barbara Budrich GmbH, pp. 183–206.
- Von Soest, C. / Haffner, D. / Sell, J. (2016): *Nebenwirkungen von Sanktionen: Kulturelle Beziehungen mit Iran, Kuba, Russland und Belarus*, Stuttgart: Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen.

# SPAIN'S MUSIC FESTIVALS AND THEIR ROLE IN CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

ANA MILOSAVLJEVIĆ

Spain has always been known as a ground rich of music, nation full of rhythm and passion for life, arts and creation in general. It is no wonder that this is the case concerning the rich history of the country, it's multicultural society and all the cultures that influenced each other on this territory during the course of time. Taking the example of *flamenco*<sup>1</sup> (UNESCO intangible heritage) and the mysterious history of its origins, both of the etymology and the form itself, one thing is for sure – this music form is a mixture of various cultures that lived on the territory of Spain since the Middle Ages, most influential of them being Arabic, Jewish and Gipsy. In this form alone, we can see the early beginnings of what we nowadays label as interculturalism, and in the performance of this music, the early beginnings of performing arts and music festivals as we know them today. Therefore, we notice that the culture of performing arts is deeply embedded in the Spanish society and tradition.

In the recent years, the government of Spain and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs defined several goals for the implementation of the country's foreign policy through cultural diplomacy which include promotion of Spanish language (the second most spoken mother tongue in the world), promotion of Spain's cultural and artistic wealth, as well as science and technological development, through scientific diplomacy.<sup>2</sup>

Concerning cultural and artistic wealth, music of Spanish speaking territories has gained great popularity worldwide even among people who do not speak Spanish. From classical music and composers like

Manuel De Falla, who was among the first composers that introduced elements of Spanish folklore music into his compositions and therefore opened a new window for its popularity, through Latin America's famous music genres like tango, bolero and rumba (among others), then Spanish flamenco and popular music, to more modern music genres like reggaeton, Spanish pop-rock and others. As many writers, poets and musicians noted well, "music is the language of the soul."<sup>3</sup>

The focus of this paper will be on music festivals, a unique space where people gather united by the same passion for music to exchange ideas, create together, explore other countries and cities, meet new friends and gain new experiences, which refers to both artists and visitors. All of these aspects are important for cultural diplomacy of Spain being that one of the above-mentioned goals for implementing foreign policy through cultural diplomacy is the promotion of artistic and cultural riches, which music festivals are a part of. Regarding their nature as ever evolving events, they give a lot of freedom for experimenting new tools and implementing new ideas. Spanish government has recognized that potential and is supporting a large number of music festivals, where some of them excide 500.000 visitors per edition.<sup>4</sup>

Another aspect where music festivals are bringing benefit to the country is its economy. In 2018 the estimated number of festivals celebrated in Spain were 895 and €333,900,102 was the amount of live music net revenue.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, the same study predicts, besides the corona virus pandemic, a recovery of the sector achieving higher net revenues than the ones in the current times (specifically, from 2028 and with a drop in net revenue which is expected until 2024).<sup>6</sup>

Tourism sector also benefits from a large number of music festivals held in Spain every year. It is estimated that Spain has 5 million foreign visitors on music festivals spending in average 300€ per person<sup>7</sup>. Although the reason of their visit is festival attendance, they do have a great opportunity to explore the city or the region of Spain where the festival is being held. This fact also contributes to the support that these events receive from municipalities, local provinces and the state, which recognized the importance of music festivals and the number of people they are attracting.

## Festivals and events

Throughout history, times of gatherings and celebrations were among favorite events of human kind. The word *festival* derives from the Latin word *festum* for “a time of celebration”. Reasons for this type of gatherings can be different, from religious (before Christianity it was about pagan celebrations), economic trades (fairs that were very often accompanied by music and dances) to purely leisure time mass meetings that can be caused by a simple reason as enjoying a same interest in art, like music and other.

In the modern times and through the lenses of cultural diplomacy and soft power, an important part of festivals of any kind is also the place and the space where a specific festival is being held. We may know or associate countries or towns with festivals, such as *Oktoberfest* with Munich, *Burning man* with USA, *Carnival* with Rio de Janeiro, *Cannes* with the French city of the same name, etc.

As stated by the author Alvin Reiss, “the arts and cultural industries, especially through festivals and special events, can offer something for the tourism sector to exploit – experience.”<sup>8</sup> This correlates to the notion of soft power that Nye defined, and that is attractiveness. The more attractive the experience, the more visitors it will allure.

## Analysis of music festivals in Spain

In this chapter, valuable information and data obtained after a thorough research (books, articles, websites, etc.) will be presented. The information and findings from the data analysis will be elaborated and commented, and some additional observations will be given.

Selecting the music festivals which will be the subject of the analysis for this research was not an easy task, being that in Spain around 900 festivals are held a year.<sup>9</sup>

We will divide music festivals that we selected and that will be the topic of our interest into two groups: **popular music festivals** like *Arenal Sound* (Castellón) that gathers around 300.000 visitors per edition.

Here we can include festivals like *Sónar* (Barcelona), *Primavera Sound* (Barcelona), *Bilbao BBK Festival* (Bilbao) and other, which attract between 100.000 to 500.000 people per festival every year (with the exception of years 2020 and 2021, when most of these music festivals weren't held due to global COVID-19 pandemic). All of these festivals usually display some of the following music genres: pop music, electronic music, indie and rock music.

Following are the festivals that are linked to **religious and/or traditional music**, and are related to the celebration of traditional or religious customs. An analysis of music festivals in Spain cannot pass without a festival dedicated to flamenco, the traditional music form from Spain which has been declared UNESCO intangible cultural heritage in 2010<sup>10</sup>. Among numerous festivals dedicated to this music genre, for this paper we will analyze *Festival del Cante de las Minas*, which is considered one of the most prestigious flamenco festivals in the world. *Semana Santa* (Holly Week) is held throughout Spain and essentially pays tribute to the Passion of Jesus Christ. Traditional customs are carried out by Catholic Brotherhoods who perform penance processions throughout the streets in the week leading up to the Easter Weekend. *Semana de Música Religiosa de Cuenca* (Cuenca Religious Music Week) coincides with the Easter week celebrations. Every year it features important international orchestras and soloists. There is a wide and varied line-up of concerts, including new composers, rarely performed works, old pieces recovered from history, and of course the great traditional works of religious music. The concert venues were chosen to help create a more profound religious atmosphere: the cathedral, the old convent of *Las Carmelitas* and the churches of San Miguel and Arcas, to name just a few. In the Spanish capital, the biggest *fiesta* of this type is *Fiestas de San Isidro*, San Isidro being the patron saint of Madrid. One of the festivals that are linked to traditional customs, not involving religion, is *Feria de Abril de Sevilla*. It was founded in 19<sup>th</sup> century as a trade fair with the aim of gathering people and merchants, which later became a celebration of the city and its people. Considered the European version of the *Carnival* in Rio de Janeiro, *Carnival Santa Cruz de Tenerife* is a festival with major celebrations symbolically representing the final party before the liturgical season of lent. All of the above-mentioned types of music festivals are supported by the local and/or state institutions and ministries. In



this paper we will get more into detail about what kind of support they provide for these events and how it is linked to the cultural diplomacy agenda of Spain.

## Popular music festivals

**ARENAL SOUND.** We start our analysis with *Arenal Sound* festival that is being held in Castellón de la Plana, Burriana Municipality, region of Valencia which is celebrated since 2010. The festival happens begging of August and lasts between five and six days. What we can define as a festival mission and vision<sup>11</sup> is their aim to position themselves as the biggest festival in Spain, as well as gather and present the most popular names of independent (indie) music, that is, music which is produced independently from commercial record labels or their subsidiaries.<sup>12</sup> Music genres that can be heard on this festival are pop, rock, hip-hop and electronic music. They succeeded in their mission because starting from 2015 they temporarily did become the most massive festival in Spain having 260.000 visitors in 4 days (two days were canceled because of the bad weather, storms and rain).<sup>13</sup> In 2019, that number reached 300.000.<sup>14</sup>

The founder and the organizer of the festival is a private company *The Music Republic* dedicated to the organization of music festivals, with headquarters in Valencia. Owners of the company responsible for the organization of ten different festivals across the country are David and Antonio Sánchez, referred to by the Spanish media and public as “masters of the festivals”.<sup>15</sup>

Even though *Arenal Sound* is a private initiative, in 2015 they managed to get the support from the Municipality of Castellón de la Plana, under various conditions, some of them being zero cost for the council, the creation of job positions for the habitants of the municipality, and the adaptation of the camping site near the El Arenal beach.

As the festival grew, the local authorities as well as the state institutions recognized the potential. After getting the support from the Municipalities of Burriana and Catellón, the Region and the Government of the Valencian community joined (Comunitat Valenciana and

Generalitat Valenciana). Among key partners of the festival that we should mention is *The National Institute for Performing Arts and Music* (INAEM Instituto Nacional de Artes Escénicas y de la Música) which is a state body that belongs to the Ministry of Culture and Sports. Valencian Institute of Culture and the organization *Sempre Teua*, for the promotion of Valencian language provided their support to the festival too.

The phenomena of indie music (indie pop, indie rock, electronic) in today's society is on the rise, especially among younger generations. Surpassing music record labels, independently produced music gives an opportunity to young authors, who don't have access to agents and record labels, to stream their music for free on numerous digital platforms such as YouTube, Soundcloud, Spotify, Instagram accounts, Twitter, Facebook... Whenever a song or an artist of indie music "goes viral" there is naturally a desire among their public to see them performing live. Which *Arenal Sound* is providing to their audience. It is no wonder that the majority of visitors are between the age of 18 and 25.<sup>16</sup>

When it comes to domestic and foreign visitors in 2019 the percentage of the first group was 90% while the second was 10%.<sup>17</sup> If we know that festival had 300.000 visitors in the same year that means that 30.000 people from abroad visited the festival in 2019.

**SÓNAR.** Taking place middle of June in the region of Catalonia and its capital Barcelona, *Sónar* is an electronic music festival reaching up to 126.000 visitors in 2018<sup>18</sup> and 122.000 last year.<sup>19</sup> The festival is held middle of June and lasts for three days.

Founded in 1994 by three friends (Ricard Robles, Enric Palau and Sergi Caballero) and their company *Advanced Music S.L.*, the goal was to celebrate and gather the fans of electronic music but also organize networking sessions and roundtables for music professionals, offering very well beyond music and striving to provide reasons for other people to visit, besides the fans of electronic music. Today, *Sónar* has the title of *International Festival of Music, Creativity and Technology* and it is recognized as a leader event for networking, collaboration and innovations when it comes to electronic music, art and technology. Since 2002, *Sónar* has organized more than 70 events in different parts of the world, adapting the *Sónar* philosophy to unique places and environments. It strives to highlight the most interesting local talents and the scene of

the city where it takes place. In addition to the event in Barcelona, *Sónar* organizes festivals in other cities every year. In the previous years it has traveled to Reykjavik, Buenos Aires, New York, London, Frankfurt, Seoul, Lisbon, Lyon, Hamburg, Toronto, Montreal, Chicago, Boston, Denver, Oakland, Los Angeles, Tokyo and Osaka, among many other destinations.

One of the differentiating characteristics of the festival is that the program is divided in two parts: *Sónar by Day* and *Sónar by Night*. Additionally, instead of the trade fair format in which the networking was organized for the first ten editions of the festival, in 2013 the organization choose to expand it and include conferences, talks, art installations and film screenings all of which makes a special part of the festival called *Sónar +D*.

Over the years, *Sónar* positioned itself not only as a highly visited festival with a quality program of electronic music, but also as a platform for promotion of innovations and the digital tools, especially used in arts. This was recognized by the city of Barcelona, the region of Catalonia and the Spanish state. Therefore, the festival's key partners include Government of Catalonia – The Department of Culture, AC/E (Acción Cultural Española) which is a part of Spanish Ministry of Culture and Barcelona Municipality. It is interesting to mention, considering that it is not a common practice among festivals in Spain, that the festival is partially being funded by the tourist tax for Barcelona, which has the value of 3.5 euros a day.<sup>20</sup> Being that the program of the festival highly supports art and innovation, the museum of modern and contemporary art *Fundació Antoni Tàpies* is also among the partners of the festivals through organizing exhibitions as a part of the festival program.

**PRIMAVERA SOUND.** Another important large-scale festival that happens in Barcelona, every year in the first days of June, *Primavera Sound* is considered as one of the biggest and most prestigious festivals in Europe.<sup>21</sup>

Showcasing renewed artists in pop, rock, indie and underground music, this festival is also known for giving space to the upcoming musicians. The first edition happened in 2001 and since 2005 it is held in *Parc del Fòrum*, a public park on the seafront. On its first edition the festival had 8.000 visitors only to reach an amazing half of million in

2022. Some of the names that have performed here are Kendrick Lamar, Neil Young, Sonic Youth, Portishead, Pet Shop Boys, Pavement, Echo & The Bunnymen, Lou Reed to name a few. For the next edition in 2023 the festival is expanding to Spain's capital, for which Depeche Mode already confirmed their appearance. Madrid is not the only location where the festival expanded. It has its editions in other cities beyond borders of Spain, like Porto in Portugal (being the first city where they expanded), followed by Los Angeles, Santiago de Chile, Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo, all confirmed in 2022.

The festival is a private initiative, the founder and organizer being Gabi Ruiz. His organization with the same name *Fundació Primavera Sound* is behind the festival. He stated that the mission of the festival is not to use the resources of the city where its being held, but to bring something back to the city in the terms of cultural and other values, such as equality, gender equality and sustainability.<sup>22</sup>

*Primavera Sound* over the years received the support of Municipality of Barcelona and Sant Adrià de Besòs, Center for Contemporary Art of Barcelona. As one of the most important and recently earned (in 2022) supports, is the title of an *Event of Exceptional Public Interest* rewarded by the Ministry of Culture and Sports of Spain, starting from 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2022, the year of the festival's 20<sup>th</sup> edition, until 31<sup>st</sup> of December 2024.<sup>23</sup>

**BILBAO BBK FESTIVAL.** In the biggest city of Basque region, on the slopes of Mount Cobetas, *Bilbao BBK Festival* is a festival of pop and rock music reaching up to 115,000 visitors in 2022.<sup>24</sup> The festival is held in summer, beginning of June and lasts for 3 days.

Unlike the previous popular music festivals we analyzed, the history of its foundation is quite unique. Namely, after building a street-circuit for *Formula Renault 3.5* competition and using it only once in 2005, the city of Bilbao wanted to use this space to build summer events in the city. The municipality approached the private event making company *Last Tour International*, which was already organizing other festivals. With a generous budget of 4,200,000 euros, the first edition of *Bilbao BBK Festival*, starring Guns N' Roses y Placebo, was born.

The mission of the festivals is to provide quality entertainment hosting star artist in pop and rock music, but also attract foreign visitors

and tourists to the city of Bilbao and the beautiful mountain site where the festival is held.

Apart from having the support of the local public bodies, like Municipality of Bilbao and Regional Basque Government and its tourism department, the festival also enjoys the support of the *National Institute of Performing Arts and Music* (INAEM), which is the organism of the Ministry of Culture and Sports that is in charge of articulating and developing programs related to theater, dance, music and the circus.

## Traditional and religious music festival

**FESTIVAL DEL CANTE DE LAS MINAS.** To start our analysis of traditional and religious music festivals, we begin with the flamenco festival happening in the region of Murica, in the town of La Unión. It is held at the end of July and beginning of August every year since 1961 and it is considered as one of the most prestigious and respected flamenco festivals in Spain and the world.

When the festival was founded, it started as a festival of *cante flamenco* (singing), but later in the 80's and the 90's it incorporated both *el toque* (playing an instrument, usually a guitar) and *baile* (dancing), which are the three artistic forms of expression of flamenco music. In 2009 a new festival category was implemented under the name of *other instruments*.

Gaining more and more popularity over the years in 2010 the Spanish state declared the festival as Intangible Culture Asset of Interest (Bien de Interés Cultural de carácter inmaterial). Following later that year, flamenco as a music genre was declared as UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage, which contributed to an international popularity of the festival. *Festival del Cante de Las Minas* also enjoys the label of the Festival of International Touristic Interest (Fiesta de Interés Turístico Nacional). Furthermore, the Spanish Academy of Music awarded the festival with the Prize for the Dissemination of Music in 2011. Back in 1961 the first edition was organized by the mayor of the time of the Municipality of La Unión, Esteban Bernal, who is considered the founder of the festival. He created *Festival del Cante de Las Minas* in honor of

flamenco and especially *cante de las minas*, which means “the songs of the mines”. These songs were sung by the miners that worked in the area and were later carried through generations in order to be preserved, which is the festival’s mission too.

On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of July 2010, the *Fundación del Cante de Las Minas* (Cante de las Minas Foundation) was created and it is the body that organizes the festival every year. Besides the management and organization of both the festival as well as the Cante de las Minas Museum since 2010, the foundation also created the International Chair of Flamencology that integrates the two annual University Flamenco Congresses. By their initiative, the School of Flamenco Art, the Gastronomic Day of the Cante de las Minas and the Meeting of Haute Cuisine by the Cantes de Levante were also created. The festival is funded by both governmental and private partners. Among the public institutions that support the festival, the key partners are the Region of Murcia, Municipality of La Unión, the regional Institute for Culture Industry and Arts, and the National Institute for Performing Arts and Music (Spanish Ministry of Culture).

### **Semana de Música Religiosa de Cuenca**

Held annually in the period of the Holy Week, *Semana de Música Religiosa de Cuenca* is a week of religious music happening in Cuenca, the region of Castilla-La Mancha. Founded in 1962, it is considered the fourth oldest festival in Spain and because its uniqueness and peculiarity it has been declared the Festival of International Touristic Interest (Fiesta de Interés Turístico Nacional) since 1979.<sup>25</sup>

The first edition was an initiative of a civil governor and a mayor of Cuenca at the time. The concerts were held in a renovated San Miguel church and consisted of a whole week of sacred music. Since its founding, the mission and vision of the festival has not changed, it was only modernized. As stated on the festival’s website, *Semana de Música Religiosa de Cuenca* turns Cuenca into an international cultural epicenter every year with a defined proposal of liturgical, sacred, mystical, spiritual and transcendental music. The most outstanding figures of classical and ancient music have paraded through the Cuenca stage, and it is also a spring for new musical creation.<sup>26</sup>

In regards to the historical and cultural importance of such event, a large number of political and state actors supported the festival. The most relevant indicator of this support is probably the declaration of the Honorable President of the festival, Her Majesty the Queen of Spain. Furthermore, for the President was named the President of the Board of Communities of the Region of Castilla-La Mancha and for the Vice President the Counselor of Education, Culture and Sports of the same board of communities.

Among the key partners of the festival are the Government of Spain, Ministry of Culture and Sports, National Institute for Performing Arts and Music (INAEM), the Municipality of Cuenca, the Region of Castilla-La Mancha and the Province of Cuenca.

Regarding the religious bodies we can see their support through associations that are important for the organization and realization of the festivals. This includes the Diocese of Cuenca and Association of Brotherhoods of the Holy Week, Cuenca.

### **Fiestas de San Isidro**

The biggest fiesta of the Spain's capital happens every year on 15<sup>th</sup> of May. San Isidro is the protector saint of the city and is also referred to as *Laborador* (the working man) and considered the protector of farmers and working people. This tradition dates back to 1619 when it was first documented and it was a motive of inspiration to a large number of Spanish artists, including the famous painter Francisco Goya who created the painting *La padera de San Isidro*.

La Pradera de San Isidro is actually the city park of Madrid that is still used for the celebration of this holiday. No matter the long tradition, this fiesta was declared an Asset of Cultural Interest (Bien de Interés Cultural) only last year, in 2021. Instead of a one-day celebration, the festival is held for three days, from the 13<sup>th</sup> until 15<sup>th</sup> of May, with numerous activities for both children and adults like concerts of pop and folk music and dances, DJ sessions, theater performances, blessing of Holy water on the San Isidro tap and others. The main event being the procession of the image of San Isidro and Santa María de la Cabeza. In charge for the organization of this big event is the Municipality of Madrid and their General Directorate for Programs and Cultural Activities.



## **Feria de Abril de Sevilla**

“Light, colors and a lot of joy” is how *Feria de Abril de Sevilla* (also known as *Feria de Sevilla*) is described<sup>27</sup> on the web portal of Department of Tourism of Sevilla. This festival of music, dance and gastronomy in Andalucía was founded in 1847 with the Royal Decree of Her Majesty Queen Isabel II.<sup>28</sup> The celebration is held in April, it lasts for a week and it is usually one or two weeks after the celebration of Catholic Easter.

It started as a livestock market, but as described in the documents of Municipality of Sevilla of that time, the merchants complained that they cannot do their business properly due to *sevillanos* and *sevillanas* (the people of Sevilla) who were disturbing them and impeding with their songs and dances.<sup>29</sup> And so, the *Feria de Sevilla* as we know it today, a celebration of life, the town of Sevilla, and its people, was born.

Since its founding and up to this day the organizer of the festival is the Municipality of Sevilla and has the title of Festival of International Touristic Interest (Fiesta de Interés Turístico Nacional) in 1980.<sup>30</sup> The ministries of culture, consumption and labor are partners of the festival and it is also supported by the Council of Brotherhoods of Seville (Consejo de Cofradías de Sevilla).

## **Carnaval Santa Cruz de Tenerife**

Referred to as “European version of Rio de Janeiro Carnival”, *Carnival Santa Cruz de Tenerife* happens every February on the Spanish Canary Islands, more precisely in one of its capitals Santa Cruz de Tenerife. It is the second most important festival in the world, the first being the one in Rio de Janeiro, which is Santa Cruz de Tenerife’s sister town. It has been declared Festival of International Touristic Interest (Fiesta de Interés Turístico Nacional) in 1980. It happens annually in the week that precedes the beginning of the Easter fasting period.

An estimated 250,000 people visited its streets in 1987 breaking the Guinness record dancing to the music of Celia Cruz. Since then, the number of attendees has not stopped increasing, and in 2019 the initial number practically doubled: 400,000 people gathered on *Sábado de Piñata* (Piñata Saturday), the most important day of the carnival.



The Municipality of Santa Cruz de Tenerife is the main organizer of the carnival. In 2022 a contract between the municipality and the Spanish National Television (RTVE) and the local Canary Islands television RTVC has been signed about broadcasting the future editions of the carnival.

## **The role of music festivals in cultural diplomacy**

The definition of the concept of cultural diplomacy by M. C. Cummings' is explained as "the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their people in order to foster mutual understanding".<sup>31</sup> This type of exchanges are an integral part of music festivals. The interchange happens on various levels of one festival. Firstly, through gathering, meeting and international mixing of artists (performers). It is a space where people of common interest (in this case music) come to share their art, ideas, knowledge and information. On the other hand, this concept also applies for the audience on the festivals, creating a third aspect which is the performer-artist relation. Facilitating the open dialogue, music festivals are at the same time a platform for meeting and exposure. Used within diplomatic programs they offer each culture an environment to make contacts easier, to start or to permit constructive dialogue (De Greef, 2017).<sup>32</sup>

As defined in the *White paper on intercultural dialogue* by the Council of Europe, intercultural dialogue is "a process that comprises an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds and heritage, on the basis of mutual understanding and respect."<sup>33</sup> Again, this exchange of views happens on music festivals when people gather around a shared passion, which is in this case music, and therefore form a type of community.

According to the IFEA brochure<sup>34</sup>, festivals and events are among the most successful and important tools available to communities, cities, states, regions and countries and they enable the increase of tourism, job opportunities and enhance the quality of life in places where they are staged. (Jovićević, 2017; Dragićević-Šešić et al. 2017)<sup>35</sup>

Music festivals bring various benefits for the country. One of them is boosting the economy, on a local but also the state level. On a local level, it can economically benefit the city or province where the festival is being held, as well as contribute to the country's GDP budget. By attracting more visitors to the country, the sector of tourism expands and profits. Having more tourist that will bring positive image to their homeland about Spain is certainly contributing to better promotion of Spain and the county's international image.

The state has various gains in supporting music festivals, some of them, as we mentioned earlier, are helping the economy and tourism. Therefore, various public bodies and institutions provide financial support for organizing such events. That support can come in different ways, either directly for the festival's budget or support for the artist exchange (such as paying the accommodation and/or travel for the performers). Support can also come in a form of providing venues for the festivals. Municipalities can provide public spaces or city/state owned venues rent-free. Marketing and advertising by the public bodies can also be provided, or helping in logistics or communication with foreign state bodies, if needed.

## Conclusion

As we have seen, the rich musical heritage that Spain has is a valuable resource for cultural diplomacy. The mixture of cultures that happened over centuries is a good starting point to promote interculturalism, openness of the country and tolerance.

Music festivals have a lot of advantages when it comes to gathering people, building a community and promoting culture(s). People gather to enjoy, share similar interest in a specific kind of music or to get to know other cultures, as with the case of traditional and religious music festivals. This environment is suitable for dialogues, developing tolerance, learning about new form of arts or cultures that we know little about.

We followed the definition of M. C. Cummings on cultural diplomacy and after the data analysis we have concluded that music festivals that we selected incorporate the element of cultural diplomacy such as

fostering mutual understanding, exchange of art, information and ideas. When it comes to intercultural dialogue, following the outlines of the *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue* composed by Council of Europe, we see that festivals provide safe space for open and respectful exchange of views of people with different cultural, ethnic, religious or linguistic background. The friendly environment on music festivals not only does it give space but also facilitates the intercultural dialogue.

Referring to the notions of soft power as observed by J. S. Nye<sup>36</sup> we have seen that selected music festivals in Spain have a big scope of visibility and influence, as well as various means to attract visitors and tourists, that is, the foreign public. The government recognizes this potential and therefore by supporting these festivals and investing in them, it allows expanding the scope of the influence and reach. In the case of religious music festivals, the church also plays an important role, because with their support believers from other countries can come and share their art in a country and culture which is not of their origin.

Spanish government has recognized this potential and has built a network of public institutions and organizations to support music festivals. This support can come in various forms, financial where the festivals get direct financial support, logistic in a form of venues that local authorities provide them rent-free, and marketing so the festivals can be advertised on governmental websites and touristic platforms and offices.

What festivals bring back to the country are economic benefits in a form of increasing the states GDP, by revenue and/or by attracting tourists. A big contribution goes to the accommodation providers as well, like hotels, hostels and apartment owners which will later pay the taxes to the state and the guest that stay in their facilities will pay the tourist tax. This we saw in the example of *Sónar* festival in Barcelona, which is partially being funded by the tourist tax.

We conclude that music festivals in Spain do play an important role in the cultural diplomacy strategy of the country. They are a valuable instrument for the implementation of cultural and public strategies and reaching foreign policy goals. By explaining and describing the role of the music festivals we were able to better understand Spanish cultural diplomacy and the position of music festivals and their contribution to the sector.

The aim of this paper was not only to be of explanative character, but also to serve as an example for other countries that wish to use music festivals as an efficient tool for implementing cultural diplomacy goals. This can also be a good example for the Serbian government to use, raising awareness about importance of music festivals and how much benefits and promotion they can bring to the country.

## Notes

- 1 A style of dancing, characteristic of the Andalusian Roma, that is strongly rhythmic and involves vigorous actions, as clapping the hands and stamping the feet; style of instrumental or vocal music originating in southern Spain and typically of an intensely rhythmic, improvisatory character, performed by itself or as an accompaniment to flamenco dancing. <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/flamenco>, accessed on June 16<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 2 <https://www.exteriores.gob.es/en/PoliticaExterior/Paginas/DiplomaciaCultural-Cientifica.aspx>, accessed on June 19<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 3 Pythagoras (c. 570 – c. 495 BC), Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (1835), Victor Hugo (1917)
- 4 Primavera Sound Festival, Barcelona, 2022 edition
- 5 Aina Fontova Benet (2020), Economic analysis of music festivals in Spain, they came to stay; Faculty of economic and business, University of Barcelona, Spain
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 <https://www.festicket.com/magazine/news/spain-top-destination-festival-tourism-says-new-festicket-report/> accessed on June 27<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 8 Reiss, A. (1993). *Arts ties to tourism offer new support opportunities*, Fundraising Management
- 9 <https://www.statista.com/statistics/747847/music-festivals-in-spain/>, <https://www.billboard.com/pro/spain-music-festivals-live-music-report/> accessed on June 4<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 10 <https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/flamenco-00363> accessed June 16<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 11 <https://www.arenasound.com/> accessed on July 5<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 12 [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent\\_music](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independent_music) accessed on July 5<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 13 [https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arenal\\_Sound\\_Festival](https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arenal_Sound_Festival) accessed on July 5<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 14 <https://es.statista.com/estadisticas/1034245/numero-anual-de-asistentes-al-arenal-sound-espana/> accessed July 5<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 15 <https://www.elmundo.es/cultura/2019/07/26/5d39f923fdddff9f0e8b46e8.html> accessed on July 5<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 16 [https://elpais.com/cultura/2019/07/29/miss\\_festivales/1564409633\\_769928.html](https://elpais.com/cultura/2019/07/29/miss_festivales/1564409633_769928.html) accessed July 6<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 17 Ibid.

- 18 <https://www.catalannews.com/culture/item/sonar-festival-attracts-record-126000-visitors> accessed July 12<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 19 <https://elpais.com/espana/catalunya/2022-06-18/el-publico-local-se-impone-por-primera-vez-en-el-sonar-con-un-70.html> accessed on July 12<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 20 <https://www.statista.com/statistics/773883/tourist-accommodation-tax-in-barcelona-spain/> accessed July 18<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 21 <https://theculturetrip.com/europe/spain/articles/10-things-to-know-about-primavera-sound-festival-barcelona/>; <https://mag.soundclub.com/all-about-primavera-sound-barcelona-festival/>; <https://www.festicket.com/magazine/discover/top-20-music-festivals-Europe/> accessed on July 26<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 22 <https://www.lanacion.com.ar/espectaculos/musica/gabi-ruiz-el-creador-de-primavera-sound-sonic-youth-me-cambio-la-vida-nid28042022/> accessed on July 16<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 23 <https://www.eldebate.com/cultura/musica/20211229/festival-primavera-sound-nombrado-acontecimiento-excepcional-interes-publico.html> accessed on July 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2022
- 24 <https://www.europapress.es/euskadi/noticia-ultima-edicion-bilbao-bbk-live-genera-impacto-economico-mas-25-millones-euros-villa-20220714115945.html> accessed on July 25<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 25 <https://www.smrucuenca.com/historia/> accessed on July 29<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 <https://www.visitasevilla.es/historia/la-feria-de-abril> August 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2022
- 28 <http://www.sevilla.org/documentos/feria/guia-de-la-feria-de-abril-de-2016-pag-doble.pdf> accessed August 6<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 [https://web.archive.org/web/20111206205246/http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/bases\\_datos/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1980-3772](https://web.archive.org/web/20111206205246/http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/bases_datos/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1980-3772) accessed on August 6<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 31 Cummings M. C. (2003), *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey*. Center for Arts and Culture, s. 6, in Schneider C.P. (2004), *Culture Communicates: US Diplomacy that Works*, Clingendael – the Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- 32 Greef H. “Arts Festivals are our voices in society. Opening Speech @ BITEF Belgrade Conference” in Dragičević-Šešić et al. (eds); (2017), *Cultural Diplomacy: Arts, Festivals and Geopolitics*, Belgrade: Desk Creative Europe and Ministry of Culture, p. 124
- 33 [https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/source/white%20paper\\_final\\_revised\\_en.pdf](https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/source/white%20paper_final_revised_en.pdf) accessed August 5<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 34 <https://files.ifea.com/pdf/IFEAMembershipBrochure.pdf> accessed August 6<sup>th</sup>, 2022
- 35 Jovićević A., “Festivals as Social Dramas and Metaphors: Between Popular and Subversive”, in Dragičević-Šešić et al. (eds); (2017), *Cultural Diplomacy: Arts, Festivals and Geopolitics*, Belgrade: Desk Creative Europe and Ministry of Culture, pp. 133-144

- 36 Nye J. S, Jr. (2004), *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: Public Affairs

## Bibliography

- Caterina Carta, Richard Higgott, (2020), *Cultural Diplomacy in Europe: Between the Domestic and the International*, Springer International Publishing; Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, Switzerland
- Costa, Xavier (2002), *Festive Traditions in Modernity: The Public Sphere of the Festival of the 'Fallas' in Valencia (Spain)*, Routledge: The Sociological Review
- Cummings M. C. (2003), *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey*. Center for Arts and Culture, in Schneider C.P. (2004), *Culture Communicates: US Diplomacy that Works*, Clingendael: the Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Dragičević-Šešić, M., Rogač-Mijatović, Lj. and Mihaljinac, N., (eds); (2017), *Cultural Diplomacy: Arts, Festivals and Geopolitics*, Belgrade: Desk Creative Europe and Ministry of Culture
- Greef H. (2017) "Arts Festivals are our voices in society. Opening Speech @ BITEF Belgrade Conference" in Dragičević-Šešić et al. (eds); *Cultural Diplomacy: Arts, Festivals and Geopolitics*, Belgrade: Desk Creative Europe and Ministry of Culture, pp. 123-124
- Irena Kozymka, (2014) *The Diplomacy of Culture: The Role of UNESCO in Sustaining Cultural Diversity*, Palgrave Macmillan US
- Jovićević A., (2017) "Festivals as Social Dramas and Metaphors: Between Popular and Subversive", in Dragičević-Šešić et al. (eds); *Cultural Diplomacy: Arts, Festivals and Geopolitics*, Belgrade: Desk Creative Europe and Ministry of Culture, pp. 133-144
- Nye J. S, Jr. (2004), *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: Public Affairs

## Online sources

- White Paper on Cultural Diplomacy, Council of Europe, 2008  
[https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/source/white%20paper\\_final\\_revised\\_en.pdf](https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/source/white%20paper_final_revised_en.pdf)
- The Spanish Constitution (1978): <https://www.boe.es/legislacion/documentos/ConstitucionINGLES.pdf>
- Strategy for External Action, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Kingdom of Spain: <http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/SalaDePrensa/Multimedia/Publicaciones/Documents/ESTRATEGIA%20DE%20ACCION%20EXTERIOR%20ingles.pdf>

# III

## **Serbia and Yugoslavia / Srbija i Jugoslavija**

*section editors/ urednice poglavlja:*

LJILJANA ROGAČ MIJATOVIĆ, MILENA DRAGIĆEVIĆ ŠEŠIĆ





# O DELOTVORNOSTI KULTURNE DIPLOMATIJE

DARKO TANASKOVIĆ

Pojam kulturne diplomatije nije nov. Kulturna diplomatija suštinski postoji od kad je sveta i veka, odnosno, od kad različite ljudske zajednice dolaze u međusobni dodir koji nije samo puka borba za preživljavanje i prevlast. Ali, našim modernim i postmodernim vremenima svojstvena je potreba da se definišu, opišu i racionalizuju i, naročito, teorijski, pa često i pseudoteorijski, osmisle pojave koje su ranije bile podrazumevajuće i samorazumljive, sa kojima se živelo i u skladu sa njima ponašalo, ali bez osećanja potrebe da se podvrgavaju formalizovanoj akciji racionalnog uma, odnosno naučnom izučavanju, imenovanju i sistematizovanom klasifikovanju. O kulturnoj diplomatiji se sve više govori i piše u kontekstu afirmisanja „novih pojmova“, kao što su javna diplomatija, sportska diplomatija, čak i pingpong diplomatija, naučna diplomatija, vakcinalna diplomatija, verska diplomatija, zatim tvrda moć, meka moć, pametna moć, hibridni rat, proksi rat, itd. To su sve pojmovi i termini kojima nas u novije vreme zasipaju, od kojih neki zaista ukazuju na izmenjene procese i realnosti u svetu, dočim neki zapravo i ne donose suštinski nešto novo. Međutim, bilo bi dobro kada bi ovaj pokušaj racionalizacije nečega što nam je pred očima i čime se bavimo doprineo kvalitetu toga posla, a ne da se ostane pri zabludi da smo novim imenovanjem pojmova, „ontologizacijom naziva“, izmenili stvarnost i potvrdili svoje ovladavanje njome, što je često slučaj. I zamka.

Što se nas tiče, mislim da je tužna i štetna činjenica opšte percepcije Srbije u međunarodnoj zajednici, koja je od devedesetih godina bila negativna, kao plod tendencioznog nastojanja da se prikažemo u svetlu

koje sigurno nije bilo realno, kao neka vrsta kolateralne dobiti, doprinela tome da se kod nas bolje shvati značaj kulturne politike, pa i kulturne diplomatije, i da se o tome počne intenzivno razmišljati i, mogu reći, čak i veoma kvalitetno pisati. Praksa međutim, pogotovo u institucionalnom i organizovanom vidu, još pomalo kaska za onim do čega smo već došli na saznajnom ili teorijskom planu, pa je sigurno važno da se te dve ravni sjedine ili bar približe. Smatram da su kulturni dodiri, kulturni doticaji i razmena kulturnih dobara među ljudima i narodima odista onaj pravi vid uspostavljanja kontakta koji je najstabilniji, najtrajniji i najmanje podložan hirovima politike i nekih neposrednih efemernih interesa. Baš zato je kulturna saradnja obično i u senci takvih interesa, jer se u politici poglavito računa na neke kratkotrajne, efemerne dobitke, a kulturna uzajamnost, bolje upoznavanje, predstavljanje sebe drugima i razumevanje drugih, sve to daje rezultate na dugu stazu i donosi velike ljudske satisfakcije i obogaćenja, ali kratkoročno, pogotovo na nekom, uslovno rečeno, pragmatičnom planu, a pogotovo u kratkom roku, ne donosi dovoljno da bi se sa dostatnom organizacionom i institucionalnom pažnjom prišlo domenu kulturne saradnje i, pre svega, finansijski i materijalno u nju adekvatno ulagalo.

Pri razmatranju problematike kulturne diplomatije podrazumevam i kulturnu politiku, jer ona je operativna delatnost kroz koju se realizuje određena kulturna politika. Kulturna diplomatija će zavisiti od kulturne politike jedne države, kako one na unutrašnjem tako i na spoljnom planu, a to pre svega znači od valorizovanja kulture kao takve u najširem smislu. Postoje, inače, formalni, institucionalni akteri koji se bave kulturnom diplomacijom i oni neformalni, neinstitucionalni akteri kulturne diplomatije, a to smo zapravo svi mi građani. Svi, naime, kad dolazimo u kontakt sa nekim sa strane, bilo da radimo u diplomatskoj službi, da se bavimo naučnim radom, da smo umetnici, novinari, turisti, akteri smo kulturne diplomatije u onoj meri u kojoj predstavljamo karakteristike svoga pogleda na svet, svojih kulturnih vrednosti i svog identiteta drugima. To je naravno veoma široko određenje kulturne diplomatije, ali i životno u stalnom potvrđivanju.

Kad se govori o delotvornosti kulturne diplomatije i o tome da li je ona stvarno delotvorna – veoma je važno objasniti onima koji su zaduženi za spoljnu politiku države da je delovanje u oblasti kulture izuzetno značajna spoljnopolitička aktivnost i da su njeni rezultati

stvarni i trajniji od rezultata klasične diplomatije ili klasične spoljne politike. U tom smislu navešću primere triju država čije je delovanje u oblasti kulturne diplomatije, usuđujem se reći, dalo čak i veće rezultate nego njihovo spoljnopolitičko nastupanje standardnim diplomatskim sredstvima i kanalima. Ima više takvih država, a odabrao sam za ovu priliku tri, za koje mislim da su svaka na svoj način karakteristični primeri, a jedna od njih, Kina, zahvaljujući radu kolege Dragana Trailovića, obrađena je u tematskom bloku časopisa *Kultura*, pod naslovom „Kulturna politika Narodne Republike Kine na Zapadnom Balkanu. Srbija u uporednoj perspektivi”. Odabrao sam, dakle, Kinu, Iran i Tursku i reći ću o svakom od tih triju slučajeva ponešto, zbog nemogućnosti da temu ovde predstavim celovito. Za ove tri države, koje su nejednake po mnogo čemu – po civilizacijskoj pripadnosti, po veličini i po međunarodnom položaju – karakteristično je da su sa stanovišta jednog, u biti evropocentričnog/kulturocentričnog pogleda na svet koji nastoji da se globalizuje (kroz globalizaciju koja ne počiva na istinski univerzalnim vrednostima već na nametanju jednog određenog modela društvene organizacije i pogleda na svet), smatrane niže vrednima, odnosno da ne pripadaju nečemu što je savremenom smislu civilizacijski produktivno. Sa druge strane, i u političkom smislu, Kina, Iran i Turska su države koje su se nalazile u stanju sukoba, povremeno i izolovane, u odnosu na dominantne tokove u svetskoj politici, koje je najviše diktirao Zapad. „Međunarodna zajednica”, koja se tako zove po svojim najuticajnijim činionicima, ali ne i po statističkim pokazateljima, geografskom prostranstvu i broju stanovnika, uvek je prema navedenim državama vodila politiku manje ili više otvorenog ili prikrivenog ostrakizma. Upravo iz tog razloga su ove tri države, sistematski i godinama, posvećivale znatnu brigu organizovanoj i veoma dobro osmišljenoj politici kulturnog delovanja, što nazivamo kulturnom diplomatijom.

Kina je mrežom svojih kulturnih centara, objedinjavanjem i centralizovanjem delovanja na kulturnom planu kroz jednu veoma značajnu Upravu, koja je među najznačajnijim delovima kineskog državnog aparata i na čijem čelu se uvek nalazi jedan veoma značajan i uticajan član Komunističke partije Kine, organizovala svoj nastup u inostranstvu. Mi smo u Srbiji bili svedoci toga, na najvidljiviji, a istovremeno i najefektivniji način. Naime, Kina je, ne samo u oblasti kulture, pre dvadesetak i više godina, ciljno odabrala upravo Srbiju kao državu koja će joj biti

odskočna daska u ovom delu Evrope. Procenili su koji je geopolitički i geostrategijski značaj našeg prostora i kakvi su potencijali Srbije u tom pogledu, te odabrali Srbiju da bude najznačajniji centar njihovog kulturnog delovanja u jugoistočnoj Evropi i na Balkanu. Pored kulturnog centra „Konfučije“ u Beogradu, postoji takav centar i u Bugarskoj. Vodila se, jedno vreme, izvesna borba za uticaj i prestiž između ovih dvaju centara, da bi kasnije Kinezi beogradski proglasili referentnim regionalnim kulturnim centrom. Ovakvi centri postoje sada u svim državama u okruženju. Kina je, kao jedna on najvećih i najznačajnijih država u svetu, koja je poslednjih decenija u svakom pogledu silno napredovala, pre svega ekonomski, a zatim i vojno, uspela da na kulturnom planu u potpunosti osužeti sve pokušaje da se njena civilizacija, koja ima najduži neprekinuti kontinuitet na planeti Zemlji, proglasi retrogradnom i da bude potisnuta kulturnim modelima nametanim sa Zapada. Zanimljivo je, i poučno, da i u Kini postoji veliko interesovanje za kulturne obrasce i vrednosti koji dolaze sa Zapada, pre svega iz Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, ali da su, sa druge strane, očuvani tradicionalni kulturni modeli koji su predstavljeni svuda u svetu, ne samo kao ravnopravni već po mnogo čemu i superiorni u odnosu na kulturnu produkciju i ponudu u drugim delovima sveta. Ovakva uravnoteženost je velikim delom zasluga postojanja mreže kulturnih centara čija se delatnost u glavnim, strategijskim linijama, centralizovano planira, kojima se centralizovano rukovodi, ali za koje se veoma prilagođeno lokalnom „horizontu očekivanja“, diferencirano i selektivno utvrđuju programi u pojedinim zemljama. Ono što se, kao osnovna poruka i vrednost, prenosi inostranstvu pomno se usklađuje sa horizontom percepcije u datoj zemlji i osobenostima date ciljne grupe. Na ovome se radi veoma promišljeno i studiozno, te se, na primer, kineska opera ne predstavlja na isti način u Beogradu i u Turskoj ili u nekoj drugoj zemlji. Takvim delovanjem, a pre svega dugoročnim planiranjem, izdašnim finansiranjem i jasnom strategijskom idejom o tome šta treba da se uradi u kulturnoj politici, Kina je postigla bar isto onoliko (što možda nije tako vidljivo) koliko i u sferi ekonomije, razvoja vojne moći, tehnologije i drugim oblastima. A Kina, najblaže rečeno, bez obzira na to koliko je velika, moćna i mnogoljudna, nije bila država koja je, sa stanovišta unutrašnje situacije i spolnog pogleda na sebe, delovala u povoljnim okolnostima.

Druga država je Iran. Ne treba posebno objašnjavati u kojoj meri

je Iran, pogotovo od 1979. godine i kulturne, odnosno Islamske revolucije ajatolaha Homeinija, bio država koja je sistematski predstavljana kao „parija” međunarodnog poretka, odnosno država koja se nalazi van sistema vrednosti svojstvenog modernom dobu. Homeinijeva revolucija je predstavljala šok i za muslimanski i za nemuslimanski svet, koji se od njega dugo nije oporavio. Ova revolucija je označila početak ozbiljnog razmišljanja o islamu kao političkom i kulturnom činiocu u međunarodnim odnosima, o tome da je moguće na osnovu zasada religije, odnosno religijske ideologije, izvesti revoluciju protiv režima jedne od najsnažnijih država toga vremena, koja je pod šahom Rezom Pahlavijem bila prilično sekularizovana, i stvoriti republiku koja i dalje opstaje na specifično razrađenim islamskim doktrinarnim temeljima.

Od kad se pojavio fenomen radikalnog islamskog fundamentalizma, verovalo se da je u fazi destrukcije postojećeg poretka i institucija islamizam jak, ali da će se u fazi konstrukcije srušiti, jer ne zadovoljava potrebe čoveka modernog doba. Međutim, desilo se sasvim suprotno i od tada Iran postaje svima zanimljiv, ali i sumnjiv, pa je odavno podvrgnut sankcijama, a na kontakte sa Teheranom ne gleda se sa simpatijama. Sa jedne strane, dakle, na globalnom planu Islamska Republika je bila prokažena i ostrakizovana država, dok je sa druge, na planu odnosa sa Balkanom, konkretno bivšom Jugoslavijom, a onda Srbijom kao njenim nastavljачem, Homeinijev Iran bio, uslovno rečeno, negativno percipirana država, jer je u vreme rata u Bosni i Hercegovini potpuno otvoreno i bez ikakvog zazora podržavao muslimane, pošto u iranskom Ustavu stoji obaveza da se moraju podržavati svi ugroženi muslimani u svetu. Kako je propagandno predstavljano da su muslimani u Bosni i Hercegovini ugroženi od hrišćana, Iran je na sve načine bio prisutan na terenu, uključujući vojnu pomoć, obaveštajni rad i logističku podršku. To svakako iz perspektive Beograda devedesetih godina nije bio preduslov za razvijanje kulturne saradnje sa Iranom, tim pre što je sam faktor sprovođenja islamske revolucije već ranije tu državu učinio *a priori* sumnjivom i problematičnom.

I upravo u takvo vreme i u takvim izrazito nepovoljnim okolnostima vlada u Teheranu povukla je iznenađujući potez i predložila osnivanje Kulturnog centra Irana u našem glavnom gradu. Naše vlasti su, mora se priznati, dalekovido reagovala i prihvatile iransku inicijativu. Kako sam u to vreme bio upravnik Katedre za orijentalistiku

na Filološkom fakultetu, gde je naš uvaženi iranista profesor Fahim Bajraktarević davne 1926. godine, tada u okviru Filozofskog fakulteta, počeo da predaje Istoriju persijske književnosti, palo mi je u deo da se sa iranskim kolegom zaduženim za osnivanje Centra, formalno atašedom za kulturu Ambasade Islamske Republike Iran, angažujem na poslovima u vezi sa osnivanjem Kulturnog centra. Iranski izaslanik Abas Arjazand ostao mi je u živom sećanju. Uživao je znatan ugled u svojoj zemlji, i kao literata i pesnik, ali i iskusni obaveštajac. Prilikom prvog susreta otvoreno sam mu rekao da obojica dobro znamo kakva on sve zaduženja ima i kakvim se aktivnostima bavi na planu operacionalizovanja iranske podrške bosanskohercegovačkim muslimanima, ali da se time svakako bave nadležni resori i službe naše vlade, dok nas u saradnji treba da zanima samo njegova kulturna misija, jer su ratni sukobi privremeno stanje, a kultura neprolazna vrednost. Saglasio se, rekavši, slično Čerčilu tokom Drugog svetskog rata, da bi propast kulture i trajno gašenje kulturnih veza među narodima i državama obesmislili i ciljeve radi čijeg se ostvarivanja povremeno, nažalost, vode ratovi, kao i da je za iransku naciju celokupno kulturno nasleđe preislamskog i islamskog Irana najčvršći temelj kolektivnog identiteta. Naša saradnja se pokazala veoma uspešnom, iako je moj kolega u međuvremenu ispevao strasnu pesmu o ratnom „mučeništvu” Sarajeva.

Kulturni centar koji deluje u sklopu ambasade Irana u Beogradu do danas je učinio mnogo više od iranske ambasade, kao takve, u zbližavanju Irana i Srbije i stvaranju povoljne slike o Iranu i iranskoj kulturi među Srbima. U Beogradu se retko nalaze oni koji imaju izraženi negativan odnos prema Iranu i Irancima, a pogotovu se to može reći za pojedince koji su na neki način došli u dodir sa Kulturnim centrom. Centar je, recimo, shvatio značaj organizovanja nastave jezika, te je u njemu počela sa radom mala škola persijskog jezika, koju su, pored mnogih znatiželjnika, kao vid dodatne nastave, pohađali i studenti sa Filološkog fakulteta. Razvijan je čitav niz aktivnosti, izložbi, predavanja, izdavanje časopisa, radionice kaligrafije itd. Drugim rečima, Kulturni centar, osnovan u ratno vreme, postao je najbitniji faktor delovanja Islamske Republike Iran u Srbiji. Suprotno optužbama upućivanih iranskom režimu da je netolerantan, isključiv i nesavremen, Iranci su uspeli da uspostave zadivljujuću sintezu kulturnog identiteta, povezujući vrednosti preislamske iranske kulture, koja je bila dugotrajna, velika i bogata,

sa islamskim periodom. Kao što je u Španiji period mavarske Andaluzije, posle velikih polemika arabista i nacionalista, takođe uključen kao integralni deo španskog kulturnog nasleđa, te se svuda pri učenju istorije španskog jezika i kulture nailazi i na andaluzijsku komponentu, tako su i Iranci uspeli da, bez ikakvih ideoloških lomova, integralno predstavljaju svoju kulturu kao celinu, od najstarijih perioda i Ahemenidskog carstva do danas. Tako je stvorena kulturna sinteza koja se pokazala veoma moćnom i impresivnom i Iran se, ne samo kod nas, već i u svetu, čak i među građanima onih država koje su iskazivale i iskazuju veći animozitet prema Islamskoj Republici, apsolutno uvažava kao ozbiljna, stara istorijska nacija i država koja ima šta da ponudi kulturi sveta.

Treća država je Turska. Za Tursku, koja nam je najbliža i najprisnija, karakteristično je to da njena kulturna politika, a zatim i kulturna diplomatija ove zemlje, kao svoj „kičmeni” sastavni deo sadrže komponentu neoosmanističke strategijske doktrine o potrebi obnove turske uticajnosti na onim područjima sveta koja su najduže ostala u sastavu Osmanskog carstva. To su Balkan, Bliski istok, Srednji istok i Kavkaz. U ovu strategiju je izuzetno disciplinovano i osmišljeno uklopljena kulturna dimenzija, kao uostalom u celokupni državno-nacionalni nastup Turske, i to ne samo kroz liniju spoljnih poslova, već i šire.

Poznata turska državna Agencija za saradnju i razvoj (TIKA) je ustanova za promociju turskih vrednosti u svetu. Te vrednosti se, u danas naglašenije islamskom vidu, projektuju kroz sve elemente delovanja države. Agencija TIKA, sa pozamašnim budžetom gotovo bez ograničenja, i kod nas mnogo i razučeno radi na obnovi i afirmisanju osmanskog kulturnog nasleđa. U toj aktivnosti ostvaruje se vrlo pragmatičan spoj novca koji se u ulaže i rezultata koji se dobijaju, naročito u turističkom vrednovanju ovakvih objekata, što je veoma privlačno, pogotovo za lokalne vlasti opština i srezova na čijoj se teritoriji spomenici nalaze, tako da su one po pravilu izuzetno kooperativne. To je saradnja koja sjajno teče, a Turci sistematski obnavljaju sve što je deo osmanskog kulturnog nasleđa, sve do digitalizacije arhivske građe, a to vide kao retroaktivno materijalizovanje dimenzije tzv. „istorijske dubine”, uz „geografsku dubinu” jedne od dveju sastavnica doktrine „strategijske dubine”, u verziji kojoj je zaokruženi teorijski oblik dao profesor međunarodnih odnosa, bivši ministar inostranih poslova i premijer Ahmet Davutoglu. Ovakva dirigovana kulturna politika je



veoma uspešna i u njenoj implementaciji se meka moć koristi na izuzetno sofisticovan, kompetentan i kvalitetan način.

U tematu časopisa *Kultura*, u tekstu koleginka Nevene Daković i Aleksandre Milovanović, obrađena je meka moć Balkana. Tu dolazimo i do fenomena turskih televizijskih serija. Turske serije su jedan od najučinkovitijih sredstava ili kanala turske kulturne politike i kulturne diplomatije, a pored toga su i komercijalno veoma isplative. One predstavljaju mudro funkcionalno združivanje praktičnog, komercijalnog, kulturnog i ideološkog u međunarodnom afirmisanju Turske. U pomenutom tekstu naišao sam na termin za koji nisam znao, a koji mi se dopao, *neo-ottoman pull*. Svojevremeno sam kod nas uveo u stručnu literaturu termin neoosmanizam, zbog čega sam u početku bio poprilično kritikovan, jer se smatralo da je to izraz retrogradnog pogleda na savremenu Tursku. Međutim, danas se u samoj Turskoj već uveliko govori o neoosmanizmu, kao o kulturološkoj matrici i ideološkoj doktrini.

Ove televizijske serije su zaista rađene majstorski. Sve relevantno se uzima u obzir, kako bi one bile što prihvatljivije i kako bi sliku turskog društva učinile privlačnom, što i jeste njihova osnovna uloga. Koleginica Rogač je o tome ubedljivo pisala – da svoje kulturne vrednosti valja učiniti privlačnim ljudima u inostranstvu, što u suštini jeste smisao ili cilj svake kulturne diplomatije. Turske serije su „ulepšane” na veoma sofisticovan način i u njima zapravo u prvom planu nije odraz autentičnosti turskog sveta, već njegova teleološka montaža od probраних elemenata izvornosti. Svako ko poznaje Tursku, kad gleda ove proizvode, zapaža da su dizajnirani i „umiveni” tako da budu što prihvatljiviji i prijemčiviji neturskoj publici.

Recimo, ako uzmemo kao primer poznatu i široko omiljenu seriju *Sulejman Veličanstveni*, stručnjaci će oceniti da tu ima izvanredno rekonstruisanih osmanskih kostima. Međutim, to nisu kostimi iz vremena Sulejmana Veličanstvenog već iz otprilike dva veka kasnijeg doba, kad su tekstil i moda iz Venecije i uopšte sa Zapada već ulazili u Osmansko carstvo, tako da su ti kostimi mnogo bliži oku i ukusu savremenog čoveka, pa čak i savremenog Turčina, nego grubi i rogobatni kostimi starije epohe kojoj fabula serije pripada. Zatim, u tim serijama nijednom nećete čuti glas mujezina sa džamije, a možete čuti Mocartovu muziku i melodije drugih klasičnih zapadnih kompozitora, kao i savremenu popularnu muziku sa Zapada. Znači, želi se zapadnom svetu prikazati



naslednica Osmanskog carstva kao emancipovana od islamskih vrednosti. Na tom planu, Turska je država koja deluje veoma promišljeno i uspešno, ali je njenu formulu kulturne politike nama iz niza razloga vrlo teško slediti.

Kad je reč o kulturi, a u kontekstu razmatranja turskog primera, smatram da treba afirmisati pogled na sintezu Istoka i Zapada u nama, a ne stereotipno ponavljati da smo mi između Istoka i Zapada, razapeti, na vetrometini, granici i slično... Takav pristup bi nam dao šansu da izbegnemo izvesnu shizoidnost koju nam nameću istorijsko iskustvo i istorijska svest, a često i politika i ideologija, da stalno sebe posmatramo u cvijićevskom ključu, kao one što sagrađiše „kuću nasred druma“. Mi jesmo tu gde jesmo, a smatram da je jedini produktivan način da sagledamo šta to integralno znači, i danas i u budućnosti, a onda da sa stanovišta promišljene i uravnotežene kulturne politike i diplomatije, bez kompleksa, sagledamo Istok i Zapad u sebi. To je preduslov za podsticajno vrednovanje našeg složenog kulturnog identiteta, a ne da nas njegovo realno istočno-zapadno dvojstvo stalno opterećuje i onemogućava da u punoj meri valorizujemo nešto što jeste, ili bi trebalo da bude, komparativna prednost i unutrašnje bogatstvo, sposobnost za stvaralačku otvorenost i za Zapad i za Istok.

Da zaključim, mislim da je delovanje na planu kulture u međunarodnim bilateralnim i multilateralnim odnosima izuzetno značajno i da su neke države u tom pogledu primeri, čiji učinci dovoljno rečito govore da bi i Srbija, pogotovo s obzirom na svoj međunarodni geokulturni položaj i kulturne potencijale, iz njih mogla mnogo da nauči i primeni.

\* \* \*

Svesni smo da živimo u trenutku koji niko od nas nije predviđao da će nastupiti, a čiji je glavni generator rat u Ukrajini i sve što je on izazvao. Tu je, međutim, i niz drugih pojava najnovijeg vremena, koje se mogu i metafizički sagledavati. Ne bih voleo da unosim elemente nečega što ne spada u naučni, racionalni metod, ali neka razmišljanja se prosto nameću: prvo smo imali masovne migracije biblijskih razmera, koje su izgledale praktično nezaustavljive. One, zapravo, i nisu zaustavljene jer će se, sa pogoršavanjem ukupne situacije u svetu i sve veće neravnomernosti uslova za život u pojedinim delovima planete, ove

migracije neminovno nastaviti... Sada su medijski u drugom planu zbog rata u Ukrajni, a pre toga su bile zbog krize izazvane pandemijom, ali, sumnje nema, nastaviće se... Nakon toga je došla bolest, velika virusna pošast – pandemija, koja je takođe imala biblijski karakter. I na kraju (ako je to kraj?) danas imamo rat. To su jahači Apokalipse. Vidimo da sa svetom nešto duboko nije u redu i da to nije slučajno. Na velikim smo iskušenjima kao čovečanstvo. Mnogi govore da treba razmišljati o budućnosti planete. To, međutim, ne bi trebalo da je naša prva briga, jer, kako je svojevremeno lucidno napisao Klaudio Magris, planeta će nas preživeti, opstaće i nastaviti da traje u kosmičkim dimenzijama, sa nekim bledim belezima našeg prisustva. Potrebno je ozbiljno razmišljati, i ne samo razmišljati, o sudbini čovečanstva, jer su znakovi vremena, koji se mogu posmatrati teološki, mistično, ali i sasvim racionalno, takvi da istinski ugrožavaju život čovečanstva.

U vezi sa našom temom kulturne diplomatije, ono što mogu da zapazim, a da to ne bude shvaćeno kao pretenciozno, jer nemam nikakve velike ambicije, jeste da je ovaj trenutak, sa pandemijom i sada ratom, a pre toga migracijama, kad je elementarna ljudskost dovedena u pitanje, u stvari znak krhkosti i nestabilnosti opšteg sistema vrednosti, uključujući i kulturne, i da doživljavamo udar involutivne reverzibilnosti društvenih i kulturnih procesa, za koje smo imali iluziju da su progresivno ireverzibilni. Svedočimo da ništa nije, kako kažu u Evropskoj uniji trajni *acquis communautaire*, odnosno da postoje dostignute vrednosti kojih se držimo i koje su nepromenljivo stabilne, što nije slučaj. Nažalost, ono što je u razvoju ili, bolje, kretanju čovečanstva na svim planovima o kojima govorimo pozitivno ostvareno, uopšte nije nepovratno zadobijeno. Sada živimo u vremenu velikog poraza politike, što se mora priznati, a znamo da je politika umnogome, ponekad i presudno, određivala i puteve kulture u međunarodnim odnosima, kao uostalom i puteve nauke. Naš mislilac i teolog Radovan Bigović napisao je da smo mi, nažalost, sposobni samo za jednu metafiziku, a to je politika. Politika je postala naša jedina „metafizika”, što je tužno i osiromašujuće. Aktualna politička kriza prividno paradoksalno nas je dovela do situacije da, na dužu stazu, šansu dobijaju kultura, nauka i sve one ljudske delatnosti koje su do sada bile zarobljenice i taoci politike. Kako je uopšte moguće konvencionalno zamisliti model kulturne politike i diplomatije kad se neko retroaktivno obračunava sa velikim književnicima i umetnicima

svetskog domašaja samo zbog toga što nacija kojoj su oni pripadali danas vodi rat koji se ocenjuje neprihvatljivim? To se nije dešavalo ni u doba nacizma i, potom, pobede nad njim. Sve nam govori da zapravo ništa nije sveto i da na planu kulturnih modela upravo onaj deo čovečanstva koji je nama diktirao i propisivao standarde i merila, danas demonstrira kolosalnu izdaju elementarnih načela poštovanja univerzalnih kulturnih vrednosti, da ostanemo samo pri njima. Meni je inspirativno da pojmovi kao što su medicinska i vakcinalna diplomatija ili sportska diplomatija, nisu slučajno isplivali na uzburkanoj površini sadašnje svetske pometnje. U tim, za čoveka vitalnim oblastima življenja i delovanja uočeno je da su politička ograničenja takva da ugrožavaju opstanak čitavih naroda i država i da elementarna međunarodna solidarnost više ne postoji. O iskrenoj empatiji da i ne govorimo. Rečeno je, poodavno, da je svet „globalno selo” i da je sve globalizovano. Jeste, ali, pokazalo se, u krajnjim situacijama i vanrednim prilikama na negativan način, jer kada se dogodi ovo što je dogodilo ceo svet, odjednom se sve raspada. U suštini, poredak koji se nameće čovečanstvu nije univerzalizovan na temelju univerzalnih vrednosti, već je samo grubo, materijalistički globalizovan u onome što jednom delu međunarodne zajednice odgovara, odnosno što njegove elite misle da im odgovara. Kada se to promeni i radikalno dovede u pitanje, jednostavno prestajemo da postojimo kao ljudi, sa svojim dostojanstvom i nasušnim potrebama.

Na toj granici vidim mogućí odgovor čovečanstva, a samim tim i Srbije, da se kroz stvarne kontakte i uvažavanjem onoga što je konkretno i proverljivo korisno za ljude svih nacija, svih država i svih vera afirmišu nove paradigme onoga što nazivamo kulturna diplomatija, a to važi i za naučnu, sportsku..., i da se, koliko je najviše moguće, postave granice vulgarnom i bezosećajnom političkom uticaju na sve sfere našeg života. Tu izgleda potencijalno ima, ali je pitanje da li će biti dovoljno inventivnosti, snage i sinergije da se realizuju. Jer, centri moći koji žele da svet bude globalizovan po njihovoj meri i zamisli neće se lako predati. Zato mislim da je ovo presudan momenat, u kome ćemo morati da pronađemo ravnotežu između puteva i načina istinskog delovanja u službi čoveka, kako kulturnog, tako i zdravstvenog, ekonomskog, prehrambenog, s jedne strane, i onoga što nam sadašnje institucionalizovane i etablirane političke strukture dozvoljavaju, odnosno prostora koji nam ostavljaju, sa druge. Taj će se prostor širiti i lomiti, ali se u njegovim koordinatama

već sada moraju tražiti i krčiti putevi. Ako se ne krene u tom smeru, ako se malodušno dignu ruke i baci koplje u trnje, neminovno će doći do opšteg raspada sistema, jer je poredak koji nam se nudi kao spasonosni obrazac zapravo antisistem suprotstavljen vitalnim potrebama i interesima čovečanstva kao celine, tako da ne može opstati, ali se može urušiti uz kataklizmički prasak. U tom smislu, ovu veliku krizu vidim kao šansu i u međukulturnim odnosima, jer sasvim je očigledno da u toj oblasti još nije doživljen totalni poraz.

Službujući tri i po godine kao ambasador Srbije i stalni predstavnik pri Unesku, mogao sam da pred sobom vidim panoramu kulturne geografije sveta i doživim da je ova organizacija, bez obzira na to što je silno ispolitizovana i što se najmanje 80% odluka donosi pod političkim diktatom, ipak uspela, baš zato što se bavi obrazovanjem, naukom i kulturom, da u nekim slučajevima nadjača političku konjunkturu i bude delotvornija i korisnija čovečanstvu nego mnoge druge međunarodne organizacije koje se pred našim očima raspadaju ili je njihov rad blokirano. Godine 2015, kada smo uspeli da sprečimo prijem „Kosova” u Unesko, pritisak centara političke moći u svetu bio je strahovit, tada mnogo veći nego danas, da „Kosovo” po svaku cenu bude primljeno. Shvatajući tadašnju međunarodnu konstelaciju i naravno uz pomoć prijatelja, uspeli smo da to sprečimo. To tada ne bi bilo moguće ni u jednoj drugoj multilateralnoj organizaciji, sem u ovoj koja se bavi obrazovanjem, naukom i kulturom. Čitav niz naroda i država, koji su na marginama svetskog poretka ili se diskriminatorski i potcenjivački uopšte ne doživljavaju kao ozbiljni činioci, svoj kulturni identitet i volju afirmisali su u Unesku, i na taj način opstali u međunarodnim odnosima uzdignute glave. Smatram da bi ovaj (pre)težak trenutak mogao biti šansa za reafirmisanje istinske vrednosti kulture, a samim tim i kulturne diplomatije, i postepenog oslobađanja od ideoloških ili administrativnih stega koje se danas nameću toj delatnosti i njenim poslenicima. Biće teško, jer odavno u ovoj sferi vlada ustaljeni model ponašanja i struktura institucija, kao i logika finansiranja itd., što nije nimalo lako razbijati i menjati.

\* \* \*

Što se tiče kulturne diplomatije Jugoslavije, kao što je poznato, vreme sprovođenja politike nesvrstanosti bilo je naročito produktivno.

Na osnovu uspeha skorašnjih memorijalnih konferencija Pokreta nesvrstanosti može se osnovano zaključiti da ideja koja je okupljala njegove države članice nije iscrpljena već, štaviše, ponovo zanimljiva i privlačna u svetu koji više nije bipolaran, već je na putu da postane multipolaran, uz velike otpore i lomove zbog protivljenja onih koji su u jednom trenutku poverovali da se zaista može ostvariti njegova unipolarnost. U suštini, ideja pokreta nesvrstavanja je mnogima aktualna, ne zbog toga što ne bi želeli da se svrstaju uz one aktere koji bi da nametnu svoj apsolutni planetarni primat ili uz njihove protivnike, već su protiv bilo kakvih direktivnih svrstavanja ma uz koga. Opstojava, naime, neumrla volja samostalnosti i potrebe da se u nekim oblastima deluje koliko je najviše moguće autonomno, te nije slučajno što su tolike delegacije došle na poslednje obeležavanje jubileja Pokreta nesvrstanih – šezdesete godišnjice velike konferencije, održane 1961. godine u Beogradu. Tačno je da je u Pokretu nesvrstanih kultura kasnila za ostalim formama uzajamnosti i zbližavanja. Za to je bilo mnogo razloga, pored ostalih i taj što su mnoge članice bile države koje se tek bejahu oslobodile kolonijalne vlasti. One su morale prevazilaziti vitalne problema preživljavanja i izgradnje institucija, a zatim, kulturno su i dalje bile prevashodno orijentisane ka bivšim kolonizatorima, što su velikim delom i ostale. Međutim, valja priznati da je i kod nas u sferi kulture postojao jedan sasvim neprimeren refleks superiornosti i evropocentrični pogled na te zemlje. Ovaj zid je donekle probijen pristizanjem velikog broja studenata iz nesvrstanih zemalja na studije u Jugoslaviju, tako da je došlo do sticanja iskustava neposrednog kontakta i ljudskog zbližavanja.

Od dvanaest naših kulturnih centara, koji su nekada postojali, danas je ostao samo jedan – u Parizu. U vezi sa delovanjem kulturnih centara, želeo bih da ukažem na nešto što mi se čini potrebnim i bitnim za uspešnu operacionalizaciju kulturne politike posredstvom kulturne diplomatije. Promocija vrednosti nacionalne kulture u svetu suština je i cilj kulturne diplomatije. Radi toga treba da postoje strategija ili vizija, opšti cilj delovanja, što je S(F)RJ imala, te je kao ozbiljna država sve potčinjavala i usmeravala ka tom strategijskom cilju. Mora, zatim, postojati dugoročno planiranje. Kulturna saradnja se dugoročno planira i ne može se u hodu improvizovati, što ne znači da u delovanju kulturnih centara treba isključiti da se programski i *ad hoc* iskoristi, ako se ukaže, prilika da se nešto uradi i van utvrđenog plana i kalendara aktivnosti.

Dugoročno planiranje je potrebno i zato da se prioriteti ne bi menjali sa svakom promenom vlasti, u skladu sa afinitetima, ideološkim, ličnim i drugim predilekcijama, pa i grupnim i klanovskim interesima. Mora takođe, u svakom pogledu, postojati dobra organizacija i logistika, što podrazumeva istrajnost i kontinuitet. Dolazimo, tako, do onoga što je sadržinski najvažnije, a to je kvalitet programa koji se predstavljaju u kulturnom centru. U svemu ovome je, i nije ispod časti ili sramotno to reći, novac veoma bitan činilac, odnosno sistemsko, stalno i izdašno finansiranje kulture je nešto bez čega se ono što su nam namere i ciljevi ne može adekvatno ostvariti i dostići. Mogu se i bez ili sa malo sredstava, na osnovu entuzijazma zaposlenih u centru i uključenih stvaralaca iz raznih oblasti, kao i inherentne kulturne vrednosti ponuđenih sadržaja, uz korišćenje ličnih veza, postići i zadivljujući rezultati, ali to nije stvar sistema. A sistem nam je potreban. Važno je, uz prethodno eliminisanje motiva angažovanja koji se rađaju iz užih ličnih i klanovskih uticaja i interesa, osmisлити formulu teško dostižne ravnoteže između univerzalne vrednosti, nacionalne autentičnosti i autorske prepoznatljivosti, što jedno drugo ne isključuje, kako se ponekad čini ili želi predstaviti, jer autentične nacionalne vrednosti po pravilu sadrže i univerzalnu dimenziju izvrsnosti. Mora se, potom, veoma dobro poznavati, proučiti i pratiti horizont očekivanja (inostrane) ciljne grupe, publike, što je sa stanovišta teorije recepcije, ali i prakse kulturne diplomatije veoma važno. Dakle, utvrditi na koju ciljnu grupu se računa i u skladu sa njenim horizontom očekivanja, koji valja ozbiljno istražiti, univerzalne vrednosti koje su nacionalno prepoznatljive prilagoditi receptivnosti publike, a ne denaturisati ih ili poništiti zarad željene prohodnosti u kulturnom kontekstu različitom od njihovog matičnog.

Kod kulturnih centara je, u neku ruku, problem i, uslovno rečeno, filozofija pristupa, odnosno smatra li se da je kulturni centar prevashodno namenjen našoj dijaspori u datoj zemlji, njenim potrebama i aktivnostima ili je on primarno usmeren ka građanima date države, tj. države akreditacije ambasade pri kojoj kulturni centar radi. Ne može se na isti način praviti repertoar ako je namenjen pripadnicima naše dijas-pore ili ako je za građane zemlje, odnosno grada, u kojima se kulturni centar nalazi. Moje je mišljenje da planiranje i osmišljavanje delovanja uvek treba da budu usmereni ka potencijalnim posetiocima iz zemlje akreditacije, što ne znači da, kao što je to, recimo, slučaj sa kulturnim

centrom u Parizu, ne može postojati dan u sedmici koji je odvojen kao dan za dijasporu, kako bi naši ljudi imali gde da se okupe. Potrebno je takođe, postići optimalnu i primerenu meru odnosa svega pomenutog sa onim što možemo nazvati duhom vremena, odnosno dominantnim kulturnim trendovima, onim što je uobičajeno pejorativno nazivati kulturno-umetničkom modom. Dakle, moramo voditi računa o tome šta je trenutno „u modi”, ali ne žrtvovati kulturne sadržaje univerzalnih vrednosti na oltar pomodnosti, no voditi računa o tome čemu su ljudi u datom momentu skloni, pa čak s izvesnim lukavstvima malo podići aktualnoj kulturnoj modi, ne izneveravajući suštinu, tj. univerzalnu vrednost, nacionalnu autentičnost i stvaralačku prepoznatljivost i samosvojnost. Naravno, teško je pomiriti sve pomenute zahteve i pretpostavke, a u našem slučaju iskustvo govori da posebno nije lako postići da uplivi raznih vankulturnih klanovskih i korporativnih interesa ne budu dominantni u uobličavanju programa kulturnih centara. Kako doći to tih programa? Svakako ne otvaranjem „pasijansa” (ja tebi – ti meni) sa špilom karata obeleženih domaćom hijerarhijom kulturnog značaja ili, češće, „značaja” i čaršijske uticajnosti nosilaca sadržaja koji se predstavljaju stranoj publici, a bez uzimanja u obzir specifičnosti navika, ukusa i konceptualnog sveta te publike.

Često se dešava(lo) da su zaposleni u kulturnim centrima očajni, jer im se administrativno u Beogradu skroji program za celu godinu, obično s jeseni, kad počinje sezona kulturnih zbivanja, od kojeg oni ni za jotu ne smeju da odstupe, bez posebnog odobrenja iz centra. Drugim rečima, imaju potpuno popunjene termine u skladu sa utvrđenim programom, te ne mogu i ne smeju da prikažu ništa drugo, čak i ako ocene da u mestu gde su akreditovani, odnosno u gradu i zemlji u kojoj centar deluje, postoji ili se ukazuje šansa da nešto vanprogramski urade, da to bude bolje primljeno i da efekat bude veći. Ovo možda deluje kao nevažno, ali je ponekad i te kako bitno, jer se propuštaju povoljne prilike da se srazmerno skromnim sredstvima ostvare vredni učinci koje kruto, birokratsko pridržavanje isključivo godišnjih programa aktivnosti nerazumno sputava. Kako u planiranje i izvođenje kulturnih aktivnosti u inostranstvu uvesti pravu meru između nužne institucionalne discipline i fleksibilnosti? Nisam sklon predlaganju stvaranja nekih paralelnih tela na republičkom nivou, jer takvih tela i komisija uvek ima više nego što je potrebno, ali sam sklon sudu da bi se morao pronaći način da se naša

ukupna kulturna politika prema svetu i, sledstveno, kulturna diplomatija usaglašavaju i koordinišu na najvišem republičkom nivou. Telo koje bi se time bavilo ne bi smelo da bude glomazno i preveliko, moralo bi da bude ekspertski kompetentno i do životno potrebne mere fleksibilno. Najvažnije bi bilo da njegovi članovi ne budu vođeni ličnim, esnafskim ili kakvim drugim neprincipijelnim interesom, da su osobe profesionalno ostvarene i bez ambicije da im učešće u radu koordinacionog tela bude, kako sociolozi kažu, kanal socijalne pokretljivosti. Smatram da bi takav vid centralizacije proveravanja kvaliteta i celishodnosti odlučivanja bio potreban, jer se sada ionako nedovoljna sredstva koja se izdvajaju za afirmisanje naše kulture u inostranstvu isuviše ekstenzivno i nekoordinisano troše, što rezultativno umanjuje delotvornost ukupnog nastupa naše kulture, kao važnog segmenta javne diplomatije.



# СРПСКА НАУЧНА ДИПЛОМАТИЈА У ФРАНЦУСКОЈ (1894–1903)<sup>1</sup>

АЛЕКСАНДРА КОЛАКОВИЋ

## Увод

Одувек су контакти, везе и сарадња научника биле значајна покретачка снага човечанства и развоја односа између држава и народа. Ипак, тек је савремено доба ове односе и њихов утицај на дипломатију почело да сагледава под терминима културне и научне дипломатије. Поред терминолошког одређења, посебно су значајне стратегије држава и/или министарства које препознају значај улоге научника у дипломатији и јасно дефинишу њихове активности. У неколико претходних година сведоци смо бројних промена у свету. Од климатских промена до технолошке и дигиталне револуције и потраге за новим лековима и вакцинама. Науке, а пре свега оне природне, медицинске и техничке, имају све већи утицај не само на свакодневни живот већ и на моћ држава. Ово је простор где наука заузима посебно место на пољу сарадње и дипломатских односа између држава. Полазећи од поменутог, циљ нам је да у овом раду истражимо српска искуства у ангажовању научника као актера културне и научне дипломатије у прошлости, као и да на основу овог сазнања спознамо могуће примере добре праксе.

Обележавање стогодишњице Великог рата (11. новембар 2018), Стратегија Француске за Западни Балкан (април 2019), као и посета Емануела Макрона, француског председника, Србији (јул 2019) током које је посебно истакнута веза Француза и Срба, обновили су сећања на културна зрачења и на значај француско-српских

односа. У овом контексту у јавности је истицан период „братства по оружју“ у Великом рату, али се осим помињања да је један део српске елите школован у Француској није отишло даље од тога да је, захваљујући њима, француска култура била веома заступљена у Краљевини Срба Хрвата и Словенаца (Југославији). Када се анализирају истраживања историје француско-српских односа написан је значајан број радова који су обухватили сфере политичких, дипломатских, економских и културних односа (Алексић-Пејковић 1965; Терзић 1990; Павловић, Новаковић 2004; Sretenović 2009; Bataković 2010; Новаковић, Ристић 2015; Kolaković 2016; Kolaković, Marković 2021a; Kolaković, Marković 2023). Ипак, аспект културне дипломатије Француске у Србији, као и Србије у Француској, потребно је детаљније истражити.

Од званичног ступања на снагу Руско-француског споразума за решавање српског питања 1894. године, српска елита је, поред Русије, пажњу усмерила ка Француској (Колаковић 2014: 57–59). Ово је било и очекивано, не само због значаја Француске већ и стога што је међу носиоцима политичког живота у Србији било некадашњих француских ђака, који су заузимали значајна места у министарствима и влади. Ранија истраживања су нам показала да су српски научници имали значајну улогу у политичком и дипломатском животу Србије на прелазу два века (Немањић 2001). За Србе тога доба била је привлачнија идеја слободе и једнакости, него апсолутизам монархија. Идеолошки оквири и укључивање српске елите у друштвени, културни и научни живот модерне Европе уносили су промене и у схватањима државе, њеног организовања и функционисања, а посредно и дипломатије. Како је од владе Стојана Новаковића 1895. године почела промена спољнополитичке оријентације Србије (Војводић 1988), упоредо са појачаним деловањем српске дипломатије, при чему је планирано и увећање утицаја на јавно мњење у Француској, определили смо се да осветлимо циљеве, актере и домете културне и научне дипломатије последњих Обреновића у земљи која се сматра колевком културне дипломатије.

Наша ранија истраживања су систематизовала контакте и везе које су српски научници и професори изградили у Француској у периоду 1894–1914. (Колаковић 2016a), али су остала отворена питања

јаснијег дефинисања циљева, актера и домета културне дипломатије Србије тога доба, као и које би то поуке из прошлости, наравно, у измењеном и прилагођеном облику, било могуће применити и данас у доба убрзаног мењања архитектуре међународних односа и безбедности. У анализи архивских докумената, изворних текстова и литературе, настојимо да одговоримо на неколико питања. Како је у сложеним односима нараслих империјалних амбиција великих сила и прегруписавањима која су водила ка кризама и ратовима, мала држава на Балкану, са нерешеним националним питањем и бројним спољнополитичким притисцима, дефинисала своје дипломатске циљеве? Како је Србија организовала и водила активности које у данашњем смислу подразумевамо под појмом културе и научне дипломатије, као и који су били домети оваквих активности? Ко су били, модерним речником речено, актери научне дипломатије? Одговори на ова питања омогућавају и детектовање домета културне и научне дипломатије Србије у историјском контексту, али и стварају оквир за разматрање поука из прошлости које би могле бити примењене и у актуелном периоду креирања нове архитектуре међународних односа и безбедности.

## **Француско-српски односи и циљеви српске дипломатије у Француској**

Србија је одлукама Берлинског конгреса 1878. стекла независност, а 1882. проглашена је за краљевину, међутим, њен спољнополитички положај је био компликован. Аустроугарска окупација Босне и Херцеговине и потписивање Тајне конвенције 1881. утицале су на политичку и економску зависност Србије од Аустроугарске (Ристић 1896: 97; Чубриловић 1982: 272; Екмечић 1989: 330; Јовановић 1990: 293–308, 315–327). Срби под Калајевим режимом у Босни и Херцеговини, као и на простору Старе Србије и Македоније, где је слабила османска власт, били су изложени снажним притисцима турске, односно аустроугарске власти. Док је углед династије Обреновић опадао, српска елита, већином школована у европским престоницама, подељена у више странака, тражила је

путеве националне еманципације, уједињења свих Срба у оквире једне државе, развоја друштва и државе. Снажан утицај у политичком животу Србије имали су радикали, услед чега се и тежиште српске спољне политике крајем 19. века постепено пребацује на Русију (**Терзић 1996: 299–310**). У политичком животу Србије били су активни и некадашњи студенти Сорбоне и других француских универзитета. Било их је у свим странкама, као и на важним местима за катедрама Велике школе и у министарствима (Ковић 2003: 125–130.). Они су били више опчињени идејама слободе и једнакости, него апсолутизмом Аустроугарске и настојали су да српско друштво и државу оснаже на западноевропским, пре свега француским моделима.

Колонијално питање, економска и територијално-политичка експанзија у фокусу су интересовања Француске, стога међународне околности краја 19. века, а посебно раст немачке економске и политичке моћи и аспирација, утичу на веће интересовање Француске за Балкан (Алексић-Пејковић 1965: 26; Christophe 1991: 141–164; Робертс 2002:127; Winock 1999:117–119; Winock 2003: 81). Од овог доба француска политика на Балкану обликује се кроз призму економских интереса и поделе на два блока сила. *Banque impériale ottomane* (Царска отоманска банка) је још од шездесетих година 19. века инвестирала француски капитал у Османско царство. Последица је била француска подршка власти Османског царства на Балкану. Француска је у перспективи османског повлачења са Балкана тежила да развије економски утицај у младим балканским државама, где је посебно место имала Србија. У овом контексту се интересовала за српске политичке прилике и утицај на династију Обреновић. Краљ Милан је био школован у Паризу, а његов наследник је прво добио учитеља француског језика Алфонса Магруа (Alphonse Magru), а потом и професора историје дипломатије Албера Малеа (Albert Malet). Долазак Албера Малеа у Београд био је део званичне дипломатије Француске. Мале долази уз утицај радикалских веза и у време значајних промена у српској спољној политици и француско-руског приближавања, које је финализовано потписивањем Француско-руског споразума 1893. године (званично ступио на снагу 1894) (Колаковић 2015: 175–190; Колаковић 2016а: 62, 81–87, 175–176; Колаковић 2019: 127–151).

Прво постепено приближавање Русији и земљама Западне Европе, пре свега Француској у доба Обреновића започело је владом Стојана Новаковића, који се у националној политици залагао за угледање на развијене народе – Французе, Италијане, Немце (Војводић 1988: 153 – 155; Војводић 1999: 79; Рајић 2010: 127–155). Српска елита је идеалистички схватила Француско-руски споразум. Веровала је да може допринети реализовању српских националних интереса. У овом периоду, 95% српске спољна спољне трговине остваривано је са Аустроугарском, па када је преко Солуна у Марсељ кренуо први контингент српске стоке, био је то и тренутак велике наде. Ипак, Француска због географске удаљености још није била заинтересована за увоз из Србије. Након што је изгласан Закон о конверзији државног дуга, тзв. Карлбадски аранжман, који је укључивао и Царску отоманску банку, са којом је српска влада закључила Протокол јуна 1895. у Карловим Варима, основана је Независна управа монопола Краљевине Србије. Претварањем свих ранијих српских зајмова основан је и нови српски фонд Уједињени 4% (Sretenović 2009: 46–47). Иако је овим француска банкарска породица Навил, у пратњи других финансијера, значајно економски продрла у Србију постојала је кочница код Француза. Србија је преко војних набавки у Француској настојала да отклони неповерење Француске. Влада Ђорђа Симића јула 1897. окончала је преговоре о набавци опсадних топова у Француској и поручила репетирке за српску војску (Војводић 1999:220). Поменуто неповерење Француске према Србији може се објаснити вишегодишњом аустрофилском политиком Обреновића и српских влада, политичком нестабилношћу Србије, као и недовољним познавањем економских могућности Србије.

Стојан Новаковић је крајем 19. века усмерио спољнополитички програм Србије. Правац српске потраге за стицањем покровитељства у решавању најважнијих националних питања Србије и Срба водио је ка Француској. Како је у ово доба руска политика према Балкану била обележена последицама Берлинског конгреса (1878), након кога је Русија своје интересе на Балкану остваривала преко упоришта у Бугарској (Јовановић 2011: 15–16), стварао се простор не само за економско већ и политичко повезивање са Француском. Циљеви српске дипломатије у Француској били су пружање економске и дипломатске подршке Србији и њеним националним циљевима

даљег развоја и очувања независности. Ипак, крајем 19. века било је потребно и представити Краљевину Србију у Француској, уклонити наслеђе романтичарских представа, показати да се модернизује и да припада породици развијених европских држава. Упоредо, задатак српске дипломатије кретао се од изласка на Париску берзу, добијања зајмова, војних набавки, заинтересованост француских пословних људи за пројекте као што је железница до развоја културних и научних веза ради стварања повољних услова за француску подршку српским националним интересима у контексту развоја Краљевине Србије, а показаће се почетком 20. века тешког положаја, па и њеног опстанка под притисцима Аустроугарске.

### **Српска културна дипломатија у Француској: организовање и актери**

Одабир личности које су од 1894. до 1903. године биле на челу српског Посланства у Паризу, као и њихова активност, сведоче колико је Краљевини Србији била битна Француска. Када је започело изграђивање развијене дипломатске сарадње са Француском 1894. године, на месту српског посланика у Паризу налазио се Милутин Гарашанин, син Илије Гарашанина и некадашњи француски ђак Политехнике и Артиљеријске школе у Мецу (Продановић 1939: 16). Поред блискости са француском културом и бројних познанства у Паризу, што је био резултат породичних веза и школовања, Гарашанин је и због свог интересовања за привреду, трговину и производњу био погодна личност за место посланика у Паризу. Ово су били и његови први задаци у Паризу у којима је показао иницијативу да се увећа обим трговине између Француске и Србије. Обишао је Француску, посебно интересовање је посветио могућностима трговине свињама и рогатом марвом (говеда и овце). Извештавао је и о интересовању за конопљу и рудно богатство Србије (Гарашанин 1995: 4–7). У ово доба, Француска је критиковала аустрофилску политику краља Александра и утицај краља Милана на његове одлуке, што се огледало и у негативним натписима у француској штампи (Bataković 2010: 294–295, 306).<sup>2</sup> Неповерење

које су Французи имали према оваквој српској политици ометало је развоје економских веза, а удаљавало политичку подршку Француске. Француска није имала разумевања за српске интересе на Балкану, а посебно не на простору Османског царства. Ово је фебруара 1897. године истакао Габријел Аното (Gabriel Hanotaux), министар спољних послова Француске, рекавши да се прати да Србија не ремети мир на простору Македоније.<sup>3</sup>

У таквим околностима, пред Милутином Гарашанином је био задатак да се припреми снажнија пропаганда у Француској. Учесће Краљевине Србије на Светској изложби 1900. био је један од начина да се реализује представљање земље, њеног рудног богатства и развоја друштва, као и да се створе повољни услови за излазак на Париску берзу и објасни положај Срба и ван матице. Припреме за наступ Србије у Паризу 1900. започеле су већ 1897. године, а једна од личности на коју су се Обреновићи посебно ослањали био је богати банкар, мецена и љубитељ уметности гроф Моиз Камондо (Comte Moïse de Camondo), почасни конзул Краљевине Србије (Душковић 1995; Колаковић 2016а: 237–241). Иако је повезаност са угледним личностима француског друштва била значајна за промоцију Краљевине Србије у Француској, ипак, није била довољна. Постало је јасно да Србија мора осмислити и систематски спроводити пропагандне активности.

Поред недовољног поверења у француско-српским односима, у француском друштву је дошло до значајних промена и постојања бројних струја у политичком животу које су мењале и фокус интересовања. Француско министарство спољних послова је мењало своју структуру, док је афера Драјфус у први план јавног живота поставила интелектуалце (Prochasson, Rasmussen 1996: 12–13). Професори универзитета и научници, новинари и књижевници су покретали дискусије и износили мишљења која су постепено постајала утицајна. Упоредо, штампа се убрзано развијала, новине су због ниских цена и убрзања процеса штампе и илустрација постале доступне и важне широким масама (Албер 1998). Сарадници и аутори спољнополитичких рубрика, као и њихови уредници, настојали су да више пажње посвете анализама међународних односа.

Србија је радила и на повезивању са француским научницима, професорима универзитета, публицистима и новинарима. У

овом контексту, користила је везе и контакте српских студената у Паризу. Као посебно способан у креирању научних и публицистичких веза већ од 1893. године истакао се Гргур Јакшић, студент, а касније и доктор са Сорбоне (Колаковић 2016: 182–184). Његов рад на националној пропаганди подразумевао је успостављање и развој научне сарадње, контаката у круговима штампе и рад на изради публикација. У стварању ових веза вероватно се посебно ослањао на Албера Малеа, који је током свог боравка у Србији изградио пријатељске везе са Милованом Миловановићем, Андром Николићем и Милутином Гарашанином, а касније и са Миленком Веснићем, Стојаном Новаковићем и Јованом Цвијићем (Колаковић 2016а: 199–201).<sup>4</sup> Јакшић је у Латинском кварту упознао и професоре Емила Омана (Emile Naumant), Виктора Берара (Victor Berard) и Ернеста Денија (Ernest Denis), и омогућио успостављање сарадње Омана и Новаковића (Оман 1927; Стојић, Колаковић 2012; Колаковић 2016: 192–197; Kolaković 2021a: 493–514). Сарадња Малеа и Јакшића била је нуклеус креирања научне сарадње, која се на прелазу два века преклопила и укрстила са дипломатском, а касније надограђивала.

Након смрти Милутина Гарашанина 1898. године, српски посланик у Паризу постао је Драгомир Рајовић, некадашњи државни саветник, школовањем и породично везан за Француску (Јагодић 2009: 176). Како су Обреновићи задржали аустрофилску политику, односи Србије са Русијом и Француском нису били задовољавајући, што је Рајовићевим активностима стварало проблеме. Након атентата на краља Милана 1899. године, започели су прогони радикала, који су у француској штампи наишли на осуду. Како би се поправила слика династије Обреновић и Србије, Рајовић је користио везе у круговима штампе. Афирмативно су, уз новчану накнаду, писали о Обреновићима и Србији лист *Le Paris* и месечник *La Revue d'Europe*. Овај покушај није имао великог успеха јер се још нису изградиле везе са битним новинарима и уредницима. Процене су биле и да је у Француској потребна нека угледнија личност са већим дипломатским искуством. Стога је фебруара 1900. за српског посланика у Француској и Белгији именован дипломата и научник Стојан Новаковић, који је пре овога повучен из Цариграда што говори о значају који је Париз стекао за српску дипломатију.<sup>5</sup>



Од Новаковића, као угледног научника и првог српског политичара који је у својству председника владе започео политику политичког и економског приближавања Русији и Француској, очекивало се да спроведе у дело замисао успешног представљања Србије на Светској изложби, утиче на подизање курса српских државних хартија код Отоманске банке и омогући креирање позитивне слике о Србији у француском јавном мњењу, како би га заинтересовао за српско питање и стекао подршку за развој железнице и трговине (Војводић 2007: 171; Војводић 2012). Делимичан успех је постигао у трговинском повезивању и превазилажењу проблема око зајма. Договорио је нови циклус преговора у време посете краља Александра Светској изложби у Паризу, до када је постојећи зајам код Отоманске банке остао по постојећим условима.<sup>6</sup> Када је реч о поправљању слике Обреновића у француској штампи, а посебно краља Александра, Новаковић је у извештајима писао да штампа није наклоњена ни династији ни Србији и, у том контексту, предложио укидање субвенција које су даване листовима осим агенцији L'Navas.<sup>7</sup> Како су решавање зајма и креирање позитивне слике о Србији зависили од политичких односа Србије са Русијом и Француском, као и проценом Француске о нестабилним приликама на Балкану, односно неразумевањем српског питања и страха финансијских и политичких кругова да би зајмови били искоришћени за наоружање и рат<sup>8</sup> овим је Светска изложба постала вишеструко значајна.

Српски павиљон, који је визуелно подсећао на Грачаницу, на Светској изложби 1900. у Паризу са централног места слао је поруку да је Србија држава са дугом историјом и традицијом са којом треба развијати сарадњу. Настао на основу сарадње архитекте Милана Капетановића, професора нацртне геометрије на Техничком факултету Велике школе у Београду, и познатог француског архитекте Амброаза Бодрија (Ambroise Baudry) Павиљон Србије је привукао велику пажњу и српски излагачи добили су укупно 220 награда, од чега седам гран прија, 35 златних и 53 сребрне медаље. Индустријски, пољопривредни и рудни експонати, производи народне и домаће радиности, руде, дуван, житарице, пиротски теписи, костими из различитих крајева Србије и ван матице из свих крајева Балкана где су живели Срби, као и дела савремене српске

уметности (Ђока Јовановић, Паја Јовановић, Бета Вукановић) и научних открића (хидроинтегратор Михаила Петровића Аласа, који је награђен бронзаном медаљом) представљену су с циљем да разбијају предрасуде и заинтересују посетиоце за нове економске и политичке односе француске и српске средине и држава. На основу сачуваних докумената Посланства у Паризу можемо закључити да је током трајања манифестације (од априла до октобра 1900.) значајан број новинара, пословних људи и државника, међу којима и француски председник Емил Лубе, посетио Павиљон Србије поред моста Алма (Колаковић 2016а: 234–240).<sup>9</sup> Павиљон Србије и његов унутрашњи изглед пример су нових оквира деловања српске дипломатије у Француској. Сарадња признатих стручњака, ослањање на локалне актере, поред већ устаљених и постојећих актера доказ су да је српска држава следила обрасце великих сила, наравно у обиму својих финансијских могућности.

Када је пред крај 1900. године српског посланства у Паризу Стојана Новаковића заменио Михаило Вујић, радикал и стручњак за финансије, већ су се осећали позитивни ефекти представљања Краљевине Србије на Светској изложби. Рударски инжењер из Париза Шарл де Рикар (Charles de Ricaris) заинтересовао се за грађење западних железница у Србији, што је било у вези и са Вујићевим главним задацима да се од Француске добију концесије за део железнице преко османске територије (Војводић 1999: 155). Вујић се кратко задржао на месту српског посланика, али се пре повратка у Србију, у пролеће 1901. ангажовао у преговорима са француским финансијерима и Отоманском банком како би се добила кота на париској берзи, и у томе је успео. Може се закључити да су нови оквири деловања српске културне пропаганде у Француској, представљање Србије на Светској изложби, као и приближавање краља Александра Обреновића Русији резултирале изласком српских хартија на париску берзу.

Француска је показала већу заинтересованост за Србију када се краљ Александар Обреновић ослободио утицаја оца, а добри односи Србије са Русијом 1900. године утицали су да дође до изражаја трговачко-политички интерес. Србија је, поред економских интереса због којих се приближавала Француској, имала и политички који се у овом периоду односио на подршку Француске српским

интересима у Старој Србији, посебно у Македонији. Француска дипломатија, са Теофилом Делкасеом (Theophile Delcassé) на челу, била је супротног става. Залагала се да Османско царство изведе реформе без територијалних подела и губљења суверенитета власти султана (Renouvin 1965: 114; Tejlor 1968: 356; Војводић 1999: 224). То је обликовало и задатке Андре Николића, радикала са одличним везама у Француској који је на чело српског посланства дошао у Паризу 1902. године. Како је српским дипломатама било јасно да се не може остварити велики домет утицаја директним контактима и преко штампе, Николић је започео нову пропагандну акцију у коју је укључио професоре и научнике, а која је српско питање повезивала са интересима Француске.

Како би се француски политичари (али и шире, јер је француски језик дипломатије) упознали са српским питањем на Балкану започео је публиковање научно аргументованих брошура и књига на француском језику. Ова активност је, поред ослањања на српске научнике, професоре и студенте у Француској и Србији, подразумевала и сарадњу са француским професорима и научницима. Тако је Светислав Симић, публициста и дипломата, стручњак за Стару Србију и особа са dobrим контактима у француској штампи, написао брошуру Питање о Ст. Србији, која је преведена на француски (*La question de la vieille Serbie*) и, под псеудонимом Павле Орловић (Paul Orlovitch), публикована посредством Албера Малеа као издање престижне издавачке куће Hachette (Колаковић 2016а: 241–245). Важно је нагласити да се хиљаду примерака, преко књижаре, 1903. године поделило државницима, политичарима, професорима и „свим виђенијим политичким дневним листовима и часописима у Француској, Енглеској, Русији, Немачкој, Аустрији и Италији“, дакле и ван граница Француске, да се посао на коме се радило годину дана спровео у највећој тајности и да нико није знао да иза ове брошуре стоји српска влада.<sup>10</sup>

Поред Малеа, у кога је српска влада међу француским професорима и научницима имала велико поверење, наравно јер је био и близак са српским краљем Александром Обреновићем и Андром Николићем, посредством кога је дошао у Србију, још једну особу препознајемо као важног актера српске дипломатије у Француској. Реч је Шарлу Лоазоу (Charles Loiseau). Он је, као научник,

публициста, протериван из Аустроугарске и зет пројугословенске породице Војиновић, био укључен у важне активности српске дипломатије. Био је сарадник *Le Revue hebdomadaire* и *La Revue de Paris*, где је писао текстове уперене против Аустроугарске и опстанка власти Османског царства у Европи. Могућност да дође до сецесије Словена на југу Аустроугарске и њиховог уједињења са „својом браћом у Србији и Црној Гори“ по први пут јавно је изнео Шарл Лоазо у чланку „La Hongrie et l'Opposition Croate“ („Мађарска и хрватска опозиција“) публикованом у *La Revue des Deux Mondes* 1895. године (Loiseau 1895: 101–128; Колаковић 2016а: 92–97). Лоазо је уз Малеа, био консултован приликом сваког важнијег корака у афирмацији српског питања.<sup>11</sup> Колико је његов значаја за српску дипломатију сведоче и одликовања. Пре него што ће написати своје најзначајније дело *Le Balkan slave et la crise autrichienne* (Балкански Словени и аустријска криза) (Loiseau 1898), црногорски кнез Никола Петровић одликовао га је орденом *Књаза Данила I четиријої сїеїена* 1895, а краљ Александар Обреновић 1897. године *Таковским крстојом шрећеї пеге*.<sup>12</sup>

Важно је нагласити да ни промена на српском престолу није утицала на то да се овај вид деловања и ослањања на професоре, научнике и публицисте напусти, већ је чак добио и нови замах. Франкофил и угледни научник Стојан Бошковић, који је наследио Андру Николића преломне 1903. године за српску историју и династију Обреновић, наставио је да организује активности у српском посланству на сличан начин.<sup>13</sup> Још једна брошура, сличне тематике као Симићева, појавила се на француском језику. Реч је о делу *La Probleme macédoинien et sa evolution*, чији је аутор L. V. Povolni, а у њену припрему и дистрибуцију био је укључен Гргур Јакшић. Архивска документа сведоче да је подељено 247 примерака, у Француској још 96, у Белгији 38, у Швајцарској 32 примерка и још 66 примерака у осталим земљама.<sup>14</sup>

## Домети културне и научне дипломатије Краљевине Србије у Француској

Домети српске културне и научне дипломатије у Француској крајем 19. и почетком 20. века показују нам да су развијене културне и научне везе и сарадња предуслов успешне не само промоције државе већ и реализовања стратешких дипломатских и националних циљева државе. Високо образоване дипломате, које представљају Краљевину Србију у Паризу, долазе из различитих професија, а заједничко им је да показују богату ерудицију. Они одлично познају историју, културу, политички живот и актуелне проблеме земље. Говоре француски језик као матерњи, као и још неке стране језике. Већином имају и изграђена пријатељства и развијену мрежу контаката и пре службеног боравка у Француској. Неки су се школовали, а неки усавршавали у Француској, док су други веома угледни у својим професијама. Приметно је и да значајни предлози и иницијативе долазе од дипломата. Ово говори и о њиховој заинтересованости, ауторитету и жељи да својим деловањем оставе траг у историји.

Једна од кључних карактеристика српске дипломатије у Француској на прелазу два века је ослањање на личности познате у локалној средини, међу којима су посебно важни публицисти, професори и научници. Школовање српске елите у Француској и сарадња научника, њихове контакти и везе имају велики утицај у формирању дипломатских активности и остваривању циљева. Важне међународне догађаје и манифестације, као што је Универзална изложба у Паризу 1900. године, Краљевина Србија видела је као простор промоције. Показали су се и као добра прилика за успостављање економске и политичке сарадње (излазак на Париску берзу, зајмови, политичко приближавање). Српска дипломатија се приликом реализовања својих циљева у Француској ослања на научнике, научну сарадњу и везе и контакте научника који се школују у Француској, као што је на пример активност Гргура Јакшића. Упоредо, актери културне и научне дипломатије су и француски научници, на пример Албер Мале, Шарл Лоазо, а касније ће им се придружити и Виктор Берар, Огист Говен, касније

Ернест Дени и Емил Оман. На прелазу два века поставља се темељ да се веза и сарадња француских и српских научника користи за представљање Србије преко штампе, публикација и предавања. Наравно, ове контакте је користила и Француска за своје интересе у Србији. Најзначајније је то што се, са развојем научне и културне сарадње између Француске и Србије, створила база научника који су сарађивали у пресудним годинама за Србију (Анексиона криза, балкански ратови и Велики рат) (Kolaković 2012: 199–212; Kolaković 2016b:13–29; Kolaković 2017: 330–352; Kolaković 2018: 83–106).

Како је постојало више проблема за стицање економске и посебно политичке подршке Француске, а продор у француску штампу био тежак или немогућ, научници су у дипломатији постали важни актери за промоцију Србије и реализовање националних циљева и даљи развој државе и друштва. Краљевина Србија је својим присуством на Универзалној изложби 1900. године успела да се издвоји као важна држава на Балкану. Посета француског председника, пословни контакти и везе и излазак на париску берзу почетак су економског повезивања Србије са Француском. Романтичарске и оријенталне представе о Србији и српском друштву нису потпуно уклоњене, стога је највећи домет културне и научне пропаганде Србије у Француској довођење у питање ранијих представа о Србији и стварање предуслова за афирмативне слике државе и народа. Поред промене слике Србије, повезивање са научницима Француске, стварање оригиналног доприноса у наукама којима су се бавили уз преузимање најбољих модела функционисања државе и друштва, уочавамо да су српске дипломатске активности у Паризу успеле да француска политичка, пословна и дипломатска елита више пажње (а постепено и разумевања) показује према српском питању.

## Закључак

Истражујући путеве деловања српске дипломатије пре више од сто година, такође трагамо и за поукама историје. Свесни да су промене у међународним односима сталне, а посебно изазовне након избијања пандемије коронавируса и рата у Украјини 2022.

године, не мислимо да се примери из историје могу употребити у директном, већ у измењеном и прилагођеном облику и оној мери колико им актуелни циљеви и стратегије, као и финансије државе, дозвољавају. Ипак, верујемо да подсећање на успехе и добре праксе у прошлости, као што је пример деловања српске дипломатије у Француској на размеђи два века, могу допринети рађању нових идеја и иницијатива. Недавна истраживања су показала да 73,3% научника у Србији никада није било укључено у званично од стране државе организовану културно-дипломатску. Такође, 76,7% анкетираних научника би учествовало у оваквим активностима, а од укупног броја анкетираних чак 35,6% без хонорара (Колаковић 2021b: 189–190). Потенцијал за систематизовано организовање научне дипломатије, дакле, постоји, а потребно је радити на стратегијама.

Како се од 2019. године може говорити о повратку интересовања Француске за Балкан, њеној све већој економској улози, као и у подршци Србији у процесима евроинтеграција развој културне и научне дипломатије се појављује као посебно важан. Културни центар Србије у Паризу јесте кључна тачка реализовања културне дипломатије Србије у Француској. Не улазећи, због обима дискусије, у оцене његовог функционисања и могућности оснаживања домета утицаја, и у наредном периоду Културни центар Србије у Паризу биће окосница деловања. Ипак, српској културној дипломатији у Француској могуће је, а и потребно, додати нове импулсе. Они би на основу историјског искуства и савремених односа могли бити пронађени у оквирима научне дипломатије. У овом контексту је посебно значајна научна сарадња са Француском која се остварује кроз више платформи за финансирање научних пројеката, од којих већ двадесет година одличне резултате подразумева програм билатералне сарадње Француске и Србије „Партнерство Hubert Curien Павле Савић“.<sup>15</sup>

Значајан број научника у дијаспори, научни тимови у Србији који креирају пројекте и развијају међународну научну сарадњу, јесу основа за научну дипломатију. Подршка развоју међународне научне сарадње, као и културне сарадње, међународним пројектима и публикацијама важна је основа и за дипломатске иницијативе. Поред подршке развоју научне сарадње, као један од битних фактора за даљи развој дипломатије Србије препознајемо и креирање



стратегија научне дипломатије. Иако, термин научне дипломатије не постоји у документима српских министарства (Колаковић 2021б: 182), постоје активности које се могу подвести под термин културне и научне дипломатије. На основу активности Фонда за науку и Министарства науке технолошког развоја и иновација препознају се и потенцијали науке у контексту савремених међународних односа. Стога је и овај научни чланак потребно посматрати као иницијативу да се и кроз научне пројекте друштвено-хуманистичких наука дефинишу стратегије научне дипломатије Србије.

## Напомене

- 1 Рад је настао у оквиру планова научноистраживачке делатности за 2023. годину Института за политичке студије у Београду, који финансира Министарство науке технолошког развоја и иновација Републике Србије.
- 2 Archives des Ministère des Affaires étrangères [АМАЕ], Correspondance politique, Serbie, vol. 9, N° 16, Report, Belgrade 11 mai 1889.
- 3 Архив Србије [АС], Министарство иностраних дела [МИД], ПО, 1897, фасц. VII, дос. 1, пов. бр. 295, Извештај, Париз 29. јануар/10. фебруар 1897.
- 4 Народна библиотека Србије [НБС], Хартије Гргура Јакшића, Р 558/Х.
- 5 АС, Лични фонд Стојана Новаковића [СН], бр. 1389, В. Ђорђевић–С. Новаковићу, Ниш 25. децембар 1899; АС, МИД, ПО, 1900, фасц. X, дос. II, пов. бр. 255, С. Новаковић–В. Ђорђевићу, Цариград 6. фебруар 1900.
- 6 АС, МИД, ПО, 1906, фасц. II, дос. V, пов. бр. 1669, С. Новаковић – В. Петровићу, Париз 10. јун 1900.
- 7 АС, МИД, ПО, 1900, фасц. X, дос. VIII, пов. бр. 125, С. Новаковић – А. Јовановићу, Париз 24. јул 1900.
- 8 АС, МИД, ПО, 1900, фасц. III, дос. IX, пов. бр. 921, С. Новаковић – В. Ђорђевићу, Париз 28. март 1900.
- 9 АС, МИД, ПО, 1900, фасц. VII, дос. VIII, пов. бр. 917, С. Новаковић – В. Ђорђевићу, Париз 27. март 1900. АС, МИД, Посланство у Паризу, ф. 1, пов. бр. 225, Посланство у Паризу – Министарство иностраних дела, Париз 9. октобар 1900.
- 10 АС, МИД, Посланство у Паризу, ф. 2, бр. 4491, Министарство иностраних дела – А. Николићу, Београд 14. новембар 1902.
- 11 АС, МИД, Посланство у Паризу, ф. 2, бр. 4491, Министарство иностраних дела – А. Николићу, Београд 14. новембар 1902. ХБС, Хартије Гргура Јакшића, Р558/Х/126, А. Мале – Г. Јакшићу, Париз 5. јануар 1908.
- 12 Архив Српске академије наука и уметности [АСАНУ], Заоставштина Лоазо – Војиновић, бр. 14427, I–7, Одликовање.



- 13 АС, МИД, Посланство у Паризу, ф. 2, пов. 16, Министарство иностраних дела – Посланство у Паризу, Београд 23. јануар 1903.
- 14 АС, МИД, Посланство у Паризу, ф.2, Признаница, Париз 10. мај 1903.
- 15 Вид: Министарство науке технолошког развоја и иновација, <https://nitra.gov.rs/tekst/83/bilateralna-saradnja.php> (19. 3. 2023).

## Библиографија

Archives des Ministère des Affaires étrangères [АМАЕ]

Correspondance politique, Serbie.

Архив Србије [АС]

Министарство иностраних дела,

Посланство у Паризу,

Лични фонд Стојана Новаковића.

Архив Српске академије наука и уметности [АСАНУ]

Заоставштина Лоазо – Војиновић.

Албер, Пјер 1998. Историја штампе. Београд: Плато, Земун: XX век.

Алексић-Пејковић, Љиљана 1965. Односи Србије са Француском и Енглеском 1903–1914, Београд: Историјски институт.

Bataković, Dušan T. 2010. *La Serbie et la France: une alliance atypique: relations politiques, économiques et culturelles, 1870-1940*. Belgrade: Académie serbe des Sciences et des Arts, Institut des Études balkaniques.

Winock, Michel 1999. *La fièvre hexagonale Les grandes crises politiques 1871–1968*, Paris: Seuil.

Winock, Michel 2003. *La France politique XIXe–XXe siècle*, Paris: Seuil.

Војводић, Михаило 1999. *Пућеви српске дипломатије: ојлеги о сјољној јолијици Србије у XIX и XX веку*. Београд: Clio.

Војводић, Михаило 2007. *Изазови српске сјољне јолијике: (1791–1918): ојлеги и расјраве*. Београд: Историјски институт.

Војводић, Михаило 2012. *Сјојан Новаковић: у служби националних и државних ињтереса*. Београд: Српска књижевна задруга.

Гарашанин, Милутин 1895. Извештај краљ. Српског изванредног посланика и пуномоћнога министра у Паризу г. Милутина Гарашанина о марсељској и другим француским сточним пијацама и у опште о трговини између Србије и Француске, Београд: Министарство народне привреде 1895.

Душковић, Весна 1995. *Србија на свешјској изложби у Паризу 1900. јодине*, Београд: Етнографски музеј.

Екмечић, Милорад 1989. *Сјшварање Јујославије 1870–1918*, 2, Београд: Просвета.

Јагодић, Милош 2009. Српски студенти у Паризу средином шездесетих година 19. века. *Зборник Мајице српске за исјорију*, 79/80, 175–182.

- Јовановић, Мирослав 2011. О две Русије у српском друштву или Русија за унурашњу употребу: слика Другог као идентитетско самодефинисање, у: Јовановић, Мирослав (приредио), *Срби о Русији и Русима Од Елизабете Пејировне до Владимира Пушина (1750–2010)*. Београд: Православни богословски факултет, Институт за теолошка истраживања, Институт за новију историју, 11–42.
- Јовановић, Слободан 1990. *Влада Милана Обреновића, I*, сабрана дела Слободана Јовановића, књ. 4, Београд СКЗ.
- Ковић, Милош 2003. *Зайагноевройске йолиџичке игеје у „Срѣском књижевном іласнику“ 1901–1914*, Београд: Филозофски факултет (магистарска теза).
- Kolaković, Aleksandra 2012. French Intellectuals and the French Policy Change in the Balkans (1912–1913), *Journal of Turkish World Studies* XII/2 (2012) 199–212.
- Колаковић, Александра 2014. Русија и Француска у очима српских интелектуалаца (1908–1918). *Политичка ревија*, 4, 57–75.
- Колаковић, Александра 2015. Београд крајем XIX века: поглед ‘Србо-Француза’ Албера Малеа. *Годишњак града Београда*, 60, 175–190.
- Колаковић, Александра 2016а. *У служби ошацине: сарања француских и српских интелектуалаца (1894–1914)*. Београд: Институт за политичке студије.
- Kolaković, Aleksandra, 2016b. French Intellectuals on the Austro-Hungarian Interest in the Balkans 1894–1914. in: Matei Gheboianu, Matei and Cosmin Ionita. *Balkan Entanglements – Peace of Bucharest*, Bucharest: Universitatii din Bucuresti, 13–29.
- Kolaković, Aleksandra 2017. War and Propaganda in 1915: French Intellectuals and Actualization of Serbian Issues. in: Dalibor Denda, Dalibor and Christian Ortner. *The Great War in 1915*. Belgrade, Wien: Institut za strategijska istraživanja, Heeresgeschichtliches Museum, 330–352.
- Kolaković, Aleksandra 2018. *La France et la Grande Guerre dans la memoire serbe*, Српска политичка мисао, специјално издање, Изазови француско-српских односа, 83–106.
- Колаковић, Александра 2019. О Србији и Србима у делима француских интелектуалаца крајем 19. и почетком 20. века. *Kultura*, 164, 127–151.
- Kolaković, Aleksandra, Markovic, Sacha 2021a. *La France et la Serbie les défis de l'amitié éternelle: hommage au 180e anniversaire des relations diplomatiques franco-serbes*. Belgrade: Institut d'études politiques.
- Kolaković, 2021b. Научници и културна дипломатија Србије, *Култура*, 173, 175–197.
- Kolaković, Aleksandra, Markovic Sacha 2023. *La France et la Serbie les défis de l'amitié éternelle: hommage au 180e anniversaire des relations diplomatiques franco-serbes*. Belgrade: Institut d'études politiques. (друго допуњено издање)
- Christophe, Charle 1991. *Histoire sociale de la France au XIXe siècle*, Paris: Seuil.
- Loiseau, Charles 1895. „La Hongrie et l'Opposition Croate“, *La Revue des Deux Mondes*, septembre, 101–129.
- Loiseau, Charles 1898. *Le Balkan slave et la crise autrichienne*, Paris: Perrin.
- Немањић, Милош 2001. *Јеган век српске стваралачке интелијенције*, Београд: Београд : Идеа, Институт за криминолошка и социолошка истраживања, Институт за политичке студије, 2001.

- Новаковић, Јелена, Ристић, Љубодраг 2015. *Срби о Французима – Французи о Србима*. Београд: Филолошки факултет : Друштво за културну сарадњу Србија – Француска.
- Оман, Емил 1927. Предговор, у: Јакшић, Гргур, *Европа и Васкрс Србије*, Београд: Народна мисао.
- Павловић, Михаило, Новаковић, Јелена 2005. *Српско-француски односи 1904–2004*. Београд 2005: Архив Србије.
- Продановић, Јаша 1939. *Милушин Гарашанин*, Београд: СИЗ.
- Рајић, Сузана 2010. *Неуштралне владе у Краљевини Србији (1893–1900)*. Српске студије, књ. 1, бр. 1, 127–155.
- Ристић, Јован 1896. *Дипломатска историја Србије за време српских ратова за ослобођење и независност 1875–1878*, I, Београд: Просвета.
- Робертс, Џон 2002. *Европа 1880–1945*, Београд: Clio.
- Sretenović, Stanislav 2009. *Francuska i Kraljevina Srba Hrvata i Slovenaca 1918–1929*. Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju.
- Стојић, Биљана, Колаковић, Александра 2012. *Група Јакшић и европизацна активност Србије у Француској 1912–1913*. Мешовита Грађа – Miscellanea, XXXIII, 413–432.
- Tejlor, Alan John Percivale 1968. *Borba za prevlast u Evropi 1848–1918*. Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša.
- Терзић, Славенко 1996. Српски национални покрет између Русије и западних сила (велико раскршће друге половине XIX века), у: Терзић Славенко (ур.) *Европа и Срби*, Београд: Историјски институт, 299–310.
- Чубриловић, Васа 1982. *Историја политичке мисли у Србији XIX века*. Београд: Народна књига.
- Министарство науке технолошког развоја и иновација, <https://nitra.gov.rs/tekst/83/bilateralna-saradnja.php> (19. 03. 2023)

# КУЛТУРНА ДИПЛОМАТИЈА У ТРИМА ПУТОПИСИМА О БАЛКАНУ

Милош Пржић

Ако културну дипломатију дефинишемо онако како то нуди [ispionline.it](http://ispionline.it) (2021) у презентацији курса из културне дипломатије, остаће отворено питање значаја књижевности, нарочито оне путописне. По тој дефиницији, културна дипломатија подразумева једну

од најразвијенијих форми тихе моћи (*soft power*): поделом и разменом идеја, вредности, језика и уметничке праксе, поспешује се промоција дијалога, поштовања различитости, те међусобно разумевање међу народима и нацијама, као подршка широј политичкој и економској сарадњи на међународном нивоу.

Како се једна таква актуелна дефиниција овог појма не би одбацила, размену информација треба разумети и објаснити кроз призму коју нуди Петровић (2011), а онда увести путопис као погодан књижевни жанр за ову област. А. Петровић појам културне дипломатије посматра кроз априорну историју и постисторију. Заснована на понављањима, потреби за понављањем или одступању од тих понављања, априорна историја, коју уводи Е. Кант, релативно је мало разматрана (Петровић 2011: 11). Она нуди одговор на питање шта је постисторија. Објашњена је на примеру јеврејских пророка који су, разумевши разлог због кога ће пропасти старозаветна јеврејска држава, ту пропаст могли да проричу до у детаље. На основу изнетих примера, рефлектованих кроз славну револуцију из 1688, и „хуманитарну револуцију” бомбардовања Србије 1999.

као преседан, А. Петровић уводи појам постисторијске културне дипломатије. Како би се тај концепт уопште могао применити, одређени текст треба декомпоновати „на његове супротности следећи поларне одзиве на српску културу” (*Исшо*: 12).

Такав биполаран одзив на једну културу најсликовитије се може објаснити кроз путописе, као текстове које треба декомпоновати и таквим приступом објаснити њихов однос према српској култури, те њихове унутрашње и међусобне биполарности. Овакав приступ могао би се применити на све књижевне жанрове, на све жанрове које је могуће проучавати у оквиру културних студија, али путопис је за то погодан због своје првобитне литерарне и научне намене. Циљ путописа је „да поучи, да побуди истраживачку или авантуристичку страст да забави, задовољи радозналост” (Пековић 2001: 17). То значи да ће путописац, мање или више свесно, тежити да већину својих запажања изнесе кроз идентитет и алтеритет, учитавши то у оно што је његово, и следствено томе припада његовом идеалном читаоцу или примаоцу писма, и ту појаву приказати као сличност или као другост. Да није те биполарности, путопис не би био ни поучан ни забаван, рецепција овог жанра била би минорна, тако да овакав приступ, у мањој или већој мери примењив код свих путописа, чини овај жанр погодним да се разматра као чинилац културне дипломатије. Такође, свесни смо „да је разговор међу културама незамислив без посредника” по речима В. Гвоздена (2005). Позивајући се на *Теорију књижевности* Драгише Живковића, Гвозден додаје да „писац у путопису не измишља појаве и догађаје, већ објективно и верно износи оно што је видео и доживео” (Gvozden 2005). Тежећи да буде објективан, путописац се труди да изнесе добре и лоше стране народа и(ли) културе које описује. Његова припадност другом народу и другој култури у томе га ограничава, али та распетост између двеју реалности чини структуру путописа интерактивном, дозвољава читаоцу да оствари дијалог са текстом, па чак и са аутором, можда и боље него са аутором неког жанровски другачије одређеног текста, утолико што је аутор путописа и његов главни лик, а то текст чини аутентичнијим.

Сва три путописца о којима је у овом раду реч, кренула су на пут по балканским крајевима из различитих побуда. Алберто

Фортис (Alberto Fortis) имао је неколико задатака: да за рачун Млетачке републике пронађе бољи начин експлоатације рибе у Јадранском мору око Задра и по тзв. млетачкој Далмацији, да одреди минералошке карактеристике далматинског краја (Pizzamiglio 2010), као и да за своје „британске финансијске покровитеље” (Костић 1988, 1998) пронађе стихове једног „примитивног” народа којима ће потврдити аутентичност Осијанових песама и предромантичарских примитивистичких теорија, што ће наћи у балади о Хасанагиници. Бруно Барили (Bruno Barilli), такође Италијан, из већ уједињене Италије, наћи ће се у Србији из приватних разлога (Montefoschi 2010: 114). па ће његово присуство бити искоришћено да за неколико италијанских листова послужи као ратни дописник. Принц Божидар Карађорђевић, с друге стране, наћи ће се у Србији једном као изгнаник, на путу за Атос, под лажним именом и са пасошем свог пријатеља (Ацовић 2018: 20), а други пут као члан краљевске породице Карађорђевић на крунисању свог рођака краља Петра. Поред чињенице да су оба Италијана свој путопис писала на свом језику, интересантно је да је путопис принца Божидара састављен од неколиких текстова на француском. Док је Фортисов путопис у традиционалној, епистоларној форми касније објављен за ширу читалачку публику, Барилијев је у форми новинских чланака, а путопис принца Божидара објављиван је као дневнички записи у разним француским листовима.

Како би успешно обавио свој задатак потврђивања примитивистичких теорија, Фортис је требало да истражи обичаје људи који су живели на територији Далмације. Морлаци, како су их Венецијанци називали, били су непознаница млетачком народу, а довољно близу да би Фортис могао да обави свој задатак. Његово писмо упућено Џону Стјуарту ерлу од Бјута (John Stuart earl of Bute) насловљено је управо „О обичајима Морлака” (*De' costumi de' Morlacchi*). То писмо, и касније то поглавље у целокупном путопису, прилично је другачије од осталих која су оријентисана ка другим Фортисовим циљевима и, самим тим, писана више научним него литерарним стилем. Ипак, његово дивљење према Морлацима јесте нешто што, чини се, ни сам није очекивао, као ни његов идеални читалац. Морлаци, било латинског (*i Morlacchi di fede latina*) или грчког (*i Morlacchi di fede greca*) обреда, добри су, гостољубиви

људи, премда међусобно завађени. Приређивач јединог интегралног превода на овим просторима, Јосип Братулић, не помишља да би ови Морлаци грчког обреда могли бити Срби. Фортис, с друге стране, иако помиње Србију као посебну државу, сматра да су Морлаци народ који живи од далматинског средоземља до обале „Леденог океана”, те да је словенски језик распрострањен свуда по тој области.

Међутим, чак и његови текстови усмерени на друге циљеве одишу дивљењем према Морлацима. У једном од њих, где говори о водопаду Велике Губавице уз који се и сам пео, наглашава како је добио похвалу од једног Морлака. Његову ће физичку спремност тај мештанин похвалити речима које Фортис записује у оригиналу али по италијанском изговору „Gospodine, ti nissi Lanzmanin, tissi Vlàh!” (Fortis 1984: 202). Овде ваља нагласити да Фортис нашу реч „Влах” преводи венецијанском речју „Morlacco”, а М. R. Leto (2011), испитујући феномен морлакизма који је укоренио Фортисов путопис, у Вуковом *Рјечнику* налази да становници Далмације сами себе називају Власима. Поред све своје радозналости, Фортис не успева да се потпуно отргне стереотипима и предрасудама о овом народу. Тако Морлакиње, каже Фортис, доје децу до њихове четврте, па и шесте године. „Послије свега овога не треба сматрати бајком оно што се прича о чудесној дужини сиса у Морлакиња које могу дојити дјецу страга преко рамена или испод пазуха” (Fortis 1984: 77).

Рецепција Фортисовог путописа у свету умногоме је другачија него на нашим просторима. Већ смо видели да постоји само једно преведено интегрално издање, настало у СФРЈ, тачније у Хрватској, тек 210 година након објављивања оригиналног текста. Поменути феномен морлакизма огледаће се у мистификацији балканских Словена кроз најразличитија књижевна дела, нарочито у Француској (Павловић 2006). Вампири, вукодлаци, вештице, биће основни елемент ове књижевности, пре него добри дивљак о коме Фортис много више говори у свом путопису. Пример је роман Пола Февала (Paul Feval) *Вампирџа* (La Ville vampire, 1875) „чији се један део радње дешава у нашим крајевима, пошто је „Град“ смештен између Београда и Земуна, а вампири говоре српски” (Павловић 2006: 622). Може се, дакле, слободно рећи да је мода морлакизма заслужна за романтичарску фасцинацију фантастичним. Чак и онда када нема

фантастике, крвна освета и осветољубивост, о којој говори Фортис, битан је елемент у неком књижевном делу, као што је то у роману гусле (La Guzla, 1827) Проспера Меримеа (Павловић 2006: 615). Добра намера путопишчева остала је у сенци Волтерових речи да су Морлаци „најдивљији народ на свету, по осветољубивости равни Корзиканцима” (Павловић 2006: 616).

Нешто више од једног века после Фортиса, Балканом путује принц Божидар Карађорђевић. Изгнаник због припадности Карађорђевићима у време власти династије Обреновић, принц Божидар долази у Србију са пасошем и под именом свога пријатеља Жоржа Киртена. Истовремено, Србин и странац у њему не долазе у конфликт, али се могу тумачити као два поларитета, у биполарној Србији која га с почетка неће ни познавати, да би га, само неколико година касније, гледала као члана краљевске породице, кад Карађорђевићи опет преузму власт. Поглед из угла странца дозвољава му да сагледа и опише културу сопственог народа са фортисовском радозналошћу. То чини, наравно, и због чињенице да пише на француском језику, те је његов идеални читалац образовани Европљанин. Принц је свестан да Европљани релативно мало знају о култури његовог народа и Балкана уопште. Али чак и онда када описује народ, крајолике и све оно што се у једном путопису може очекивати, не пропушта да помене освајачке претензије присутне кроз читаву историју Срба и Балкана. „Свештеник, који је Словен, назива га Брач и одбија да острво зове италијанским именом” (Карађорђевић 2018: 45).

Пролазећи кроз Србију на путу за Свету Гору, принц просто мора да посети гроб свога прадеде Карађорђа. Дошавши у село пуно тајних присталица Карађорђевића, бива дочекан са радошћу и одушевљењем. Да ли би Срби другог Србина дочекали тако, или би, барем у то доба, макар с почетка сељани сумњали да се ради о каквом обреновићевском шпијуну? Принчева „маска” овде демаскира Србе који су, још једном у историји, били приморани да ставе маску притворности. То у њему само појачава радост онда када се његови сународници веселе. Тако, док описује свадбу у том селу, принц каже: „Млађи брат испрошенице зове се Божидар, као ја, и осврћем се кад год га неко ослови, сасвим заборављајући да према мом пасошу носим име Жорж” (Карађорђевић 2018: 34).



Толеранција и мултикултуралност, карактеристичне особине Срба, веома су наглашене код Карађорђевића. Чак и кад је обазрив према Албанцима, када се чуди њиховом понашању, ниједном речју не ниподаштава тај народ. Ипак, и он и Фортис долазе у сличан сукоб на својим путовањима.

Брат вратар препречује ми пут. Искушавам свој грчки из лица, молим га да преда моју визиткарту претпостављеном, али добијам само охи, не, најпре нимало љубазно, а потом веома љутито. И ја одустајем од посете, уз једину утеху да вратару саопштим све оно чега сам се присетио од простаклука на старогрчком (Карађорђевић 2018: 101).

Тај негостољубиви и сумњичави човјек апсолутно је одбијао отворити цркву и није хтио попустити молбама које су му се узастопно упућивале с највећом могућом понизношћу. Није одговарао ништа друго осим „нећу“ [*non voglio*], па што год му водич говорио или ја муцао. Због тога кратког поступка изгубих стрпљивост; нисам се више скањивао говорити илирски, те провалих у набрајање тако опширна пописа наслова против тога непопустљива човјека да вјерујем како сам у њ убацио не само мушке псовке него и грдне што се говоре женама (Fortis 1984: 186).

Гостољубивост и добро опхођење према странцу ипак су код обојице проткани неповерењем, и то баш када су у питању грчки православни и далматински римокатолички храм.

Принц Божидар је код нас познатији као уметник кога карактерише ар нуво стил (*Art Nouveau*) него као путописац или преводилац, о чему говори Ацовић (2018: 15). Поред Ацовића о принцу Божидару писао је и Стеван К. Павловић (2012). Монографија је писана на француском, а постоји и српски превод који је коришћен за потребе овог рада. Она читаоцу представља веома детаљну биографију принца Божидара са врло студиозно обрађеном историјском, политичком, породичном и уметничком позадином рада и живота принца Божидара.

Чланци Бруна Барилија настају у доба Првог балканског и Првог светског рата. Први чланци из балканског рата писани су у време када Италија није гајила најпријатељскије претензије према Србији, нарочито у јадранском приобаљу. Као и код Фортиса, где

идеални читалац не би очекивао памфлете о добрим дивљацима, тешко је да би читаоци новина за које је Барили писао могли да очекују похвалне речи о страдању Срба, а он ће описивати страдања српског народа срцем и душом” (Поповић 2014: 135). Сматрајући Србе спаситељима хришћанства на копну уз Венецију на мору (Барили 2014: 74), Барили више пута понавља:

Хиљаду година удаљени од нас по култури и од нашег мешовитог хуманитета узвраћа нам са сигурношћу ефикасношћу израза магнетичног патоса, ванредног смисла, коренитог смисла привлачности и чудесности који извиру из древног, готово угашеног, изворног, обамрлог атавизма који вене у нашој крви (Барили 2014: 74, 107).

О познато залагање Италије за стварање државе Албанаца, због већ поменутих претензија на источну обалу Јадрана, Барили као да се оглушује описујући пословична понашања Срба и Албанаца.

Јуче, на граници код Мердара, појавиле су се велике групе Арнаута, са белом заставом; српски официри чим су угледали становнике старе Србије албанске националности, потрчаше им у сусрет како би их братски загрлили, међутим, бела застава Арнаута скривала је најподмуклију подвалу. Чим се приближило неколико официра и војника Срба кругу Арнаута, они су изненада испалили оружје на њих, масакрирајући их (Барили 2014: 25).

Ово се види и у описима Скопља.

Желео си да посетиш Арнаута у њиховим четвртима? Након што си се духовно припремио кренуо си, за сваки случај, са набијеним пиштољем у цепу, низ такозване опасне путевке Дедала, а нашао си се пред тужним и пустим пределом, пуним насађених, разбијених фењера, прекривених снежно-белим прекривачем; свеколики минарети губили су се у магли, ни једно лице, ни један глас, нити иједан јаук да произиђе из ове тишине (Барили 2014: 70).

Док је Барили свој однос према Србима унапредио, у поређењу са Фортисовим, где то више није однос цивилизованог човека према дивљаку, премда и Барили сматра да постоји огромна разлика због другачијег историјског развоја, његова веза са Карађорђевићима,

па самим тим и принцом Божидаром, јесте опипљивија. Док су путописи Бруна Барилија и принца Божидара временски блиски, ваља нагласити и податак да је супруга Бруна Барилија била Даница Павловић, нећака краља Петра Карађорђевића, чије крунисање принц Божидар описује у другом делу свог путописа.

Бруно Барили је, међутим, код нас остао у сенци своје кћерке, велике сликарке Милене Павловић Барили. У Италији је рецепција његовог дела концентрисана на његове музичке критике, а његово ратно дописништво, иако хваљено као књижевно веома вредно, само је успут помињано. Његове ратне текстове скупио је и приредио Ђорџо Пелегрини (Giorgio Pellegrini 1993), те написао предговор, а након тога се ван контекста проучавања италијанско-балканских културних веза Барили ретко помиње.

Све што је овде изложено, писано у току три века, три раздобља, могло би се сажети у наслов књиге Светог владике Николаја Велимировића *Изнад истока и запада*. Биполарност какве, чини се, другде нема и не може бити, показана је на примеру балканског и, нарочито, српског културног наслеђа. Распето између прогресистичке радозналости и деструктивистичке стереотипизације, извориште непознатог и сличног, страха и спорадичног дивљења, оно опстаје и развија се. Цвета чак и када Србин и Балканац здружено примају једног Карађорђевића као странца а одбацују га као Србина. Али, да ли цвета када одбацује све оно добро што други код њега уочавају?

Можда би боља рецепција у Србији и шире познавање аутора дела разматраних у овом раду довела до помиљивијих ставова и мањег зазирања историјских непријатеља Србије. Александар Петровић, на чију се дефиницију постисторијске културне дипломатије ослања наш рад, можда је превише забринут за опстанак српског народа у културно-дипломатским односима какве представља. Разлог за забринутост, међутим, још је већи када се сагледа наш однос према оним странцима, или натурализованим странцима, који су кроз историју покушавали, на овај или онај начин, амање или више свесно, да непознате, егзотичне балканске народе интегришу у савремене цивилизацијске токове. Примером слабе рецепције Фортисовог путописа, уступивши хрватским тумачима сав херменеутички маневарски простор, одбацујемо део

свог наслеђа на просторима јадранског приобаља. Потискујући Барилија у страну игноришемо његове панегирике нашем народу какве је ретко ко ван Србије писао. Овлаш посматрајући принца Божидача, можда само зато што је писао на језику који није српски или зато што је „извесно да Божидар никада није гајио династичке претензије, чак ни у најдубљој интими” (Ацовић 2018: 13)<sup>1</sup>, а можда по инерцији страха у коме је живело неколико генерација, одлазимо у постисторију о којој говори Петровић (2011: 18). Прихвативши туђе погледе онаквим какви су, опростивши покоју грешку која се овде-онде јави, опет бисмо испољили пословичну културну толеранцију коју пропагирају наши западни контрапоненти, која је на Балкану цветала много раније него што је појам мултикултурализма добио своје данашње значење, те коју, као српску особину, наглашавају сва три разматрана путописца, и тиме још једном себи и свету показали ко смо, те ограничили могућности нове стереотипизације.

## Напомене

- 1 Pavlović (2012) од стр. 76. веома детаљно говори о Божидаровој незаинтересованости за претензије на српски престо. У одређеним тренуцима подржавао је свог брата Алексија у покушајима да добије статус наследника, али су његова интересовања гравитирала према уметности, а политике се клонио чим би му уметничка инспирација и друге прилике то омогућавале.

## Библиографија

- Ацовић, Дејан (2018) „Путописна проза Божидача Карађорђевића” у: Карађорђевић, Божидар. *Пушевима Балкана*. Прир. Дејан Ацовић. Библиотека Браћа Настасијевић: Горњи Милановац, стр. 9–23.
- Барили, Бруно (2014) *Српски рајови*. Прометеј: Нови Сад.
- Bratulić, Josip (1984) Alberto Fortis i njegov put po Dalmaciji, у: Fortis, Alberto. *Put po Dalmaciji*. Прир. Josip Bratulić. Globus: Zagreb.
- Gvozden, Vladimir (2005) „Kako čitati putopis“, у: S. Ilić (ur.), *Kako čitati: o strategijama čitanja kulture*. Beograd: Narodna biblioteka Srbije, доступно на: <https://bif.rs/2014/05/vladimir-gvozden-kako-citati-put-opis/> (приступљено: 23. 2. 2023).

- Живковић Фиати, Марија (2014) „Уз овај превод“, у: Барили, Бруно. *Српски рајшови*. Прометеј: Нови Сад, стр. 121–132.
- Ispionline.it. (2021) CERTIFICATE „DIPLOMAZIA CULTURALE E COOPERAZIONE INTERNAZIONALE“ (IN MODALITÀ WEB-LIVE). <https://www.ispionline.it/it/ispi-school/advanced/professional-certificate-diplomazia-culturale-e-cooperazione-internazionale> (приступљено: 12. 2. 2022).
- Карађорђевић, Божидар (2018) *Пушевима Балкана*. Прир. Дејан Ацовић. Библиотека Браћа Настасијевић: Горњи Милановац.
- Костић, Веселин (1998) Алберто Фортис и његови британски покровитељи. *Зборник Маџице српске за књижевност и језик*.
- Костић, Веселин (1988) Предвуковска интересовања за нашу народну поезију : Алберто Фортис и шкотски естетичари. *Зборник радова Вук Караџић и његово дело у своме времену и данас*.
- Leto, Maria Rita (2011). I Morlacchi, un nome per l'altro, у: *Rotte Adriatiche: Tra Italia, Balcani e Mediterraneo*. Franco Angeli Edizioni: Milano, стр. 50–61.
- Montefoschi, Paola (2011) L'altra sponda: gli itinerari adriatici di Bruno Barilli e Giovanni Comisso, у: *Rotte Adriatiche: Tra Italia, Balcani e Mediterraneo*. Franco Angeli Edizioni: Milano, стр. 113–125.
- Павловић, Михаило. Алберто Фортис и француска књижевност. *Лешојис Маџице српске*, април 2006.
- Pavlović, Stevan K. (2012) *Božid'art*. Clio: Beograd.
- Paccagnini, Ermanno. Il Barilli “riscritto” delle corrispondenze belliche, у: *Secondo volume della Nuova Serie della rivista Trasparenze* (2/2017), Kindle edition.
- Pellegrini, Giorgio (1993) L'apprendista prosatore, у: Barilli, Bruno. *Le Guerre serbe*. Editori Riuniti: Roma.
- Пековић, Слободанка (2001) Путопис – условљеност жанра. *Зборник радова Књиџа о јуџојису*, Институт за књижевност и уметност: Београд, стр. 11–26.
- Петровић, Александар (2011) „Поларна Србија“, у: *Наслеђе : часојис за књижевност, уметност и културу*. ISSN 1820-1768. Год. 8, бр. 17, стр. 9–27.
- Pizzamiglio, Gilberto (2010) Introduzione, у: Fortis, Alberto. *Viaggio in Dalmazia*. Prir. Eva Viani. EDIZIONI DIGITALI DEL CISVA.
- Поповић, Радован (2014) „Бол и туга Бруна Барилија“ у: Барили, Бруно. *Српски рајшови*. Прометеј: Нови Сад, стр. 133–144.
- Fortis, Alberto (1984) *Put po Dalmaciji*. Prir. Josip Bratulić. Globus: Zagreb.
- Cecchi, Emilio (1987) „Bruno Barilli“, у: *Storia della letteratura italiana*, Il Novecento, t. 2. Mondadori: Milano.

# KULTURNA DIPLOMATIJA U ODNOSIMA JUGOSLAVIJE I ALBANIJE NAKON DRUGOG SVETSKOG RATA, 1945–1948.

IGOR VUKADINović

## Uvod

Specijalne veze Jugoslavije i Albanije nakon Drugog svetskog rata zasnivale su se na saradnji koju su komunističke partije dveju država uspostavile tokom 1941. Tada su članovi Oblasnog komiteta KPJ za Kosovo i Metohiju Miladin Popović i Dušan Mugoša prešli u Albaniju, gde su angažovani kao savetnici Centralnog komiteta KP Albanije (Hodža 1981: 19–22; Mugoša 1973: 28–44; Pljaku 1984: 29–30, 34–36; Fevziu 2016: 66–79; Prifti 1978: 13–14; Fischer 123–125). Istovremeno, članovi komunističkog pokreta u Albaniji su 1941. došli na područje Jugoslavije koje je okupirala Albanija i preuzeli vodeću ulogu u upravljanju Oblasnim komitetom KPJ za Kosovo i Metohiju (Vukadinović 2021: 73–74).

Pošto su tokom jeseni 1944. komunističke partije preuzele vlast u obe zemlje, otvorena je nova faza u bilateralnim odnosima. Jugoslavija je bila jedina socijalistička zemlja koja se graničila sa Albanijom i ujedno najvažniji oslonac u ekonomskoj i spoljnoj politici novog režima u Tirani. Pored uputstva da Jugoslavija razvija intenzivnu saradnju sa svim socijalističkim zemljama u Evropi, odnosima sa Albanijom poseban pečat davala je namera Politbiroa Centralnog komiteta Komunističke partije Jugoslavije (CK KPJ) da ostvari ujedinjenje sa Albanijom u „Balkansku federaciju“ (Petranović 1991: 136–142). Time bi položaj Komunističke partije Jugoslavije i njenog vođstva dodatno ojačao u evropskom socijalističkom bloku. Planirano je i da se unutar nove federacije Kosovo i Metohija izdvoje iz sastava Srbije i pripoje Albaniji (Dimić i dr. [ur.] 2010:

181; Đilas 1986: 82; Imami 2017: 26–27). Hrvatski i slovenački komunisti, koji su politički i brojčano dominirali u Politbirou CK KPJ, na ovaj način su nastojali da dodatno oslabe srpski uticaj u novoj državi (Vukadinović 2021: 194–198).

Plan za dvostruku promenu granica odredio je posleratne odnose dve zemlje. Nova jugoslovenska vlast je preuzela ulogu zaštitnika albanskih interesa na međunarodnom planu. Prva je priznala Vladu Envera Hodže, insistirala je na tome da se Albaniji dodeli status „žrtve fašističke okupacije“ i da joj se isplate ratne reparacije (Stojnić 1945: 23–25; Dedijer 1949: 147–153; Petranović 1991: 143–144).<sup>1</sup> Iako je i sama bila pogođena ratom, Jugoslavija je počela da u Albaniju upućuje značajnu vojnu i ekonomsku pomoć (Babić 1981: 55–62; Plasari, Malltezi [eds.] 1996: 531–533). Od 1945. do 1948. iz Jugoslavije je u Albaniju isporučena pomoć od 1,908 milijardi dinara, odnosno 38 miliona tadašnjih dolara (Vukadinović 2021: 204; Dedijer 1949: 173–181; Slavković 2012a: 144–148). Oko 700 jugoslovenskih stručnjaka i radnika je tokom 1947. i 1948. boravilo u Albaniji, gde su učestvovali u podizanju njene privrede, dok su kulturni delatnici, glumci, književnici i umetnici dobili zadatak da rade na kulturnom uzdizanju Albanije. Zauzvrat, članci albanske štampe i programi radio-stanica u Albaniji bili su ispunjeni sadržajima posvećenim izgradnji kulta ličnosti Josipa Broza, kao i veličanju jugoslovenskih partizana i posleratne jugoslovenske privrede (Méhilli 2017: 40–41).<sup>2</sup> Jugoslovenska politika prema Albaniji je u osnovnim crtama podsećala na odnose Sovjetskog Saveza sa zemljama Istočnog bloka. Status političke i kulturne dominacije nad manjim saveznicima u bloku socijalističkih zemalja bio je plaćen upućivanjem bespovratne vojne, ekonomske i kulturne pomoći tim zemljama.

## **Učenje srpskog jezika i širenje jugoslovenske literature u Albaniji**

U septembru 1945. u Tirani je formiran inicijativni odbor za formiranje Društva za kulturnu saradnju Albanije i Jugoslavije. Za predsednika društva izabran je Ramadan Čitaku, ministar finansija Albanije, koji je kasnije preuzeo dužnost ambasadora u Jugoslaviji. Ovo društvo

je priredilo brojne kulturne manifestacije, a posebne svečanosti je organizovalo povodom rođendana Josipa Broza, kada su u Tirani gostovali umetnici iz Jugoslavije.<sup>3</sup> U Beogradu je 24. marta 1946. osnovano Kulturno društvo Jugoslavija–Albanija. Članovi društva bili su visoki partijski funkcioneri poput Petra Stambolića i oficiri Jugoslovenske armije Savo Drljević, Velimir Stojnić, Vojo Todorović, Dmitar Vlahov i drugi.<sup>4</sup> Društvo je obeležavalo značajnije albanske praznike i organizovalo kurseve albanskog jezika za svoje članove u Beogradu. Potom je i svaka jugoslovenska republika formirala svoje društvo za kulturnu saradnju sa Albanijom.<sup>5</sup>

Krajem 1945. pokrenuta je inicijativa za organizovanje kurseva srpskohrvatskog jezika u Albaniji. Albanske vlasti su podržale ideju, a kao kandidat za učenje srpskohrvatskog javio se i predsednik Vlade Enver Hodža. Albanija je potom ukinula italijanski jezik kao obavezni predmet u srednjim školama i uvela učenje ruskog i srpskohrvatskog jezika, što je bio odraz nove političke klime. Albanska vlada je od Jugoslavije zatražila da pošalje najmanje deset nastavnika koji će predavati srpskohrvatski jezik u albanskim školama. Kako bi se procedura ubrzala, naređenje Ministarstvu prosvete FNRJ da „hitno“ pristupi traženju adekvatnih profesora dao je lično Josip Broz.<sup>6</sup> Pored stručnosti, od kandidata se zahtevala i politička podobnost (Slavković 2012: 116). Do leta 1946. u Albaniju je otputovalo deset jugoslovenskih profesora, među kojima i Vojislav Dančetović, jedan od prvih srpskih albanologa i profesor albanskog jezika i književnosti na Filozofskom fakultetu u Beogradu.<sup>7</sup> Kurseve srpskohrvatskog jezika su, uz Envera Hodžu, pohađali i drugi vodeći albanski rukovodioci Nako Spiru, Mehmet Šehu i Dali Ndreu. Planirano je da srpskohrvatski postane obavezan školski predmet od školske 1947/1948. godine.<sup>8</sup>

I učitelji iz Albanije su nakon rata upućivani na rad u Jugoslaviju, ali isključivo sa zadatkom da predaju u albanskim školama u Srbiji i Makedoniji. Masovno slanje učitelja iz Albanije na područje okupirane Jugoslavije započele su 1941. fašističke vlasti (Vukadinović 2021a: 111–120). Nakon završetka rata, na inicijativu Oblasnog komiteta KPJ za Kosovo i Metohiju, ovi učitelji su zadržani u nastavi, a zatraženo je da se pošalju dodatni kontingenti učitelja iz Albanije. Vodeći albanski komunista u Jugoslaviji Fadilj Hodža je tim povodom u aprilu 1945. u Tirani razgovarao sa predsednikom Vlade Albanije Enverom Hodžom.



Režim u Tirani je izašao u susret molbi kosovskometohijskih komunista i uputio nove grupe učitelja (Fevziu 2016: 191; Vukadinović 2021: 154; Vukadinović 2021a: 125–129).<sup>9</sup>

Koliko se jugoslovensko-albanska prosvetna saradnja odvijala u specifičnim okolnostima pokazuje to što srpska nacionalna manjina u okolini Skadra u to vreme nije uspjela da izdejsstvuje pravo na školovanje na maternjem jeziku. Iako su predstavnici srpske manjine upućivali molbe da im se omogući ovo pravo, Albanska vlada je odbacivala njihove inicijative, a jugoslovensko poslanstvo u Tirani nije pokazivalo nikakvo interesovanje za rešavanje ovog problema (Vukadinović 2021: 214; Petranović 1991: 144–145). Tokom 1946. i 1947. godine uspostavljena je situacija u kojoj su srpski jezik učili funkcioneri Komunističke partije Albanije i albanski učenici širom Albanije, ali ne i deca iz srpske nacionalne manjine u toj zemlji.

Predmet srpskohrvatski jezik se tokom 1946/1947. učio u gimnazijama i učiteljskim i srednjim stručnim školama u Tirani, Elbasanu, Đirokastri, Korči, Valoni, Beratu i Skadru (Slavković 2012: 117). Jugoslovenski profesori u Albaniji imali su različita iskustva. Pored primera uspešno obavljenog posla, bilo je i profesora koji su ušli u konflikte sa Albancima, a neki su, poput profesora Vojislava Dančetovića, ostvarili previše bliske odnose sa ljudima iz albanskog Ministarstva prosvete, među kojima je bilo i onih koji nisu bili naklonjeni Jugoslaviji, što je zasmetalo jugoslovenskom poslanstvu u Tirani.<sup>10</sup>

Paralelno sa radom u školi, dvoje jugoslovenskih profesora je tokom boravka u Tirani angažovano i na pisanju srpskohrvatsko-albanskog rečnika. Ovaj zadatak je Ministarstvo prosvete Albanije poverilo Naučnom institutu u Tirani. Vojislav Dančetović je bio član redakcionog odbora, koji su još činili lingvisti Ećrem Čabej, Aleksandar Džuvani i Kostać Cipo. Saradnici u izradi rečnika bili su Zagorka Filipović, Mark Ndoja, Aleks Buda, Paško Geci i Ivan Brabec. Naučni institut u Tirani je u junu 1947. objavio prvo izdanje srpskohrvatsko-albanskog rečnika (Српскохрватско-албански речник 1947: 7–8). Sredinom 1946. u Tirani je otvorena jugoslovenska knjižara pod nazivom „Jugoslovenska knjiga“, preko koje je u Albaniji počela da se širi literatura iz Jugoslavije. Kao primarni zadatak knjižare „Jugoslovenska knjiga“, Komitet za kulturu i umetnost je naveo „vršenje propagande“, a potom i prodaja knjiga i razmena literature.<sup>11</sup> Na molbu Ministarstva prosveta

Albanije, Jugoslavija je u Albaniju počela da šalje školske programe za srednje stručne škole, kao i programe nastave sa pravnih, ekonomskih i tehničkih fakulteta.<sup>12</sup>

## Saradnja na polju umetnosti

Kulturna delatnost u posleratnoj Jugoslaviji bila je pod strogim nadzorom državnog i partijskog aparata, koji je usmeravao kulturne akcije u skladu sa ideološkim i političkim interesima KPJ (Dimić 1988: 36–71; Doknić 2021: 42–51; Čavoški 1990: 198–212). Razmene i upućivanje umetnika u inostranstvo organizovali su i nadgledali činovnici Ministarstva inostranih poslova i drugih resora Vlade FNRJ. Prvi gostujući koncerti umetnika iz dve zemlje održani su tokom 1946. godine, kada je Centralni državni hor Albanije nastupao u većim gradovima Jugoslavije i organizovao turneju u hrvatskim gradovima duž jadranske obale (Slavković 2012: 109–127).<sup>13</sup> Naredne godine, grupa od 71 jugoslovenskog umetnika, pretežno horista, solista i plesača iz Ljubljane i Zagreba, izvela je 17 priredbi i 3 radio-emisije u Albaniji.<sup>14</sup> Jugoslovensko poslanstvo u Tirani je zaključilo da je turneja „od albanskog naroda bila primljena sa oduševljenjem“ i da je „uspeh grupe bio potpun“. Poslanstvo je predložilo da se ubuduće šalju manje grupe umetnika zbog problema sa njihovim smeštajem, snabdevanjem i transportom.<sup>15</sup>

Jugoslavija je pružila stručnu i finansijsku podršku za formiranje prvog profesionalnog Narodnog pozorišta u Albaniji. Na ovom poslu je 1945. bio angažovan glumac i reditelj Narodnog pozorišta u Beogradu Božidar Nikolić (Babić 1981). On je u Albaniji boravio osam meseci sa zadatkom da od diletantskog pozorišta napravi prvo profesionalno pozorište u Albaniji. Nikolić je bio višegodišnji predsednik Udruženja glumaca Jugoslavije, a učestvovao je i u stvaranju mreže banovinskih pozorišta tokom tridesetih godina. Sa ovim iskustvom, u Tirani je izdvajao najtalentovanije amaterske glumce, koji su potom izvodili srpska i svetska pozorišna dela. Prva izvedena predstava u novom pozorištu bila je „Đido“ srpskog književnika Janka Veselinovića. Na Nikolićevu inicijativu, na albanski jezik je prevedeno delo Branislava Nušića „Narodni poslanik“, koje je potom izvedeno u pozorištu u Tirani (Slavković 2012: 110).

U Tirani je 1946. godine otvoren Umetnički licej, koji je imao muzički odsek za klavir, violinu i solo pevanje, zatim teorijski, vajarski i slikarski odsek. Usled nedostatka stručnih kadrova, Albanija je uputila molbu Jugoslaviji za slanje deset muzičara koji bi bili angažovani u Umetničkom liceju, kao i u Albanskom državnom orkestru – dva profesora violine, i po jedan profesor viole, kontrabasa, violončela, flaute, klarineta, fagota, trombona i harmonike.<sup>16</sup> Jugoslovenskim vlastima nije bilo lako da pronađu ljude za ovaj poduhvat zbog otpora muzičara da se presele u Albaniju, kao i zbog kadrovskog deficita u samoj Jugoslaviji. Najveća briga jugoslovenskih umetnika kojima je ponuđen odlazak u Tiranu odnosila se na materijalni aspekt angažmana, izdržavanje njihovih porodica u Jugoslaviji i očuvanje radnog mesta po povratku iz Albanije.<sup>17</sup>

Dirigent opere i filharmonije u Subotici Milan Asić je početkom maja 1947. otputovao u Albaniju sa zadatkom da organizuje mešoviti hor Društva Albanija–Jugoslavija u Tirani i održi kurs za dirigente. Asić je uspeo da formira hor od nekoliko desetina ljudi, ali planirani kurs za dirigente nije organizovan. Asić je odlučio da se angažuje u rešavanju problema nedostatka kadrova za orkestar Radio Tirane. Neki od njegovih predloga su podrazumevali da Jugoslavija šalje umetnike u Albaniju, čak i po cenu da njihova mesta u jugoslovenskim kulturnim ustanovama budu popunjavana umetnicima iz Centralne i Istočne Evrope (Petrović 2002: 81–82). Po povratku u Jugoslaviju 1947. postigao je dogovor sa osmoro slovenačkih i hrvatskih muzičara koji su potom angažovani u Albaniji. Asić je predložio i da se u Albaniju pošalju svi jugoslovenski školski planovi za muzičko obrazovanje, od osnovnih muzičkih škola do akademija.<sup>18</sup>

Slovenački dirigent Bojan Adamič boravio je u Albaniji radi procene stanja i kvaliteta albanskih muzičara.<sup>19</sup> Njegovi utisci su bili negativni: smatrao je da je nivo znanja muzičara u simfonijskom orkestru u Tirani bio nedovoljan i da je u orkestru bilo i muzičkih analfabeta koji nisu znali da čitaju note. (Slavković 2012: 118).<sup>20</sup> Od jugoslovenskih vlasti je tražio da se pošalje profesionalni violinista koji bi naučio albanske violiniste tehniku sviranja. Žalio se i na lični tretman i na nisku platu koju je dobijao od jugoslovenskog poslanstva, kao i na ukus hrane u hotelu u kojem je boravio.<sup>21</sup>

Izveštaj Bojana Adamiča je bio toliko negativan prema Albaniji da se jugoslovensko poslanstvo u Tirani, koje je izveštaj prosledilo

Ministarstvu spoljnih poslova Jugoslavije i Komitetu za kulturu i umetnost, ogradilo od njegovih stavova i poručilo da je Adamičev odnos prema Albancima bio nadmen i potcenjivački. Poslanstvo je zaključilo da se jugoslovenski kulturni radnici u Albaniji ubuduće ne smeju odnositi prema albanskim kulturnim delatnicima na način na koji je to činio Adamič.<sup>22</sup>

Nakon pregleda stanja muzičke kulture u Albaniji koju su izvršili Adamič i Asić, jugoslovensko-albansko društvo za uvoz-izvoz dobilo je uputstvo da iz Jugoslavije u Albaniju prebaci trideset muzičkih instrumenata, uključujući klavire, violine, violončela, klarinete, flaute, trombon, obou, gitare i bubnjeve.<sup>23</sup> Komitet za kulturu i umetnost Vlade FNRJ je između maja i decembra 1947. doneo preko trideset akata koji su se odnosili na isporuke slikarskog i umetničkog materijala u Albaniju.<sup>24</sup> Tokom septembra i novembra 1947. u Tirani je boravila jugoslovenska koreografkinja Agata Žic, koja je albanskom Komitetu za kulturu i umetnost pomagala u organizovanju grupa narodnih plesača.<sup>25</sup>

## Prosvetna saradnja

U maju 1946. albanske vlasti su otvorile pitanje školovanja albanskih omladinaca u jugoslovenskim srednjim stručnim školama i preduzećima. Nakon što je primio molbu od Vlade Albanije, jugoslovenski poslanik u Tirani Josip Đerđa je predložio da sav trošak za školovanje albanskih omladinaca preuzme Jugoslavija, odnosno ministarstva poljoprivrede, industrije i rudarstva njenih republika. Uskoro se ispostavilo da ova ministarstva nemaju dovoljno sredstava da pokriju sve troškove omladinaca i da nedostaje novca za nabavku odeće, knjiga i pribora.<sup>26</sup> Ministarstvo inostranih poslova zaključilo je da bi odustajanje od finansiranja albanskih omladinaca „štetilo jugoslovenskom prestižu u savezničkoj Albaniji“, zbog čega je zamolilo Predsedništvo Vlade da ipak pronađe izvor finansiranja za ovaj poduhvat.<sup>27</sup>

U decembru 1946. u Jugoslaviji se nalazio 391 albanski omladinac, od kojih je najveći broj bio angažovan u resoru ministarstva rudarstva (170), a potom poljoprivrede (129) i industrije (75). Šest Albanaca se usavršavalo u sektoru saobraćaja, trojica su bili zaposleni na Radio

Beogradu, a osmorica u PTT-u. Učenici koji su imali do 20 godina bili su smešteni u domove učenika, dok su starijim omladincima preduzeća u kojima su radili obezbedila privatni smeštaj.<sup>28</sup>

Tokom 1946. započeti su pregovori, a potom i pripreme za upisivanje albanskih državljana na jugoslovenske fakultete. U decembru 1946. organizovani su prvi prijemi albanskih studenata i njihovo raspoređivanje u univerzitetske gradove. Dok je za stručno usavršavanje omladinaca celokupne troškove snosila Jugoslavija, za stipendiranje albanskih studenata postignut je dogovor da se troškovi podele. Jedan deo studenata finansiralo je Ministarstvo prosvete Albanije, a drugi deo Komitet za škole i nauku FNRJ i jugoslovenske republike u kojima su se univerziteti nalazili.

U statističkom pregledu studenata albanskih državljana u Jugoslaviji, koji se odnosio na školsku 1946/1947. godinu, navedeno je da je u Beogradu studiralo 48, u Zagrebu 94, Ljubljani 26, a u Sarajevu 16 studenata iz Albanije.<sup>29</sup> Studenti iz Albanije su najveće interesovanje pokazivali za medicinske fakultete, industrijsku inženjeriju, filozofske fakultete, građevinske i ekonomske fakultete.<sup>30</sup> Albanski studenti su 1947. počeli da izlaze na ispite, na kojima su postizali relativno slabe rezultate. Ipak, albansko poslanstvo u Beogradu je bilo zadovoljno prvom godinom studija Albanaca u Jugoslaviji, a slabiji rezultati na ispitima su objašnjavani nedovoljnim poznavanjem jezika i činjenicom da su studenti u Jugoslaviju stigli tokom decembra i januara, kada je školska godina uveliko bila u toku.<sup>31</sup>

Naredne 1947/1948. dogovoreno je upućivanje 335 albanskih studenata, od čega 235 kao stipendista Albanije, a 100 kao stipendista Jugoslavije.<sup>32</sup> Konačan raspored stipendista albanske vlade bio je sledeći: Visoke škole i fakultete u Zagrebu upisala su 83 studenta, 78 je upućeno u Beograd, 61 u Ljubljani, a 13 studenata je upisano na Medicinski fakultet u Sarajevu.<sup>33</sup> Studenti iz Albanije koje je finansirala Jugoslavija raspoređeni su na sledeći način: 35 studenata je poslato u Beograd, 25 u Zagreb, 32 u Ljubljani, a 8 na Medicinski fakultet u Sarajevu.<sup>34</sup>

	Stipendisti albanske vlade	Stipendisti jugoslovenske vlade	Ukupan broj Albanaca školske 1947/1948.
Univerzitet u Beogradu	78	35	113
Univerzitet u Zagrebu	83	25	108
Univerzitet u Ljubljani	61	32	93
Univerzitet u Sarajevu	13	8	21
Ukupno	235	100	335

**Tabela 1.** Pregled studenata iz Albanije upisanih na jugoslovenske fakultete 1947/1948.

Fakultet sa najviše upisanih studenata bio je Tehnički fakultet u Ljubljani, koji je upisalo je 85 državljana Albanije, dok je Tehnički fakultet u Zagrebu upisalo njih 66. Sledeći po popularnosti bio je Ekonomski fakultet u Beogradu sa 40 upisanih studenata iz Albanije, kao i Poljo-privredno-šumarski fakultet sa 30 studenata.<sup>35</sup>

## **„Kulturna diplomatija“ u uslovima pogoršanih političkih odnosa**

Konvencija o kulturnoj saradnji Jugoslavije i Albanije potpisana je 9. jula 1947. Obe strane su se obavezale da će na visokim obrazovnim ustanovama osnovati katedre za jezik, književnost, istoriju i druge predmete u vezi sa kulturom druge države potpisnice.<sup>36</sup> Konvencijom je dozvoljeno da države ugovornice na teritoriji druge države organizuju trajne izložbe, biblioteke, čitaonice i arhive. Predviđena je razmena istraživača, profesora i studenata, međusobne posete istaknutih književnika, slikara, muzičara i glumaca, kao i predstavnika sindikalnih, omladinskih i ženskih organizacija.<sup>37</sup>

Da su, uprkos saradnji dveju zemalja u gotovo svim oblastima kulture i privrede, na relaciji Tirana–Beograd postojale i nejasnoće svedoči pismo koje je 22. jula 1947. Komitetu za škole i nauku uputio Drago Košmrlj, savetnik u jugoslovenskom poslanstvu u Tirani. On je poručio da je ministarstvom prosvete Albanije dugo upravljao „trockista“

Sejfula Malešova, poznat po neprijateljstvu prema Jugoslaviji. Naveo je i da je novi ministar prosvete Fadilj Parčami neprijateljski nastrojen prema Jugoslaviji. Prema tvrdnjama Košmrlja, Parčami nije pokazao interesovanje za konvenciju o kulturnoj saradnji, i naredio je da se tekst konvencije ne štampa u Albaniji.<sup>38</sup>

Protivrečnosti u jugoslovensko-albanskim odnosima došle su do izražaja 1947. godine. Na političkom polju ispoljavale su se u tome što je predsednik Vlade Albanije Enver Hodža pred Staljinom kritikovao jugoslovensko rukovodstvo u godini u kojoj je 56% albanskog budžeta trebalo da se obezbedi kroz pomoć iz Jugoslavije (Hodža 1981: 135). Na prosvetnom planu kontradiktornost se ogledala u tome da je, i pored sveobuhvatnih programa kulturne i prosvetne saradnje dveju zemalja, jugoslovensko poslanstvo u Tirani o albanskim ministrima prosvete izveštavalo kao o „neprijateljima Jugoslavije“.

Nesporazumi su se produbili u prvoj polovini 1948, kada je savezništvo Jugoslavije i Albanije počelo ubrzano da iščezava pod pritiskom hlađenja jugoslovensko-sovjetskih odnosa (Dimić 2014: 117–119; Kardelj 1980: 111–119). Međutim, dok su politička rukovodstva dve zemlje uveliko iskazivala nepoverenje prema drugoj strani, kulturno-prosvetna saradnja Albanije i Jugoslavije bila je u svom zenitu. U februaru 1948. jugoslovensko poslanstvo u Tirani radilo je na slanju nove grupe jugoslovenskih muzičara u Albaniju. Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova Jugoslavije je tada zategnute političke odnose sa Tiranom navelo kao razlog zbog kojeg Jugoslavija treba da pošalje stručne muzičare u Albaniju, bez obzira na problem njihovog kadrovskog deficita u Jugoslaviji.<sup>39</sup> Jugoslovensko rukovodstvo je u tom periodu pokušavalo da kroz povećanje ekonomske i kulturne pomoći Albaniji prevaziđe političke nesporazume sa albanskim rukovodstvom.

U martu 1948, Albanija je uputila molbu Jugoslaviji da za narednu školsku godinu obezbedi petnaest profesora srpskohrvatskog jezika za gimnazije, šezdeset dva učitelja za nastavu srpskohrvatskog jezika u osnovnim školama i jednog univerzitetskog profesora za nastavu na Višem pedagoškom institutu u Tirani.<sup>40</sup> Istog meseca, na Filozofskom fakultetu u Zagrebu osnovan je lektorat za albanski jezik, a usled nedostatka kvalifikovanih kadrova u Hrvatskoj, molba za slanje lektora upućena je Ministarstvu prosvete Albanije. U Tirani je počela da se štampa nova, korigovana verzija srpskohrvatsko-albanskog rečnika. Komitet za



škole i nauku FNRJ se 18. maja 1948. pretplatio na tri albanske revije – „Shqiperi – Jugosllavi“, „Arsimi popullor“ i „Literature e jone“. <sup>41</sup>

U kulturnoj saradnji dve zemlje javljao se sličan problem kao i u privrednoj saradnji, a on je proisticao iz preambicioznih obećanja pripadnika jugoslovenskog poslanstva u Tirani. Upućivanje profesora, naučnika i umetnika u Albaniju predstavljalo je proceduralno zahtevne poduhvate, tako da neretko nisu ni ispunjavani.

Jugoslavija je sačinila predlog plana kulturne saradnje sa Albanijom za 1948. i 1949. kojim je bilo predviđeno da se Ministarstvu prosvete Albanije šalju materijali o organizacionoj strukturi jugoslovenskog školstva, nastavni planovi i programi, udžbenici, i literatura. Planirane su posete arheologa, ekskurzija etnografa Jugoslovenske akademije znanosti i umetnosti iz Zagreba, koncerti jugoslovenskih muzičara u Albaniji, izvođenje jugoslovenskih predstava u Tirani i druge manifestacije. <sup>42</sup> Grupa muzičara sa Cetinja je u aprilu 1948. izvela priredbe u Skadru i Tirani, a u maju je koncert u Tirani organizovala i grupa umetnika iz Maribora. U Tirani su 25. maja 1948. održana tri koncerta jugoslovenskih umetnika u čast Brozovog rođendana. <sup>43</sup>

Jugoslovenske državne službe i ministarstva nastavili su da vode politiku kulturnog zbližavanja sa zemljama Istočnog bloka sve do 28. juna 1948. kada je objavljena rezolucija Informbiroa o situaciji u Komunističkoj partiji Jugoslavije. Već sutradan zabeležen je niz incidenata u Albaniji, Brozove slike su izbacivane iz prostorija mešovitih društava, a dolazilo je i do fizičkog nasilja nad jugoslovenskim radnicima i stručnjacima. Albanski MUP je 30. juna naredio zatvaranje knjižare „Jugoslovenska knjiga“ u Tirani i zabranu prodaje lista *Borba*. Po naređenju ministra industrije, zabranjeno je slanje nafte za Jugoslaviju, a ministar saobraćaja naredio je obustavu izgradnje pruge od Skadra do jugoslovenske granice. Pojedini lekari u Albaniji su tih dana odbijali da prime bolesne i povređene jugoslovenske radnike (Vukadinović 2021: 306). <sup>44</sup>

CK Komunističke partije Albanije je 1. jula poručio da je KPJ pokušala da Albaniju pretvori u koloniju i uništi njenu nezavisnost (Slavković 2020: 328). Albanska vlada je jugoslovenskom poslanstvu predala dve note sa porukama da svi jugoslovenski radnici i stručnjaci moraju napustiti Albaniju u roku od 48 sati i da albanska strana napušta sve ugovore i konvencije potpisane sa Jugoslavijom (Vukadinović 2021: 307). Za samo tri dana, celokupna konstrukcija jugoslovensko-albanskog savezništva



srušena je do temelja. Komitet za kulturu i umetnost jugoslovenske vlade je još neko vreme slao određene materijale u Albaniju u skladu sa ranije postignutim dogovorima. Međutim, Komitet za kulturu i umetnost Albanije odbacivao je svaku dalju saradnju sa Jugoslavijom. Iz državnih biblioteka u Albaniji izbačene su sve jugoslovenske knjige, uključujući čak i srpske prevode Staljinovih dela.<sup>45</sup> Albanske kulturne institucije dobile su uputstvo da programe saradnje sa Jugoslavijom zamene kulturnom saradnjom sa Rumunijom, Bugarskom, Mađarskom i Čehoslovačkom.<sup>46</sup>

## Zaključak

Kulturna saradnja dveju zemalja, kao i način na koji je Albanija prekinula diplomatske odnose sa Jugoslavijom 1948. godine, otkrili su prednosti, ali i ograničenja u korišćenju kulture i umetnosti kao sredstva u međudržavnim odnosima i diplomatskoj praksi. Pokazalo se koliko angažman naučnika i umetnika u inostranstvu može biti nezahvalan posao ukoliko se odnosi dve zemlje ne temelje na istorijskoj, kulturnoj i identitetskoj bliskosti, nego isključivo na trenutnim odnosima dva režima.

Iskustvo jugoslovenske pomoći Albaniji nakon Drugog svetskog rata pokazalo je slabosti modela kulturne diplomatije u uslovima autoritarnog uređenja zemlje. Nedemokratski karakter jednopartijskih režima u dve zemlje ograničavao je poziciju kulturnih radnika u zajedničkim projektima. Kulturna i spoljna politika posleratne Jugoslavije bile su podređene partijskim i ideološkim ciljevima Komunističke partije Jugoslavije i njenog rukovodstva. Intenzivni kontakti jugoslovenskih i albanskih umetnika i naučnika bili su gotovo isključivo rezultat partijske direktive, što je na kraju dovelo i do njihovog naglog prekida. Koliko god da su kulturni radnici iz Jugoslavije imali iskrene motive tokom boravka u Albaniji, albanska strana je u njihovom radu neretko prepoznavala nadmen odnos, a u jugoslovenskom prisustvu je umesto proklamovanog „internacionalizma“, prepoznavala crte političkog i kulturnog hegemonizma. Ovi nesporazumi su često doводili do konflikata, povlačenja umetnika iz Albanije i umanjivanja efekata jugoslovenske kulturne diplomatije.

## Napomene

- 1     Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova (DAMSP), Politička arhiva (PA)–1945, Albanija, f. 1, d. 28, Odnosi albansko-jugoslovenski, I-376. Šifrovani telegram Ministarstva spoljnih poslova vojnoj misiji u Tirani, 30. 4. 1945; AJ, fond 507, CKSKJ, IX, Albanija, K.1/ I-11, Baškimi ističe značaj priznanja nove albanske vlade od strane Jugoslavije, 4. 5. 1945; AJ, 507, CKSKJ, IX, Albanija, K.1/ I-24, Jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi po pitanju reparacija, decembar 1945.
- 2     Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), fond 507, CKSKJ, IX, Albanija, K.1/ I-45, Članci posvećeni Josipu Brozu Titu u „Luftetariju“ i „Baškimiju“, 25. februar – 26. maj 1946.
- 3     DAMSP, PA–1945, Albanija, f. 1, d. 25, I/309, Dopis jugoslovenskog poslanstva u Tirani Ministarstvu spoljnih poslova DFJ, 21. 9. 1945.
- 4     DAMSP, PA–1949, Albanija, f. 1, d. 9, Odnosi kulturni sa Albanijom, 1/72-76, Referat Ministarstva kulture i nauke FNRJ Ministarstvu spoljnih poslova FNRJ o kulturnoj saradnji sa Albanijom, 23. 12. 1949.
- 5     Isto.
- 6     DAMSP, PA–1946, Albanija, f. 1, d. 4, Odnosi sa Jugoslavijom, I/14, Pismo Josipa Đerdre Vladimiru Velebitu 1. januara 1946, I/18, Pismo Oskara Juranića ministarstvu prosvete FNRJ.
- 7     AJ, fond 315, Komitet za škole i nauku pri Vladi FNRJ, f. 3, a.j. 360, Pismo Komiteta za škole i nauku ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova FNRJ. 27. 3. 1946.
- 8     AJ, 315–3–386, Dopis Komiteta za škole i nauku pri Vladi FNRJ Ministarstvu prosvete Srbije u vezi sa slanjem profeorra u Albaniju, 2. 7. 1947.
- 9     Arkivi Qendror Shtetëror (AQSH), fondi 490, viti 1945, dosja 62, Kërkesë e deputetit të Këshillit të Rrethit të Reshovës (Kosovë) drejtuar shokut Enver Hoxha, mbi dërgimin e arsimtarëve për hapjen e shkollave në gjuhën amtare; AJ, 507, CK KPJ, 1944/310, Depeša Miladina Popovića Centralnom komitetu KPJ; DAMSP, PA–1945, Albanija, f. 1, d. 9, Socijalno-kulturna politika, Dopis Narodnooslobodilačkog oblasnog odbora KiM Nacionalnom komitetu OJ – povereništvu za prosvetu, 2. 3. 1945; AJ, 315–3–883.
- 10    AJ, 315–3–487.
- 11    AJ, fond 314, Komitet za kulturu i umetnost pri Vladi FNRJ, f. 4, a.j. 12, Dopis Komiteta za kulturu i umetnost pri Vladi FNRJ Ministarstvu inostranih poslova, 2. 8. 1946.
- 12    AJ, 315–54, a.j. 306–308, Veze sa Albanijom 1946–1948.
- 13    DAMSP, PA–1945, Albanija, f. 1, d. 25, I/309, Dopis jugoslovenskog poslanstva u Tirani Ministarstvu spoljnih poslova DFJ, 21. 9. 1945.
- 14    AJ, 314–4–25, Dopis Poslanstva FNRJ u Tirani Ministarstvu inostranih poslova i Komitetu za kulturu i umetnost, 21. 4. 1947.
- 15    Isto.
- 16    AJ, 314–4–186, Liste de professurs de musique instrumentale, 16. 11. 1946.
- 17    AJ, 314–4–191, Ministarstvo prosvete Hrvatske Komitetu za kulturu i umetnost FNRJ, 16. 7. 1947.

- 18 AJ, 314–4–31, Izveštaj Milana Asića o organizovanju i početku rada hora pri društvu Albanija-Jugoslavija u Tirani, 29. 5. 1947.
- 19 AJ, 314–4–190, Dopis Ministarstva prosvete Slovenije Komitetu za kulturu i umetnost Vlade FNRJ, 24. 3. 1947.
- 20 AJ, 314–4–34, Izveštaj Bojana Adamića Komitetu za kulturu i umetnost FNRJ, 23. 5. 1947.
- 21 Isto.
- 22 AJ, 314–4–33, Dopis Poslanstva FNRJ u Tirani Komitetu za kulturu i umetnost FNRJ u vezi sa izveštajem Bojana Adamića, 13. 6. 1947.
- 23 AJ, 314–4. a.j. 44–50, Albansko-jugoslovensko društvo za uvoz-izvoz, 12. 7. 1947.
- 24 AJ, 314–4–69, Spisak akata koji se odnose na predmete isporuke za Albaniju.
- 25 AJ, 314–4–41, Dopis sekretara Komiteta za kulturu i umetnost Ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova FNRJ u vezi sa produženjem pasoša Agati Žic.
- 26 DAMSP, PA–1946, Albanija, f. 2, d. 9, Albanski državljani kod nas, II/244, Pismo Ministarstva poljoprivrede i šumarstva FNRJ Ministarstvu inostranih poslova FNRJ, 20. 10. 1946.
- 27 DAMSP, PA–1946, Albanija, f. 2, d. 9, Albanski državljani kod nas, II/245, Pismo Ministarstva inostranih poslova Predsedništvu Vlade FNRJ, 4. 11. 1946.
- 28 AJ, fond 50, Predsedništvo Vlade FNRJ, f. 57, a.j. 21–23, Albanski omladinci u našim stručnim školama i preduzećima.
- 29 Opširnije: AJ, 315–6–113.
- 30 AJ, 315–49–230.
- 31 AJ, 315–49–297, Produženje stipendija albanskim studentima.
- 32 Jugoslavija je u avgustu 1947. godine poručila albanskim vlastima da može da primi „neograničen broj“ albanskih studenata na svojim fakultetima: DAMSP, PA–1947, Albanija, f. 2, d. 17, 2/437, Telegram Aleša Beblera poslanstvu FNRJ u Tirani, 23. 8. 1947.; AJ, 315–49–316, Upis albanskih studenata.
- 33 AJ, 315–49, a.j. 321–322, Raspored albanskih studenata stipendista albanske vlade.
- 34 AJ, 315–49, a.j. 317–320.
- 35 AJ, 315–49, a.j. 317–321.
- 36 AJ, 315–3, a.j. 375–378, Konvencija o kulturnoj saradnji zaključena i potpisana u Tirani 9. 7. 1947. između Federativne narodne republike Jugoslavije i Narodne republike Albanije; AJ, 314–4–4, Nacrt konvencije o kulturnoj saradnji između FNR Jugoslavije i NR Albanije.
- 37 AJ, 315–3, a.j. 375–378, Konvencija o kulturnoj saradnji zaključena i potpisana u Tirani 9. 7. 1947. između Federativne narodne republike Jugoslavije i Narodne republike Albanije.
- 38 AJ, 315–54–331, Prikaz kulturno-političke situacije u Albaniji, 22. 7. 1947.
- 39 AJ, 315–4–201, Dopis Ministarstva inostranih poslova FNRJ Komitetu za škole i nauku FNRJ u vezi sa potrebom Albanije za stručnim muzičarima, 9. 2. 1948.

- 40 DAMSP, PA–1948, Albanija, f. 1, d. 11, Kulturno-prosvetni život, Pismo Ministarstva inostranih poslova Albanije Ministarstvu inostranih poslova FNRJ, 15. 3. 1948.
- 41 AJ, 315–6–210.
- 42 AJ, 315–6, a.j. 197–199, Plan kulturne saradnje sa Albanijom, jugoslovenska strana predlaže.
- 43 AJ, 314–4–181, Dopis Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Komitetu za kulturu i umetnost FNRJ, 2. 6. 1948.
- 44 AJ, 507, CKSKJ, IX, Albanija, K. 2/I–191, Izveštaj Dušana Diminića, poslanika FNRJ u Albaniji, o događajima posle objavljivanja rezolucije Informbiroa, 1, 2.
- 45 AJ, 315–4–222, Dopis Ministarstva inostranih poslova Komitetu za kulturu i umetnost, 13. 10. 1948.
- 46 AQSH, fondi 624, Shoqëria për Bashkëpunimin Kulturor të Shqipërisë me Jugosllavinë, viti 1949, dosja 1.

## Bibliografija

- Babić, Milenko (1981). *Enver Hodžina Albanija*, Beograd: Tanjug.
- Čavoški, Kosta (1990). *Tito. Tehnologija vlasti*. Beograd: 1991.
- Dedijer, Vladimir (1949). *Jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi 1939–1948*. Beograd: Borba.
- Dimić, Ljubodrag (1988). *Agitprop kultura. Agitpropovska faza kulturne politike u Srbiji 1935–1952*, Beograd: Rad.
- Dimić, Ljubodrag (2014). *Jugoslavija i Hladni rat. Ogledi o spoljnoj politici Josipa Broza Tita (1944–1974)*, Beograd: Arhipelag.
- Димић, Љубодраг и др. (2010). Југословенско-совјетски односи 1945–1946: зборник докумената, Београд: Министарство спољних послова.
- Doknić, Branka (2021). *Kulturna politika Jugoslavije 1946–1963*. Beograd: Službeni glasnik.
- Dilas, Milovan (1986). *Susreti sa Staljinom*. London: Naša reč.
- Fevziu, Blendi (2016). *Enver Hoxha. The Iron fist of Albania*. London: I.B. Taurus.
- Fischer, Bernd (1999). *Albania at War (1939–1945)*. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press.
- Hodža, Enver (1981). *Titoisti*. Tirana: 8 Nentori.
- Imami, Petrit (2016). *Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove. Tom I*. Beograd: Samizdat B92.
- Imami, Petrit (2017). *Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove. Tom II*. Beograd: Samizdat B92.
- Kardelj, Edvard (1980). *Borba za priznanje i nezavisnost nove Jugoslavije 1944–1957*. Beograd: Radnička štampa.
- Mëhilli, Elidor. *From Stalin to Mao. Albania and a Socialist World*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Mugoša, Dušan (1973). *Na zadatku*. Beograd: Četvrti jul.
- Petranović, Branko (1991). *Balkanska federacija 1943–1948*. Šabac: Zaslون.

- Petrović, Ljubomir (2002). „Kulturne veze Jugoslavije i Albanije 1946–1948“. *Istorija 20. veka*, 2, 61–87.
- Plasari, Ndreçi, Malltezi, Luan (eds.) (1996). *Marredheniet shqiptaro-jugosllave 1945–1948*. Tiranë: Drejtoria e përgjithshme a arkivave.
- Pljaku, Panajot (1984). *Nasilje nad albanskom revolucijom*. Beograd: Narodna knjiga.
- Prifti, Peter (1978). *Socialist Albania since 1944: Domestic and Foreign Developments*. Cambridge: Mit Press.
- Slavković, Božica (2012). „Jugoslovensko-albanska saradnja u oblasti kulture, nauke i prosvete 1945–1948“, *Istorija 20. veka*, br. 3, 109–128.
- Slavković, Božica (2012a). „Jugoslovensko-albanski ekonomski odnosi 1945–1948: planovi i saradnja“, *Istorija 20. veka*, br. 1, 133–148.
- Slavković, Božica (2020). *Jugosloviija i Albanija 1945–1948: ekonomski odnosi*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije.
- Српскохрватско-албански речник, (1947), ur. Vojislav Dančeto­vić, Aleksandar Džuvani, Kostać Cipo, Ećrem Čabej, Tirana: Naučni institut.
- Stojnić Velimir (1945). *Današnja Albanija*, Novi Sad: Budućnost.
- Surroi, Veton (ed.) (2010). *Fadil Hoxha në veten e pare (me shënime dhe parathënie të Veton Surroi)*, Prishtinë: Koha.
- Vukadinović, Igor (2021). *Autonomija Kosova i Metohije u Srbiji (1945–1969)*. Beograd: Balkanološki institut SANU.
- Вукадиновић, Игор (2021a). „Просветна политика Краљевине Албаније на Косову и Метохији током Другог светског рата“, *Токови историје*, бр. 1, 109–132.

# ARCADIAN AND YUGOSLAV – (RE)SHAPING CULTURAL IDENTITY IN THE STATE ART COLLECTION IN BELGRADE

JELENA TODOROVIĆ AND BILJANA CRVENKOVIĆ

When discussing cultural diplomacy in connection with government or state art collections, one is usually focused on the embodiments of soft diplomacy and the compilation of artifacts that were acquired as diplomatic gifts, acquisitions and commissions over the course of time. The government art collections usually function as dual mirrors, those that reflect the history of diplomatic relations through the exchange of gifts, while acting as looking glasses through which the notions of the ideal state are envisioned.<sup>1</sup>

However, the State Art Collection of the Royal Compound in Belgrade (SAC) had different patterns of development and a rather remarkable history. It was created to be an idealized presentation of the state and throughout its history represented three different political entities, two completely opposing regimes while remaining a notable art collection in its own right. We present the specific role that the State art collection played in the cultural diplomacy of the Kingdom and later the Republic of Yugoslavia, and to show how its universal artistic vocabulary was reshaped through different regimes.

When it was founded in 1929, the State Art Collection of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was not envisaged with the complex and turbulent future that lay in front of it. From 1929 until late 1970s when the last artefact was added to the collection, it symbolically stood for all three *Yugoslavias* that evolved during this period: the Kingdom (1929/1941), the FNRJ (1945/1963) and SFRJ (1963-1991). Its artworks perpetually reflected universal and encompassing concepts of cultural diplomacy

that could be best divided into three main subjects: *the ideal state, the new Arcadia and the land of the Yugoslav nations*.

The SAC had a rich and a curious history, which is an integral, albeit neglected, part of the European cultural history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It was symbolically founded in 1929 with the proclamation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (previously it was the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), and the last works were added to it in the late 1970s prior to the death of President Tito. Although by its contents and its historical importance the SAC formed a notable part of the European and Yugoslav cultural heritage, this collection was never fully researched and was virtually unknown outside, and even within the borders of Yugoslavia. It was for the first time in 2014, that a complete Catalogue of the fine arts collection of the SAC in Belgrade was printed and its artworks protected as national heritage, and finally made available to the wider local and European audience.<sup>2</sup>

From the very foundation of SAC, two elements were made remarkably clear – the methodology of its formation, and the dual course of its development. While similar institutions, as noted at the beginning of this paper, were customarily created through diplomatic gifts, the SAC was formed solely by acquisitions and commissions that aimed at reflecting the ideals that first Kingdom, and later the Republic of Yugoslavia, stood for. Therefore, the founding of the SAC did not resemble the usual founding of art museums in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, (like the pattern that was followed in the creation of the Museum of Modern Art in Belgrade in 1927) it was, in its concept, much closer to the establishment of the princely collections of the past. For that very reason, the SAC cannot be viewed in the framework of the public state collections of other European capitals (e.g. National Gallery in London or Ireland, or the Museum of Fine Arts in Budapest or Louvre...) On the contrary, it should be perceived in the context of princely collecting of the early modern era, and the formation of the state and government collections that symbolically embodied the cultural diplomacy of a particular realm. Consequently, the SAC was envisaged with a particular audience in mind – it was not a museum opened to the general public, but the state art collection established to be the part of the ceremonial space of the state in the new Royal palaces that were completed in 1929 and 1936. Although created to present the monarchy its concepts, as we

shall see later, were easily translated into the ideology of the republic of Yugoslavia under President Tito. The same collection became the scenery of many important state visits: from the kings of Bulgaria and Romania, in the 1930s to Anthony Eden, Willy Brandt, Sukarno (president of Indonesia), Seku Ture, Naser (president of Egypt), Indira Ghandi, Haile Selassie and Queen Elizabeth II...

The artifacts displayed, had to convey, to the state dignitaries and official visitors the real and desired image of the state: its place in the grand continuum of the European cultural history as well as its newly constructed identity of the Yugoslav nations.<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, from the very first acquisition the dual course of cultural diplomacy was manifest: as the virtual *alter ego* of the newly proclaimed state, the State Art Collection strove to be the personification of the ideals that shaped European cultural history as well as to represent the most excellent contemporary artists from all corners of the Yugoslav realm. Despite the radical change of the regime after WWII, the new republic of Yugoslavia only continued along this highly valued conceptual trajectory, equally aiming to position itself as both European and Yugoslav through acquisitions of some esteemed artifacts. Despite the fact that this division to the European and Yugoslav is best reflected in the formation of its fine art collection, the same pattern, is discernible in its architecture, its interior decoration as well as in the applied arts collection.

## Constructing the palaces

Two main edifices of the Royal Compound that house the State Art Collection, the Royal and White Palace also reflect this duality. Begun in 1925, and ceremonially opened on the day of the proclamation of Yugoslavia on 1<sup>st</sup> December 1929, the Royal Palace was erected to be the main residence of King Aleksandar Karađorđević. Its architects Živojin Nikolić and Vladimir Lukormiski aimed to reflect the spirit of the joint Slavic past in its architecture. It was designed in the peculiar Serbian/Byzantine style a current architectural hybrid that strove to amalgamate the legacies of the medieval Serbian past with the current



architecture. The White Palace, constructed from 1934 to 1936 by the architect Aleksandar Đorđević, was created in the Neoclassical style in order to echo the French and English palaces of the Neoclassical age. Initially designed to be only one of the residences, it became the main residence of Prince Paul during his regency until WWII and after the war continued to be used as one of the key ceremonial spaces of the republic of Yugoslavia. This carefully crafted distinction in the architectural styles fulfilled the same aim of the cultural diplomacy that would conceptually shape the State Art Collection. A deliberate creation of the Royal Palace in the unmistakably *national* style, displayed the need to bridge the temporal gap and connect the noble Medieval past with the new Kingdom of the Slavs. The materials used in its construction of Royal Palace were purveyed from all corners of the country, (the marble from Brač, onyx from Peć, sandstone from Bihać, and glass from Rogaška Slatina) thus symbolically linking all regions of Yugoslavia in the joint ideal of pan Slavism. On the other hand, the design of the White Palace in the style of neoclassicism was to present the symbolic and cultural belongingness of the young state of Yugoslavia to the great European past. This same idea would be further elaborated in the fine and applied arts of the SAC, thus creating a particular ceremonial space for the presentation of the new country.

## Founders of the SAC

Despite the pivotal, both governing and financial role, that King Aleksandar had in the formation of the SAC, the real founder, and the main connoisseur, was his cousin Prince Paul Karađorđević, who devoted much time and great knowledge, and more importantly, all of his valuable contacts into this endeavour. A notable collector himself, Prince Paul was well connected in the art world of the 1920s and 1930s.<sup>4</sup> Despite his own collection, and his subsequent ascent to the level of Regent (after the assassination of king Aleksandar in 1934) he always carefully separated his own purchases from that of the state.<sup>5</sup>

Both with his education and his career as collector, Prince Paul perfectly fulfilled the role of the main initiator of the State Art Collection.

Although he was interested in art history during his studies in Oxford, particularly the collection of the Ashmolean Museum and the National Gallery in London, he found great interest and, one could freely say, his essential vocation, in the research and connoisseurship of early modern and modern European art. During his time in Oxford Prince Paul made acquaintance that would grow into friendship with then keeper of the Ashmolean museum, Kenneth Clark,<sup>6</sup> I who would later become one of the directors of the National Gallery in London.

At the same time in Oxford, Prince Paul made another great acquaintance, with Bernard Berenson, that would leave a lasting mark both on his career as a collector and a creator of the State Art Collection. Often referred to as the 'patriarch of Renaissance Art', Bernard Berenson was one of the most, if not *the most* important figure in the research and market for Renaissance art in the first half of the twentieth century. Berenson greatly helped Prince Paul during the creation of the State Art Collection, often advising him what to purchase and recommending some favourable deals at the art market.<sup>7</sup> Upon his advice, some of the key Renaissance works for such as: SAC were purveyed: two tondos by Biaggio D'Antonio (inv. no. 58-01) and Maestro di Tondo Campano (inv. no. 57-01), as well as the masterpieces by Palma Vecchio.<sup>8</sup>

The third collaborator and friend would prove to have the most decisive role in the creation of the SAC – one of the most important art dealers of the age, Joseph Duveen.<sup>9</sup> Often called *the prince of dealers* Joseph Duveen had a pivotal role in the making of the State Art Collection acting as one of the main purveyors and advisors for the acquisitions of early modern art. Prince Paul had such great confidence in Joseph Duveen, that he often asked Duveen to act in Prince's name at an auction or to be a councillor in the case of important acquisitions.

It is with Duveen's help that Prince Paul purchased for the SAC some of its most important paintings, primarily the Renaissance works from the notable Benson collection<sup>10</sup> (Palma Vecchio's *Holy Family with St. John, St. Cathrine and the Donor* and *Portrait of the Young man* (inv. no.56-01 and inv. no.119-01), Domenico Beccafumi's *Flight of Cloelia* (inv. no.120-01) Veronese's *Rape of Europe* (now attributed to his son Carlo Caliari (inv. no.235-01) and Biaggio d'Antonio), as well as the masterpieces of the French Baroque classicism (Nicolas Poussin's *Three Monks* (inv. no.241-01) Sebastien Bourdon's *Landscape with ruins* (inv.

no.123-01). This fruitful collaboration between Prince Paul and *the prince of dealers*, grew into lifelong friendship that profoundly connected two families.

## The Pursuit of Arcadia

In the establishing of the SAC its founders respectively desired to acknowledge the long European tradition of princely collecting, and to appropriate it for the representation of their young state. However, the works collected, in particular the Old Masters and some artefacts in the applied arts collection, had another function: They were meant to symbolically emulate their Renaissance predecessors by appropriating the Renaissance notions of an ideal state, and of the Arcadian abode. Through such subtle means King Aleksandar presented himself as continuing the legacy of the Renaissance princes, while giving his newly proclaimed kingdom of the Slavs prerequisites of the ideal state, the one envisaged in the works of Renaissance humanists and depicted in the works of Renaissance masters. Carefully acquired works of Old Masters in the SAC, particularly those by Palma Vecchio, Veronese (as then attributed), Biaggio d'Antonio, Bernardo Licino or Altdorfer, exemplify not only a discerning taste of its collector, but a vision of the glorified age of statehood, the time of flourishing of the arts and patronage that early modern era stood for. Despite their diverse subject matters (religious, classical and portraiture) these works ought to give the impression to its beholder, a state official visiting the Royal courts on Dedinje, of the country deeply embedded in the long tradition of European culture, statehood, and princely patronage.

Analogous to the concept, the works from the SAC European collection transmitted another important ideal of the early modern ideology of rule – the notion of *the state as the new Arcadia*. It was particularly manifest in the grand Arcadian landscapes by the masters of French classicism – Nicolas Poussin, Francisque Millet, Sebastien Bourdon, Gaspard Dughet, Nicolas Chaperon, that all project the images of a perfected nature and the lost golden age. From the serene lakes and calm rivers, from lush trees and golden fields where shepherds ramble

with their flock; these canvases envisaged the early modern dream of the ideal land, the one that never was.

Both notions were further underlined in the interior design of the Royal Palace, of which a great part is still visible nowadays. While the White Palace was decorated in the contemporary *art deco* style, the furnishing of the Royal Palace was to project a rather different image, the one that associated the new state with the glory of the European past. Its decoration was commissioned from the most esteemed company of master carpenters and decorators from Vienna, *Bernhard Ludwig*, the courtly firm of the Austro Hungarian Empire responsible for the decoration of many European palaces and stately homes from 1860s onwards.<sup>11</sup> By the excellence of their designs and the refinement of its pieces, *Bernhard Ludwig* company not only received the imperial warrant of the Habsburg emperor Franz Joseph, but established itself as the interior decorator of choice of the royal houses of Europe.<sup>12</sup> The virtuosity of their craftsmanship was so exceptional that they not only survived the economic crisis in the Empire, followed by the first world war, but they outlasted Austro-Hungarian Empire, and were still in business decorating the princely courts during 1920s and 1930s. However, their style was not one of the austere lines of *art deco* – *Bernhard Ludwig* offered a much grander vision, the one exemplified in the neo-Renaissance and neo-Baroque fashions of the 1800s. It is this specific feature that made it the ideal choice for the decoration of ceremonial space of the new Royal Palace of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The entire ground floor, that functioned as *piano nobile* of the Royal Palace, as well as the first floor of the building, were transformed into an imposing tribute to the Renaissance culture, with appropriate furniture, coffered and gold plated ceilings, inlaid parquetted floors resembling great 16<sup>th</sup> century interiors and the wrought iron decorations echoing palaces of Medici or della Rovere. Despite a partial destruction of the interiors of the first floor in WWII the remaining abundant neo-Renaissance decoration of the ground floor, where nowadays the paintings by Renaissance masters are kept, could help us envisage the grandeur of the original ceremonial space projected by the founders of the SAC.

In the early 1930s an important purchase in the field of applied arts was made to complement this vision of everlasting princely ideals. On 26<sup>th</sup> June 1935, acting in the name of Prince Paul, Joseph Duveen

acquired at the sale at Jean Charpentier gallery in Paris, an impressive set of Sevres porcelain created for count d'Artois (brother of the French king Louis XVI) between 1779 and 1782.<sup>13</sup> This set was so admired by Prince Paul that he commissioned a special display case in the White Palace for its presentation in 1936. There are documents that this masterpiece of Sevres production was not only displayed, but also used for great state occasions.<sup>14</sup>

Painted in conspicuous shade of blue green and adorned with rich gilding, this particular dessert set from Sevres offered a unique set of images: it represented a veritable encyclopaedia of birds in porcelain.<sup>15</sup> The main decoration of all the dishes are carefully depicted images of diverse ordinary as well as exotic birds, carefully copied from the first encyclopaedia of the species written by Georges Louis Leclerc the count of Buffon's *Histoire Naturelle des Oiseaux* in 1749. While embodying the spirit of enlightenment in its choice of subject matter, this Sevres set was also a prized artifact of both the early modern courtly culture and of the history of cultural diplomacy. It was originally commissioned by count d'Artois as a diplomatic gift of the French crown to the Spanish court upon the occasion of the birth of Spanish infanta Marie Louise in 1782.<sup>16</sup> Due to its opulence, and the vividness of its avian protagonists, the set became the model for manufacturing of similar sets in Sevres in decades to come. Over subsequent centuries, this set had a rather long and turbulent history but it remained always known as a "Spanish diplomatic gift". Considering the particular history of this artefact, and the prestigious princely tradition of porcelain collecting at the European courts of the early modern age, it is possible that by its acquisition for the White Palace in Belgrade Prince Paul wanted to emulate those very qualities.

Although the main purchases for the European part of the fine arts and applied arts collection were conducted prior to WWII, this part of the SAC, and the concepts it conveyed, still figured importantly in the cultural diplomacy of the Republic of Yugoslavia. Several purchases of the early modern art were made during the 1960s and 1970s (Melchior d'Hondecoeter, Ackeringe, Francesco Furini...) Only it was not interpreted in the framework of strictly princely and court culture, but much more in the context of belongingness, through great early modern collection, to the shared European cultural heritage. In the period following

WWII greater emphasis was given to the enrichment of the collection of Yugoslav art, aiming to represent the most conspicuous achievements in the field of the contemporary fine arts.

## The Unity of the Slavs

The other direction of cultural diplomacy exemplified in the fine and applied arts collections of the SAC, from its very foundation, had to recreate, albeit in the symbolic form, the imaginary artistic space of the new Yugoslav identity. It was created parallel to the European part of the Fine Arts collection and it offered the idealized vision of Yugoslav nations.<sup>17</sup> Regardless of its undisputed complexity, this part of the collection was much more straightforward in its representation. By acquisitions and commissions from the renowned Yugoslav artists, both in the pre and post WWII Yugoslavia, an imaginary portrait of the new land was being perpetually constructed.

Despite a great number of acquisitions and commissions from Yugoslav artists that both King Aleksandar and Prince Paul made in late 1920s and 1930s, one particular body of work perfectly embodied the symbolic identity of the new state of the Slavs. The appointment of the key Yugoslav sculptor of the period, Ivan Meštrović, would mark the nodal point in the process of the mythologization of Yugoslav identity.<sup>18</sup> His works would truly define the cultural diplomacy written out in the Yugoslav part of the State Art Collection and up to this day remain its undisputed masterpieces. Even before the foundation of SAC Meštrović's work was the visual embodiment of the concept of *integral Yugoslavism* (the unity of all the nations in one entity) – the same ideology upon which the image of the Yugoslav state was built upon. Hence, when king Aleksandar commissioned him to create monumental sculptures for the ceremonial space of SAC (both for the palace and its gardens) Meštrović fused some of his preexisting ideas with the needs of the state presentation. His main task was to construct an imaginary virtual past that connected all Yugoslav nations into one inseparable entity, the past that was deeply rooted in Slavic mythology as well as in the folk epics and medieval myths. In search of this joint mythology, the artist

turned to the folk epics and its two key protagonists, Miloš Obilić and Marko Kraljević, that would inspire some of the grandest sculptures he executed for the State Art Collection.<sup>19</sup>

Portraits in canvas stone and bronze by renowned artists were also meant to emphasise the national, Yugoslav, context in the State Art Collection. This is most discernible in the acquisitions of such works as the two busts of *Petar Petrović Njegoš* (bishop and poet of Montenegro) by Toma Rosandić and Ivan Meštrović's *Self-portrait* or *The History of Croatia*. By displaying the Montenegrin Bishop as a ruler and poet together with the self-portrait of a most eminent Yugoslav artist construed a nucleus of an imaginary Yugoslav spiritual and cultural pantheon.

Another important mechanism for the creation of an integrated Yugoslav identity in the SAC was the purchase of paintings that depicted landscapes and scenes everyday life of the Yugoslavs. (such as works by Matija Jama, Nicu Enea, Alexei Hansen, Anton Kos, Petar Lubarda, Lojze Dolinar, Vjekoslav Parać, etc). Although these were not necessarily the paintings with an outstanding monumental subject matter, the pieces in the Yugoslav collection were grand in their concept. All of the artifacts perceived together envisaged an image of ideal unity of all peoples of the new Republic of Yugoslavia. They presented the cultural diversity unified by the notion of the collective identity and mutual cultural heritage both Yugoslav and European.

After the death of President Tito, and furthermore after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, SAC lost a great part of its primary function. The country it was composed to represent had vanished, and consequently it ceased to be developed with new commissions and acquisitions. Nevertheless it remained the ceremonial space of the state; and also turn into a particular complex monument as well as memento of Yugoslav countries that shaped it. Although it is still occasionally used for grand state occasions, the future role of this important state collection is still to be determined.<sup>20</sup> It is our hope, as scholars, curators and researchers that SAC would become the museum and that its treasures would become accessible to the wider local and European public.



## Notes

- 1 As other state art collections they were composed also through acquisitions, commissions and more often than not theft but such instances are not going to be focus of this paper.
- 2 For the catalogue of the SAC see Todorović, Crvenković 2014.
- 3 Todorović 2014:14-41.
- 4 Archive of Yugoslavia AJ 74, Balfour, Mackay, 1980, Subotić 2011: 137-155.
- 5 See Todorovic 2014: 14-41.
- 6 About the correspondence between Kenneth Clark and Prince Paul, see „Kenneth Clark Archives“, kept in Tate Britain in London. It was upon Clark's expert advice that Prince Paul acquired in 1921 the first important work of art for his own collection – Piero di Cosimo's *Forest Fire*. In another interesting proof of their close friendship, and in a curious twist of faith, when Prince Paul decided to sell this painting in 1933 he sold it to Ashmolean museum and its director – Kenneth Clark. Piero di Cosimo 's *The Forest Fire* (Inv. No. WA1933.2) still presents one of the important masterpieces of museums's collections.
- 7 Prince Paul's legacy Archive of Yugoslavia, AJ Fund 74.
- 8 Berenson's famous house in Florence, Villa I Tatti that up to this day serves as a centre for research of Renaissance culture. See Getty papers, Duveen Brothers records, 1925-1940, box 497, roll 352.
- 9 Todorović 2020: 211-225.
- 10 Joseph Duveen bought the entire Benson Collection in London in 1927 for 500,000 pounds only to sell its contents to some of his most valued clients including Prince Paul. See Getty Research Institute, Duveen Brothers records, 1925-1940, box 351, reel 207.
- 11 For the primary sources of the Bernhard Ludwig company see Private Archive of Bernhard Ludwig in Vienna and Archive of Yugoslavia Marambo fund, AJ 335-5.
- 12 See Windisch-Graetz, Ludwig, Bernhard Hieronymus 1972, 347 and Тодоровић/Црвенковић, 2013: 263-278.
- 13 For the primary sources see Getty Research Institute, Duveen Brothers records, 1925-1940, box 497, reel 352; documents of the Gallery Jean Charpentier for 1935 19-22. For the more extensive analysis see Biljana Crvenković 2013: 45-55; as well as her excellent monograph Biljana Crvenković 2017.
- 14 See Crvenković 2013: 53.
- 15 See Crvenković 2017.
- 16 See Crvenković 2017.
- 17 See Biljana Crvenković 2014: 18-45.
- 18 See Biljana Crvenković 2014: 18-45.
- 19 The works were meant to be synonyms with the ideology of integral Yugoslavism, despite the fact that by early 1930s they were already outdated and far removed from the current artistic practice. See Crvenković 2014: 18-45.



- 20 At present the SAC is still the part of the larger entity of the art collections of the republic of Serbia under the control of the body responsible for National collections with the headquarters in the Palace of Serbia (former SIV), while the artifacts kept in it are under supervision of the National Museum of Serbia and the Museum of Applied Arts of Serbia.

## Bibliography

### *Primary sources:*

- Archive of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, AJ 74.  
 Archive of Yugoslavia, Belgrade AJ 335-5.  
 Getty Research Institute, Duveen Brothers records, 1925-1940  
*Gallery Jean Charpentier for 1935, Liquidation Founes: objets d'art, et de très bel ameublement du e XVIII siecle*, Paris: Galerie Jean Charpentier  
 Private Archive of Bernhard Ludwig, Vienna  
 Tate Britan, Kenneth Clark Archives, London

### *Secondary sources:*

- Balfour, Neil, Mackay, Sally (1980) *Paul of Yugoslavia – Britain's Maligned Friend*, London, Hamilton 1980.  
 Crvenković, Biljana (2013) Predmet moći i želje: porcelan iz Sevra u Belom dvoru, in *Zbornik MPU 9*. Beograd, 45-55.  
 Crvenković, Biljana (2014) *Catalogue of the State Art Collection: Yugoslav art*, vol. II, Novi Sad: Platoneum.  
 Crvenković, Biljana (2017) *Bifon servis: Sevr porcelan sa sa Belog dvora*, Beograd, MPU.  
 Stourton, James (2012) *British as Art Collectors: from Tudors to the Present*, London, Scala.  
 Subotić, Irina (2011) Prince Paul Karađorđević – Art Collector, in *The Prince Paul Museum*, Belgrade, Narodni muzej, 137-155.  
 Тодоровић Ј., Црвенковић, Б. (2013) Стварање простора моћи: Бечка уметничка радионица Бернхард Лудвиг и уређење дворова у Београду, in *Саопштења* 44, 263–278.  
 Todorović, Jelena (2014) *Catalogue of the State Art Collection of the Royal Compound in Belgrade*, vol.1, Novi Sad, Platoneum.  
 Todorović, Jelena (2020) Constructing the Ideal Realm – the Role of the Duveen Brothers in the Creation of the State Art Collection of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1928-1939, in *Old Masters Worldwide: Markets, Movements and Museums*, eds. Susanna Avery-Quash, Barbara Pezzini, Bloomsbury, London, 211–225.

# KULTURA KAO MANIFESTACIJA: MEĐUNARODNO POZICIONIRANJE SRBIJE KROZ KREATIVNE INDUSTRIJE

MARINA SIMIĆ I MILOŠ NIČIĆ

## Savremeno viđenje pojma kulture Rejmonda Vilijamsa<sup>1</sup>

Pojam kulture je jedan od centralnih pojmova antropologije i u antropološkom shvatanju, još od Edvarda Tajlora, od sredine 19. veka, kultura obuhvata „znanja, verovanja, umetnost, moral, zakon, kao i sve druge sposobnosti i navike koje čovek stiče kao član društvene zajednice“ (Tylor 1958 [1871]: 1). Kultura, dakle, predstavlja nešto „obično“ i obuhvata celokupnu ljudsku delatnost. Međutim, čak i u antropologiji ta ideja se dugo primenjivala na kulture „drugih“, dok je kultura Zapada bila neobeležena, neutralna oznaka koja je u isto vreme označavala i kulturu uopšte („normalnu“ meru svih drugih) i zapadnu specifičnost (u smislu evropskih dostignuća u sferi nauke i umetnosti).<sup>2</sup> Ova prva ideja napuštena je prilično brzo, dok je specifičnost evropske kulture dugo ostala van sfere interesovanja antropologa.

Donekle slično idejama u antropologiji, u studijama kulture brzo je uspostavljena ideja da je kultura „obična“, ali simbolička sfera.<sup>3</sup> Ova sada već anegdotalna ideja, koja se obično preuzima iz eseja Rejmonda Vilijamsa istog naslova iz 1958. godine<sup>4</sup>, označiće početak proučavanja popularne kulture u okviru studija kulture.

Rejmond Vilijams je britanski, odnosno velški teoretičar kulture, pisac, kritičar i teatrolog, jedan od „očeva osnivača“ Centra za savremene studije kulture u Birmingemu i jedan od utemeljivača studija kulture

kao discipline – žarišta ideja i aktivizma koje će u pojam kulture uvesti celokupno iskustvo života (cf. Duda 2002, Đorđević 2009, Simić 2014). Teza Rejmonda Viliijamsa da ne postoje mase, već samo pojedinci, koji se upotrebom diskursa kulture kao koncepta za označavanje proizvode masama<sup>5</sup>, značajno je uticala na osporavanje autonomnog i privilegovanog viđenja kreativnosti i umetnosti.

Studije kulture će preokrenuti uobičajene postavke zapadne teorije, koje su kulturu držale u domenu duha i izvan domena svakodnevnog, legitimišući nove poglede kako na procese stvaranja, tako i na načine korišćenja svih elemenata kulture, koja se širi da obuhvati sve one forme, fenomene i odnose koji karakterišu savremeni svakodnevni život. Tako će stripovi, televizijske serije, prakse konzumacije alkohola, nošenje iscepane odeće biti podjednako domen kulture, koliko i produkcija novih ili tumačenje postojećih sadržaja u domenu vizuelnih umetnosti, muzike i književnosti. Kultura postaje celokupan način života, što automatski znači da se na ispit stavljaju i ona viđenja kreativnosti koja su nastala u periodu prosvetiteljstva i romantizma, a koja su kulturu držala podalje i od svih ljudi, i od tržišta. Kultura podrazumeva „sve što se ticalo ljudi, i čemu su ljudi, pripadnici različitih klasa, davali određeno značenje” (Đorđević 2009: 47). Popularnu kulturu će tako, prema Džonu Fisku (2001), stvarati pojedinci kreativnom upotrebom industrijski proizvedene masovne kulture, a ta kreativna upotreba upravo znači stvaranje značenja u određenom socijalnom kontekstu, a na osnovu globalne ponude proizvoda koju stvara transnacionalni kapitalizam.

Implikacije ovakve promene i prihvatanja stava da je kultura obična bile su značajne, ali i neophodne za odgovarajuće razumevanje različitih dinamika u savremenom, post-drugosvetskoratovskom, pluralističkom društvu, u kojem se mnoge odlike prethodnih vremena, političkih i socijalnih odnosa menjaju iz temelja. Ove promene idu u dva pravca – prvi se odnosi na razumevanje da „obično” ne znači nužno i manje vredno, odnosno da svi društveni staleži, ne samo visoki, svojim aktivnim učestvovanjem u društvu stvaraju kulturu. To je automatski za sobom povlačilo značajno širenje opsega pojma kulture, u koje se sada uključuju sve sfere ljudskog života, navika, običaja i, što je najvažnije, proizvoda i praksi iz domena masovne kulture. Ovakvo proširenje stvara koncept kulture kao „celokupnog načina života”, što podrazumeva da se svi

segmenti života, uključujući materijalne odnose, seksualnost, porodične odnose, ali i način na koji se provodi slobodno vreme, odnos prema autoritetu, prakse potrošnje i provođenja slobodnog vremena jednako tretiraju i akademski analiziraju. U ambijentu snažnog zamajca globalne industrije, sposobne da proizvodi i zadovoljava potrebe sve većeg broja ljudi koji, izgubivši pejorativni epitet masa, postaju fragmentarne nestalne grupe fluidnih identiteta,<sup>6</sup> nastaje fenomen kreativnih industrija. Drugim rečima, naše razumevanje sebe i okoline sve više se stvara i izražava kroz potrošnju i slobodu izbora, koju koncept kreativnih industrija, kao posebnog oblika popularne kulture odnosno stvaralaštva i kulturnog izražavanja, postavlja na poseban nivo.

### Kultura kao manifestacija (*display*)

Rejmond Vilijams je u ovakvoj intelektualnoj klimi, u kojoj se razume da kultura obuhvata najrazličitije oblike simboličkog izražavanja, a ne samo visoku umetnost, 1984. godine formirao pojam kulture kao manifestacije (*display*) kako bi opisao poseban savremen odnos između kulture i države, a naročito aktivnosti državne upotrebe umetnosti i kreativnosti čiji je cilj osnaživanje, slavljenje i prezentacija ekonomske i simboličke snage određenog političkog sistema. U svom kratkom tekstu „Državna kultura i izvan [nje]“ (*State culture and beyond*), Rejmond Vilijams (Williams 1984: 3–5) pokušava da sagleda različite oblike odnosa između države i kulture, odnosno kulturne politike na strateškom nivou. Od pet odnosa koje Vilijams navodi<sup>7</sup> dva se vezuju za pojam manifestacije, a to su državnička kulturna politika (*stately sense of cultural policy*) i kultura kao manifestacija.

Prvi tip je državnička kulturna politika, oličena u politikama slavljenja nacionalnog/ državnog poretka. Država je, prema Vilijamsu u ovom kontekstu, ne samo centralni organ moći, već i manifestacije te iste moći. Za svaki režim, manifestacija moći, odnosno kako Vilijams kaže „javna pompa određenog društvenog poretka“ (Williams 1984: 3), podjednako je važna za održavanje tog poretka kao i sama ta moć. Reč je o bukvalnim „manifestacijama određenih aspekata državne moći“ (Williams, 1984: 3) i uključuje različite kulturne i umetničke prakse

utkane u političke rituale (cf. Đorđević 1997), koji svedoče o veličini i snazi države/režima/poretka. Tako će u Britaniji odgovarajući primer za to biti ceremonija krunisanja novog monarha ili početaka zasedanja parlamenta, u Srbiji ceremonija promocije novih oficira ispred republičke skupštine, ali i mnoge druge prilike kojima se konsoliduje i povećava priznanje i vrednovanje države u očima lokalne javnosti i međunarodne zajednice. Vilijams smatra da je ova manifestacija nepravedno zapostavljena kao oblik sprovođenja kulturne politike, jer ovakve ceremonije sadrže sijaset elemenata kulturnih i umetničkih performansa. Prema Vilijamsu, razlog za to je što je upotreba kulture i umetnosti u praksama manifestacije državne moći odviše duboko ukorenjena kako bi uopšte bila prepoznata (Williams, 1984: 3). Ovakva neraskidiva veza manifestacije kulture i manifestacije moći toliko je duboko povezana sa samim poimanjem države i prakse iskazivanja moći, da se različiti elementi kulture koji se u njoj uzimaju kao „navika, norma ili ritual, sve samo ne kao predmet kulturne politike“ (Karvelyte 2021: 145).

Drugi tip manifestacije, prema Vilijamsu, a u formulaciji Kristine Karvelajt (Karvelyte 2021) je instrumentalni oblik manifestacije. Reč je o sistematskoj i strateškoj upotrebi kulturnih i umetničkih elemenata u različitim oblicima i domenima javnih politika, naročito ekonomskih i reprezentacijskih. Njima se, recimo, osnažuje osećaj društvene pripadnosti (raznorazni lokalni festivali i druge kulturno umetničke priredbe) ali i radi na ostvarivanju meke moći (programi kulturne razmene i sl.). Na ovom mestu, Vilijams opisuje savremenu javnu moć kao „moć države koja ima biznise i turizam, koja ima privredne interese i međunarodne interese prilikom razmene poseta sa drugim državama i njihovim predstavnicima“ (Williams 1984: 3). U ovom smislu, a u kontekstu globalne tržišne povezanosti i transnacionalnog kapitalizma, delovanje kulture kao manifestacije javlja se prvenstveno kao instrument proizvodnje i promocije prostora, kao element privlačenja stranih investicija, turista i kvalifikovane radne snage (odnosno kreativne klase kako je definiše Ričard Florida [2012]), koja zauzvrat povećava poželjnost prostora i njegovu ekonomsku vrednost.<sup>8</sup>

Jedan od najznačajnijih komentatora ove Vilijamsove ideje bio je Džim Makgvigan, koji se posebno osvrnuo na sistematizaciju navedenih pet tipova odnosa koje navodi Vilijams. Prema njemu, Vilijams pravi suštinsku razliku između kulturne politike kao manifestacije i prave

kulturne politike (*cultural policy proper*). Kulturna politika kao manifestacija se, zapravo, odnosi na sve one prakse instrumentalizacije različitih formi kulture i stvaralaštva i sačinjavaju je prakse „nacionalnog uzdizanja“ (*national aggrandizement*) i „ekonomskog redukcionizma“ (*economic reductionism*), dok prava kulturna politika podrazumeva državnu patronažu umetnosti, medijske regulative i formiranje kulturnog identiteta (McGuigan 2004: 64).<sup>9</sup> Prakse nacionalnog uzdizanja se direktno vezuju za sve javne spektakle ceremonijalnog karaktera, kojima se proizvodi pomenuta javna pompa društvenog poretka, dok je ekonomski redukcionizam povezan sa raznorodnim poslovnim poduhvatima koji „sve više dolaze do izražaja u racionalizaciji javnog ulaganja u kulturu“ (McGuigan 2004: 62–63), a gde diskursi o ekonomskom napretku i povoljnom poslovnom okruženju zauzimaju centralno mesto.

Ipak, u doba neoliberalnih ekonomskih i političkih načela, često se prakse nacionalnog uzdizanja i ekonomskog redukcionizma stapaju u jedno, o čemu svedoče različite državno organizovane manifestacije čiji je (krajnji) cilj poboljšana ekonomska (i međunarodna) pozicija države i njenog vladajućeg poretka. Najbolji primer za to, navodi Makgvgigan, jesu velike izložbe i svetski sajmovi, koji nisu ništa drugo nego „ekstravagantni prikazi promovisanja nacionalnog biznisa u složenoj interakciji sa drugim nacijama i u kontekstu trgovinskog rivalstva“ (McGuigan 2004: 91). Ipak, kultura kao manifestacija nije isključivo okrenuta ka međunarodnoj sceni i internacionalnom biznisu, već i različitim unutar-državnim agendama i ciljevima. U tom smislu Karvelajt takođe uzima za primer svetske izložbe kada navodi kako su „takvi megadogađaji [...] osmišljeni ne samo da promovišu naciju domaćina u svetu već takođe imaju za cilj jačanje osećaja pripadnosti i ponosa među lokalnim stanovništvom“ (Karvelyte 2021: 145).

U ovom smislu kulture kao manifestacije, nije reč o posebnom obliku kulturne politike namenjene umetnostima, već je reč o politikama kulture namenjenim „ulepšavanju, predstavljanju, činjenju delotvornim određenog društvenog poretka ili jednog njegovog preferiranog dela“ (Williams 1984: 3). Na taj način različiti oblici tradicionalne i savremene umetnosti, ali još važnije celokupne kulture shvaćene kao načina života – što uključuje kulturu svakodnevice, potkulture i kontrakture, i popularnu kulturu – učestvuju u privrednoj i političkoj promociji zemlje. Svakodnevna kultura se na taj način inkorporira u sistem reprezentacije

zemlje, njenog međunarodnog predstavljanja i političkog, ali i ekonomskog, pozicioniranja.

## **Manifestacije kulture, kreativne industrije i nacionalna platforma Srbija stvara**

Vilijamsova teorija kulture kao manifestacije pretpostavlja stav u kojem je centralni akter manifestacije država, koji u savremenom neoliberalnom poretku zahteva dopunu. Takva dopuna dolazi kroz koncept kreativnih industrija, koji može biti krovni (državni) koncept sa *top-down* okvirom, ali se njegovi elementi nužno sastoje od mnoštva heterogenih aktivnosti, inicijativa i interpretacija različitih formi stvaralaštva lokalnih i inostranih aktera. Upravo se u kreativnim industrijama široko, heterogeno i neelitistički shvaćena kultura najefektivnije i efikasnije pretače u manifestacije kulture. Na taj način dolazi do preklapanja onih aktivnosti koje svedoče o veličini i snazi države i onih manifestacija koje služe promovisanju turizma, lokalne ekonomije i industrije stranim investitorima, ali i lokalnim akterima. Manifestacije kulture stoga vode ka manifestaciji moći (i nazad, principom povratne sprege) i koriste se za zadovoljenje političkih, ekonomskih, društvenih i drugih potreba.

Kreativne industrije predstavljaju spojnicu između kulture shvaćene u najširem smislu i svakodnevnog života ispunjenog kompleksnim činovima potrošnje i diskurzivnim praksama društvenog pozicioniranja; spojnicu koja omogućava komercijalizaciju (novih) stvaralačkih ideja i na taj način, njihovu integraciju u savremeno društvo zasnovano na ekonomijama znanja i usluga (cf. Castells 2011). Kreativne industrije služe kao platforma za komunikaciju aktivnih potrošača sa stvaralačkim sadržajem, putem koje se vrši ne samo ekonomska razmena, već i ona simbolička i estetska (Frey 2003, 2008; Throsby 2000). Drugim rečima, u kreativnim industrijama stvara se vrednost kroz stvaralačke delatnosti, bilo da je ona materijalna (finansijska) ili nematerijalna (simbolička).

Ovakvo viđeno spajanje obe verzije kulture kao manifestacije (državne i instrumentalizovane) posebno je evidentno u koncepciji kreativnih industrija kakva postoji u Republici Srbiji, u kojoj se ovaj pojam koristi kao svojevrsni krovni koncept koji uključuje promociju najboljeg

i najkreativnijeg što Srbija poseduje, ali i razvija, prvenstveno za plasiranje na međunarodnu političku, ekonomsku, diplomatsku i umetničku scenu. Manifestacije kulture se u Republici Srbiji uglavnom zasnivaju na konceptu kreativnih industrija i nacionalne platforme „Srbija stvara“ i na taj način prilagođavaju političkim i socijalnim zahtevima savremenog doba, a to je, kako se u okviru platforme navodi – „pozicioniranje Srbije kao zemlje kreativnih, inovativnih i autentičnih ljudi i ideja“ (Srbija stvara 2021). Nacionalna platforma „Srbija stvara“ je krovno, međuresorno telo zaduženo za međunarodnu promociju Srbije kroz izvozni potencijal iz oblasti kreativnih industrija, inovacija i ekonomije zasnovane na znanju. Iz tog razloga su slogani i koncepti platforme „Srbija stvara“:

- Srbija je inspirativna i moderna zemlja, stabilnog poslovnog i kreativnog okruženja u kojoj je sigurno živeti i razvijati posao.
- Kreativni ambasadori – Mreža međunarodno prepoznatljivih talentovanih pojedinaca, koji inspirišu svojim dostignućima i idejama, i na najbolji način promovišu Srbiju u svetu.
- Stvaraj u Srbiji! – Otkrij zašto je Srbija mesto susreta talenata i rađanja novih ideja – Silicijumska dolina Balkana.
- Živi u Srbiji! Srbija – zemlja dinamičnog života u kojoj uzburkane strasti, spokoj i duhovnost idu ruku pod ruku.
- Investiraj u Srbiji! – Pristup talentima, povoljan poreski okvir i makroekonomska stabilnost čine Srbiju prvim izborom za poslovanje regionu.

Ovi primeri pokazuju u kojoj meri se najrazličitiji elementi kulture svakodnevnice, životnog stila, biznisa, religioznosti i stvaralaštva nalaze u središtu strategija promocije saremene Srbije na lokalnom i međunarodnom planu. Savremene fenomene kreativnih industrija, kulture kao manifestacije, ali i svih aktivnosti koje iz njih proističu nemoguće je razumeti bez prihvatanja osnove na kojima se ovi fenomeni zasnivaju, a to je širenje pojma kulture koje se dogodilo tokom druge polovine 20. veka, na takav način da uključuje sve one setove diskurzivnih praksi kojima se pojedinci i grupe služe u savremenom globalnom kapitalistički uokvirenom svetu. Kultura svakodnevnog života, kulture otpora, nepristajanja i pregovaranja sa dominantnom kulturom, visoka umetnost, ali i estetika ružnog, kiča, performansa, antiplesa i drugih



oblika postmoderne kulture (pa i njenih stalnih kanonizacija u domen visoke kulture), kulture Drugih, transnacionalne, globalizovane kulture stalno mobilnog stanovništva... zajedno čine okvir kreativnih industrija danas, pa samim tim i okvira kulture kao manifestacije, kao njihovog sastavnog dela.

U tom smislu, posebno je indikativno učešće Srbije na *EXPO 2020*, svetske izložbe koja je 2021. i 2022. održana u Dubaiju, UAE. Kreativne industrije predstavljale su žižu međunarodnog umetničkog, poslovnog i diplomatskog predstavljanja Srbije na toj svetskoj izložbi, prilikom kojeg je naglašavano kako se upravo eklektičnim nastupom zasnovanom na kreativnim industrijama uspešno razbija „mit da jedna ‘mala’ država poput Srbije, ne može da parira velikim zemljama“ (Blic 2021). Ta eklektičnost, zasnovana na razumevanju da se pod kulturom uzima širok spektar individualnog i kolektivnog stvaralaštva, osnova je za efektivno i efikasno predstavljanje Srbije na ovoj svetskoj izložbi, na kojoj se promovišu „svi vidovi kreativnih industrija i umetnosti, od grafičkog dizajna, gejminga, dizajna softvera, preko slikarstva i vizuelnih umetnosti, do performativnih, scenskih, filma i muzike“ (Večernje novosti 2021).

Pomenuta mogućnost „pariranja velikim zemljama“ direktno upućuje na pojam simboličke moći, koju Karvelajt (Karvelyte 2021: 146) preuzima od Pjera Burdijea i uzima da se nalazi u središtu kulture kao manifestacije. Naime, upravo je kultura, a putem instrumentalnog oblika manifestacije ta koja omogućava državi ostvarivanje određenih komparativnih prednosti u odnosu na druge međunarodne entitete na bazi „priznanja i poštovanja stečenog kroz razne simboličke prakse kulture kao manifestacije“ (*ibid*). Za Burdijea simbolička moć jeste svojevrsan kredit, odnosno „moć dodeljena onima koji su stekli dovoljno priznanja da budu u mogućnosti da nametnu priznavanje“ (Burdije 1998: 156). Uzimajući u obzir pomenutu vezu manifestacije moći i kulture, sticanje simboličkog kapitala jeste jedna od osnovnih ciljeva kulture kao manifestacije, jer upravo simbolička moć „daje tu posebnu sposobnost da se utiče, a ne samo sposobnost da se bude primećen“ (Karvelyte 2021: 146). Ova simbolička moć, stečena korišćenjem različitih oblika kreativnih industrija, zasnovanih na savremenom konceptu kulture, dalje se upotrebljava za ostvarivanje mnogih diplomatskih, ekonomskih, socijalnih i drugih ciljeva. Ovakva postavka postaje posebno jasna kada se uzme u obzir da je cilj predstavljanja Srbije na *EXPO 2020*, između

ostalog, bilo i „podsticanje trajnog i održivog napretka za građane naše zemlje, razvijanje poslovnih prilika i privlačenja stranih investicija i turista“ (Nedeljnik 2021).

Jasno je da turizam igra posebno značajnu ulogu i za kulturu kao manifestaciju, i za kreativne industrije; Makgivan čak smatra kako se na polju turizma spajaju sfere ekonomije i kulture, a koje jesu osnovni činioci svake kulturne politike (McGuigan 2004: 92). Stoga je i Vilijams, iznoseći ideju kulture kao manifestacije, primetio da se „često prilikom diskusija o javnom finansiranju umetnosti, turizam [kao argument] pominje prilično rano“ (Williams 1984: 3), te da se upravo za potrošnju u turizmu, dakle kroz plasiranje stranim posetiocima, pripremaju razni oblici kulture kao manifestacije. Promocija Srbije koja proizlazi iz delovanja platforme „Srbija stvara“ to i pokazuje – čak i kada je neposredno turistička, ona je političko-ekonomska. Preklapanje elemenata kreativnosti, meke moći, turizma, izuzetnih pojedinaca (kreativnih ambasadora) i slike zemlje koju vredi posetiti nalazi se u središtu aktivnosti koje proističu iz aktivnosti ove platforme.

## Zaključak

Koncept kulture kao manifestacije Rejmunda Vilijamsa pruža značajan teorijski okvir za razumevanje savremenog pozicioniranja država u domenu međunarodnih odnosa i kulturne diplomatije, posebno kada se obogati uključivanjem kreativnih industrija kao odgovarajućeg okvira savremenog stvaralaštva. S tim u vezi, značaj kreativnih industrija kao dela *kulture kao manifestacije* je višestruk. Na prvom mestu, manifestni sadržaj omogućava inkorporaciju značajno šireg dijapazona stvaralaštva koji izlazi iz okvira etabliranih oblika visoke umetnosti. To prvenstveno podrazumeva da se, naporedo sa tradicionalnim repertoarom sadržaja koji se plasira kanalima kulturne diplomatije, u domen međunarodnih odnosa mogu (i treba) uključivati elementi popularne kulture i savremenog, svakodnevnog popularnog stvaralaštva (bilo da je reč o rekonceptualizaciji tradicionalnih estetskih motiva u formi pozadina za mobilne telefone, video-igrama čiji delovi uključuju elemente kulturnog nasleđa ili nečeg trećeg). Na drugom mestu, to omogućava značajno

širenje i diverzifikaciju potencijalne publike za sadržaj koji se u okviru kulturne diplomatije plasira, a koja je zainteresovana za stvaralaštvo izvan opsega savremene i/ili tradicionalne umetnosti<sup>10</sup>. Na taj način se, proširenjem opsega kulture koja se preko kreativnih industrija plasira kanalima kulturne diplomatije, širi vokabular stvaralaštva kojim se gradi pozicija zemlje u međunarodnim odnosima. Konačno, ovako koncipiran model kulturne diplomatije na raspolaganju uvek ima sadržaj koji karakteriše značajna fleksibilnost, relevantnost i izražena mogućnost intertekstualnosti u odnosu na sadržaj iz relevantnih globalnih okvira.

Upravo se na takvim osnovama (u određenoj meri) zasnivaju raznorodne aktivnosti platforme „Srbija stvara“, koje omogućavaju da se navedeni smer međunarodnog (re)pozicioniranja Srbije kao zemlje kreativnih pojedinaca postiže instrumentalizacijom najrazličitijih domena stvaralaštva, od tradicionalnih umetnosti i visoke naučno-tehnološke aktivnosti, do muzičkih izvođača iz domena dens-pank muzike. To rezonira sa činjenicom da se naglašavanjem kulturnog nasleđa, kreativnosti i naučnih inovacija kao sastavnih elemenata kulturnog kapitala Srbije utiče na njeno povoljno pozicioniranje u sferi međunarodnih odnosa (Rogač Mijatović 2017: 207). Takvo pozicioniranje se najefektivnije postiže utilizacijom koncepta kreativnih industrija koje se nameću kao najbolji oblik za globalno plasiranje ovih vrednosti u domen međunarodnih odnosa. Delovanjem kreativnih industrija, popularna kultura i kultura svakodnevice povezuju se sa tradicionalnim domenima visoke umetnosti i nauke i pretvaraju u državne kulturne manifestacije, o čemu svedoči i uvođenje tema poput gastronomije (Strugar 2017) ili mode (Popović 2017) u okvir kulturne diplomatije. Stavljanjem kreativnih industrija, a ne (samo) visoke umetnosti, u žižu kulture kao manifestacije, Srbija ostvaruje potencijal za suštinski ravnopravno učešće na međunarodnom planu i snažne pozitivne odjeke tako zasnovane kulturne diplomatije.

## Napomene

- 1 Ovaj rad predstavlja proširenu verziju izlaganja na konferenciji „Kulturna diplomatija i kulturni odnosi: jačanje fer saradnje, raznolikosti i dijaloga“, koju je organizovao Univerzitet umetnosti u Beogradu od 1. do 3. juna 2022. Istraživanje je sprovedeno uz podršku Fonda za nauku Republike Srbije, broj projekta 7747152,

*Cultural Transfer Europe-Serbia from the 19th to the 21st century* – CTES i Ministarstva prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije, na osnovu Ugovora o realizaciji i finansiranju naučnoistraživačkog rada NIO u 2022. godini, broj: 451-03-68/2022-14 od 17.01.2022. godine.

- 2 Značajan primer za opisivanje ove zamišljene opštosti u kontekstu kulture kao manifestacije jeste slučaj (zapadne) klasične muzike, kojoj se pripisuje univerzalni značaj i opšteprihvaćena globalna vrednost. Za problematiku povezanu sa postkolonijalizmom i zapadnom klasičnom muzikom, vidi Van der Meer 2015.
- 3 Za razliku od antropologije čiji fokus ide od „drugih“ ka nama, u studijama kulture fokus ide od „nas“ ka drugima. To se najbolje vidi u proučavanju rase, migracija i hibridnosti.
- 4 „Kultura je obična, to je ono odakle moramo započeti“ (Williams 1958: 93); „Kultura je obična, to je najvažnija činjenica“ (*Ibid*: 94); „Kultura je obična, u svakom društvu i u svakom mišljenju“ (*Ibid*).
- 5 Način na koji se mnoštvo individualnih osoba koji se međusobno ne poznaju posmatraju kao grupe i interpretiraju u skladu sa političkim interesima elite bio je važan deo rasprave o pojmu mase koju iznosi Vilijams u svojoj seminalnoj studiji *Kultura i društvo 1780–1950* (Williams 1960 [1958]). Locirajući nastanak pojma masa u pokušajima elita da razume posledice urbanizma izazvanog kapitalističkom industrijalizacijom, Vilijams napominje da je ovaj pojam veoma brzo zadobio ona značenja koja su ranije važila za pojam *mulje* – „lakovernost, prevrtljivost, karakteristike stada, niskost ukusa i navika“ (*Ibid*: 317), te da mase predstavljaju „stalnu pretnju po kulturu“ (*Ibid*). No, kako su mase zapravo „uvek drugi, koje ne znamo i ne možemo znati“ (*Ibid*: 319) u mnoštvu ljudi koji nas okružuju u modernim društvima, i sam posmatrač postaje deo mase kada se nađe u očima drugog posmatrača. Takav pojam, smatra Vilijams, ne nosi nikakvu analitičku snagu, niti na kakav način opisuje njegove (zamišljene) pripadnike, već upućuje na formule putem kojih su ljudi označeni kao masa. Stoga, Vilijams zaključuje – „formula je ta, a ne masa, što je naš pravi posao da ispitamo“ (*Ibid*). Analiza takvih formula jeste analiza kulture na onaj način na koji je to u svom celokupnom delu izneo Rejmond Vilijams.
- 6 Kulturne i kreativne industrije nam nude perspektivu identiteta koji se gradi prvenstveno kroz društvene prakse, a ne strukturne pripadnosti, što ne odgovara socijalnoj realnosti. Na tom mestu se uviđa veliki značaj ovog fenomena za razumevanje savremene društvene dinamike kada je reč o proizvodima kreativnih industrija.
- 7 Reč je o državničkoj kulturnoj politici, kulturi kao manifestaciji, državi kao patronu, državi kao promoteru i vandržavnom pristupu. Za ovaj tekst, od posebne važnosti su prva dva – državnička kulturna politika i kultura kao manifestacija. Za diskusiju o ostalim odnosima, vidi McGuigan 2004: 61–91.
- 8 U tom smislu treba razumeti i ideju o preduzetničkom gradu (Harvey 1989, Jessop 2001) kao prostoru gde se postavljaju različiti nivoi manifestacija i spektakla, a sve radi poboljšanja simboličke, te ekonomske atraktivnosti dela ili celine

urbanog prostora, kako za lokalno stanovništvo, tako i za kratkotrajne posetioce (turiste) i sve češće pominjanu, hibridnu *glokalknu* (cf. Robertson 1992) kategoriju „digitalnih nomada“. Digitalni nomadi nikako ne predstavljaju onu kategoriju autsajdera koji sačinjavaju pretnju poretku, autoritetu i moći države, a koju su filozofi Delez i Gatarri nazvali nomadima (Deleuze and Guattari 2005 [1987]: 351–423), već kategoriju „poželjnih imigranata“ koji doprinose osećanju uspeha i sreće koji osećaju stanovnici određenog grada/države (cf. Soudias & Katsanis 2022, Vagena 2022 za slučaj Grčke i Hannonen 2020 za konceptualnu diskusiju o digitalnim nomadima).

- 9 U ovakvom viđenju, umetnost poseduje intrinzičnu vrednost za zajednicu ili državu i pretpostavlja se neupitno javno finansiranje domena visoke umetnosti, što u vremenu neoliberalnih shvatanja javnih izdataka postaje sve ređi slučaj. Stoga, navodi Makgvan, dolazi do čestih preklapanja između prave kulturne politike i kulture kao manifestacije, putem koje se demonstrira, ne samo upotrebna vrednost visoke umetnosti, već i simboličko prikazivanje relevantnim akterima da se „nešto vredno pažnje zapravo dešava [u svetu visoke umetnosti]“ (McGuigan 2004: 65).
- 10 Na ovom mestu značajno je naglasiti da se u ovde ne daje primat umetnosti nad drugim sferama stvaralaštva, naročito naučnog. U tom smislu se, preko kreativnih industrija, naučno stvaralaštvo može približiti i u prikazivanju prilagoditi široj publici, kao što je i slučaj u projektu predstavljanja praistorijskog čoveka iz Lepenskog vira, koji je izveden u okviru platforme „Srbija stvara“.

## Bibliografija

- Blic (2021) *Od pračoveka do najboljeg startapa*. 31. 12. 2021.
- Burdije, Pjer (1998) Društveni prostor i simbolička moć. U *Interpretativna sociologija*, ur. Ivana Spasić, 143–158. Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva.
- Castells, Manuel (2011) *The rise of the network society*. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.
- Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari (2005) *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Duda, Dean (2002) *Kulturalni studiji: ishodišta i problemi*. Zagreb: AGM.
- Dorđević, Jelena (1997) *Političke svetkovine i rituali*. Beograd: Dosije.
- Dorđević, Jelena (2009) *Postkultura*. Beograd: Clio.
- Fisk, Džon (2001) *Popularna kultura*. Beograd: Clio.
- Florida, Richard (2012) *The rise of the creative class – Revisited*. NYC, NY: Basic Books.
- Frey, Bruno (2003) *Arts and Economics: Analysis and Cultural Policy*. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer.
- Frey, Bruno (2008) What Values Should Count in the Arts? The Tension between Economic Effects and Cultural Value. In *Beyond Price. Value in Culture, Economics and the Arts*, eds. Michael Hutter & David Throsby, 261–269. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Hannonen, Olga (2020) In search of a digital nomad: defining the phenomenon. *Information Technology & Tourism* 22(3): 335–353.
- Harvey, David (1989) From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: The transformation in urban governance in late capitalism. *Geografiska Annaler B* 71(1): 3–17.
- Jessop, Bob (2001) Globalization and the Nation State. In *Urban Movements in the Globalizing World*, eds. Hamel, Pierre, Henri Lustiger-Thaler and Margit Mayer, XXXX. London: Routledge.
- Karvelyte, Kristina (2021) Culture as display revisited. *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 24(1): 141–156.
- McGuigan, Jim (2004) *Rethinking Cultural Policy*. Maidenhead: Open University.
- Nedeljnik (2021) Matic: Srbija je spremna za otvaranje Paviljona na Svetskoj izložbi „Ekspo 2020 Dubai”. Dostupno na: <https://www.nedeljnik.rs/matic-srbija-je-spremna-za-otvaranje-paviljona-na-svetskoj-izlozbi-ekspo-2020-dubai> (pristupljeno 24. 9. 2022).
- Popović, Mina (2017) The Roles and Practices of Fashion in Cultural Diplomacy. In *Cultural Diplomacy: Arts, Festivals and Geopolitics*, ed. Milena Dragičević Šešić (with Ljiljana Rogač Mijatović i Nina Mihaljinac). Beograd: Creative Europe Desk Serbia Ministry of Culture and Media of Republic of Serbia & Faculty of Dramatic Arts in Belgrade, Institute for Theatre Film Radio and Television, 251–262.
- Robertson, Roland (1992) *Globalization – Social Theory and Global Culture*. London: ThousandOaks and New Delhi: Sage.
- Rogač Mijatović, Ljiljana (2017) Implications of Multiple Identity Layers for Cultural Diplomacy of Serbia. In *Cultural Diplomacy: Arts, Festivals and Geopolitics*, ed. Milena Dragičević Šešić (with Ljiljana Rogač Mijatović i Nina Mihaljinac). Beograd: Creative Europe Desk Serbia Ministry of Culture and Media of Republic of Serbia & Faculty of Dramatic Arts in Belgrade, Institute for Theatre Film Radio and Television, 203–208.
- Simić, Marina (2014) Studije kulture i antropologija: sudar titana ili narcizam malih razlika? *Genero* 18: 89–108.
- Souidas, Dimitris and Philipp Katsinas (2022) *The political imaginary of happiness in Greece*. Athens: Institute for Alternative politics.
- Srbija stvara (2021) Dostupno na [www.serbiacreates.rs](http://www.serbiacreates.rs) (pristupljeno 24. 9. 2022).
- Strugar, Tanja (2017) Gastronomy as a Tool in Cultural Diplomacy and Nation Branding of Serbia. In *Cultural Diplomacy: Arts, Festivals and Geopolitics*, ed. Milena Dragičević Šešić (with Ljiljana Rogač Mijatović i Nina Mihaljinac). Beograd: Creative Europe Desk Serbia Ministry of Culture and Media of Republic of Serbia & Faculty of Dramatic Arts in Belgrade, Institute for Theatre Film Radio and Television, 241–249.
- Throsby, David (2000) *Economics and culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tylor, Edward Burnett (1958) *Primitive Culture: Researches Into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom*. Gloucester: Smith.
- Vagena, Akrivi (2022) *An upcoming destination for tourism investments, digital nomads and relocation: Greece*. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.31333.68324.van der Meer, Wim.

2015. *The Universalist Claims of Music History in the Absence of Postcolonial Theory*. Dostupno na: <https://culturalmusicology.org/uncategorized/the-universalist-claims-of-music-history-in-the-absence-of-postcolonial-theory> (pristupljeno 24. 9. 2022).

Večernje novosti (2021) *Od Vinče do Tesle i Pupina*. 4. 6. 2021.

Williams, Raymond (1958) *Culture is Ordinary*. Dostupno na: <http://artsites.ucsc.edu/faculty/gustafson/FILM%20162.W10/readings/Williams.Ordinary.pdf> (pristupljeno 24. 9. 2022).

Williams, Raymond (1960) *Culture and society: 1780–1950*. Garden City, NY: Anchor books.

Williams, Raymond (1984) State culture and beyond. In *Culture and the State*, ed. Lisa Appignanesi, 3–5. London: Institute of Contemporary Art, 3–5.

# КУЛТУРНА ДИПЛОМАТИЈА НА ВЕБ-ПРЕЗЕНТАЦИЈИ МИНИСТАРСТВА СПОЉНИХ ПОСЛОВА РЕПУБЛИКЕ СРБИЈЕ

НЕНАД А. ВАСИЋ

## Увод

Једна од важнијих могућности у савременом свету, међународним и дипломатским односима јесте помињање и појављивање званичника из државних институција у домену својих права, обавеза и одговорности и на интернету.<sup>1</sup> Вредно је помена да је Влада Републике Србије (Влада Републике Србије, 2022.) још деведесетих година 20. века имала свој веб-сајт.

Визуелни идентитет званичника једне државе је од великог значаја, јер све више људи користи савремене информационо-комуникационе технологије. То је утицало и на промене у дипломатији као и обављање спољних послова дипломата. У крајњем случају све то је имало утицај и на културну дипломатију.

Пишући уводник за темат часописа *Култура* о културној дипломатији, Александра Колаковић је констатовала, између осталог, и важност њеног утицаја (Колаковић 173/2021: 7) на људе. Укратко, људи праве културу. Употребом културе утиче се на људе. У нотронско доба (Brzezinski 1970) како га је назвао Збигњев Бжежински, а имајући у фокусу Сједињене Америчке Државе, или у дигитално доба што је што је најшире прихваћен појам, односно синтагма коју и ми активно користимо, појавила се као резултат или консеквенца и реперкусија и дигитална трансформација. У овом контексту честе су промене садржаја на интернету као



медијуму чиме се, између осталог, врши дигитална трансформација.<sup>2</sup> Тим поводом користе се различити комуникациони канали: веб-сајтови, имејл (e-mail), Live Chat, Inbox, SMS, Viber & Whats Up Instant Messaging, Твитер (Twitter), Инстаграм, Телеграм, Бот, пуш нотификација, телефон. У суштини, друштвене мреже нису дигитална трансформација, али је зато њихов контекст или начин на који се употребљавају свакако јесте. Дигитална трансформација није ни ИТ сектор као такав, већ процес који је на веб-сајту обавља. Дигитална трансформација није ни коришћење техника и разних алата, већ начини како се мењају различити презентовани материјали на веб-сајту. Дигитална трансформација је зацело и промена статистике посета веб-сајту уколико се користи кантер ради тачне мерљивости присуства корисника који га посећују. Некада се дигитална трансформација обавља набоље, а некада се и назадује или имамо *statu quo* до прве промене у креираном материјалу и потоњем објављивању.

## Савремена културна дипломатија и нови медији

Иако је култура саставни и неизоставни део дипломатске делатности људи, културна сарадња и (Стојковић, 2/2010: 664) културна дипломатија<sup>3</sup> су достигнуће модерног људског доба и савремене културе. „Културна дипломатија доказује да данас, више него икада раније, култура игра виталну улогу у међународним односима“ (Bound, Briggs, Holden, Jones 2007: 11). При том, културна дипломатија је део „јавне дипломатије“ (Bound, Briggs, Holden, Jones 2007: 12). У том контексту културе, савремени међународни односи су и међународни културни односи (Шобе и Мартен 2014).

Да би се водила успешна, флексибилна и ефикасна културна дипломатија, као део јавне дипломатије, потребан је стратешки план и програм који је спољнополитички одржив и практично примењив. У класичној, традиционалној и модерној дипломатији све се своди на моћ, примењивање и афирмисање националних интереса, а у јавној дипломатији поред тога и на заједничке интересе, уз протежирање и културних интереса. Зато је културна дипломатија

врхунац дипломатије уопште. Такав је случај и са дипломатијом и културом Србије (Васић 2016: 238–263). Према Љиљани Рогач Мијатовић, што се тиче Србије постоји више слојева културног идентитета (Rogač Mijatović, 2017: 203), што има импликације и на нашу културну дипломатију. Са становишта савремене теорије и науке о политици, а користећи аргументацију и класификацију моћи Џосефа Наја, културну дипломатију сврставамо у меку моћ (Nye 2004; Melissen 2005) – *Soft Power*, за разлику од тврде моћи – *Hard Power*. Важно је напоменути да постоји и *Ernst and Young* модел за анализу индекса (*Rapid-growth markets soft power index*, 2012: 4–22) меке моћи којег користи поменута консултантска кућа. Иначе, поменути *Ernst and Young* модел, усвојио је оправдано и Факултет политичких наука Универзитета у Београду.

Дакле, културна дипломатија у међународним односима представља тип меке моћи јер садржи моћ привлачних идеја комбинованих са стратешким пројектима националних влада до конкретног утицаја на одржив развој културе и цивилизације. Стога, културна дипломатија укључује и одржавање мира, све форме легалне сарадње, поштовање људских права и спровођење закона кроз владавину права, финансије и трансфере капитала, примање и слање међународних информација, све до културне, уметничке, омладинске и научне размене. Основни елементи културне дипломатије су „људи, односно народ, култура, држава и дипломатија” (Васић 2009: 5).

Поред тога што је део јавне дипломатије, културна дипломатија је и вештина уверавања дипломата кроз идеје, културу и вредносне принципе, у односу на супротну дипломатску страну. У суштини посла сваког човека који се професионално бави дипломатијом јесте његова пословна култура. Међутим, основна и професионална делатност културног дипломате је да се, поред сопствене културе, бави културном дипломатијом и културом других народа.

Културна дипломатија је активан (када се припрема) и динамичан (када се примењује) спољнополитички процес где културне дипломате, као званични представници своје државе у некој од држава пријема, на билатералном или мултилатералном нивоу међународних културних односа заступају и промовишу националне

културне институције, организације или појединце односно њихове креативне индустрије<sup>4</sup> и културни капитал (Фимон, 2007: 79). Ту свакако подразумевамо и досегнути вредносни ниво људских, али и културних права типичних за савремене демократске државе, владавину права и цивилну културу отвореног друштва, уз препознатљив културни идентитет као *differentia specifica* у односу на остале.

Са проналаском компјутера, као новог техничког и информатичког изума и интернета, према Бојану Јовановићу, људска цивилизација је у транзицији (Јовановић, 2004), а тиме и дипломатија, па и културна дипломатија. Ту цивилизацијску транзицију несумњиво историјски обележавају Јохан Гутенберг и Вилијам Хенри Гејтс. Налазимо се у технотронском добу људске цивилизације и културе.

Садашња научна, електронска и техничка револуција са генијима који су проналазачи и директни проносиоци, у синергији са представницима политичких власти, економским и културним центрима моћи, протежирају информатичку технологију и пролиферацију чији је израз технички изум познат под именом компјутер. И компјутер, уз помоћ мреже, постаје медијум за комуницирање, па самим тим и дипломатско комуницирање.

## Културна дипломатија на интернету

У целини узевши, култура, уметност, медији и дипломатија су важни елементи у владавини државних званичника, али и у политичким процесима и међународним односима. То се односи и на Републику Србију као државу и грађанско друштво културних размена са различитим традицијама. Култура, дипломатија и медији су не само тема већ и материја укупне државне политике коју креирају, промовишу и спроводе власти, пре свега националне владе, уз подршку парламента, а преко министарстава спољних послова и министарства културе, укључујући ту и председнике држава, у стратешкој спољној политици и међународним односима. Култура и уметност су често присутни на специјализованим

веб-сајтовима и веб-презентацијама као и културно наслеђе, што је веома позитиван савремени тренд. Несумњив допринос културној размени и културном туризму дају такође и туристи чији број расте. Додатно, расте и број веб-сајтова са могућношћу виртуелних посета са навигацијом различитим културним садржајима који се презентују уметничке галерије, музеји и локалитети из археологије и историје цивилизације.

Важно је напоменути да се унутар рачунарске мреже налазе и локалне, регионалне, глобалне мреже. Информатички истем рачунарских мрежа омогућава слободну размену информација између повезаних рачунара и отуда је она важан извор и ресурс за културну дипломатију. При томе, на мрежу се могу прикључити разноврсни рачунари, а највећи број информација и сервиса на њој је бесплатан за све кориснике. Кориснички сервиси који се налазе на интернету деле се на: основне, јавне, комерцијалне, претраживачке и сигурносне. Свакако, од свих њих најпопуларнији и најкоришћенији сервис на интернету је *Светом раширена мрежа* (*World Wide Web*), односно WWW (Hamilton 2005: 4). WWW, World Wide Web, W3, или укратко Web (на српском: мрежа) је систем међусобно повезаних, хипертекстуалних докумената, који се налазе на интернету. Заправо, светом раширена мрежа настала је захваљујући информатичким и техничким истраживањима два знаменита научника који су радили на пројекту ЦЕРН у Женеви 1993. године. Није исправно да се WWW поистовећује са интернетом јер је то само једна од услуга коју је могуће добити на интернету.

WWW се може користити и у сврху нове врсте цивилне дипломатије, од раније познате као non official diplomats (Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess 1997: 1). Дакле, сасвим је неспорно да WWW има, између осталог, и потенцијал за грађанску дипломатију. У овом контексту, поставља се питање ко све сачињава сектор цивилне дипломатије? Послужићемо се овом приликом одговором који су дали Гај и Хајди Бурџес. „Тако, цивилна дипломатија укључује, на пример религиозне лидере, медијаторе, чланове *advokacy groups*, политичких група, хуманитарне олакшавајуће организације, невладине мировне тимове, commercial interests, академце, студенте и подједнако туристе“ (Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess 1997: 1-2). Иначе, важно је напоменути да овај информатички сервис даје

могућност коришћења неограниченог броја мрежно повезаних докумената, који указују један на други уз помоћ методе познате као „сурфовање“.

## **Веб-презентације Министарства спољних послова 2013. и 2022. године – једно поређење за напредну поуку**

Приоритет и један од стубова у спољној политици Владе Републике Србије је Европска унија као међународна организација *sui generis* са међународним правним субјективитетом, с циљем интеграције државе Републике Србије у њу. Култура, према Љиљани Рогач Мијатовић, има важно место и улогу у спољним односима Европске уније (Рогач Мијатовић 173/2021: 9). Такав је случај и са Министарством спољних послова Републике Србије. Многе активности у вези с тим и целине спровођења спољне политике и дипломатије спроводи то већ поменуто. Свакако, једно од неколико ресорних министарстава у Влади Републике Србије које има континуитет у веб-презентацији на интернету јесте Министарство спољних послова Републике Србије. У делу опције Вести, налазила се подопција са линком који омогућава отворен приступ веб-страници са списком свих ресорних министарстава.

Министарство спољних послова (у даљем тексту – МСП) на веб-презентацији из 2013. у опцији *Контакт*, а која се тиче релевантних контакт информација, имао је своју институционалну адресу са улицом и бројем, затим број телефона и факса као и веб-локацију, имејл и јасно истакнуто радно време по средњоевропској временској зони. У опцији *Контакт информације*, налазиле су се и: 1) Прес-сервис МСП, 2) Одељење за конзуларне послове, 3) Одељење за визну политику и 4) Одељење за миграциону политику, дијаспору и социјалне споразуме. Сва поменута одељења имају бројеве телефона и имејл адресе. Са десне стране од централне горње платформе, налазио се и девети банер, одозго надолу, са уметничком графиком розете изнад које се налазио натпис: Културна

дипломатија. У опцији – Културна дипломатија, са леве горње стране налазиле су се три подопције: 1) Пројекти, 2) Међународне манифестације у Србији и 3) Важна догађања. У подопцији *Пројекти*, био је наведен само један пројекат који реализују у МСП: Пројекат „Свет у Србији“. У подопцији *Међународне манифестације у Србији* таксативно су наведене међународне манифестације из области културе које се остварују у Републици Србији, и то: а) Музички и позоришни фестивали, б) Манифестације у области књижевности, в) Манифестације у области визуелне уметности и г) Међународне дечје манифестације. Најзад, у подопцији *Културна догађања* наведени су неки, културни догађаји у иностранству, а у вези са Републиком Србијом (МСП, 2013.).

За разлику од веб-сајта из 2013, актуелни веб-сајт Министарства спољних послова Владе Републике Србије из 2022. године није, са становишта веб-дизајна, садржајан ни по материјалима, ни по естетици. Актуелни веб-сајт МСП нема много тога: посебну опцију на менију – културна дипломатија; 2–3. јуна 2022. била су само четири садржаја материјала у презентацији, од којих се три тичу активности ресорног министра спољних послова Србије Николе Селаковића,<sup>5</sup> и још један садржај материјала амбасадора Јасминка Поздерца (Доха: Амбасадор Поздерац за „ГПД Нетворк“ о Србији и везама с Катаром, 2021) његов превод интервјуа који је дао за *Global Public Diplomacy Network Qatar* од 14. јануара 2021.

Што се тиче централне платформе веб-сајта, МСП поред осталих има и опцију *Медији* (Медији, 2022). Кликом на њу, појављује се осам подопција у садржају од којих је седма *Друштвене мреже* (Друштвене мреже, 2022). Даљим кликом на подопцију Друштвене мреже појављују се два графичка знака: Јутјуб и Твитер.

Дакле, веб-сајт ресорног Министарства спољних послова Републике Србије требало би унапредити и садржински, визуелно и уврстити културну дипломатију свакако као посебну опцију. Исти случај требало би да буде и са економском дипломатијом као нашом добром праксом, али и европском и светском.

## Завршно разматрање

Неспорно је да је културна дипломатија важна у савременом свету. Поред тога, веома велики значај има и то да би више културних, уметничких и аудио-визуелних садржаја у вези са спољним пословима и дипломатијом требало да буде видљивије на интернету. С тим у вези, могли бисмо извести ове закључке:

Свака веб-презентација и дигитална трансформација на интернету је важна, јер може да се брзо, прегледно и лако претражује.

Стара веб-презентација ресорног Министарства спољних послова Владе Републике Србије из 2013. имала је савремени дизајн, била прегледна и имала је квалитетне и атрактивне садржаје у сектору јавне дипломатије за разлику од садашње, 2022. године, тако да бележимо неспорно назадовање у томе, а што би свако требало променити бар на достигнути ниво старог веб-сајта, уз повећавање и боље праћење културних догађаја и активности, државних званичника и културних посланика.

Стара веб-презентација културне дипломатије садржала је елементе међународних активности МСП у иностранству, али и у држави Републици Србији, што је случај и са садашњом веб-сајтом МСП Владе Републике Србије у домену дигиталне трансформације.

Стари веб-сајт МСП, и поред свих неспорних квалитета, нарочито у домену културне дипломатије, није био ажуриран од 28. августа 2012, закључно са 31. децембром 2013. – до када је последња наша анализа обављена, што је недопустиво и неприхватљиво понашање запослених људи у сектору Информационих технологија МСП Владе Републике Србије, а што је такође случај и са садашњом веб-презентацијом МСП Владе Републике Србије која се такође нередовно одржава и надопуњава.

Са становишта међународних односа и дипломатије потребно је да се, поред културе, и уметност помиње и истиче као важни елемент националног идентитета, али и део препознатљивости и брендирања наше државе, што је 2013. године било урађено, а сада, 2022. године, не постоји.

Бивша веб-презентација Министарства спољних послова Владе Републике Србије садржала је 2013. године у менију опцију *Културна*

*дипломаџија*, по први пут као део спољне политике и јавне дипломатије, коју су спроводиле дипломате са културним посленицима, а што није случај 2022. године, и то би требало променити.

Култура, а посебно активности посвећене културном наслеђу и културној дипломатији МСП Владе Републике Србије, уколико нема адекватну и правовремену презентацију на званичном веб-сајту умањиваће посећеност због неправовременог обавештавања људи о организованим, међународним културним манифестацијама, и у Србији и у иностранству. Поред тога, културно наслеђе требало би да се помиње у званичној презентацији МСП Владе Републике Србије како би било видљивије и препознатљивије ради његовог афирмисања и такође даљег унапређења културних, уметничких и аудио-визуелних садржаја, али и информатичке и техничке подршке.

## Напомене

- 1 О интернету види: Hamilton 2005: 4; Стојановић 2005.
- 2 У овоме раду појам дигитална трансформација, препозната је, схваћена и одређена свака промена садржаја презентованих материјала на интернету као што су веб-сајт, друштвене мреже и подкаст употребом информационе технике, ради боље видљивости, препознатљивости и тачне информисаности посетилаца – читалаца, гледалаца или слушалаца.
- 3 У овом раду, појам односно синтагма културна дипломатија препозната је, схваћена и одређена као део јавне дипломатије и представља скуп националних интереса, спољнополитичких мера и предузетих активности које спроводи човек – културни дипломата у функцији општег добра, и људи на пољу културе и уметности односно подстицању културних индустрија и промоцији културног капитала, с циљем постизања или исправљања и унапређења имиџа народа, културе и државе у иностранству.
- 4 Креативне индустрије представљају спој креативних уметности то јест талента човека, са новом економијом знања (поред стицања потребног знања интенција се ставља на развијање способности) и новим медијским технологијама, а који су исказани кроз њихову креативност, инвентивност и производњу нових културних добара уз очување или по уоченој потреби, редефинисање постојећег система вредности демократског друштва и грађана као потрошача. У овом контексту важна је и напомена Џона Хартлија. „Сигурно је да концепт ‘креативних индустрија’ комбинује – а затим и радикално мења – два старија термина: *креативне* уметности и културне



индустрије. Ова промена је значајна јер доводи уметност (односно културу) у директан контакт са индустријама великих размера као што су забавни медији (односно са тржиштем)“ (Хартли 2007: 12–13).

- 5 Види о томе: Интервју министра Селаковића за љубљански дневник „Дело“, 2021. (Селаковић: Радићемо организовано на враћању културној блату, 2021; Министри Селаковић и Гојковић о сарадњи министарства у области културне и јавне дипломатије, 2021).

## Библиографија

- Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1970). *Between Two Ages – America's Role in the Technetronic Era*. New York: Viking Canada.
- Bound Kirsten, Briggs Rachel, Holden John, Jones Samuel (2007). *Cultural Diplomacy*. London: Demos.
- Burgess Guy, Burgess Heidi (1997). *The World-Wide-Web: Atool for Building Citizen Diplomacy Skills*. Washington, D.C.: The United States Institute of Peace. April 1, 2.
- Васић, Ненад А. (2009). „Културна дипломатија – прилог заснивању српске културне дипломатије“, у: (уредник)Видоје Голубовић, *Очување и заштити културној наслеђа Србије у иностранству*. Београд: Институт за међународну политику и привреду.
- Васић, Ненад А. (2016). „Дипломатија и култура Србије“, у: (уредници)Бранислав Ђорђевић и Видоје Голубовић, *Дипломатија и култура Србије: сјаје и перспективе*. Београд: Институт за међународну политику и привреду.
- Влада Републике Србије. Доступно на: <https://www.srbija.gov.rs/> [30. 5. 2022].
- Интернет. Доступно на: <http://sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%98%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%82> [31. 12. 2013].
- Јовановић, Бојан (2004). *Цивилизација у транзицији: од Маклуана до Била Гејтса*. Цетиње: Дигнитас.
- Колаковић, Александра (2021). „Култура и дипломатија“, у: *Култура – часопис за теорију и социологију културе и културне политике*, бр. 173. Београд: Завод за проучавање културног развитака.
- Melissen, Jan (2005). *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Министарство спољних послова Републике Србије. Доступно на: <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/kulturne-manifestacije?lang=cyr> [31. 12. 2013].
- Министарство спољних послова Републике Србије. Доступно на: <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/kulturna-dogadjanja?lang=cyr> [1. 6. 2022].
- Милинковић Фимон, Драган (2007) Увод у економику културе. Београд: Институт економских наука/Београдска банкарска академија.
- Nye, Joseph S., Jr. (2004). *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs, New York.

Rapid-growth markets soft power index (2012). London: Ernst & Young.

Рогач Мијатовић, Љиљана (2021). „Култура у спољним односима Европске уније: ка новој парадигми културне дипломатије?“ у: *Култура* – часопис за теорију и социологију културе и културне политике, бр. 173. Београд: Завод за проучавање културног развитка.

Rogač Mijatović, Ljiljana (2017). Implications of Multiple Identity Layers for Cultural Diplomacy of Serbia, in: Edited by Milena Dragičević Šešić, *CULTURAL DIPLOMACY: Arts, Festivals and Geopolitics*. Belgrade: Creative Europe Desk Serbia, Ministry of Culture and Media of Republic of Serbia/Faculty of Dramatic Arts in Belgrade, Institute for Theatre Film Radio and Television.

Стојановић, Драган (2005). *Интернет: Веб приручник – Outlook Express, Internet Explorer, HTML, Front Page, Dreamweaver*. Београд: Логос арт/Светионик.

Стојковић, Бранимир (2010). *Полишка агенције, културна дипломатија и културна разноликост*, у: *Комуникације, медији, култура*, Годишњак Факултета за културу и медије Мегатренд универзитета у Београду. Бр. 2.

Hamilton, John (2005). *Internet*. Minnesota: ABDO Publishing Company.

Хартли, Џон (2007). *Креативне индустрије*, у: (приредио) Џон Хартли, *Креативне индустрије*. Београд: Клио.

Шобе Франсоа, Мартен Лорен (2014). *Међународни културни односи*. Клио: Београд.

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY AND CULTURAL RELATIONS  
COLLABORATION/ DIVERSITY / DIALOGUE

KULTURNA DIPLOMATIJA I KULTURNI ODNOSI  
SARADNJA / RAZNOLIKOST / DIJALOG

*edited by / urednice*

Milena Dragičević Šešić, Raphaela Henze, Ljiljana Rogač Mijatović

*publishers / izdavači*

University of Arts in Belgrade / Univerzitet umetnosti u Beogradu

Clio publishing house, Belgrade

*in collaboration with / u saradnji sa*

Heilbronn University/ Univerzitetom u Hajlbronu

*for publishers / za izdavače*

Mirjana Nikolić

Zoran Hamović

*proofreading / lektura*

Paul Muray

Slavica Uzelac

*cover design / dizajn korice*

Aleksandra Jovanić

*preprint / priprema za štampu*

Dejan Tasić

ISBN 978-86-7167-066-1

*print run / tiraž*


300

*print / štampa*

River Print, Beograd







It is not common to find a compendium of articles that, from a critical perspective, away from the mundane interests of soft power, analyze the plural reality of international cultural relations. Its value lies in the complementarity and diversity of the views included, where beyond the expected view from the Western Balkans, experiences from many other parts of the world are collected. I enthusiastically recommend reading it.

**Lluís Bonet, University of Barcelona**

All scholars, policymakers, and cultural managers interested in understanding ongoing debates in cultural diplomacy and cultural relations from new perspectives should read this book. Its chapters examine the continuities between several challenges facing cultural diplomacy and cultural relations today as well as historical and recent developments in a wide number of contexts – ranging from Austria and Serbia to Canada, China, Cuba, and Bangladesh among others. Moreover, the book's contributors establish links between cultural diplomacy and relations and broader topics such as artistic freedom, digital diplomacy, and calls for restitution. In doing so, the book provides a fresh examination of the interrelations between policy and practice in this field.

**Mafalda Dâmaso, Erasmus University Rotterdam**

From the rich material collected in this book, it is evident that international cultural relations and the promotion of a country do not only take place in the sphere of international communication, but that a whole series of elements of cultural policy at the local or national level are important for achieving international visibility of a country and establishing dialogue, so the authors touch in their analyses of cultural festivals, exhibitions, living and working conditions of artists, freedom of artistic expression, or cultural industries, etc. The authors advocate for the construction of those instruments of dialogue and cooperation that lead to the true acceptance of the culture of others and critically reflect on the instrumentalization of culture for the purpose of propaganda of certain centers of power.

**Aleksandra Uzelac, Institute for Development and International Relations IRMO, Zagreb**

Culture and the arts are today, as never before, a driving force in international relations. This book is a major contribution to understanding the dynamics by which culture is instrumentalised in an evolving global arena. Covering a wide range of issues – including the restitution of heritage appropriated in the colonial period and the international strategies of subnational states – this book is a must-read for those interested in internationalisation from an intercultural perspective.

**Federico Escribal, Universidad Nacional de las Artes, Buenos Aires**